It's surprising to learn that one of the first pieces of " what if" speculative history was by the Roman writer Livy on the hypothetical outcome of a war between Alexander the great and his army (who decided not to go East but West to Italy) and the forces of the Roman republic at the time.
http://www.shsu.edu/~his_ncp/Livy2.html
He reaches to conclusion that, given the huge amount of resources and manpower available to Rome, the comparatively small size of the Macedonian army and Rome's ability to withstand military catastrophes would eventually lead to Rome's victory. But is this strategic assessment correct?
Well firstly, lets look at manpower and the size of each army. Livy in this piece reckons the total manpower of Rome at the time ( taken from surveys done during the period) was roughly 250,000 men, citing that during the Latin wars a full 10 legions could be deployed from city levy, with 4 or 5 legions deployed throughout Italy ( though the accuracy of this assessment is unsure.) . Let us also factor in Romes allies, the Sabine's, Volscans, Latins, Aequians, Umbria, parts of Etruria as well as several other mentioned tribes. Potential allies of a Macedonian expeditionary such as the Samnites or the Greeks of Cumae and Neopolis had recently been crushed or bound by treaties to Rome.
However, the loyalty of these allies to Rome was in many cases dubious to the extreme, with many possibly seeking to abandon Rome should she suffer a major defeat. Also bear in mind that Rome had recently come out of a drawn out and exhausting war with the Samnites as well as being forced to dissipate her armies throughout her territory to keep her "allies" in check. By looking at the size of an average Roman army during the then recent Samnite wars, the average size of a Roman army was 25-30,000 men.
Alexanders force on the other hand would be much smaller overall, with perhaps 20-25,000 heavy infantry, 20,000 peltasts and roughly 5-600 cavalry, mostly his companion and Thessalonian cavalry. A total of 50,000 men in all, with perhaps several thousand more reinforcements arriving later on. This leaves him at a infantry advantage, but a considerable cavalry advantage.
Now to the troop quality. Here the Macedonian's have the edge, with many of the Phalanx pikemen being veterans of Philips and more recently, Alexanders campaign against the Greeks. The cavalry was also elite, with its core being the Companion cavalry, noblemen loyal to Alexander personally and many of them had fought along side him for several years before hand. He also had at his disposal powerful light infantry from Illyria and Thrace. The phalanx at the time was a well oiled killing machine, that was not yet the top heavy death trap of later years, making it a deadly force when combined with cavalry. However, it was not as flexible as Roman troops and liable to being outflanked and surrounded. Attrition would also sap moral faster then the Romans, who would be fighting on their own soil.
The roman force was not the post Marian killing machine we imagine of later years, but rather a mixture of Samnite and Greek influence. Many men still fought in a phalanx , though Roman commanders were then adapting the way of fighting of their samnite enemies, making them more flexible. Hastati, the fittest men in the city, made up the front lines. They were supported by Principes who would add support, while Triarii ( the veterans) would act as reserves. All these men were armed with Javelins and short stabbing swords ( not yet Gladius though) that were perfect for close quarters combat. Most would be green, but many were veterans of the Samnite wars. They lacked a strong cavalry contingent however.
Livy also points out, correctly, that Alexander was a superior commander, though many Roman commanders at the time, including Quintus Fabius Maximus ( not be confused with the creator of the Fabian strategy in the Punic wars) , Marcus Valerius Corvus and Caius Marcius Rutilus to name a few were all experienced commanders.
Livy comes to the same conclusion as I: That like Hannibal or Pyrrhus of Epirus, Alexander would likely win the first few battles and inflict severe casualties on the Roman forces, but ultimately lack the forces to successfully capture Rome itself and eventually be forced to withdraw due to attrition or face defeat. He could win battles, but not win the war.
But what is your opinion?
http://www.shsu.edu/~his_ncp/Livy2.html
He reaches to conclusion that, given the huge amount of resources and manpower available to Rome, the comparatively small size of the Macedonian army and Rome's ability to withstand military catastrophes would eventually lead to Rome's victory. But is this strategic assessment correct?
Well firstly, lets look at manpower and the size of each army. Livy in this piece reckons the total manpower of Rome at the time ( taken from surveys done during the period) was roughly 250,000 men, citing that during the Latin wars a full 10 legions could be deployed from city levy, with 4 or 5 legions deployed throughout Italy ( though the accuracy of this assessment is unsure.) . Let us also factor in Romes allies, the Sabine's, Volscans, Latins, Aequians, Umbria, parts of Etruria as well as several other mentioned tribes. Potential allies of a Macedonian expeditionary such as the Samnites or the Greeks of Cumae and Neopolis had recently been crushed or bound by treaties to Rome.
However, the loyalty of these allies to Rome was in many cases dubious to the extreme, with many possibly seeking to abandon Rome should she suffer a major defeat. Also bear in mind that Rome had recently come out of a drawn out and exhausting war with the Samnites as well as being forced to dissipate her armies throughout her territory to keep her "allies" in check. By looking at the size of an average Roman army during the then recent Samnite wars, the average size of a Roman army was 25-30,000 men.
Alexanders force on the other hand would be much smaller overall, with perhaps 20-25,000 heavy infantry, 20,000 peltasts and roughly 5-600 cavalry, mostly his companion and Thessalonian cavalry. A total of 50,000 men in all, with perhaps several thousand more reinforcements arriving later on. This leaves him at a infantry advantage, but a considerable cavalry advantage.
Now to the troop quality. Here the Macedonian's have the edge, with many of the Phalanx pikemen being veterans of Philips and more recently, Alexanders campaign against the Greeks. The cavalry was also elite, with its core being the Companion cavalry, noblemen loyal to Alexander personally and many of them had fought along side him for several years before hand. He also had at his disposal powerful light infantry from Illyria and Thrace. The phalanx at the time was a well oiled killing machine, that was not yet the top heavy death trap of later years, making it a deadly force when combined with cavalry. However, it was not as flexible as Roman troops and liable to being outflanked and surrounded. Attrition would also sap moral faster then the Romans, who would be fighting on their own soil.
The roman force was not the post Marian killing machine we imagine of later years, but rather a mixture of Samnite and Greek influence. Many men still fought in a phalanx , though Roman commanders were then adapting the way of fighting of their samnite enemies, making them more flexible. Hastati, the fittest men in the city, made up the front lines. They were supported by Principes who would add support, while Triarii ( the veterans) would act as reserves. All these men were armed with Javelins and short stabbing swords ( not yet Gladius though) that were perfect for close quarters combat. Most would be green, but many were veterans of the Samnite wars. They lacked a strong cavalry contingent however.
Livy also points out, correctly, that Alexander was a superior commander, though many Roman commanders at the time, including Quintus Fabius Maximus ( not be confused with the creator of the Fabian strategy in the Punic wars) , Marcus Valerius Corvus and Caius Marcius Rutilus to name a few were all experienced commanders.
Livy comes to the same conclusion as I: That like Hannibal or Pyrrhus of Epirus, Alexander would likely win the first few battles and inflict severe casualties on the Roman forces, but ultimately lack the forces to successfully capture Rome itself and eventually be forced to withdraw due to attrition or face defeat. He could win battles, but not win the war.
But what is your opinion?
