I meant his campaigns in the western part of the Achemenid Empire, with pretty much known lands, relatively easy supply, etc.How was his champaign in Central Asia or India logistically favorable?
Certainly so : that Alexander was a great tactician is pretty much an understatement. But I note that even Alexander had significant troubles as he entered India, and not all due to the land being largely unknown.And he still went undefeated. Im not saying he was unbeatable but he has a really impressive track record.
Oh, I'm far being an expert myself on this : I just wanted to advise caution as we know really little of Alexander's ambitions beyond restoring the Achemenid Empire at his benefit. I suspect that, eventually, he made them along his progress.I willingly acknowledge that I dont consider myself an expert of ancient history and accept your point here.
Again, I agree but I'm not sure what Alexander would have done on this regard : as much of an unmatched tactician he was, he didn't demonstrated great logistical skills. He could learn, of course, as he matures but it would ask for resolve part of the issues being a statesman : maybe building up roads and supply posts along the Iranian plateau for instance, basically making up for the harsh ground he would encounter. That he didn't really did something like this, or rather actually planned something, in his return trail to Babylone would make me think it wasn't his priority.I dont think it impossible that if he prepared for an Indian champaign he would take at least consideration of logistical preparation in to account.
Tactically, the Battle of the Hydaspe was clearly a great Alexandrine victory : prevting Poros to conentrate his troops, depriving him of cavalry at the start of the battle and efficiently using javelineers in the midst of phalanges against Elephants. There's nothing pointing that Alexander would have to loose similar battles as he did after this one up to the Bias river. But the losses IOTL were really important, and Alexander had to fight minor kingdoms only at this point. At the very least, Mauryas would make him pay for any of tactical victories he would pull : the risk for Alexander to go too deep in India and turn his expedition as an anticipation of Napoleon's campaign in Russia is real.and that he come up with counter strategies of what he encountered in india the first time.
As you said, the problem isn't tactical (altough Chandragupta would be more than able to pull something out of his sleeve himself, even if probably not as brightly, especially as he kept contact with Greeks advisors IOTL) but strategical. If Mauryas pull a scorched earth policy, Alexander would be in a really problematic position, as he would depend on supply he would find in India.
I'd say relatively fresh : crossing Iranian plateau wouldn't be a promenade. Of course, ITTL, it would be fresher than the previous attempt, and completed with Indian troops, so it's to be relativized : but logistical lines would still be particularily extended : the best solution I could think of would be a maritime supply trough Red Sea.Also a fresh army instead of one after a very long champaign. I also think that he will retain a core of veterans and his very experienced and proven officers.
On the other hand, we'd have a fresh, really important army (Chandragupta's army would be dwarfing what Poros had to oppose Alexander, and that was really no easy prey) close to its supply lines.
Mostly because Maurya's army would have a direct access to these ressources, and that Alexander would have to rely on long logistical lines or looting, the first being costly, the second being quite vulnerable to scorched earth tactics, something that weakened skilled commanders since Antiquity.How is it that for Maurya its relevant that he has a very rich and populated country and for Alexander less so?
Don't get me wrong : a new Alexander's campaign in India up to the Gangetic plain would have consequences : but militarily; it does simply not depends on tactics alone.