AHQ: What other countries/peoples could "pull a Meiji"?

Substantial relative to what came before, but not even close to substantial in terms of what @Socrates has been referring to. Consider that this line of discussion derives from his claim that Islamic countries are hamstrung by shariah law, which forbids various forms of taxation (including income tax). The fact is that the sort of substantial government growth we see in the 20th century, financed by such increased taxation, occurred after industrialisation. The idea that income tax and the size of government that developed in the 20th century would be needed to make industrialisation work is therefore blatantly incorrect.

And obviously, the expenditures of 19th century governments are indeed insubstantial when compared to the expenditures of 20th century (post-income tax) governments. Hence my statement that (by the standard that Socrates set) government expenditures on industrialisation were, in the 19th century, not substantial. I repeat that a government that is much smaller than the sort we see develop in the 20th century can demonstrably oversee industrialisation. I further repeat that no income tax is required to facilitate industrialisation.

Consider also that the Meiji era itself only saw income taxation fairly late, and then only as a temporary war measure. Permanent income tax was only introduced in Japan in 1920 (after the Meiji era). Now I ask: had Japan not introduced an income tax in 1920... would its Meiji-era developments have retro-actively failed? Of course not.



And @Socrates, I see that you still refuse to admit to basic causality. You wring yourself in every conceivable shape to avoid having to admit that your initial claims don't stand up to scrutiny. You again move the goalposts, and now seem bent on pretending that industrialisation didn't happen before the government reached the magical "we take 10% of the GDP" threshold. Your once-ardent claim that an income tax is indispensible is suddenly absent, now that it's proven to be nonsense. How quaint. Now, we really are done. I refuse to run after moving goalposts.

Firstly, the income tax in Japan was first implemented in 1887, halfway through the Meiji period and necessary to sustain industrialization to later become a mainly industrial economy. I could dig up more numbers but frankly I am tired of proving you wrong.

Secondly, just because you are not bright enough to follow the distinction between a pre-modern agricultural economy of ~5% state spending and early industrial powers 10-15% spending doesn't mean it is nonsense. I have not moved any goalposts - you brought in the later post-war 40% spending levels I never referenced. You were just super imposing your preconceived ideology of governments as parasites and couldn't follow things.

I will respond to John's lengthy post when I have time to give it the respectful response it deserves, but I am done with your rudeness, incorrect numbers and bad faith.
 
Secondly, just because you are not bright enough to follow the distinction between a pre-modern agricultural economy of ~5% state spending and early industrial powers 10-15% spending doesn't mean it is nonsense.
Is 10% something that only came with industrialization? Wasn't the tithe (a 10% tax) pretty much universal in pre-modern Europe?
 
I repeat that a government that is much smaller than the sort we see develop in the 20th century can demonstrably oversee industrialisation.

The topic here isn't about those 'Western governments' from the region that hosted the most dynamic economy in the world supported by the most advanced financial institution in the world, including your example of the Netherlands, but about those who could not catch up in time and had to kick-start a rapid modernization to survive. The challenge is best described by Stalin's famous quote of closing a gap of 100 years within 10 years. The idea that industrialization requires income tax is baffling but so is the notion that the experiences of the most advanced economy can be universally applied to other less-fortunate economies' trajectory.

The point of income tax being implemented in 1887 was discussed already so I'll not touch that point.
 

Skallagrim

Banned
The topic here isn't about those 'Western governments' from the region that hosted the most dynamic economy in the world supported by the most advanced financial institution in the world, including your example of the Netherlands, but about those who could not catch up in time and had to kick-start a rapid modernization to survive. The challenge is best described by Stalin's famous quote of closing a gap of 100 years within 10 years. The idea that industrialization requires income tax is baffling but so is the notion that the experiences of the most advanced economy can be universally applied to other less-fortunate economies' trajectory.

My argument has certainly not been that every country could simply industrialise. For starters, each case is unique, and has its own set of circumstances. Two examples mentioned in this thread, the Ottoman Empire and Persia, both had certain factors working against them. My contention is that a relatively small government and the lack of an income tax were not the factors in question. I'd argue that the main issues were, structurally, maintaining support internally and preventing hostility externally.

By that first one I mean: a modernisation programme typically meant a Westernisation programme, and that caused reactionary backlash. Going to fast with the modernisation runs the risk of losing so much support that reactionary factions gain power and undo too much of the work. Going too slow runs the risk of always lagging behind, meaning your efforts come to nothing. Even in the West itself, industrialisation has major "growing pains", and those could be weathered with relative ease thanks to the fact that the West was in a very strong position versus the rest of the world. For, say, the Ottomans, a period of truly serious social strife between modernist reformers and reactionary *luddites was an unacceptable risk, because it would mean an open invitation to the Europeans to march in and carve up the Empire.

By the second point, I refer to that same fear, but in the sense that any attempt at serious modernisation ran the risk that the Western powers would see it as a threat-- and act aggressively to eliminate that threat.

All in all, I'd argue that the crucial factor in Japan's success was the enlistment of foreign "backers", who supported the modernisation, and were willing to help in suppressing the reactionary backlash. If, say, the Ottomans can get one or more Western powers to see profit (and/or other benefits) in actively supporting a modernisation programme, then that will probably prove to be the crucial step. Yes, "catching up" is the big issue. Getting someone in a better position to give you a leg up is the best way to get it done. And the biggest risk is that someone in such a strong position decides to start kicking at you while you're scrambling to get ahead. How well you play the game of (commercial) diplomacy, then, is in my opinion infinitely more important than what your exact tax regime or the size of your government is.
 
One does not require such state. Also, the state could control heavy resources and make incomes via this route if it is so necessary. Regardless, I do not see it as necessitated to have a large state and tiered bureaucracy to create an industrial economy. Maybe to create a western industrial economy, but this is eurocentrisme and accepting of only one plausible model that hampers this discussion critically.

Maybe it’s Eurocentrism, but seeing as the only states which became developed economies was Europe and states which adopted European-style economies, I think it’s silly to talk about a second way. The Gulf states may become rich by pulling oil and gas out of the soil, but the moment the prices falls permanent or they run out, they have nothing. The pre-colonial states in Africa was able to fund themselves on the slave trade, but when the slave trade was destroyed, it left them as easy targets of European expansion. USSR funded itself in the last phase on heavy resources, and as the oil and gas prices fell, their economy collapsed.

As for industrial economies, manufacturing are heavy dependent on the state setting up infrastructure, protect them and their work force and also dependent on the states educating their work force.
 
The Meiji Restoration was less impressive than conventional wisdom says, largely because Tokugawa Japan was already doing pretty well. Tokugawa Japan had significantly more to work with than Qing China, for example. Something like 40% literacy compared to under 10%, which should be enough to trigger Victoria 2 players.

A lot of nations could have a stable, modernizing government like Meiji Japan had, but I don't think that would immediately turn them into the kind of military power Japan became. Not to mention that part of Japan's military power was that it punched significantly above its weight when compared to the economic development of the country - for example, Japan was probably not as economically advanced as Russia in the 1904-1905 war.

Obviously, Japan also has the weird position of the Meiji Restorationists being the reactionary backalsh that people seem to forget (their original slogan was literally "expel the barbarians")
 
I'd argue that Tokugawa Japan, in many respects, was very developed even until it was visited by Commodore Perry. Aside from the aforementioned high literacy, the government was largely stable. So all the pieces in place needed to jump-start industrialization were there.

I think a non-European state seeking to keep itself independent in the Age of Imperialism would be better served to look at Thailand or Ethiopia. Of course, neither were Great Powers, so there.
 

CalBear

Moderator
Donor
Monthly Donor
Substantial relative to what came before, but not even close to substantial in terms of what @Socrates has been referring to. Consider that this line of discussion derives from his claim that Islamic countries are hamstrung by shariah law, which forbids various forms of taxation (including income tax). The fact is that the sort of substantial government growth we see in the 20th century, financed by such increased taxation, occurred after industrialisation. The idea that income tax and the size of government that developed in the 20th century would be needed to make industrialisation work is therefore blatantly incorrect.

And obviously, the expenditures of 19th century governments are indeed insubstantial when compared to the expenditures of 20th century (post-income tax) governments. Hence my statement that (by the standard that Socrates set) government expenditures on industrialisation were, in the 19th century, not substantial. I repeat that a government that is much smaller than the sort we see develop in the 20th century can demonstrably oversee industrialisation. I further repeat that no income tax is required to facilitate industrialisation.

Consider also that the Meiji era itself only saw income taxation fairly late, and then only as a temporary war measure. Permanent income tax was only introduced in Japan in 1920 (after the Meiji era). Now I ask: had Japan not introduced an income tax in 1920... would its Meiji-era developments have retro-actively failed? Of course not.



And @Socrates, I see that you still refuse to admit to basic causality. You wring yourself in every conceivable shape to avoid having to admit that your initial claims don't stand up to scrutiny. You again move the goalposts, and now seem bent on pretending that industrialisation didn't happen before the government reached the magical "we take 10% of the GDP" threshold. Your once-ardent claim that an income tax is indispensible is suddenly absent, now that it's proven to be nonsense. How quaint. Now, we really are done. I refuse to run after moving goalposts.
Probably should, however, learn to play the ball.
 
Is 10% something that only came with industrialization? Wasn't the tithe (a 10% tax) pretty much universal in pre-modern Europe?

You should remember that these taxes were often in-kind or substituted by military service. However, your point is correct. There were certainly states with much higher tax revenue in pre-industrial societies. There were some despicably high tax levels in parts of India in the 1700s and 1800s. However, my point is that sub-5% tax levels can work perfectly fine for pre-industrial states, as shown by powers like the Ottomans. It can even work to have a small chunk of your economy industrial - when only 5% of your workers have moved to the cities, you obviously need fewer urban services than you do when a majority have moved there. It just isn't a level sufficient for a mainly industrial or post-industrial economy.
 

I will attempt to write a web serial of it very soon high fantasy style.


NOTE: You know what a web serial is right?

EDIT: It might be weird but I hope everyone will be ready by the I post a thread and use link only. The project will take lots of time because I have 2 on-going originals, 1 timeline thread I made, 2 fan fiction and hidden projects.
 
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