AHC/WI: Subic Bay Chosen over Pearl Harbor

Okay, but could US leaders (military or civilian) come up with a wacky idea of sending a small number of the most modern ships to the Philippines to act as a deterrent and failing that in wartime they would, "exercise that kind of vague menace which capital ships of the highest quality whose whereabouts is unknown can impose upon all hostile naval calculations. How should we use them now? Obviously they must go to sea and vanish among the innumerable islands."

The quote is from Mr. Churchill regarding the decision to send Force Z to Singapore.

There was the Asiatic fleet, which included the modern cruiser Houston in 1941. At various times other modern cruisers were assigned to the Asiatic fleet. This unit was technically home ported in PI, but actually operated in China. In the winter of 1927-28 the Asiatic fleet was heavily reinforced from the Pacific fleet, and a extra brigade of Marines from the US. So there is some precedent.

Withdrawing the entire Asiatic fleet from China to PI from mid 1941 was part of the small build up of OTL, at least in surface ships. I dont know if the USS Pensacola would have remained in PI after convoy escort in January, but it or many others sent would have complemented the Houston. Where the real USN strength lay in PI was in the submarine base. It was capable of hosting 25+ subs, at least in the short run. Not knowing the deficiencies in tactics & the infamous torpedo problem this sub fleet looked really good to the US leaders in 1941.

However the defense of PI depended heavily on the Brits repulsing any Japanese attack on Malaya & continued use of Singapore as a naval base. The Brits & US had been conducting secret war planning sessions for the far east. ie: Adm Phillips made a visit to MacArthur just a couple days before Japan attacked. When the British defense of Mayala/Singapore collapsed it left PI isolated other than a narrow avenue south to the DEI.

Furthermore the destruction of the US Army air defense on Luzon made the naval base near useless. The Japanese were able to bomb the stores & repair sites at Cavite with near impunity, leaving the submarine force with a shaky undependable base, tactics & torpedos notwithstanding. Hart did the sensible thing and evacuated his fleet south to the DEI.
 
There was the Asiatic fleet, which included the modern cruiser Houston in 1941. At various times other modern cruisers were assigned to the Asiatic fleet. This unit was technically home ported in PI, but actually operated in China. In the winter of 1927-28 the Asiatic fleet was heavily reinforced from the Pacific fleet, and a extra brigade of Marines from the US. So there is some precedent.

Withdrawing the entire Asiatic fleet from China to PI from mid 1941 was part of the small build up of OTL, at least in surface ships. I dont know if the USS Pensacola would have remained in PI after convoy escort in January, but it or many others sent would have complemented the Houston. Where the real USN strength lay in PI was in the submarine base. It was capable of hosting 25+ subs, at least in the short run. Not knowing the deficiencies in tactics & the infamous torpedo problem this sub fleet looked really good to the US leaders in 1941.

However the defense of PI depended heavily on the Brits repulsing any Japanese attack on Malaya & continued use of Singapore as a naval base. The Brits & US had been conducting secret war planning sessions for the far east. ie: Adm Phillips made a visit to MacArthur just a couple days before Japan attacked. When the British defense of Mayala/Singapore collapsed it left PI isolated other than a narrow avenue south to the DEI.

Furthermore the destruction of the US Army air defense on Luzon made the naval base near useless. The Japanese were able to bomb the stores & repair sites at Cavite with near impunity, leaving the submarine force with a shaky undependable base, tactics & torpedos notwithstanding. Hart did the sensible thing and evacuated his fleet south to the DEI.

I understand all of that, the reason I made my point was that instead of trying to make Subic Bay the primary base for the Pacific Fleet which makes no sense at all, I could see the US doing what the British did and sending its own version of Force Z to the Philippines. Maybe one of the carrier groups - a carrier and a good force of heavy cruisers and destroyers as escort, both as a deterrent and as a raiding force in the event of war.

Yeah I know it's stupid, it's unrealistic, it's ASB, the US would never do that. I added the Churchill quote to show how easy it is to establish a logic trail for a such a move.
 

Ian_W

Banned
Couldn't the Philippines be seen as a good basing location because it is an American territory very close to the Japanese Empire? In some aspects of logistics it is even less vulnerable than Hawaii. Coal can be brought in from Australia and the British Raj, and petroleum from Malaya and Indonesia.

You're assuming the only potential war is with Japan, and that the Entente will be American, and not Japanese, allies.
 
On another note: In 1900, both the Philippines as well as Hawaii were US protectorates. With the US having a mayor military base in the Philipines, and none in Hawaii, would that wank the importance of the islands and their eventual fate? Could there be a massive US cultural and industrial involvement in the Philippines in the wake of the Subic Bay presence? at the cost of Hawaii? Could eventually the Philippines become the 50th US state and Hawaii an independent kingdom? Or was the fate of Hawaii already decided by 1900 and was Teddy Roosevelt's preference for Subic Bay just a reaction of his earlier involvement with the Manila Roughriders?

Philippine independence was already set to occur. I could see greater opposition to the war were it the Philippines that the IJN attacked rather than an archipelago closer to CONUS that was slated to eventually join the Union.
 
The only reason the Fleet was forward deployed as far as Pearl was as a deterrent. Prior to May of 1941 the Battle Fleet was home ported on the West Coast (San Pedro, CA).

Permanently home porting the fleet that far forward would have left the U.S. West Coast completely unprotected. Even forward deploying to Hawaii was something of a risk.

Having the Pacific Fleet in the Philippines also makes it harder to reinforce the Atlantic Fleet if necessary.

Subic Bay would eventually be lost to the Japanese. At the very least, the Subic Bay facilities would be denied to the wider US war effort. Bases would have to be built up in Hawaii. Plus, the Pacific Fleet is stuck in the Philippines.
 
I understand all of that, the reason I made my point was that instead of trying to make Subic Bay the primary base for the Pacific Fleet which makes no sense at all, I could see the US doing what the British did and sending its own version of Force Z to the Philippines. Maybe one of the carrier groups - a carrier and a good force of heavy cruisers and destroyers as escort, both as a deterrent and as a raiding force in the event of war.

Yeah I know it's stupid, it's unrealistic, it's ASB, the US would never do that. I added the Churchill quote to show how easy it is to establish a logic trail for a such a move.

I understood your point. Mine was that was halfway in place what with the Asiatc fleet concentrated in PI, plus the largish submarine flotillia. Actually had there been a viable air defense of PI, we were only a month or two away from that, a larger Asiatic fleet could have survived for a time & done some damage before the survivors withdrawn south. If it stuffed or delayed the initial Japanese ground attacks then there might be knock on effects through 1942 of significance.
 
I understood your point. Mine was that was halfway in place what with the Asiatc fleet concentrated in PI, plus the largish submarine flotillia. Actually had there been a viable air defense of PI, we were only a month or two away from that, a larger Asiatic fleet could have survived for a time & done some damage before the survivors withdrawn south. If it stuffed or delayed the initial Japanese ground attacks then there might be knock on effects through 1942 of significance.

And to your earlier point, big things were expected of the Asiatic Fleet's submarines but bad tactics, peace time skippers, and really bad torpedoes messed that up.
 

Driftless

Donor
I think this question has been asked on other threads before, but were there other naval bases in the Philippines beyond Subic in that era? If not, were there shipyards that could have been expanded quickly to serviceable levels?

I'm thinking more for use by subs, and smaller warships - not the big dogs.
 

Driftless

Donor
We had a base at Davao on Mindanao but I do not know how developed it was.

That makes sense to at least have an alternative. The Philippine Archipelago is huge: over 7,000 islands, stretching 1100 miles north to south and 600 miles across.
 
At the start of the war, the seaplane tender USS William B. Preston and a few PBYs were in Davao Harbor and they were attacked by planes from the carrier Ryujo and the Japanese invaded Davao and secured the port early in the campaign.

However, active resistance continued on Mindanao into April 1942 and the USAAF even pulled off some pretty gutsy raids against Japanese forces in the Philippines by staging B-25s through Del Monte Airfield on Mindanao on 12 and 13 April and I think there were still active forces resisting on Mindanao when Wainwright surrendered in May 1942.
 
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However, active resistance continued on Mindanao into April 1942 and the USAAF even pulled off some pretty gutsy raids against Japanese forces in the Philippines by staging B-25s through Del Monte Airfield on Mindanao on 12 and 13 April and I think there were still active forces resisting on Mindanao when Wainwright surrendered in May 1942.

Wainright did not want to order forces outside Battan to surrender. It was insisted he would.
 
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