I'll answer these some time today. It's 7:45 in the morning here and I haven't slept a wink.
Allow me to communicate my opinion however that both of you seem to be talking complete bollocks. I'll explain why later.
Making a post just to insult people's arguments isn't a great way to convince me you have anything useful to contribute to the discussion you know.
(which won't be a superpower btw, just a great power)
Yes, I think that even absent WW2, Japan would only be a real superpower by the 60s at the very earliest.
Mind you, some people argue that the Soviet Union was never a real superpower. Definitions are slippery things.
would have to juggle civilian economic development, modernisation of both the army and the navy, a nuclear program, and very likely a bunch of programs (nuclear or not) to improve energy security.
This is very true. The Japanese have much on their plate.
IMO energy security is likely to be the main driver of a Japanese nuclear program though, so it may not get the low priority you think. The Japanese navy was quite interested in maritime nuclear engines - that could then lead to designs that would be suitable for generating power on land, which would be very useful for meeting the electricity needs of their growing economy.
Certainly I do agree that the Japanese would have a lower priority on bomb development - particularly as the prerequisites for a Japan to rise to superpower status (avoiding stupid wars) make for atom bombs looking unattractive.
I would argue that the even if it's not militarist, the military still holds the whip hand post-Manchuria.
Post-Manchuria it is too late to avoid a militarist Japan. At least, I've not seen any really convincing PoD that could shift Japanese politics so late in the game.
So when I speak of a non-militarist Japan, I am speaking with the assumption that such a Japan has not colonized Manchuria. If I speak of Japan owning Manchuria, I am speaking of a Japan that has gone through a militarist phase.
Sorry, I am responding to a jumbled grab-bag of alternate Japans, so my points could have been clearer there.
It is also likely, if you believe that it will affect political decisions on military matters, that less money would be poured into the army and it would actually be less effective at opposing any foreign threats or projecting it's power, which a superpower is supposed to do.
Well, why wouldn't a lack of militarist control change the political decisions on military matters?
Also, one of the reasons why Italy was so poorly equipped relative to the Germans in WW2 is that they had poured all their money into armaments in the early 30s, when the Germans had spent their money in the late 30s, leading to a difference in fighting power of the two allies. As such, spending lots of money on the military can actually weaken a country when crunch time comes.
Or, take the example of the Soviet Union, who spent so heavily on their military during the cold war that they were left with little strength to do anything else as America ran rings around them. One can posit that the Soviets would in fact have been more powerful had they not spent so much on guns.
So I am not convinced that heavy military spending is necessary or even very helpful in meeting the challenge set by the OP.
Sure, Japan was growing fast, and they are likely to be a significant economy, but they do have a lot more they have to spend on than they did OTL post-war world, and we should always be suspicious about treating growth rates as perpetual, as they tend to slow down over time without good reason for greater stimulus.
This is true. I'm not assuming that Japan will experience OTL's growth record though, I am looking where Japan actually was in the 1930s, at the human and economic resources they had and drawing conclusions based on that. Most importantly, Japan was very poor back then - they had an economy about as large as Italy's and twice the population - that is alot of underused economic potential, and putting that potential to efficient use will mean that Japan will grow faster than the USA and Britain for the next 40-50 years. So unless Japan makes very bad decisions or is extraordinarily unlucky, I think she is likely to become a more important power than she was in 1938. Now, one can legitimately ask "does Japan converge with Britain, or does it converge with the USA, as it did OTL" - I don't think Japan is particularly fated to become as wealthy per capita as it has in OTL.
possibly, at least in the post-war world, have an ideological draw. The Japanese don't really have that beyond "Asia is for Asians". They're still Imperial, and as such representative of an increasingly out-dated system. I can't see them having a great deal of appeal in Africa or Latin America, beyond maybe the occasional 'stray' country.
Before the US got drawn into the cold war, they didn't have an "ideology" either. Indeed, even after the cold war, people are still arguing about what the American ideology is.
I suspect that if Japan gets involved in some cold-war analogue, they will create an ideology.
I feel like trying to woo Japan is out of the question for both superpowers but especially the USSR. There are existing territorial issues (Sakhalin for instance) and Japan is a state inherently suspicious of Communism and therefore hostile to the USSR. The USA probably wouldn't have an interest in the decolonisation of Japanese colonies (unless they were allies with China and Chiang/whoevers in charge of the KMT really want Formosa back). The USSR is a different beast. They will know that many of Japan's resources come from Manchuria, which is right across the border. They will be supporting anti-colonial saboteurs and guerrillas. I don't think they'll consider it a special case.
Sure, it is very likely that the USSR and Japan will be bad neighbours. I'm not saying they won't - I am saying that the people saying that "a massive war between the two of them is inevitable" are being silly. There are many factors that mitigate against a war, and ignoring those factors to focus on the factors that might cause a war is skewing things.
That being said, it seems like the Soviets were generally friendlier with the KMT than with the Japanese, so I don't really see why they're worried about "unleashing" a China that is less threatening to them than the Japanese. IMO Stalin was going to join anyway. He was just good at playing FDR and getting the most he could out of him.
Yes, the Soviets supported the KMT - but not very much. They seemed to be more interested in making sure that Japan did not win in China than making sure that China won against Japan. As with many other powers, the Soviets gained from both Asian giants being locked in a bruising eternal war.
This is why I put a Soviet attack as more likely, but a Chinese one can't be ruled out. China is kinda a wildcard in that a lot can go differently between 1940 and 1960, so it's kinda reliant on a more fleshed-out scenario.
Yes, this is very true. I just found the blanket declarations of "Japanese are slanty eyed and inferior by nature and thus destined to be beaten up by whoever" some people were making to be quite annoying. Countries do not stay still, a superpower Japan that arrises from a militarist Japan that never crosses Marco Polo bridge and never goes through WW2 will be a different place from the place it will become in the 40s and 50s. Their neighbours will also not be animated by a narrative imperative to smite the Japanese - they will do what they consider to be in their interests.
That might involve a major war, it might not.
I was expecting a nice thread about the 1980s fears of Japan becoming a major competitor to America coming true.
Instead we get Imperial Japan impossibilities
I don't think it is impossible for Japan to make better choices in the first half of last century, but debates on Japan before 1945 are dreadfully tiresome for the most part.
(And "Imperial Japan"? You know they are still an empire right?)
I think the difficulty in discussing 80s Japan PoDs is that Japan in the 80s was already a superpower economically - indeed, they'd overtook the Soviets economically in the late 70s. OTL it didn't change very much because Japan was fully committed to her place in the American world systems and to being neutral and non-interventionist.
For Japan to be a competitor to the USA with a PoD in the 70s or 80s would require some absolutely enormous change in Japanese politics or in world geopolitics. Probably both.
I can't actually think of anything that might qualify.
Now, if Japan avoided OTL's demographic decline and economic slowdown in the 90s and the population and economy continued to slowly grow (probably requires a much more immigrant friendly Japan or better women's rights - both would be better), then we might get a Japan with an economy half the size of the US economy and with a population of 150-160 million people by today. Such a Japan might be reasonably able to compete with China and we could see such a competition stimulating Japan to be more active in Asian geopolitics and building up her military faster...
Mind you, I think both China and Japan would need to be bitten by a stupid bug for the rivalry to get too deep. Both economies are heavily trade dependent in the 90s and early 00s, so neither has much interest in risking war.
I don't think the 1980s version of a Japanese superpower was ever going to happen it seems yet anthoer yellow perial myth.
Yes... When I go back and read American worries about Japan written in the 80s and 90s, they seem fantastically racist. Probably because they actually are.
fasquardon