AHC: Worst possible large airforce for WW2?

To quote Tacitus "They have made a desert and call it peace".

If the WALLIED actually had those numbers of aircraft, the bases large enough to operate them, the trained crews for them, the maintenance crews to keep them running, and the factories producing spares and new behemoths (Even if it's at a much lower level production then say B17s/B24s it's at least enough production to make up for losses from accidents, enemy action, and just the general nature of the B36s and a bit extra to slowly increase the operatable force size) in say mid 1942 to early 1943 do you think that might be enough to actually get the Germans to surrender? Say a minimum of say 300-400 B36s doing at least one sortie per day. So say 300-400 B36s each carrying 50,000 pounds in pounds per day/night continously.

Do the Germans have any aircraft or Flak guns that could reach them? If not how long to bring them into oeration.

Did the B36s have radar guided bombing sights? That would be a mass improvement over Nordens or just "Put a 1,000 B17s in a box each carrying four 500 pound bombs and have them release at the same time and hope for the best.

Of course all of this is incredibly ASB.
 
Albert Speer claimed to have said to Goering that with three or four more Hamburg sized raids over a short period of time and Germany would have had to give in. How true that was I couldn't say.
 

tonycat77

Banned
I'm gonna play devil's advocate and say they'd be met by swarms of Ta-152, who had a ceiling of 49000 feet...
Once germany gets their version of the proximity fuse ( development was constantly halted, and only appeared in 1945), any attempt to bomb/nuke germany would be over.
If the WALLIED actually had those numbers of aircraft, the bases large enough to operate them, the trained crews for them, the maintenance crews to keep them running, and the factories producing spares and new behemoths (Even if it's at a much lower level production then say B17s/B24s it's at least enough production to make up for losses from accidents, enemy action, and just the general nature of the B36s and a bit extra to slowly increase the operatable force size) in say mid 1942 to early 1943 do you think that might be enough to actually get the Germans to surrender? Say a minimum of say 300-400 B36s doing at least one sortie per day. So say 300-400 B36s each carrying 50,000 pounds in pounds per day/night continously.

Do the Germans have any aircraft or Flak guns that could reach them? If not how long to bring them into oeration.

Did the B36s have radar guided bombing sights? That would be a mass improvement over Nordens or just "Put a 1,000 B17s in a box each carrying four 500 pound bombs and have them release at the same time and hope for the best.

Of course all of this is incredibly ASB.
B-36 doesn't make sense unless the isles fall, even so, i doubt a sustained bombing campaign would happen, the crew fatigue, engine failures for flying the atlantic, the maintenance nightmare that was the b-36, i don't see how even a dozen of them could be flown to sortie daily.
 
Go all in on "The bomber always gets through" concept? Ditch any real notion of fighters for defense or escort, and any other types of aircraft (recon, transport, etc) are strictly afterthoughts.
It was a standard belief in the late thirties, and into WW2. Both actual experience (Guernica) and media (What Happened to the Corbetts) suggested that aerial bombing of cities was a war-winner.
 
It was a standard belief in the late thirties, and into WW2. Both actual experience (Guernica) and media (What Happened to the Corbetts) suggested that aerial bombing of cities was a war-winner.
The idea was caused by the 2 problems: the first was that, in the late 20s early 30s, multiengined aircraft were flying higher and fast than single engined, and the fact there was no way to actually detect a bomber raid unless someone actually saw it coming, ie some lucky ground observer or a fighter that happened to be on CAP. But CAPs in those days, with those short ranged fighters, would mean having 100s of planes round the clock going up and down... so, virtually impossible. The result, at the eyes of most strategists was: the fast, high flying bombers will be over the cities before anyone can do anything.

Ofc, radar and better fighters put paid to these ideas, but would take the hard reality of 1939/140 (for the RAF and Luftwaffe at least) for this lesson to actually be learned.
 
Edit: which means the germans would very much have time to develop a high altitude fighter. In fact, without USAAF and RAF bombing, developing and building jet fighters would be a lot easier...
Not just jet fighters. The Ta-152 was a beautiful high-altitude aircraft piston-driven aircraft which could've butchered the B-36 variants available in the late-40s (though it would have struggled with some of the later ones that entered service in the 50s), and barely in service in 1945 (and it spent all of it's short service life playing guard duty to Me-262 airfields). Without the difficulties Germany was experiencing in '42-'45, it's entirely conceivable it could have been in service by '44.
 
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Not just jet fighters. The Ta-152 was a beautiful high-altitude aircraft piston-driven aircraft which could've butchered the B-36 variants available in the late-40s (though it would have struggled with some of the later ones that entered service in the 50s), and barely in service in 1945 (and it spent all of it's short service life playing guard duty to Me-262 airfields). Without the difficulties Germany was experiencing in '42-'45, it's entirely conceivable it could have been in service by '44.
I know, I posted it in #83 :winkytongue:
 
The idea was caused by the 2 problems: the first was that, in the late 20s early 30s, multiengined aircraft were flying higher and fast than single engined, and the fact there was no way to actually detect a bomber raid unless someone actually saw it coming, ie some lucky ground observer or a fighter that happened to be on CAP. But CAPs in those days, with those short ranged fighters, would mean having 100s of planes round the clock going up and down... so, virtually impossible. The result, at the eyes of most strategists was: the fast, high flying bombers will be over the cities before anyone can do anything.

Ofc, radar and better fighters put paid to these ideas, but would take the hard reality of 1939/140 (for the RAF and Luftwaffe at least) for this lesson to actually be learned.
Exactly. In fact if you read the theorists or even fiction of the period (I'm thinking of Thou Shell of Death as an example) there is discussion of these factors. The need for aircraft that could remain on station for many hours on end (hence also the interest in air-to-air refuelling) and systems like enhanced acoustic locators (e.g.the Dungeness mirrors and the beginnings of the ground control system that worked so well when RADAR was developed and added to the system).
 

Errolwi

Monthly Donor
The idea was caused by the 2 problems: the first was that, in the late 20s early 30s, multiengined aircraft were flying higher and fast than single engined, and the fact there was no way to actually detect a bomber raid unless someone actually saw it coming, ie some lucky ground observer or a fighter that happened to be on CAP. But CAPs in those days, with those short ranged fighters, would mean having 100s of planes round the clock going up and down... so, virtually impossible. The result, at the eyes of most strategists was: the fast, high flying bombers will be over the cities before anyone can do anything.

Ofc, radar and better fighters put paid to these ideas, but would take the hard reality of 1939/140 (for the RAF and Luftwaffe at least) for this lesson to actually be learned.
Here's a multi-post survey of the use of "the bomber will always get through" by historian Brett Holman.
 
Here's a multi-post survey of the use of "the bomber will always get through" by historian Brett Holman.
That's an excellent resource (I've used it for 'Scareships' material in the past) and coverage of the idea.
As I mentioned, the idea is also endemic in the fiction of the period, with threats of surprise air attack (usually using poison gas) being a common theme.
 
The best demonstration of how long this notion kept going comes from the US, with Disney's "Cictory Through Air Power", launched in 1942, showing us how heavily armed bombers will make short work of enemy fighters... two years after the war in Europe proved this didn't work. The poor USAAF crews would soon start learning this the hard way...
 
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