AHQ: What would be an interesting topic for me to discuss on Islamic History?

Ottoman caliphate survives how does long does it survive (the later ottomans no longer represented the ummah and were mere puppets) and would have any impact on modern sunni islam.
 
Something I've always been interested in: how did Shiism morph from (I guess) a sort of party around Ali's leadership of the muslim community into a distinctive theological and religious community/confession within the Muslim world?

Also, it seems like the early Islamic period and early modern empires get a lot of press except maybe the Safavids, but not a lot on either post-Abbasid hegemony stuff or the Ilkhans, their breakup, and successor states to Timur.
 
"1. There was no conflict during the period of Ali ibn Talib in the sense that is often framed in the West. The conflict between Mu'awiyah, Amr ibn al-A'as and Ali ibn abi Talib was one of a personal anture, nto theological or political. Do you mean the death of Husayn ibn Ali? So which sort of victory are we discussing?"

Ali is not assassinated and his authority as Caliph is accepted. He doesn't have to be succeeded by relatives in this scenario. A POD might be that Mu'wiyah and not Ali is assassinated. So no Ummayyads and this could potentially butterfly away Shiism.

"3. I doubt this will occur, the Abbasid would also be highly reluctant to accept such a conversion."

The earlier commentator was correct, I was thinking of Heraclius converting. I realize the episode is legendary and Heraclius had a hard enough time getting his Christian theological views to prevail, but its an interesting scenario.
 
"1. There was no conflict during the period of Ali ibn Talib in the sense that is often framed in the West. The conflict between Mu'awiyah, Amr ibn al-A'as and Ali ibn abi Talib was one of a personal anture, nto theological or political. Do you mean the death of Husayn ibn Ali? So which sort of victory are we discussing?"

Ali is not assassinated and his authority as Caliph is accepted. He doesn't have to be succeeded by relatives in this scenario. A POD might be that Mu'wiyah and not Ali is assassinated. So no Ummayyads and this could potentially butterfly away Shiism.

"3. I doubt this will occur, the Abbasid would also be highly reluctant to accept such a conversion."

The earlier commentator was correct, I was thinking of Heraclius converting. I realize the episode is legendary and Heraclius had a hard enough time getting his Christian theological views to prevail, but its an interesting scenario.

I feel that you misunderstand the situation. Ali ibn Talib was not assassinated by anyone from the Banu Umayya or from Amr ibn al-A’as. Rather, Ali ibn Talib was assassinated by members of his own group and faction. This faction that assassinated him are also the same group who murdered Uthman ibn Affan the previous Caliph. Ali ibn Talib was killed further by this faction that would be called, initially the Harruriyyah and later called the Khawarij and they themselves referred to themselves in teens such as Shurha, which then broke into many separate sects of similar methodology (including Ibadhi).

Mu’awiya accepted the Caliphate of Ali ibn Talib. The issue was that the murder of Uthman Ibn Affan was committed by members of Ali’s faction, or suspected and Mu’awiya demanded investigation and immediate justice for his clansman. Ali ibn Talib was somewhat divisive in this manner in that he did not agree tu investigate and seemed to be hiding something. Hence the 1st Fitnah occurred between Ali ibn Talib and his camp made up mainly of Iraqi and the Nejd against the faction of Mu’awiya abd Amr ibn al-A’as (Syrian and Egyptian parties).
 
He might be talking about the Prophet's (PBUH) letter to Heraclius.

Understood. However, the source material supposes that Najashi of Ethiopia reverted to Islam also. However, this did not last apparently as we know from Ethiopian/Abyssinian history. Thus, the proclaimation gifted to the rulers, I will tend to not regard as a major determinant. It should also be known that this proclamation was equally a declaration of war as it was an invitation. This perspective is most noted in the source material in how it mentions Khisrau of the Sassanids as a taghut who must be destroyed, whilst treating Heraclius relatively mildly in comparison.
 
Personally, I'd like to hear about the treatments of Jews and more widely, of religious minorities in the Umeyyad Caliphate (before its spanish exile). You've mentioned that we have a rosy-coloured perception of it, and I'd love to hear more about it :)
 
Recently, I have noticed after being less active on the forum, he numbers of posts regarding the Islamic middle ages or early middle ages slow to a trickle after having some fair numbers of previously. As a result, I wished to decide to do a post or series of posts where I describe and give opinions on certain events of the past in Islamic history as I have done with several other topics on this site to generate interest or educate. Thus, is there any suggestions on a topic that someone would enjoy to read about or discuss?

I'd be interested to know more about how far you think the Islamic Golden Age extended - did it come to an end as late as the 1600s, or was it much earlier, with the Mongol sack of Baghdad? And also, was the decline of the Muslim ummah a historically inevitable process, caused by geographical determinism, or was it an accident of history that could have been avoided with a few different choices and events going slightly differently?
 
This might be too modern or too wide of a topic but ill say anyway. Why is ibadi islam not attacked by salafists/sunni jihadists in the same way as modern shia islam is. Why does algerian ibadi minorities and omani muslims not targetted, is this due to simply modern islamic sectarianism being geopolitical and ibadis do not pose a geopolitical threat? or are ibadis historically not seen as much of enemies. I remeber reading that when terrorists took the grand mosque in 1979 the saudis initially blamed Kharijites, why is it then that the descendents or those kharijites are not targeted in the same way.
 
It might be on the fringes of the Islamic world, but I would like to learn about the spread of Islam into the Sahel and beyond, most particularly the period of the Fulani jihads.
 
This might be too modern or too wide of a topic but ill say anyway. Why is ibadi islam not attacked by salafists/sunni jihadists in the same way as modern shia islam is. Why does algerian ibadi minorities and omani muslims not targetted, is this due to simply modern islamic sectarianism being geopolitical and ibadis do not pose a geopolitical threat? or are ibadis historically not seen as much of enemies. I remeber reading that when terrorists took the grand mosque in 1979 the saudis initially blamed Kharijites, why is it then that the descendents or those kharijites are not targeted in the same way.

Ibadi as a group represent a minor influence in today’s time as it often held in the past, when compared to other more radical Kharijite. To understand this mentality though, it is important to understand Islam in ways similar to Christendom with its complexities. The Shurha as a group we can say are mostly removed as a group or sect, aside from the Ibadhi. However, the theological abd methodology of the Kharijite Shurha remain and appear among people in the Islamic world periodically.

In terms of the relation of the terrorist groups such as ISIS, they too have made public their enmity to the Kharijite-Shurha impulse. In 2016, they executed a cadre of their own operatives, as supposed Kharijite spies and apostates. Claiming further, that their ranks would be combed to search out those who use the Kitman (a form of deception used by the various clandestine sects of the past; it differs from taqqiyya as Kitman is an offensive usage of outright lie and deception to gain trusts and positions and widely known in Fiqh al-Hiyal [the laws of trickery] and is considered haram by Sunni Muslim and allowed for Shi’a and Ibadhi/Shurha).

Within Saudi Arabia, there is also similarly those who adopt certain traits of the Shurha. Namely, they believe that one can make takfir (sort of, excommunicate) upon people for minor sins, such as drinking alcohol. However, these excessive Ghulat (exaggerators) are always rejected by the higher scholars in Saudi Arabia. Yet it is still a reality that due to many factors, people develop these ideas. Mainly because the ideals of the Shurha are attractive to people who espouse both an overtly emotional and austere Islam and take a fashion to rebellion and rebellious actions. In the days of the Abbasid Caliphate, Khawarij generally were found in extremely diverse backdrops, speaking to its appeal, but especially with ethnic minorities, Bedouin and some intellectuals.

In short, the terrorist attacks upon Shi’a are generally both religious and political. Ibadhi carry less political power in today’s time than Shi’a. Also, according to many scholars, the innovations of the Shi’a is objectively worse than the Khawarij in terms of the matters of theology. Especially the Ibadhi. Now, the more radical Shurha of the Abbasid Caliphate were often in danger of execution due to their views that Uthman ibn Affan, Ali ibn Talib, Mu’awiya, etc etc were all apostates and they frequently abused these companions in their discourse. So, in the case of a true Shurha who makes takfir upon the companions, like the Shi’a, then the ruling is similar. However, most scholars place the Shi’a as a more ‘deviant’ large group (aside from Zayydi) on account of its manyfold views that are considered idolatry, polytheism, anthropomorphism, some Shi’a scholars who hold the narrative of the false Quran or corruption of Quran, the erroneous message to Muhammad, Ghulat views that Ali is Allah or Fatima is Allah or that Allah creates a new deity, etc etc. Further, the idea of Wilayat al-Tawkwaniyyah (complex topic) is enough for most major scholars of the Sunni field to consider Shi’a more divergent if you will.
 
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yoyo

Banned
How about more semi/successful attempts by non-islamic Indian, Iranian, Christian states? Would be interesting to see an Islamic league forming.
 

yoyo

Banned
Ibadi as a group represent a minor influence in today’s time as it often held in the past, when compared to other more radical Kharijite. To understand this mentality though, it is important to understand Islam in ways similar to Christendom with its complexities. The Shurha as a group we can say are mostly removed as a group or sect, aside from the Ibadhi. However, the theological abd methodology of the Kharijite Shurha remain and appear among people in the Islamic world periodically.

In terms of the relation of the terrorist groups such as ISIS, they too have made public their enmity to the Kharijite-Shurha impulse. In 2016, they executed a cadre of their own operatives, as supposed Kharijite spies and apostates. Claiming further, that their ranks would be combed to search out those who use the Kitman (a form of deception used by the various clandestine sects of the past; it differs from taqqiyya as Kitman is an offensive usage of outright lie and deception to gain trusts and positions and widely known in Fiqh al-Hiyal [the laws of trickery] and is considered haram by Sunni Muslim and allowed for Shi’a and Ibadhi/Shurha).

Within Saudi Arabia, there is also similarly those who adopt certain traits of the Shurha. Namely, they believe that one can make takfir (sort of, excommunicate) upon people for minor sins, such as drinking alcohol. However, these excessive Ghulat (exaggerators) are always rejected by the higher scholars in Saudi Arabia. Yet it is still a reality that due to many factors, people develop these ideas. Mainly because the ideals of the Shurha are attractive to people who espouse both an overtly emotional and austere Islam and take a fashion to rebellion and rebellious actions. In the days of the Abbasid Caliphate, Khawarij generally were found in extremely diverse backdrops, speaking to its appeal, but especially with ethnic minorities, Bedouin and some intellectuals.

In short, the terrorist attacks upon Shi’a are generally both religious and political. Ibadhi carry less political power in today’s time than Shi’a. Also, according to many scholars, the innovations of the Shi’a is objectively worse than the Khawarij in terms of the matters of theology. Especially the Ibadhi. Now, the more radical Shurha of the Abbasid Caliphate were often in danger of execution due to their views that Uthman ibn Affan, Ali ibn Talib, Mu’awiya, etc etc were all apostates and they frequently abused these companions in their discourse. So, in the case of a true Shurha who makes takfir upon the companions, like the Shi’a, then the ruling is similar. However, most scholars place the Shi’a as a more ‘deviant’ large group (aside from Zayydi) on account of its manyfold views that are considered idolatry, polytheism, anthropomorphism, some Shi’a scholars who hold the narrative of the false Quran or corruption of Quran, the erroneous message to Muhammad, Ghulat views that Ali is Allah or Fatima is Allah or that Allah creates a new deity, etc etc. Further, the idea of Wilayat al-Tawkwaniyyah (complex topic) is enough for most major scholars of the Sunni field to consider Shi’a more divergent if you will.
A post at par excellence.
 
I'm particularly interested in the Zaydis and their historic potential throughout Islamic history. They're the most moderate branch of Shi'a and refrain from cursing the Sahabah (I think they make an exception for Mu'awiya), and only disappeared from Iran after Shah Ismail's reign. Unfortunately information about is extremely scarce and I've been unable to find much of anything.
 
Recently, I have noticed after being less active on the forum, he numbers of posts regarding the Islamic middle ages or early middle ages slow to a trickle after having some fair numbers of previously. As a result, I wished to decide to do a post or series of posts where I describe and give opinions on certain events of the past in Islamic history as I have done with several other topics on this site to generate interest or educate. Thus, is there any suggestions on a topic that someone would enjoy to read about or discuss?
Have you read The Myth of the Andalusian Paradise, and if so what are your thoughts on it? Its a candidate for my Christmas gift to myself :coldsweat:
 
The status of Arabs from the Seljuk to early Ottoman periods; it seems like during the Middle Ages there were not very many independent Arab dynasties remaining north of the Arabian Peninsula proper. However, Arabization was still a dominant element in both cities and countryside, even with Turkic and Mongol empires kicking about.

Also, the infrastructure of cities in the medieval Islamic world. How were cities supplied to grow much larger than in medieval Europe, despite greater logistical difficulties in deserts and highlands?
 
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