Al-Andalus: An Umayyad Caliphate backed by the mob

We've talked about Al-Andalus in the past, but...

It's been observed that Al-Andalus was the most "European" of the Islamic states; usually this is observed in the context of its primitive nature (the lack of an adequate tax base, the small size of its cities, the decision to reward grants of lands as opposed to revenues to the initial conquerors, etc.) But there are a few times which seem to be more analogous.

Al-Andalus, in some ways, reminds me of northern Italy or the low countries, where you saw urban militias able to defeat traditional European armies, and there were several attempts at forming urban militias in OTL. You have a couple of oddities (a short lived mercantile city-state run by sailors at Penchina; the public debate of the citizens of Seville in 1229 over who to appoint as their leader; at

In the early 11th century, the Umayyad Caliphate was dependent on Berber mercenaries and Slavs (Saqaliba) who were imported as slave-soldiers. It was also run by a lien of chancellors who used the Umayyads as a cover for their control of the state, ruling in fact if not in name. In 1008 the current chancellor, Abd Al-Rahman, became chancellor and decided to dispense with the Caliphate entirely[1]. He pressured the Caliph Hisham to name him heir apparent, and adopted Berber clothing to show he aligned with their interests. To show he was a good Calph, he led an expedition against the Christians in 1009, and as soon as they crossed the border, an Umayyad by the name of Mohammed, who took on the name al-Mahdi.

The Mahdi then broke with Umayyad tadition by raising an army from Cordoba's inhabitants, referred to in the source as the suq or sufla, meaning the mob or people of the markets, but he had a great deal of support from merchants and tradesman in Cordoba.

Abd Al-Rahman's position actually did collapse, but many of the saqaliba decamped from Cordoba to withdraw to the east coast ,and the Berbers in Cordoba rallied to an Umayyad of their own, Suleiman. With the support of Sancho of Castille, they were able to seize Cordoba after a battle outside the town and proclaimed Suleiman caliph.

But.

There are no shortage of battles in OTL's medieval Europe where armies have been defeated by chance. So let's give Suleiman his own Battle of the Spurs; and as of mid-November, the Mahdi, with an army of the mob, is firmly ensconced in Cordoba...

[1] To be fair, this doesn't seem that crazy to me; it's how the Carolingian gained power, after all...
 
But as long as there's no acceptance of the mozarab majority (acceptance in the sense of allowing them to raise within the Caliphate)...
In a very real sense, the mozarab population felt racially discriminated upon, even if only the mozarab nobility was actually discriminated (apex fallacy).

The problem is, to have a mob army, you need to be able to train them and arm them. How is the Caliphate going to do that? That requires a lot of money and freeing a lot of hands from the land labors and artisan workshops.
On the other hand, if they want a feudal army supported by the mozarab majority, they need to give them the chance to raise.

(Not expert on this field, please point out my errors.)
 
It's been observed that Al-Andalus was the most "European" of the Islamic states;
It's a really debatable affirmation. While it was affirmed by a conservative spanish historiography that claimed that Al-Andalus was Spain with a superficial Islamic veil, it's not making the consensus (it's rather mocked as "geologic hispaniolism")
The lack of an adequate tex base is quite common in the western Islamic world, forcing to use "exceptionnal" measures that tend to settle.
I don't really get the small sizes of cities, tough : if we except the marches (that were indeed more rural and underpopulated) Betica (Andalusia proper) had the most important urban ensemble of western Europe up to the XII and final decline of Al-Andalus. Cordoba was comparable to Constantinople and Badgad in this regard, while not being the only one to have a strong density and population.
Grants of lands are quite normal in conquered regions everywhere in the first Umayyad caliphate (not that it would be different from Europe in same times). It lasted, because the early cut off of the peninsula from the rest of the Caliphate was favouring the Arabs elites (that supported Abd al Rahman as champion of "arabity" and Arab nobles' interests) but not only Hispano-Romans keep a strong *local* power after the conquest, but after the revolts of the late IX century, Abd al Rahman managed to impose a more bureaucratic model inspired by Arabo-Persian exemples.


Al-Andalus, in some ways, reminds me of northern Italy or the low countries, where you saw urban militias able to defeat traditional European armies, and there were several attempts at forming urban militias in OTL.
There's a difference tough : Italian or Flemish militias (or Toulouse in the late XII) were the normal form of communal/consular army, when Arabo-Andalusian were more usually restrained to a local role, both because it didn't fit entierly great expeditions role and because of a local chauvinism. When they acted on their own, it was often in rebellion against caliphal/emiral authority (Toledo, being in revolt every 2 years before the XIII is a good exemple)


You have a couple of oddities (a short lived mercantile city-state run by sailors at Penchina; the public debate of the citizens of Seville in 1229 over who to appoint as their leader;
During the fitna, Cordoba was run by an urban council as well.
But I don't see how it's an oddity. Crusaders most often make negociations with towns they wanted to pay a tribute or conquer, showing that at least for Syria, urban councils were a thing.
Taking Cordoba exemple, it seems that the body (if possibly informal) of notables and elites pre-existed the fall of Umayyads and that it filled a vaacum.
Italian cities-states managed to get a real autonomy and independence because of a comparable (not similar) vaacum in the same time many urban councils existed elsewhere on the same model but under a royal or feudal "protectorate".

To say the truth, I wouldn't be exxagerly astonished to learn that Italian urban councils were at least partially inspired by Arabo-Syrians exemples : the first clearly autonomous cities being the most mercantile ones.

In the early 11th century, the Umayyad Caliphate was dependent on Berber mercenaries and Slavs (Saqaliba) who were imported as slave-soldiers.
Saqaliba were present in the peninsula at least since the Carolingian era, and weren't importated only as mercenaries but as slaves fitting for all domestic works including military.

Again, it wasn't a specificity of Al-Andalus : Muwayia is known to have gathered a Saqaliba army against Byzantines. What differed in Al-Andalus is that Saqaliba began to be used for a large range of slaves (not unlike in medieval latin, slavus took over servus).

But as they were tied to a house, rather than mercenaries, they weren't that much favoured by emir/caliphes for strictly military purposes. At the end they preferred using "contractual" Berbers and Christians that were independent (more or less) from peninsular politics.

It was also run by a lien of chancellors who used the Umayyads as a cover for their control of the state, ruling in fact if not in name
Only in the late period. The Amirid dictatorship is quite exceptionnal in this regard, and as they decredebilized the caliphal figure (the only one susceptible to hold Al-Andalus in one piece), they certainly quickened Muslim Spain decline.
But I don't think you could say it was a common feature.

There are no shortage of battles in OTL's medieval Europe where armies have been defeated by chance. So let's give Suleiman his own Battle of the Spurs; and as of mid-November, the Mahdi, with an army of the mob, is firmly ensconced in Cordoba...
We're talking about a mob army here, in a really really troubled city. While a victory may be possible of Muhammad II, the city was in a chaotic situation (think Russian Revolution scale) deeply divided in factions including the urban militia (that's one of the difference with European armies, whom informal divisions were dynastic rather than factional).

Now, how making it happening?

In the Kitâb Al-Bayân al-Mughrib, of Ibn Idhârî, it's noted that during the Berber attack of Cordoba, the cordoban army wasn't sent outside the city's limit while Berber attacked and took al-Zahra.
The author accuses Wâdih, a saqaliba commander loyal to Muhammad II of being passive and hesitating (saying it was common with him) in order to prevent a Berber attack on the city itself. And he continues by noting that when Wâdih finally sent cavalery, they were too afraid of Berbers to attack them.

While it shows, IMHO, that Muhammad II's army was too divided, that saqaliba weren't willing to help Cordoban for their own sake and that Cordoban didn't wanted to left the town...It's possible to have Wâdih (maybe obeying to a direct order of Muhammad, that seems to have been otherwise quite passive as well) to chase Berbers out of al-Zahra.

It would certainly calling for an harsh attack of the city, but with quick and strong enough response, could break at least part of Berbers (that would be still driven by the huge and promising pillage of the richest city of Al-Andalus).

Stopping as much berber raids than possible would likely as well prevent some of countryside devastations that led many refugee in the city, spreading its ressources thin.

Now having Muhammad II being reactive (and that's going to ask for some inner change. While SUlaiman seems to have been active and skilled militarly, Muhammad seems to have been really passive and not that much involved), again, is taking the risk of an harsh answer but it would certainly divert some of these attacks on countryside. Remember that the city had to support a siege, not of its walls, but of its reinforcements and ravitail.

It wouldn't be enough to make Sulaiman defeated, but maybe the city could hold (while not firmly, during the siege, people suspected to be Berbers were killed on the spot, ravitail made one of the support of Muhammad, merchants, impoverished, etc.)

At best, I could see Muhammad holding an equivalent of Cordoba taifa (possibly augmented of some neighbouring ones), maybe as a mere figurehead.

[1] To be fair, this doesn't seem that crazy to me; it's how the Carolingian gained power, after all...
There's two differences, actually.

1) Pippinids not only were Dukes of France but took all the VIII century to impose their authority, Late Merovingian Gaul being in a continual civil war which they ended by putting trusted men (if not family) in charge.
Aminids, on the other hand, tried to consolidate their power by attacking Christians and while they tried (often sucessfully) to get rid of opposers they didn't crushed their power base.

2) Furthermore, Peppinids beneficied from religious support on overthrowing the merovingian dynasty. Seeing how Umayyad was this religious support in Al-Andalus and even with a formal renounciation as OTL, it wasn't valid and Islamic clergy went loose.
 
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But as long as there's no acceptance of the mozarab majority (acceptance in the sense of allowing them to raise within the Caliphate)...
In a very real sense, the mozarab population felt racially discriminated upon, even if only the mozarab nobility was actually discriminated (apex fallacy).

I don't think it was still the case in the XI century. The revolts of the IX/X centuries managed to make the old arabized Hispano-Roman issued nobility more in charge, actually more than Berbers.

The Mozarabs of the 1000's were more arabized, or what we could call "neo-mozarabs", aka a Christian immigration fro Leon, Castille that settled in Al-Andalus and didn't have a nobilty of their own on these lands. It could have admittedly "redynamised" and recentered some Mozarab communauties, but the overhall situation was an assimilated one (while still distinct but not different culturally).
Mozarab nobility in 1000's doesn't make a great deal of sense, I'm afraid.

On the other hand, if they want a feudal army supported by the mozarab majority, they need to give them the chance to raise.
If they want a feudal army, they would need a feudal system in first place, something that is outside a ruler's will. Having a vassalic system army would be probably more fesible (XanXar began to wrote a TL about it)

Furthermore, I doubt Mozarabs were that much distinct from other arabized populations (Mozarab meaning litterally that, after all) and in city (where Arabs represented a crushing majority) they had rather special activities but the bulk of Mozarabs and Neo-Mozarabs lived in countryside.
 
How is the Caliphate going to do that? That requires a lot of money and freeing a lot of hands from the land labors and artisan workshops.

Sorry to bump this again, but I found an interesting text about how qati was percieved by Ibn Hazm, quite representative of administrative and intellectual elites of Al-Andalus on this era.

"If I make a difference between our times and previous times, it's that the exactions made during the time of the truce weren't generalized and institutionalised as nowadat, and that the conquest's tributes were made only on land property. They didn't differed much from the ones imposed by Umar.
But today, we have now : a capitation taxe on Muslims, called the qati, recieved each month; a tax on their goods on sheep, cows, oxen and bees consisting as a determied ammount by cattle head and milking female; commercial taxes percieved on everything sold in market including the wine selling licence accorded to some Muslims in some regions.

All of this, all that is covered by modern despots.

It's an abject outrage, a violation of islamic laws, a shattering piece by piece of the commune society, the creation of a new religion when the only power in this regards is God's only! By God! If they learned that in the worship of the cross, there was something to make business, they would quickly convert to christianism."


The problem isn't much to make taxes happening, or making money (I spare you the passages about how new dirhams were impure). it's about making them accepted by judicial, religious elites and popular social classes.
It could work for short ammounts of time, granted, but for a lasting system it would provoke indeed a great fragilization of Arabo-Andalusian society (giving room for northern Christian, southern Berbers and Andalusian pretenders). I don't think a sucession war is the best time for a pretender to try that.

Really, it's not about Al-Andalus society being able to pay, it's about it being ready to pay. And given how taxes of this kind were associated with a dhimmi or second-class status, it's not going to be easy.
 
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