Airpower at Omaha Beach

LVT's

Totally agree with CalBear on LVT's at Omaha would have reduced casualties on the beach, would have to look at beach exits/slope for use inland. Would the height of an LVT (any variant) help in the hedgerows in spite of the minimal armor protection. (Ronsons?)

Regarding the original comment, what about Project DANNY a USMC air group with F4U's with Tiny Tim 5" rockets originally intended to take out V1 sites in N France VS the bunkers at Omaha? How about CAS at Pointe Du Hoc? This plan supposedly quashed by Gen Marshall as well as reinforcing the original Ranger landing at P D Hoc there with MARDET's from BB's TEXAS and ARKANSAS
 

NothingNow

Banned
Actually, I can't help wonder why they didn't use LVT(A)s instead of the ridiculous DD Sherman...:confused: Had the Hedgehog-equipped Matilda made its debut, yet? That would've been a pretty nice idea, adapted to an LVT.:cool:

The LVT(A)s only had a really light armament, and fairly thin armor. The ones available at the time only had the 37mm Gun M3, 75mm howitzer or a flamethrower. The most heavily protected mark, the LVT(A)-4, topped out at 38mm of Armor, and had an open-topped turret, while being extremely ponderous and slow on land.

If you want an Amphibious AFV with the Sherman's firepower, it might be better to fit a larger turret ring to the LVT(A) series, and use the QF 6pdr and OQF 75mm, in turrets scavenged from various Matilda II CS or Churchill MkII CS, and a hull mounted flamethrower.
 
The LVT wasn't a perfect answer to every issue, but it would have damned handy at Omaha, especially in the gun carrier variant.

Hard fact is that the defenses of the vaunted Atlantic Wall were not in the same league as what the Japanese had in place at Tarawa, Peleliu, Saipan, Tinian or on Iwo. The Overlord planners decided that the the conventional landing craft were all that was needed for the threat level in Normandy. They were right for everywhere but Omaha.

The LVT's would have come in handy during the drive inland too, although their impact on logistical requirements, especially fuel, might have canceled that mobility advantage out.


The US Army did consult two USMC generals and actually stockpiled several hundreds of LVTs in England. The plan was to use those LVTs to rush Patton and his army to one of the landing site as reinforcement in a contingency.
 

CalBear

Moderator
Donor
Monthly Donor
Totally agree with CalBear on LVT's at Omaha would have reduced casualties on the beach, would have to look at beach exits/slope for use inland. Would the height of an LVT (any variant) help in the hedgerows in spite of the minimal armor protection. (Ronsons?)

Regarding the original comment, what about Project DANNY a USMC air group with F4U's with Tiny Tim 5" rockets originally intended to take out V1 sites in N France VS the bunkers at Omaha? How about CAS at Pointe Du Hoc? This plan supposedly quashed by Gen Marshall as well as reinforcing the original Ranger landing at P D Hoc there with MARDET's from BB's TEXAS and ARKANSAS

A quibble:

The Tiny Tim was an 11.75" inch rocket since it was the diameter of the 500 pound SAP bomb it used as a warhead and of the pipeline tubing it used as an airframe body. It also wan't in service until December '44.

Marshall had a serious blind spot regarding the Corps. He thought the USMC had gotten too much credit in WWI and the Army too little.
 
The LVT(A)s only had a really light armament, and fairly thin armor. The ones available at the time only had the 37mm Gun M3, 75mm howitzer or a flamethrower. The most heavily protected mark, the LVT(A)-4, topped out at 38mm of Armor, and had an open-topped turret, while being extremely ponderous and slow on land.

Ah... the Sherman had a 75mm gun at the time. For short-range use, not noticeably better than the 75mm howitzer and in some respects worse.

No, LVT's don't instantly solve all problems. They do, however, reduce the 1st wave casualties and help get off the beach. I doubt they'd be sent inland, or be much use if they were.

Sadly, Marines were banned from the ETO by the fiat of a very prejudiced senior general, so getting Marine CAS is difficult at best. However, the Army had their own Amtrak and Amtank battalions, so these could be used without problems.
 
Coming back a bit late.... :eek:

IMO, the LVT(A) could have coped with the immediate obstacles of bringing troops ashore & defeating the pillboxes just above the beach, which were AFAIK the main need for armor on 6 June. Once the beach is held (even if it means there's still fighting close behind it), drive the M4s onto the beach, & forget the DDs entirely.
 
Institutional bias

The problem with Omaha, and other D Day beaches was that in the ETO the amphibious invasions had not faced the type of obsticles and defenses that were present there. If they would have asked the USN/USMC planners in the Pacific theater what they might expect with those types of defenses the Germans had in Normandy they could have planned better. One of the best ways of looking at this is the fact that they did not use DD drive Shermans in the Pacific invasions like they did in Normandy. The other was the fact that close air support was brought to bear on the beaches by USN/USMC aircraft even when the first and succeding waves were landing with a full range of ordnance.
They did not need to have USN/Marine units specifically to help them, just the expertise that they had developed up to that time to plan better what they needed to do for the pre invasion and invasion support of the troops going in.
 
Marshall saw Europe as the main theatre for glory and made efforts to keep the Marine participation minimal this also lead to a number of Generals considering the Pacific theatre as the "bush" league hence no need to consult the amatuers about things. IIRC there was one general that had transferred in from the Pacific to one of the D-Day assault units and had asked about the use of LVTs and such. He was apparently given a cold shoulder for the idea.

I'll have to see if I can find his name again.

Found it! Major General Charles Corlett CO XIX Corps. Had commanded the 7th Infantry Division at Kwajalein.
 
Last edited:
I've always had a soft spot for Patton. We had plenty of blimps in 1944, so as a contingency for bad weather (and we certainly had bad weather for overlord), some large economy size balloons hauled by blimps bring some tanks over and crashland a few miles from the German airfields.
The German AA guns could have been relaid, if they had time, but it would have been distinctly interesting to have the paratroopers big brothers arrive for the party.
 
They did not need to have USN/Marine units specifically to help them, just the expertise that they had developed up to that time to plan better what they needed to do for the pre invasion and invasion support of the troops going in.
I'd disagree. The techniques need to have practised execution, too. Of course, when COs ignore lessons, as was done in re arty prep at Salerno...:eek::eek:
 
Bump.

One of the main reasons for the failure of the heavy bombers at Omaha was the timetable for the landings insisted on by Bradley. He wanted the troops ashore beginning at 0630, which didn't give the 8th really enough daylight to drop their loads, or give them enough leeway in regards to distance between the beach targets and the landing craft approaching the shores.

So, what if Bradley concedes that the landings could begin later, like 0700 or later, with the landing craft 1000 yards or more further back. This minimizes the bombers's chances of hitting the boats, giving the planes extra daylight, extra time, and extra space to do the job.
 
Actually, I can't help wonder why they didn't use LVT(A)s instead of the ridiculous DD Sherman...:confused:
The LVT(A) had only a 37mm gun, the Sherman had a 75mm gun. The DDs would have fared better if the Americans had launched them closer in. Some LCA(HR)s ought to have done well as well. Also, every LVT that gets knocked out (and with the German defences, they'll go down like flies) creates another barrier for later vehicles to have to manoeuvre around.

sure, bombardment could improve things, but if they bombard to early the germans could realize the real landing and then your chance of getting a red communist europe is better and better
Germany was waiting for an attack on Calais, by the time they realised it wasn't coming it was too late.

IMO what they should have started off doing was what they ended up doing, supporting the landing with destroyers and the like, which were capable of getting in close (relatively speaking) and actually see what they were firing at. In fact it might have been worth it to ground some old destroyers (Wickes class for preference, due to their age) on the beaches to provide fire-support.
 
Bump.

One of the main reasons for the failure of the heavy bombers at Omaha was the timetable for the landings insisted on by Bradley. He wanted the troops ashore beginning at 0630, which didn't give the 8th really enough daylight to drop their loads, or give them enough leeway in regards to distance between the beach targets and the landing craft approaching the shores.

So, what if Bradley concedes that the landings could begin later, like 0700 or later, with the landing craft 1000 yards or more further back. This minimizes the bombers's chances of hitting the boats, giving the planes extra daylight, extra time, and extra space to do the job.

I thought Montgomery was in charge of all D-Day landings? Where does Bradley come in?:confused:
 
Marshall had a serious blind spot regarding the Corps. He thought the USMC had gotten too much credit in WWI and the Army too little.

WWI had no Pacific War, no war in Africa, and the US had no involvement in the Imperial campaigns against the Ottoman Empire. The U-Boat War ended fairly quickly after convoying was adopted. WWI U-Boats really didn't have an answer to the convoy system. France was still very much in the war providing a working national railnet and ports to handle incoming troopships. All these factors combined to allow the creation of a much larger sized USMC relative to the US Army in France during the war. The Army saw the Marines as a "junior service subservient to the US Navy:mad:", so they were held in contempt by the Army brass. It wasn't the fault of the US Marines that they played, by sheer force of numbers, a much larger role in the war than expected.

If a young man volunteered for the US Marines over the US Army, that was that, unless he washed out of Parris Island basic training. THEN the army could have him. The army didn't have the power to go poaching from Marine Corps Induction Centers. Ironically, thanks to the US Congress and their love affair with the USMC, Marine Corps recruiting officers and NCO's COULD and DID just walk into Army Induction Centers and grab the picks of the litter!:mad::D
 
Bradley was in command of the American landings, and basically did most of the planning, subject to approval by Montgomery and Eisenhower.
 
Top