Okay, but could US leaders (military or civilian) come up with a wacky idea of sending a small number of the most modern ships to the Philippines to act as a deterrent and failing that in wartime they would, "exercise that kind of vague menace which capital ships of the highest quality whose whereabouts is unknown can impose upon all hostile naval calculations. How should we use them now? Obviously they must go to sea and vanish among the innumerable islands."
The quote is from Mr. Churchill regarding the decision to send Force Z to Singapore.
There was the Asiatic fleet, which included the modern cruiser Houston in 1941. At various times other modern cruisers were assigned to the Asiatic fleet. This unit was technically home ported in PI, but actually operated in China. In the winter of 1927-28 the Asiatic fleet was heavily reinforced from the Pacific fleet, and a extra brigade of Marines from the US. So there is some precedent.
Withdrawing the entire Asiatic fleet from China to PI from mid 1941 was part of the small build up of OTL, at least in surface ships. I dont know if the USS Pensacola would have remained in PI after convoy escort in January, but it or many others sent would have complemented the Houston. Where the real USN strength lay in PI was in the submarine base. It was capable of hosting 25+ subs, at least in the short run. Not knowing the deficiencies in tactics & the infamous torpedo problem this sub fleet looked really good to the US leaders in 1941.
However the defense of PI depended heavily on the Brits repulsing any Japanese attack on Malaya & continued use of Singapore as a naval base. The Brits & US had been conducting secret war planning sessions for the far east. ie: Adm Phillips made a visit to MacArthur just a couple days before Japan attacked. When the British defense of Mayala/Singapore collapsed it left PI isolated other than a narrow avenue south to the DEI.
Furthermore the destruction of the US Army air defense on Luzon made the naval base near useless. The Japanese were able to bomb the stores & repair sites at Cavite with near impunity, leaving the submarine force with a shaky undependable base, tactics & torpedos notwithstanding. Hart did the sensible thing and evacuated his fleet south to the DEI.