AHC: "Win" the War in Afghanistan Before 2005

Without total support from the Pakistanis in dealing with the Taliban in the FATA and the ISI completely declaring war on al-Qaeda and the Taliban and/or a very different war waged immediately after 911 by the U.S. and its allies there is no way to 'win' the war by 2005.

The way the war could have gone differently to allow for the near utter destruction of al-Qaeda and the Taliban is the Pakistanis and the Iranians to allow you to put troops on either border before the attack on the Taliban in Afghanistan. Given how damn scared Mushie and Iran were of us after 911 its possible. Then start the attack with about 300,000 U.S. and coalition troops sometime in 2002 and attack from the West and East so that the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan are caught between two large ground armies and end up being mostly annihilated.

Some of them will survive and eventually try to fight on in the mountains for years, but it would greatly delay them being able to fully reconstitute into the kind of insurgency they reformed into 7-8 years after the initial invasion. Afghanistan's biggest problem after the invasion no matter what the U.S. does in 2001 is no infrastructure and a population that would take a generation to be able to educate to form into the quality of army that say Iraq had by 2007.

The grand mistake in Afghanistan of going with a light footprint with a heavy focus on bombing and not troops on the ground and not securing the exist routes of Bin Laden and his aids and the Taliban leadership going to Pakistan and Zarqawi and his aids going to Iran and then Iraq had already been made by the end of 2001. A greater focus on Afghanistan and no Iraq War would have made virtually no difference at all in Afghanistan after that point unless Bush decided to invade Western Pakistan were the entire Taliban leadership had gone and were reconstituting.
 
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As usual, we discuss Counter Insurgency from the POV of wars that went badly, while ignoring the cases were the counter insurgency forces did win.
Government victories in Angola (beating UNITA for good and securing a peace that is holding) and Sri Lanka (lets hope that one holds, its been a few years of peace allready) might provide lessons on how to win.
Angola is an interesting case. After years of inconclusive civil war MPLA accepted a deal that removed UNITA's legitimacy, staging and winning internationaly observed elections, incorporated part of UNITA into the state and wiped out the parts of UNITA that didn't acept the electoral results with decisive (and merciless) military action.

Except this is comparing apples and oranges. While both are fruit they are different kind of fruit. The difference between US/NATO in Afghanistan and Sri Lankan government in Sri Lanka is that in latter case much more was a stake for them. Defeat in Afghanistan, Iraq, Vietnam.... for US means it can shrug its shoulders and go home. Defeat for SL gov't would mean a good chunk of their territory becoming independant (or gov't overthrown in other cases).

It's different ball game so not directly comparable.
 
Except this is comparing apples and oranges. While both are fruit they are different kind of fruit. The difference between US/NATO in Afghanistan and Sri Lankan government in Sri Lanka is that in latter case much more was a stake for them. Defeat in Afghanistan, Iraq, Vietnam.... for US means it can shrug its shoulders and go home. Defeat for SL gov't would mean a good chunk of their territory becoming independant (or gov't overthrown in other cases).

It's different ball game so not directly comparable.

And are you saying orange farmers can't learn a few lessons from apple farmers?
There are 1000 books on Vietnam (on how to loose) for each 1 on Angola (on how to win).
There are a number of lesson to be derived from Angola and Sri Lanka. If you stick to apples and say "Afghanistan is unique so no other lessons apply" you'll end up with a series of variations on an empty academic concept.
Lessons from Angola:
1. Isolate your opponent internationally.
2. Earn credibility by staging negotiations followed by real elections.
3. Once you have the political high ground strike fast and hard militarily until you finish the job.
And by the way, these lessons are valid for the intended afghan government. The war there will not be over when the Wallies leave, it will be over when one side hangs the other side leader from a lamp post, like it happened last time someone left.
So the US could phone someone in Cuba and ask them how they managed to make the MPLA so strong when they intervened in Angola in the 70s. No wait, they can't, because the Cubans are evil or something...
And yes, Angola was a political and ethnically diverse mess in 1974 with a neighbouring country messing things up.
 
And are you saying orange farmers can't learn a few lessons from apple farmers?
There are 1000 books on Vietnam (on how to loose) for each 1 on Angola (on how to win).
There are a number of lesson to be derived from Angola and Sri Lanka. If you stick to apples and say "Afghanistan is unique so no other lessons apply" you'll end up with a series of variations on an empty academic concept.
Lessons from Angola:
1. Isolate your opponent internationally.
2. Earn credibility by staging negotiations followed by real elections.
3. Once you have the political high ground strike fast and hard militarily until you finish the job.
And by the way, these lessons are valid for the intended afghan government. The war there will not be over when the Wallies leave, it will be over when one side hangs the other side leader from a lamp post, like it happened last time someone left.
So the US could phone someone in Cuba and ask them how they managed to make the MPLA so strong when they intervened in Angola in the 70s. No wait, they can't, because the Cubans are evil or something...
And yes, Angola was a political and ethnically diverse mess in 1974 with a neighbouring country messing things up.

I didn't say unique. What I said it's different cathegory. It's different game if you have government facing internal insurgency or foreign governent propping up their ally/puppet.

Some lessons apply to both, some don't. If you wish to apply lessons-learned they should apply to Afghan government, not NATO.
 
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