AHC/WI: The West intervenes pro-Nagy or pro-Dubcek?

What would be the consequences of the West intervening on the side of the democratic (or democratic socialist) forces of Imre Nagy in 1956 and/or of Alexander Dubček in 1968? I don't think this would inevitably cause World War III.

Also, why did the West not intervene in OTL at all and let tanks crush civilian demonstrators and let Moscow commit a lot of human rights violations?
 
Seriously? Why would Western Forces invading a Warsaw Pact country to support counterrevolutionaries agents of the west cause World War Three?

Sorry for being unclear. The original poster said he didn't think it would cause WW3. I agree with you.
 
The west did much to incite the hungarian revolution. End when it happened they actually went and told the Soviets they have a free hand in Hungary. Its true that they had more important things to do in Egypt (Suez crisis). Anyway as a hungarian i simply cant forgive the west the way it handled the whole situation. If they had no intention to support Hungary they shouldnt have incited it to rebellion against their Soviet owerlords to begin with.

Also leaving the morals aside. Hungary had announced leaving the Warsaw pact and the soviet forces started to leave the country. WWIII could have been threatened by the west as well in the event of Soviet return. The west instead assured the soviets that it considers Hungary as part of the soviet sphere of interest.
 
Diplomatic pressure, economic sanctions (although in 1956 not so sure how they would work, by 1967 Soviets were buying food from the west), sure. Actual military intervention on behalf of the Hungarians or Czechs, nope. Had there been a communist insurrection in Greece, for example, in 1956 and the Soviets had entered Greece across the Bulgarian border, what do you think the NATO response would have been? The pro-Soviet elements in Hungary (and Czechoslovakia) were seen as the "legitimate" government of those countries requesting "fraternal assistance" from counter revolutionaries and NATO/US military intervention would be seen as an invasion. For the WP as well NATO the mantra was "an attack on one is an attack on all".

Had NATO/US forces entered Hungary or Czechoslovakia very rapidly you'd have US and Soviet forces shooting at each other. That will almost certainly escalate. In 1956 this would end badly for the USSR although the USA and especially Europe would take a hit. In 1967, things suck for everyone although worse for WP than NATO but still...

With the Suez situation, the UK & France busy with Egypt and the USA at odds with Britain and France, even had Ike wanted to pressure the Soviets in 1956 over Hungary he was not in a good position to do so. In 1956, putting a lot of pressure on the USSR short of war is only possible if Suez does not happen. In 1967 the USA is completely bogged down in Vietnam and is a really bad position vis a vis the USSR for any potential conventional military confrontation meaning nukes would tend to fly early. As long as the USSR was willing to act the way they did to suppress anti-Soviet elements in Hungary and Czechoslovakia neither the USA nor NATO is going to riskj a general war, especially with nukes, to support them.
 
How does NATO get through Austria in 1956?

Also, for fucks sake the CIA didn't cause the Petofi society, or more importantly the revolutionary communist vibe amongst the social democratic left or the CP ultraleft (workers/peasants self-education, Lukack's daughter, Gyulia Hay)>

Yours,
Sam R.
 
I guess for Hungary we could play around with Suez somehow not happening; maybe Nasser comes up with an acceptable offer for the British or Eden's out of the picture/gets his medical stuff sorted out, or Glubb Pasha keeps his job, or whatever. If that's enough to put pressure on the soviet union to let Hungary go(maybe someone manages to negotiate an agreement that Hungary won't side against the Soviet Union in international disputes or affairs, and taht it'll remain politically and militarily limited in terms of projection), I have no idea.
 

Cook

Banned
The west did much to incite the hungarian revolution.

That’s simply not true: the Hungarian uprising was prompted by actions in Moscow, not Washington. And it was led by Socialist Reformists, not by Liberals with Western democratic ambitions; it was the product of Nikita Khrushchev’s ‘secret’ speech at the Twentieth Party Conference.

Following Stalin’s death in 1953 Mátyás Rákosi was summoned to the Kremlin and told in no uncertain terms that he had to reform; Beria shouting at him that the regime of persecution that Rákosi had been running was completely unacceptable; all of the ‘Little Stalins’ of Eastern Europe were treated to such a dressing down in June ’53. Rákosi was forced to accept Imre Nagy as Prime Minister. This needs to be noted; in 1953, Nagy was Moscow’s man.

Rákosi accepted Nagy because he was a puppet, entirely dependent on the Soviets for his authority; he simply couldn’t act directly against their explicit instructions. But in 1955 Rákosi took the opportunity of the power struggle in the Kremlin that ousted Malenkov to remove Nagy. It was a hugely unpopular move and when Khrushchev’s speech the following year showed that Moscow no longer had Rákosi’s back, he was through. The problem was that Moscow chose the wrong puppet to replace Rákosi; choosing the plodding Ernő Gerő instead of the moderately competent and more popular Nagy; by that time replacing one Stalinist with another simply wasn’t going to placate the expectations for reform within the Hungarian public that Khrushchev himself had generated and four months later it all boiled over, but throughout, it was decisions by players in Moscow and Budapest, not Washington, that were driving events.
 
That’s simply not true: the Hungarian uprising was prompted by actions in Moscow, not Washington. And it was led by Socialist Reformists, not by Liberals with Western democratic ambitions; it was the product of Nikita Khrushchev’s ‘secret’ speech at the Twentieth Party Conference.

Following Stalin’s death in 1953 Mátyás Rákosi was summoned to the Kremlin and told in no uncertain terms that he had to reform; Beria shouting at him that the regime of persecution that Rákosi had been running was completely unacceptable; all of the ‘Little Stalins’ of Eastern Europe were treated to such a dressing down in June ’53. Rákosi was forced to accept Imre Nagy as Prime Minister. This needs to be noted; in 1953, Nagy was Moscow’s man.

Rákosi accepted Nagy because he was a puppet, entirely dependent on the Soviets for his authority; he simply couldn’t act directly against their explicit instructions. But in 1955 Rákosi took the opportunity of the power struggle in the Kremlin that ousted Malenkov to remove Nagy. It was a hugely unpopular move and when Khrushchev’s speech the following year showed that Moscow no longer had Rákosi’s back, he was through. The problem was that Moscow chose the wrong puppet to replace Rákosi; choosing the plodding Ernő Gerő instead of the moderately competent and more popular Nagy; by that time replacing one Stalinist with another simply wasn’t going to placate the expectations for reform within the Hungarian public that Khrushchev himself had generated and four months later it all boiled over, but throughout, it was decisions by players in Moscow and Budapest, not Washington, that were driving events.

See: Radio Free Europe. Western propaganda was one of the reasons for the hungarian revolution. Others you didnt mention was that the soviets left Austria creating the feeling that you can get out and even the Mighty Magyars loss at the final of FIFA World Championship in 1954.
 
Yes, soccer was incredibly important in working class Hungarian mobilisation. No, that mobilisation wasn't directed at "getting out." Getting out was restricted to the furthest right wings of the legal parties and the socialists, and the illegal parties. Only two groups managed organised interfaces with the working class: the ultralefts of the Communists via the workers councils, and the shop floor organisation of the socialists. Both of these groups were interested in the communisation of Hungarian society under workers control.

Yes, there was an interest in external politics, which was fixated on the united nations, largely because of Hungary's recent joining.

RFE/RA played no significant role in motivating the strikes or armed resistance.

yours,
Sam R.
 
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