AHC: Your very own USAAC/USAAF

Since we've done the RAF, LW and the Japanese to death, let's talk about 'Muricans.
Starting by the fall of France (armistice was signed on 22th May 1940*), as a newly appointed chief of the USAAC, you have the task of developing the best air force the world has seen. As with all the fiction vs. reality, it actually has to make a sense :)
The basic engines, produced or about to be produced are as given historically, feel free to mix and match engine numbers, layout and available supercharging of the era - non-historical engines are not allowed. American-made guns & electronics of the era - no Chain guns or MK 108s etc. Cater for the need of bomber, fighter, attack and transport branches. Make the most from the designs already in pipeline, but new designs are also encouraged. The aircraft orders from other countries are respected. Try to channel the air war experiences from Spain, China, West Europe as much as possible towards training, strategy & equipment. You know that a global, war where USA is involved, is imminent.

* my mistake - armistice was signed on 22th June 1940
 
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Driftless

Donor
So everything produced or currently work-in-progress as of May 22, 1940 remains as it historically was? The procurement channel gets an emergency makeover starting on that 1940 date. Even if the US leadership (and populace?) has had a great shock from the relatively sudden collapse of the French, you still need to factor in that the US is not at war yet with Japan, Germany, or Italy; so there's still some budget limitations.

*edit* I'd think if leadership is accelerating the program, considering the impact of foreign Air Forces to this point of the war, the US should first be looking to build infrastructure: airfields, staff(doctrine and training). You need training staff and airfields before a big bump in planes.
 
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Driftless

Donor
Some historical background fodder from 1939-40 - USAAC

Expansion of the Air Corps[edit]
In a special message to Congress on 12 January 1939,[n 33] President Roosevelt advised that the threat of a new war made the recommendations of the Baker Board inadequate for American defense and requested approval of a "minimum 3,000-plane increase" for the Air Corps.[76][77][78][n 34] On 3 April 1939, Congress allocated the $300 million requested by Roosevelt for expansion of the Air Corps, half of which was dedicated to purchasing planes to raise the inventory from 2,500 to 5,500 airplanes, and the other half for new personnel, training facilities, and bases.[79] Orders for B-17s, which had been held in abeyance since June 1938, resumed in the summer of 1939 with incremental deliveries of 39 B-17Bs in 1939–40, 18 B-17Cs in 1940, and 42 B-17Ds in the first quarter of 1941.[n 35] The first large order for heavy bomber production, 512 combat-capable B-17Es, was placed in July 1940.[80][n 36]

In June 1939 the Kilner Board[n 37] recommended several types of bombers needed to fulfill the Air Corps mission that included aircraft having tactical radii of both 2,000 and 3,000 miles (revised in 1940 to 4,000). Chief of Staff Craig, long an impediment to Air Corps ambitions but nearing retirement, came around to the Air Corps viewpoint after Roosevelt's views became public. Likewise, the War Department General Staff reversed itself and concurred in the requirements, ending the brief moratorium on bomber development and paving the way for work on the B-29.[81]

Over the winter of 1938–1939, Arnold transferred a group of experienced officers headed by Lt. Col. Carl A. Spaatz to his headquarters as an unofficial air staff[n 38] to lay out a plan that would increase the Air Corps to 50,000 men by June 1941. The expansion program of the Air Corps was characterized by repeated upward revision of goals for increasing aircraft production, combat unit totals, the training of new personnel, and construction of new bases. New combat groups were created by detaching cadres from the existing 15 Regular groups to provide the core of the new units, with each older group providing the basis for an average of three new groups. Graduates of an expanded flight training program filled out the new groups and replaced the experienced personnel transferred from the older groups, resulting in a steady decline in the overall level of experience in the operational units.[82][83] In essence, groups "self-trained"[84] to proficiency standards set by training directives from the GHQAF.[85] Unable to keep pace with the revised programs for expansion of combat groups, unit tactical training for all groups suffered from a shortage of equipment (particularly combat aircraft), an unavoidable preoccupation with administrative details during organization, and a lack of training facilities, especially bombing and gunnery ranges, leaving a "vast gap between the desired status of training in combat units and their actual status immediately prior to ... Pearl Harbor."[86]

The initial 25-Group Program for air defense of the hemisphere, developed in April 1939, called for 50,000 men (12,000 pilots). Its ten new combat groups were activated on 1 February 1940.[n 39] Following the successful German invasion of France and the Low Countries in May 1940, a 54-Group Program was approved on 12 July,[87][n 40] although funding approval could not keep pace and only 25 additional groups were activated on 15 January 1941.[88] An 84-Group Program, with an eventual goal of 400,000 men by 30 June 1942, was approved on 14 March 1941, although not publicly announced until 23 October 1941.[89][n 41][90] In addition to unit training and funding problems, these programs were hampered by delays in acquiring the new infrastructure necessary to support them, sites for which had to be identified, negotiated and approved before construction. The General Staff again was unwilling to assign any of this work to the Air Corps, and instead detailed it to the overtaxed Quartermaster Corps. When the QMC failed to put new air bases in place in either an efficient or timely manner, the Corps of Engineers was then assigned the task, although it continued to implement the policies already in place.[91][n 42]

By the time the Europeans went to war in September 1939, the Americans first expansion lagged so distantly in relation to its goals in manpower and tactical aircraft that Andrews described the Air Corps as a "fifth rate air force."[92] Of its 1,500 combat aircraft, only 800 were rated as first-line, 700 of which became obsolete by December 1941.[n 43]By comparison, the RAF had 1,750 first-line aircraft and the German Luftwaffe 3,750. Moreover, the Luftwaffe had more personnel on the staffs of its headquarters and air ministry than were in the entire Air Corps (26,000). The first-line aircraft that would soon be considered obsolete were the B-18, A-17, and P-36. The only first-line aircraft in 1939 that remained so during World War II was the B-17, and it had to be significantly modernized before it was combat-capable.

The acceleration of the expansion programs resulted in an Air Corps of 156 installations of all types and 100,000 men by the end of 1940.[93] Twenty civilian flight schools and eight technical training schools were contracted to provide additional training facilities, and on 10 August 1940, Pan American Airways was contracted to provide meteorological and navigation training at Coral Gables, Florida, until military schools could be established.[94]



Some aircraft cost info (I won't swear to it's gospel accuracy)
Statistics from Flight Journal magazine.

THE PRICE OF VICTORY (cost of an aircraft in WWII dollars)

B-17 $204,370.
B-24 $215,516.
B-25 $142,194.
B-26 $192,426.
B-29 $605,360.
P-38 $97,147. .
P-40 $44,892.
P-47 $85,578.
P-51 $51,572.
C-47 $88,574.
PT-17 $15,052.
AT-6 $22,952
 
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Well fighters look cheap so buy a lot of them :)

Basically I would start talking to RAF and Navy as much as possible, to learn fighter direction and lessons of BoB and bombing Germany. As well as set up a trial to work out the best way to kill ships testing torpedoes :p and different types of bombing and bombs...
 
cost.jpg
 
Well fighters look cheap so buy a lot of them :)

Basically I would start talking to RAF and Navy as much as possible, to learn fighter direction and lessons of BoB

Gordon Saville took over the reins from Claire Chennault in determining fighter defense protocols, and spent time observing the same doctrine in the RAF, and writing a treatise, "Air Defence Doctrine" which was not approved or published at that time. Elements of his doctrine were incorporated and espoused in official circulars only days after Pearl Harbor. Had this doctrine been embraced in a timely fashion, Saville's student, Bergquist was already emplaced in Oahu to organize a defense system.
 
Going with hardware, the P-51 is obviously a safe bet. So, the POD for the P-51 would mean that USAAC does not drag their feet when XP-51 is received for testing at 24th August 1941. By late 1941, the test results should be clear, and NAA gets the contract. The NAA also gets contract for the P-51 prototype with Packard Merlin engine. Mustang will need another production source, so NAA Dallas will produce them, too, hopefully from mid-1942 on. At Inglewood, production line churns out the Allison-powered P-51s, while Dallas produces Merin-powered version. Both plumbed for drop tanks.
Over-seas service with, now, USAAF should be early 1943 for the former, Spring of 1943 for the later. Before that, both 2-stage V-1710 and 2-stage Merlin versions fly as prototypes.
 
Fewer turrets on bombers and more fast bombers like B-26 and A-26.

More Budd Conestoga transports to resupply front-line troops via Low Altitude Parachute Extraction System. LAPPS would increase the accuracy and tonnage of cargo drops to beleaguered WALLY troops.
Issue rucksacks to paratroopers
Issue more Johnson light machine guns to paratroopers.
Issue steerable Russel Lobe parachutes to path-finders.
Have (French SAS) Leo Valentine teach French free-fall techniques to pathfinders and artillery spotters.
 
Fewer turrets on bombers and more fast bombers like B-26 and A-26.
....

The B-26 introduced plenty of problems that really fast bombers had, like the problematic low-speed handling, while the speed was not that spectacular - 323 mph max, before they started fiddling with wings and started adding guns. Early B-25s were barely slower, at 315 mph. The Do-217 was faster on lower engine power, same bombload vs. range capability and no vices.
I'd forget the B-26 all together, the POD is earlier than the B-26 prototype 1st flight anyway. Let Martin produces B-25s under license, while giving NAA project for a R-2800-powered version of the B-25? Martin's design department can focus on the 4-engined bomber, in the vein of the (X)B-33, but with R-2800s, both as a step froward vs. B-17/24, and as a fall-back if B-29 encounteres problems.
 
Jets are indeed the near future when looked from mid-1940.

That gets us to what does not get produced. No P&W R-4360, Pratt & Whitney will try and design a jet engine. So will Allison, no double V-1710 (the V-3420); the USAAC accepts Allison's proposal for 2-stage and fuel-injected V-1710 and funds that properly. Wright will not embark on the Tornado money pit, but try their best to iron out the R-3350 that is needed for future big bombers. Chrysler's V16 engine, the V-2200 does not receive any funds, Other players in jet business are General Electric and Westinghouse.
USAAC tries to keep a look at USN-sponsored developments of R-2600 and R-2800. As per OTL, Packard's deal with RR is made.
 
Jet engine development was a big secret, and Westinghouse Gas Turbine Division wasn't in on it. They developed their engines largely independently, for the Navy, and did fairly well to a diameter of 34 inches, and that's where they should have stopped. Pratt and Whitney got their foot in the door by producing Westinghouse engines.

That Ford engine might have been very interesting, whereas the plethora of bizarre piston engine developments, and R-40C bizarre aircraft based on those engines, including the Fisher Eagle, could easily be forgotten, although they were certainly interesting.
 
I'll admit that jet engines are not a subject that I've read a lot about, so I'll bow to the superior knowledge.

The 'bizzare' engines include the USAAC-sponsored and partially developed Lycoming and Continental 'hi-per' engines - good riddance. Ditto for P-75. Fisher Body can continue with production of bolts & nuts for other weapons of war, as per otl; the P-51, P-47 and P-38 will do the long range work. The impetus for the USAAC embracing escort fighter concept should be the lessons of the upcoming BoB.

On P-47: good concept, that almost got killed when the P-47B was proven as a hazzard to pilots due to weak rear fuselage and fabric-covered ailerons. So continue with P-47 project, test it more than it was IOTL, plumb for wind drop tanks, use the slack between main fuel tank and upper part of fuselage so that P-47C of late 1942 has 370 gals of fuel + drop tanks, as it was with 1944 models of P-47D. All engine producers need to explore water injection, after all the experiments with it were undertaken in the USA in 1920s.
 
On P-47: good concept, that almost got killed when the P-47B was proven as a hazzard to pilots due to weak rear fuselage and fabric-covered ailerons.
My understanding was that the incident where chief test pilot Burrell died was caused by deformation and shredding of the fabric covering of the elevators, not a fuselage weakness or aileron problem. Kartvelli took it quite personal, and took to metal covering of flight controls. This would have been a good time to invent or re-invent the stabilator, or employ the stabilizer trim system as well.
 

Driftless

Donor
Looking at the cost charts (post #5), I can understand the stiff cost for the twin engine P-38. Why is the P-47 so much more expensive than it's other single-engine counterparts?
 
SOrt out near duplicit desings.
Produce only few basic engine desings lines. Clearly Marlin is there some Radial too and R-3350 Duplex-Cyclone.
 
ThunderboltP44.png

It was contrary to policy at the time, but one could wonder what could be done with a Thunderbolt without a turbocharger. Like the P-38, they were designed to perform in the stratosphere, but were never equipped with a pressurized cockpit, and spent much of their service life at lower altitudes.
 
Looking at the cost charts (post #5), I can understand the stiff cost for the twin engine P-38. Why is the P-47 so much more expensive than it's other single-engine counterparts?

The price of the Jug wasn't unfavorably priced compared to the Corsair, but had extra expenses to pay to General Electric, and the tin-bangers/plumbers.

You can also compare the price of the B-26 with the B-17. The B-24 was also more costly than the Fortress, but was heavier. Some things cost by the pound.
 
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