AHC: Win the Iran-Iraq War

And I say otherwise. Look at this then from an Iraqi, so we can dispel such myths. Direct evidence to the contrary, that they used the laser rangfinder.

Iraqi T-62s had laser rangefinders? I thought only their T-72s did. But it was so complicated to use most crews didn't.
 
Well wasn't the war a Iranian victory for the most part. Yes the conflict ended in a military stand still. But the war was geopolitical victory for them. They pushed back an invasion that was supported by both the USA and USSR, kept their country together and since then have grown in power to while Iraq is now their play thing.
the Iranians certainly didn't look at it like that. They suffered defeats on land at the hands of the Iraqis and in the Gulf at the hands of the USN. They were very demoralized at the end; an anonymous Iraqi soldier was quoted as saying 'they just don't fight like Iranians anymore'...
 
And I say otherwise. Look at this then from an Iraqi, so we can dispel such myths. Direct evidence to the contrary, that they used the laser rangfinder.

This isn't mathematics. A single counter-example does not disprove a larger pattern. Yes, those who knew how used their laser range finders tended to use them. But those who knew how to use their laser rangefinders were the exception and not the rule.

Also, completely lack of sourcing where that quote is from or even what specifically it's talking about.

And I find it hard to believe the Iraqis couldn't fight at night when the Syrians did in 1973.

"Couldn't" fight at night? No, they could fight at night as the Syrians did. They had to, after all. The problem is that the Iraqis, like the Syrians, sucked at it.

In some cases waiting for orders meant they got encircled, but sometimes early war the order was given to withdraw, and the escaped encirclement by the Iranians. The Iraqis were more than capable of retrograde operations, it was simply high command not passing down orders that resulted in them being surrounded in much the same way Stalin made Soviet forces stand their ground and not withdraw. And as to them not having sentries here is this

If your battalions are waiting for orders from the High Command even after a 9 year war in which you have had ample time to accrue a cadre of experienced junior and mid-level officers who, repeatedly, prove unable to apply their massive advantages in firepower and maeneuver then your army is royally fucked up. The comparison with the Soviets falls flat when you realized that the Soviets showed massive improvement not just strategically, but operationally and tactically as early as after the first year of war. The Iraqis conspicuously failed to show any level of improvement despite nearly a decade of all-out war anywhere below the strategic level.

And, I can't speak for every Iraqi, but some of the Iraqis on the coalition flanks didn't just sit there when coalition tanks starting bypassing them, they attacked (and got massacred when they did).

No Iraqi Division attacked the Coalition on their own initiative, with only the Republican Guards Corps mounted a major counterattack and only after being explicitly ordered by the Iraqis High Command. Spearheading the counter-attack was the single best division in the entire Iraqis Army, the Tawakalnah'alla Allah. Their gunnery was only slightly better than the regular army (so poor, rather than atrocious), their armoured tactics were still limited mainly to sitting in place and firing, although a small number of Tawakalnah's tanks did attempt to "stalk" American tanks, which is the reason why Tawakalnah actually knocked out a handful of Abrams (which was immune to the T-72s gun from the front). But even Tawakalnah clung too long to its defensive positions, and failed to consolidate or counter-attack when the opportunity presented. Even the execution of the counterattacks were disjointed, poorly organized, and uncoordinated, and hence were easily defeated. And also Republican Guard artillery, even Tawakalnah's four artillery battalions, proved unable to adjust fire or conduct counter-battery fire and so proved ineffective in battle. They did buy enough time for the rest of the Iraqis army to escape the Coalition trap, which was the Iraqis intent, but they did so entirely by making the Coalition take the time to kill them and not through any tactical skill.

And that really sums it up. Even the best of the Republican Guard were still atrociously amateurish when compared to western soldiers... or the Iranians.

And as to them not having sentries here is this

Another vague and unsourced quote.

And unless commanders were one of Saddam's favorite and could do no wrong, failure was punished by death, and as I have said the Iraqis did not show initiative for the most part as a result of extenuating circumstances outside their control.

Despite the American imposition of a completely different military system, the problems afflicting the modern Iraqi force are the same as those that crippled Saddam's troops. Rampant deception up the chain of command, an unwillingness to take action or use initiative all the way up to the division level and beyond, a complete inability to deal with surprise, a lack of tactical ability to use the capability of the weapons provided, and a requirement to have detailed and deliberate plans drawn up for every step of an operation to have any chance of success... all are just as much a problem right now as they were in 1979... or 1988... or 1991... or 2003. So no, you can't blame it on Saddam. Otherwise, the problems would have died with him.
 
No Iraqi Division attacked the Coalition on their own initiative, with only the Republican Guards Corps mounted a major counterattack and only after being explicitly ordered by the Iraqis High Command.

Counterattack?? From what I've read the Tawakalnah, like other RG divisions, was only sent to the ridge on Kuwait's western border to establish defenses in a reverse slope position. The idea was to try to stop/slow the coalition advance not throw it back.
But the Iraqi 3rd division did counterattack the Marines in Kuwait, with abysmal results.


Spearheading the counter-attack was the single best division in the entire Iraqis Army, the Tawakalnah'alla Allah. Their gunnery was only slightly better than the regular army (so poor, rather than atrocious), their armoured tactics were still limited mainly to sitting in place and firing, although a small number of Tawakalnah's tanks did attempt to "stalk" American tanks, which is the reason why Tawakalnah actually knocked out a handful of Abrams (which was immune to the T-72s gun from the front).

Yeah that's Pollack's version. But in M1 Abrams vs T-72 Ural, Zaloga didn't mention the stalking and alleged four knockouts.
 
Counterattack?? From what I've read the Tawakalnah, like other RG divisions, was only sent to the ridge on Kuwait's western border to establish defenses in a reverse slope position. The idea was to try to stop/slow the coalition advance not throw it back.

Yes, counter-attack. Counter-attacks are a fundamental aspect of modern defense and one cannot expect to halt or even slow the enemy without them. It is true that the first thing the Tawakalnah upon contact with VII Corps did was establish a defensive position on a reverse-slope, but that also is not unique: defensive positions provide bases from which to launch counter-attacks as well. And yes, the Tawakalnah did its job. It delayed VII Corps with the most vicious fighting of the war for just long enough for the rest of the army to escape. The price paid was the almost total annihilation of the division, which did not surrender and died almost to a man.

But the Tawakalnah still fought with far less skill than any western formation. While the infantry and tanks were deployed and fought together, their positions were usually poorly thought out and haphazard with a number of the division's battalions deploying far too close to the crest of the ridge to take full advantage of the position. While the Tawakalnah did aggressively counter attack rather than sitting stationary in its defensive positions, the bulk of the counter attacks were just head on charges into the teeth of American firepower and showed no sophistication nor higher co-ordination, generally being conducted as spastic, desperate company level efforts rather than a coordinated battalion or brigade level effort.

Essentially Tawakalnah had the right idea but still executed its tactics like amateurs. They scored more success than any other regular or guard division (the Hammurabi and Nebuchadnezzar divisions proved measurably easier to handle than the Tawakalnah in later engagements) but only in a relative sense. The gulf in tactical ability between the Iraqi's best and their Coalition opponents was still vast.

But the Iraqi 3rd division did counterattack the Marines in Kuwait, with abysmal results.

Eh, I wouldn't be surprised if there were some other poorly coordinated sub-divisional level attacks which were pushed with even less enthusiasm and skill then the Tawakalnah. But as I observed earlier, military history isn't mathematic. The occasional counter-example does not disprove an assessment of a military's capabilities when pitted against a much vaster array of actual examples.

Yeah that's Pollack's version. But in M1 Arams vs T-72 Ural, Zaloga didn't mention the stalking and alleged four knockouts.

Just because Zaloga doesn't mention the stalking doesn't mean it didn't happen and thus doesn't really contradict Pollack. The reality is that stalking is the primary method for tanks to hunt other tanks and on the few occasions the Tawakalnah managed to do it, they inflicted heavier armored losses on the Coalition then any other force in the war.
 
If I recall the course of the war correctly the first two years or so the Iraqis had the advantage then the Iranias forced them on the backfoot then it was a stalemate then the Iraqis were returning to the offensive and Iran was taking a beating from chemical missiles by 1988.

We'll say Saddam doesn't accede to the ceasefire and continues to pummel the Iranians as the Iraqis rebuild themselves getting aid from basically everywhere except maybe China and North Korea.

The Iranians throw everything into the fray but the Iraqis keep pushing and pushing and eventually the Arab Khuzestan falls and the Zagros mountains are breached.

Khomeini probably either died of a heartattack or is overthrown.

Iraq claims victory by 1990-1991.
 
Iraqi T-62s had laser rangefinders? I thought only their T-72s did. But it was so complicated to use most crews didn't.


In Certain Victory: The U.S. Army in the Gulf War, the author makes this point. However the Iraqi T-55QM of an older Soviet model as one example had a laser range finder. I mean it is being said that the Iraqi army are so incapable, despite the fact many of them clearly learned how to pilot aircraft, I find it hard to believe. Extraordinary claims demand extraordinary proof, Pollack only has proof the early war Iraqi army didn't use their "lead computing sights" despite how nonsensical that sounds. If they didn't use their sights then how in the world did they fire the tank gun with any accuracy at all

This isn't mathematics. A single counter-example does not disprove a larger pattern. Yes, those who knew how used their laser range finders tended to use them. But those who knew how to use their laser rangefinders were the exception and not the rule.

Also, completely lack of sourcing where that quote is from or even what specifically it's talking about.

Saddam's Generals: Perspectives of the Iran-Iraq War

There is no larger pattern as the authors that are Pollacks sources are talking about specific time frames. However, Pollack left this little detail out. They were published in 1982 and 1984 before the war was even near being over. And you mention about mathematics, what do you think one of those surveys was done by. They interview some Iraqis about it.

No T-72 until the T-72B in 1985 even had a ballistics computer though. So the Iraqis were out of luck there

"Couldn't" fight at night? No, they could fight at night as the Syrians did. They had to, after all. The problem is that the Iraqis, like the Syrians, sucked at it.

The Arabs only lost twice as many tanks as the Israelis during that war FYI. And in The Heights of Courage: A Tank Leader's War On the Golan the Syrian tanks it was very evident they were a match at night for their Israelis despite the fact that they were on the attack and were at the disadvantage. And by that way there is an example of a Syrian tank lasing a Israeli tank at night.

If your battalions are waiting for orders from the High Command even after a 9 year war in which you have had ample time to accrue a cadre of experienced junior and mid-level officers who, repeatedly, prove unable to apply their massive advantages in firepower and maeneuver then your army is royally fucked up. The comparison with the Soviets falls flat when you realized that the Soviets showed massive improvement not just strategically, but operationally and tactically as early as after the first year of war. The Iraqis conspicuously failed to show any level of improvement despite nearly a decade of all-out war anywhere below the strategic level.

I mean they could have disobeyed Saddam's orders, sure, but they'd risk ending up in a dark cellar somewhere wishing they hadn't. The problem is is that the Iraqis didn't even need to show as much of an improvement because they were already demonstrably military capable from the get go despite the fact that they had the same authoritarian command paradigm. The Iraqis did NOT face the level of military disaster the Soviets did. I've read the details of their opening campaign against Iran and though they weren't perfect they were far far from incompetent either. They ran into heavy enemy resistance and outran their logistics against an enemy who knew what they were doing and that on paper absolutely should have beat them. And by wars end the only thing stopping the Iraqis from marching to Tehran was the mountains that stood in their way to get there and the logistics to get them there. The similarity between the Soviets and the Iraqis is that they had a Stalin/Saddam problem and the resulting detrimental effects on Iraqi commanders. The Iraqis proved to be at least as capable of overcoming this than the Soviets were, going so far as to launch what amounted to a revolt against Saddam and his stranglehold over the army.

No Iraqi Division attacked the Coalition on their own initiative, with only the Republican Guards Corps mounted a major counterattack and only after being explicitly ordered by the Iraqis High Command. Spearheading the counter-attack was the single best division in the entire Iraqis Army, the Tawakalnah'alla Allah. Their gunnery was only slightly better than the regular army (so poor, rather than atrocious), their armoured tactics were still limited mainly to sitting in place and firing, although a small number of Tawakalnah's tanks did attempt to "stalk" American tanks, which is the reason why Tawakalnah actually knocked out a handful of Abrams (which was immune to the T-72s gun from the front). But even Tawakalnah clung too long to its defensive positions, and failed to consolidate or counter-attack when the opportunity presented. Even the execution of the counterattacks were disjointed, poorly organized, and uncoordinated, and hence were easily defeated. And also Republican Guard artillery, even Tawakalnah's four artillery battalions, proved unable to adjust fire or conduct counter-battery fire and so proved ineffective in battle. They did buy enough time for the rest of the Iraqis army to escape the Coalition trap, which was the Iraqis intent, but they did so entirely by making the Coalition take the time to kill them and not through any tactical skill.

And that really sums it up. Even the best of the Republican Guard were still atrociously amateurish when compared to western soldiers... or the Iranians.

They were not poorly organized the US advanced through the Iraqis almost as if they weren't there with trivial ease while systematically targeting all their reconnaissance elements and annihilating them, there is no actual evidence they were poorly organized. I will admit they were not as skilled as the Americans (although probably more experienced in battle up until that point). Limited mainly to sitting in place and firing? These were low performance T-72s not the US tanks (a difference like the F-22 to a MiG) but that went right out the window as soon as the US tanks appeared on the horizon and started pounding them with precision firepower in a matter of seconds. They weren't even aware the US tanks were that close because air power had neutralized their security perimeter, and because of air strikes they were OUTSIDE their tanks when the US crested the horizon, proceeding to massacre them like fish in a barrel. Their defenses folded like it was made of glass. There was no "tactical skill" to it. They might as well had been using T-34s for all the good it would have done them. Either the coalition tanks sniped the Iraqis outside their range, they used their vastly superior automated FCS to aimbot the Iraqis as they crested the horizon, all the while the Iraqis were firing at tank shots obscured by the dust storms because they couldn't actually see the tanks firing at them, the coalition aircraft etc. Rumaila, 73 Easting, doesn't matter where or when the results are the same. Not even a military genius could have given the Iraqis a chance in this world of doing anything other than die. And as you say even in the handful of times they were able to hit US tanks they had little effect.They faced an enemy with total air supremacy, and who had undergone the precision revolution, who was picking them a part with air strikes. The T-72 used by the Iraqis didn't stand a chance against an Abrams, or US air power, no matter how you try and spin it.

And their artillery units were modeled after Soviet units which incidentally had some of the same problems as the Soviets in Afghanistan, not that this matters, because again US artillery was vastly, revolutionary would be perhaps a better word, more advanced. And it is kind of hard to make effective use of your artillery when the enemy has total air supremacy anyways, has spy satellites, and can pick you off with trivial ease at their leisure.

Another vague and unsourced quote.

Jayhawk! The VII Corps in the Persian Gulf War

Despite the American imposition of a completely different military system, the problems afflicting the modern Iraqi force are the same as those that crippled Saddam's troops. Rampant deception up the chain of command, an unwillingness to take action or use initiative all the way up to the division level and beyond, a complete inability to deal with surprise, a lack of tactical ability to use the capability of the weapons provided, and a requirement to have detailed and deliberate plans drawn up for every step of an operation to have any chance of success... all are just as much a problem right now as they were in 1979... or 1988... or 1991... or 2003. So no, you can't blame it on Saddam. Otherwise, the problems would have died with him.

When you have an army that has massive amounts of units retreating from a small band of militia that has already fired all the parts of the army who were loyal to Saddam that made up the lion share of the military professionals that was seen in the Iraqi army, many of whom were now in ISIS, are we really going to try and pass that military failure off to the army as it was under Saddam. In what world does that make sense...
 
I forgot to mention in my last post there was also another source that Pollack missed circa 1984 by Major Martin J. Martinson, possibly because it contradicts what he wanted to convey. Neither side maintained their gun-sights or fire-control systems early war

Each side had several thousand tanks of differing origins at the start
of the war, many of which were involved in several armor versus armor
engagements. The victories achieved by either side were attributable not so
much to the effectiveness of the armor and armament of the vehicles, but
more to the proper selection of terrain and tactics. Analysts report that
neither side has been able to maintain their sophisticated gun-sights and
fire-control systems. Therefore, most of the engagements have been at
ranges of only 200-300 meters instead of the expected 1200-1500 meters. At
these distances, the armor is well-within the effective range of hand-held
and ground-mounted anti-armor assets. The Iraqi problems with the T-62's
were mainly with the lead-computing sights while the M-60's and Chieftains
of the Iranian Army were prone to maintenance problems. David Rosser-Owen
in his article "Lessons of the Iran-Iraq War" reported that the Iraqis were
more impressed by the Chieftains than they were the M-60's, but that their
Soviet equipment was best, especially the T-72's.4 Neither force was able to
consistently employ its sophisticated ground-based systems. The Iraqis
surface-to-surface missiles, SCUD-B's, and FROG-7's, have only been employed
on a few occasions and then, only to hit large targets such as cities or
military bases. On the Iranian side, it was not until the 1982 Spring
Offensive that they were able to effectively employ their TOW and DRAGON
anti-tank guided missiles.
This has not been a tank-versus-tank war. With the exceptions of the
initial Iraqi attack, the Iranian counterattack at Susangerd, and a few
other battles, most of the engagements involving armored vehicles have been
between light armored vehicles. Due to the unsuitable terrain in Khuzistan,
which is marshy ground criss-crossed by canals and rivers, and the
difficulty that the adversaries have had in maintaining their main battle
tanks,Iran and Iraq have come to rely more heavily on armored fighting
vehicles.6 Iraq has a variety of these vehicles but relies most heavily on
the Brazilian Engessa EE-9 Cascavels. Baghdad was apparently pleased with
this vehicle's performance because it signed a contract in November 1981,
worth $250 million. Brazilian officials reported that up to 2,000
Cascavels, EE-11 Urutu armored personnel carriers and EE-3 Jaracara armored
cars had seen action in the war. In addition to providing the vehicles, the
contract provides at least five year's worth of parts.

More like treble.
These are the numbers in any case

Israelis: 1,063 tanks lost

Arab armies: 2,250–2,300 tanks lost
 
The war could've been a clean cut Iranian victory if after the expulsion of Iraqi units from Iranian territory in '82 they had negotiated an armistice. Both countries would've been ended up far better than OTL if that had been the case.
 
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