AHC/WI : Yugoslav Coup in 1941 fails

What if the coup of 1941 fails and that Pavle Karađorđević remains in power?

How would it be possible? An earlier and more harsh repression of Yugoslavian communists? More subtile diplomacy?

What would be the consequences, namely on what happens on the Greek and Russian fronts? I don't really buy the "Without the delay, Hitler would take Moscow ITTL" cliché, but would it be significant changes?
Without compensations in Dalmatia and de facto control of part of ex-Yugoslavia, would Italy be that tied to the German alliance?
 
The Communists had no important role in the March 1941 coup. As for more subtle diplomacy...not sure how much room there really is for more subtlety and less commitment. Prince-Regent Pavle's regime was already extremely reluctant and slow to align itself to the Axis; might be that it wasn't even possible to get less binding and publicly more acceptable terms from Germany than OTL's.

The key to preventing or crushing the coup would IMO be to remove some elements in the military. Like if General Mirković (the chief architect of the coup) if forced into retirement before 1941, the anti-Axis sentiments in the military would remain pretty widespread, but they would most likely be too indecisive and directionless to actually try something.
And the anti-Axis sentiments in the population itself were less of a problem - they caused demonstrations and riots, but they couldn't really turn into a revolution. In time they would likely lose their energy as it becomes clear that Yugoslavia would not be required to actively participate in the Axis war effort.

Another way - make some improvements on the Kingdom of Yugoslavia's political scene that would make the Regency more popular overall. A good first step for Pavle might have been to invite the collective United Opposition into the government in 1939. But that's a complicated question.

A German general estimated that Barbarossa would have started 2 weeks earlier without a war against Yugoslavia, but he might have been wrong there. I remember reading on this forum that apparently the Germans would have had to delay the invasion to around June 22 anyway due to all the floods.
 
The key question here is how exactly and what would lead to a coup conceived by the entire army fail? Who can oppose them and with what means? If the timing had been a bit different, say coup delayed for a week and i.e. German forces are already passing through Yugoslavia it might be prevented. However, as it was, it was impossible...

With or without operation Punishment and ensuing campaign, Barbarossa was not possible earlier. Logistics were not in place, training of Panzer divisions was ongoing, rasputitsa ended later that year and major rivers represented significant obstacles.
 
The Communists had no important role in the March 1941 coup

....

A German general estimated that Barbarossa would have started 2 weeks earlier without a war against Yugoslavia, but he might have been wrong there. I remember reading on this forum that apparently the Germans would have had to delay the invasion to around June 22 anyway due to all the floods.

We're the Germans even aware that the soviets in center European Russia was going Thru on of its yearly deluge of the spring rainy seasons?
 
Even without the Balkans operations and without the spring floods, the Germans could not have started Barbarossa substantially before June 22 because of equipment shortages. To quote Martin L. Van Creveld, *Hitler's Strategy 1940-1941: The Balkan Clue* (Cambridge University Press 1973), pp. 173-4:


"Halder's diary bristles with references to various units, none of which
had anything to do with the Balkans, and whose equipment and training
were not yet complete as late as the end of May 1941. Long before the
Yugoslav campaign was in sight an entry reads 'the conversion of tanks
into underwater tanks will require 12 weeks.' Allow another few days for
transportation and 'Barbarossa', for which these machines were vital,
could not start before the first days of June...

"Throughout May Halder was recording the difficulties encountered in
supplying such diverse units as 100th armoured brigade, 13th, 17th and
18th armoured divisions and 14th and 18th motorized divisions, units
which may have had nothing in common except for the fact that they had
not been connected in any way with the Balkan campaign.
"Indeed, it is hardly possible to open a history of any 'fast' unit that
took part in the war against Russia without being struck by the
belatedness with which it was supplied with its full motor vehicle park.
Thus, the so-called Panzerzüge [freight trains adapted to carrying and
rapidly unloading armor and materials for use in occupying bridges,
strongholds, etc.]; before the Yugoslav coup it had been decided five of
these should be constructed but they were not ready for transportation to
the east until mid-June, after finally receiving French supplies. The
10th motorized division did not receive its equipment until after
marching east on 10 June, and even then the vehicles had to be collected
piecemeal from...Germany, Belgium, Holland and France!...Indeed, the
problems created by the general shortage of equipment, particularly motor
vehicles, were not limited to only the 'fast' units. At the time of the
German offensive against Russia, no less than 92--or 40 percent--of the
army divisions had to be supplied, wholly or in part, with French
material. Since the losses in material resulting from the Balkan
campaign were extremely limited, it is quite clear that lack of equipment
of all kinds would have prevented 'Barbarossa' from starting before the
end of June even if neither 'Marita' nor '25' [the Greek and Yugoslav
operations] had come into the world."
 
We're the Germans even aware that the soviets in center European Russia was going Thru on of its yearly deluge of the spring rainy seasons?

I think so...the problem was not just central Russia, parts of Poland were flooded and barely passable as well.
 
Even without the Balkans operations and without the spring floods, the Germans could not have started Barbarossa substantially before June 22 because of equipment shortages. To quote Martin L. Van Creveld, *Hitler's Strategy 1940-1941: The Balkan Clue* (Cambridge University Press 1973), pp. 173-4:

Stockings and Hancock, in "Swastika over the Acropolis" while quoting Van Creveld themselves appear less certain. To quote:

"As a consequence of the speed of the Yugoslav capitulation, the duration of large-scale German military involvement in the Balkans was inevitably
set by the length of time it took to capture Greece. It was not by coincidence
that Barbarossa start date was confirmed only at the end of the Greek
campaign (late April). The invasion of the USSR could not, and would
never be launched until the successful conclusion of this campaign, and
the subsequent invasion of Crete which itself was contingent on, and an
extension of, Operation Marita. It is here, perhaps, that one might look to
the weather. After all, the late thaw of 1941 delayed the opening of the
Bulgarian passes and slowed the 12th Army’s concentration—delaying the
start of Marita, with an inevitable impact on Barbarossa. All German units
from the Balkans, in particular motorized or mechanized formations,
needed a minimum of three weeks for refitting after the campaigns in
Yugoslavia and Greece ended. So too, it would take time for the 8th Air
Corps to redeploy in preparation for Barbarossa after Crete had been taken—
and the Crete operation was approved by Hitler before the Barbarossa
start date was confirmed on 30 April. Such factors were known to
Brauchitsch and his staff in the first week of April in a way that the weather
and other equipment-related considerations could only be guessed at
or estimated. The inescapable conclusion is that it was perhaps not exclusively, but certainly primarily Operation Marita that delayed the beginning
of Barbarossa until 22 June 1941."

The other point though here is that not having a Yugoslav coup is decidedly in the favour... of the allies. Since German troops were not to enter Yugoslavia under the Yugoslav-German treaty there is neither 2nd Panzer flanking the Metaxas line to drive on Salonica nor XL corps to drive into the Monastir gap. The Germans will breach the Metaxas line, they were in the process of doing so when it got flanked, but it is going to be costlier and slower and puts the German breakthroughs way further east. This in turn means more time for the Greek army of Albania to pull back and stronger allied defences in the Aliakmon line as no redeployments to cover the Monastir gap happened. Put all of it together and you probably manage to save at least Crete and a fraction of veteran Greek troops by the time the campaign is over.
 
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