AHC/WI: The Soviets Do Not Focus On Deep Defense Doctrine

I'm not well versed in Interwar Soviet Doctrine, but I would like to know some of the effects in WWII if the Soviets focused on static fortifications like Czechoslovakia and France, instead of their Deep Battle Doctrine, and how this could be achieved.

Perhaps a focus on static fortifications could hamper the beginnings of Operation Barbarossa, or it could allow the Germans to have their decisive victory close to the border. Any thoughts?
 
I'm not well versed in Interwar Soviet Doctrine, but I would like to know some of the effects in WWII if the Soviets focused on static fortifications like Czechoslovakia and France, instead of their Deep Battle Doctrine, and how this could be achieved.

Perhaps a focus on static fortifications could hamper the beginnings of Operation Barbarossa, or it could allow the Germans to have their decisive victory close to the border. Any thoughts?

An obvious question would be how it would have a different outcome relative to the invasion of France as France did expend valuable resources on constructing the Maginot line.

I think the early success of Barbarossa has more to do with the lack of experience of the Red Army officers and men, than to doctrine.
 
I'm not well versed in Interwar Soviet Doctrine, but I would like to know some of the effects in WWII if the Soviets focused on static fortifications like Czechoslovakia and France, instead of their Deep Battle Doctrine, and how this could be achieved.

Perhaps a focus on static fortifications could hamper the beginnings of Operation Barbarossa, or it could allow the Germans to have their decisive victory close to the border. Any thoughts?
However Soviets built two pretty impressive lines. Stalin's and Molotov's. However one was disassembled and other not finished at the time when they could support Soviets.
 
However Soviets built two pretty impressive lines. Stalin's and Molotov's. However one was disassembled and other not finished at the time when they could support Soviets.

While the Stalin and Molotov Lines were formidable (mostly the Stalin Line), it is clear that the purpose of these were not necessarily to stop the enemy in its tracks, but to delay their advance as in OTL.

Would there be any way for Stalin (or another leader) to believe that any war would be too costly for the Soviets unless the enemy can be stopped or redirected away from such resourceful areas as Ukraine and Leningrad?

It may seem counter-intuitive on such a big front, but the horrendous losses by the Russians IOTL WWI could have an effect similar to the French, with a large focus on static defenses to redirect or stop the enemy, away from the core regions of the defender.
 
While the Stalin and Molotov Lines were formidable (mostly the Stalin Line), it is clear that the purpose of these were not necessarily to stop the enemy in its tracks, but to delay their advance as in OTL.

Would there be any way for Stalin (or another leader) to believe that any war would be too costly for the Soviets unless the enemy can be stopped or redirected away from such resourceful areas as Ukraine and Leningrad?

It may seem counter-intuitive on such a big front, but the horrendous losses by the Russians IOTL WWI could have an effect similar to the French, with a large focus on static defenses to redirect or stop the enemy, away from the core regions of the defender.
While the stated purpose of the Stalin and Molotov lines wasn't to provide a complete stopping block from invasion, what you describe is not exactly accurate either. It was not intended to merely delay an advance, but to create fortified districts, predicting (correctly) the Germans would bypass a fortified area and be put in to a situation where they can be outmanuvered and defeated. This was not Deep Battle and more similar to the Maginot Line to funnel the Germans into Belgium (but note also the similarities between Deep Battle and Methodical Battle).

The problem was, the Soviets couldn't actually beat the Germans in battle once they bypassed positions, and the Molotov and Stalin lines were also kind of only imaginary anyways. For the rest of 1941 they switched from any dedicated doctrine of strategic static fortifications and focused on counter attacking whenever possible or not one step backwards otherwise. That also was not Deep Battle, but was an interm solution once the static Molotov Line had completely failed and the constant retreats would have made any dedicated static defense impossible anyways.

Deep Battle was only adopted as the the Red Army's grand strategy once Zhukov was given free reign during the Battle of Moscow. At this point they could potentially decide to use the winter season to dig in instead, but you would require someone other than Zhukov and Stalin to be incharge, and allowing the enemy to recover the initiative when they're right outside Moscow seems like it would be disastrous, to say the least.
 
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