Alexander Karinsky pulls out of World War I

Alexander Karinsky was the leader of a provisional Russian government that came into power after Tsar Nicholas II abdicated his throne and the Romanov dynasty came to an end. He was a democratic leader, but the death of his government came from his decision to continue fighting World War I, a war which was extremely unpopular with the Russian masses. He was then overthrown and replaced with Vladimir Lenin, who created the Soviet Union.

So what if Karinsky decided to sue for peace with the Germans and pull Russia out of the war?
 
To quote a recent post of mine:

The PG should have avoided the July Offensive, but leaving the war at that point was almost out of the question. Everyone assumed that it would lead to a German victory (the Yanks weren't coming for many months) and a victorious Germany, it was thought, would proceed to dismember Russia and destroy everything won by the Revolution. If Kerensky had attempted a Brest-Litovsk in the summer of 1917, the Bolsheviks would be the first to cry "Treason!" and "sell-out to German imperialism!" (Of course they were in favor of peace, they would explain, but one with the German workers and soldiers, not with the Kaiser; and if reminded that the German workers and soldiers were not in power, the Bolsheviks would reply that if Russia got rid of its bourgeois-government-with-moderate-socialist-window-dressing, a German revolution was sure to follow soon...)
 
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As I've pointed out before, if Kerensky tried to make a separate peace with Germany on anything like Brest-Litovsk terms, he would not only lose the support of the moderate socialists and Kadets (in other words, the only parties that supported him) but the Bolsheviks would be the very first to cry "treason!" and "sell-out to German imperialism!"
How did that not happen to the Bolsheviks when they did it?
 
By that time, the further disintegration of the Russian army had made it clear that any further resistance to the Germans would be futile. This was not nearly as clear in 1917. And for all that, Left SR opponents of the peace almost *did* overthrow Lenin in 1918.
So what would've happened had the Bolsheviks tried to overthrow Karinsky in 1917 while the army was mostly intact, as you say?
 
The Provisional Government also didn't have the political cover within their own coalition to make a peace offer, as I understand it; they were too dependent on Entente recognition, among other things, and that was obviously contingent on staying in the war.

So what would've happened had the Bolsheviks tried to overthrow Karinsky in 1917 while the army was mostly intact, as you say?

They hadn't taken over the Petrograd Soviet, which was still run by a Menshevik until September, so I think they fail.
 
So what would've happened had the Bolsheviks tried to overthrow Karinsky in 1917 while the army was mostly intact, as you say?

In the first several months of 1917, the Bolsheviks, though growing in strength, were still far from a majority even in the soviets. It took all sorts of missteps and misfortunes by the Provisional Government--the summer offensive, the Kornilov affair, etc.--before the success of a Bolshevik coup could be assured.
 
In the first several months of 1917, the Bolsheviks, though growing in strength, were still far from a majority even in the soviets. It took all sorts of missteps and misfortunes by the Provisional Government--the summer offensive, the Kornilov affair, etc.--before the success of a Bolshevik coup could be assured.
Would there have been other threats to Karinsky's power after a failed Bolshevik coup, such as the moderate socialists or the Kadets?
 
Not going on the offensive would be good. I think negotiating a peace treaty would be better.
Not supplying the Bolsheviks with weapons would be good too.
I suspect that if there was peace with the Germans, Lenin would not have been sent by the Germans to Russia.
I think without the war the Bolsheviks would have failed.

Kornilov affair
The Kornilov affair in August 1917 became the last nail in the coffin of the Provisional Government. Due to the extreme weakness of the government at this point, there was talk among the elites of bolstering its power by including the Commander-in-chief of Russian army Lavr Kornilov as a military dictator on the side of Kerensky. The extent to which this deal had indeed been accepted by all parties is still unclear. What is clear, however, is that when Kornilov's troops approached Petrograd, Kerensky branded them as counter-revolutionaries and demanded their arrest. This move can be seen as an attempt to bolster his own power by making him a defender of the revolution against a Napoleon-type figure. However, it had terrible consequences, as Kerensky's move was seen in the army as a betrayal of Kornilov, making them finally disloyal to the Provisional Government. Furthermore, as Kornilov's troops were arrested by the now armed Red Guard, it was the Soviet that was seen to have saved the country from military dictatorship. In order to defend himself and Petrograd, he provided the Bolsheviks with arms as he had little support from the army. When Kornilov did not attack Kerensky, the Bolsheviks did not return their weapons, making them a greater concern to Kerensky and the Provisional Government.

The Provisional Government was expected to rule until the Constituent Assembly later determined the form of government in Russia. On September 16, 1917, the country's legislature (the Duma) was officially dissolved by the newly created Directorate and the country was officially declared the Russian Republic[citation needed](Russian: Российская республика, translit. Rossiyskaya respublika), even though the state status as such occurred with the fall of the monarchy (Tsar's abdication).
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian_Provisional_Government
 
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As has been said already, Kerensky was in a lose-lose situation; many people wanted an end to the war, and soon - but pretty much no one wanted to accept the Central Powers' victory and seizure of territory. Even much later, in 1918, the Bolsheviks experienced a massive backlash when they signed the peace (a backlash from the right-wing, the center and the left-wing - remember the Left SR uprisings).

The Bolsheviks are not the only threat to Kerensky's power, especially if he pulls out of the war. There are the likes of Kornilov or Savinkov, although they would have preferred to rule alongside him, not to depose him. Then there's the last, democratic threat: Kerensky was a member of the most popular party in Russia, but he was not the SR leader, nor even really a major spokesman. Even if everything else goes fine and the Constitutional Assembly gathers in peace and strength, Kerensky will soon be politely voted out or relegated to a junior position.
 
But wouldn't he have been able to get much better terms than Brest-Litovsk if he'd opened negotiations before the string of OTL failures, that brought the Bolsheviks to power and made made B-L happen OTL? Would any kind of concessions really have resulted in his overthrow given that the war was clearly not going Russia's way?
 
IIRC Bot Lwow and Kerensky wanted to continue the war - against a majority of the population.

It would be interesting to explore what would have happened, if Lwow instantly after the February Revolution sought a peace /armistice with German. The first thing that comes to my mind is that Germany does not allow Lenin free passage - this would weaken the Bolshevik position with the Menscheviki being stronger.

Could it influence (delay?) the US declaration of war, if Germany and Russia announce an armistice in late March?
 
One issue with pulling out of the war would be the reactions of Britain and France. The western allies were giving Russia quite a bit of funding and that might be cut off in the event of a withdrawal, which wouldn't help the rather dire financial situation. The Provisional government also had the fear of a rightist coup or a "patriotic uprising" by the citizenry ( I'm not sure how plausible the first one is and the second is laughable but that was what was feared at the time). While Anti-War sentiment was rife among the general population, it was a different story with the political class- even some among the Bolsheviks wanted to keep fighting after they took power.
Avoiding the July Offensive would probably be enough to save the Provisional government, although it should be noted that it had several inherent weaknesses that might cause it to fall at a different date. Still, it wouldn't be the first government to survive despite it's weaknesses.
 

raharris1973

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I'd heard Prince Lvov and Emperor Karl were both interested in ending the war around the same time. Could they have synchronized their effort and made a fairly even-handed peace?
 
I'll recycle something I wrote some time ago about the extraordinary tenacity of Russia' moderate socialists on the war:

In December 1917 the Party of Socialist Revolutionaries held its Fourth Congress. The extreme left of the party had already defected to form the Left SR Party but there were still people of quite left-wing views at the Congress. One of them, Kogan-Bernstein, proposed that the forthcoming Constituent Assembly summon the Allies to begin peace talks without delay, and in the event of their refusal or failure to reply within a specified time limit, Russia would have a free hand. The resolution did not say how this freedom would be used, but it did at least imply separate action if not a separate peace. The resolution was voted down 72-52 with 32 abstentions. (Oliver Radkey, *The Sickle under the Hammer: the Russian Socialist Revolutionaries in the Early Months of Soviet Rule*, p. 192.) And this was after not only the disastrous summer offensive but the October insurrection! Yet *even then*, only one-third of the mainstream SRs were willing to demand tangible progress toward peace, even at the cost of breaking with the Allies. So how likely were they (or their similarly-minded Menshevik comrades) to do so several months earlier?

If there was anyone who just might have filled this role, it could have been Victor Chernov, leader of the left-center of the SRs, a man who had resigned from the PG protesting its dilatoriness on the issues of peace and land reform, and a man who was very popular in the Russian village. If only Chernov's faction of the SRs had either gained control of the party or formed their own party; if the Constituent Assembly elections had been held months earlier; if Chernov's backers had won; and if the Assembly had made Chernov Prime Minister of Russia, the country would at least have had a leader of greater legitimacy than Kerensky and perhaps more willing to confront the Allies. Chernov later claimed that while he had opposed a separate peace in 1917 he would have been willing to consider one as a last resort if the struggle for a general settlement had meant the immolation of Russia on the altar of the Allied cause. Unfortunately, Chernov's actual conduct during 1917--including during the Fourth Congress--was marked by constant compromising with the pro-war right-center of his party, and as Radkey remarks "if he could not see signs of immolation in the situation of December, 1917, then he would never see them." (p. 190)
 

trajen777

Banned
1. RPG offers peace feelers to Germany
2. Germany signs treaty less total than BL. Lith & Latvia to Germany or German Duchy & a Separate Poland (German control). Trade agreements in place for food stuffs etc.
3. France & England feel they can no longer win.
4. France and England sign treaty( No USA in site, Russia out) with Germany (starvation civil unrest, inability to get to England to win) mid 1917
5. The war ends like all previous Euro wars with minor adjustments
 

raharris1973

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The PG should have avoided the July Offensive,

I agree with this, and I would take it a step further. I think a defensive stance in Europe would have been the safer course, and that a continued offensive against their weakest opponent, the Ottomans, in Asia could have been viable and low risk. I think Milman and some others argued against, but I've heard morale and deference to officers' authority stayed high on the Caucasian front throughout 1917.
 

CaliGuy

Banned
I agree with this, and I would take it a step further. I think a defensive stance in Europe would have been the safer course, and that a continued offensive against their weakest opponent, the Ottomans, in Asia could have been viable and low risk. I think Milman and some others argued against, but I've heard morale and deference to officers' authority stayed high on the Caucasian front throughout 1917.
Milman?

Also, out of curiosity--would the lack of a U.S. entry into WWI (such as due to no German resumption of USW) have made the Russians more willing to make a separate peace with the Central Powers in 1917-1918?
 

Deleted member 94680

I don't think the Germans are going to want anything less than what they wanted at Brest-Litovsk. They had the upper hand and they knew it. The 'alternate Brest-Litovsk' would be similar in terms and territory, maybe minus Riga or the Kars Governate (with the slightly stronger Russian forces, the Germans can't take things for their allies as well) but overall it was a punishment for a totally defeated opponent.

The negotiations might drag on longer, but if Kerensky and Lvov want to end hostilities, they've got to take what the Germans are offering. The only other way to affect the offer is to launch an offensive, which is what they're trying to avoid in this scenario.
 

CaliGuy

Banned
I don't think the Germans are going to want anything less than what they wanted at Brest-Litovsk. They had the upper hand and they knew it. The 'alternate Brest-Litovsk' would be similar in terms and territory, maybe minus Riga or the Kars Governate (with the slightly stronger Russian forces, the Germans can't take things for their allies as well) but overall it was a punishment for a totally defeated opponent.

The negotiations might drag on longer, but if Kerensky and Lvov want to end hostilities, they've got to take what the Germans are offering. The only other way to affect the offer is to launch an offensive, which is what they're trying to avoid in this scenario.
AFAIK, though, Germany's peace offer to the Bolsheviks in December 1917 was much less severe than what the Bolsheviks got at Brest-Litovsk a couple of months later.
 
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