The challenge is to have the Soviets start WWII, instead of the Germans as OTL. Also, what would the coalition opposing the Red Army look like? Do we see Roosevelt fighting alongside Hitler?
What would be Japan's situation?
Unlikely, the USSR after the Civil war and Polish war wasn't an expansionistic state. It was very defensive in nature and openly feared a coalition war against it. Provoking a war against the world would run counter to all of it's interests.
LOL. Then what do you call the events of 1939/1940, apart for naked expansionism? What do you call the Mongolia affair, where he eliminated every single Communist leader apart for his personal puppet, turning the MPR into a de facto provice of the Soviet Empire? What do you call the Soviet-Japanese conflict of the mid-late-30s (instigated and waged primarily through Stalin's Mongol proxies)?The USSR under Stalin wasn’t an expansionist state.
Actually no, he wasn’t. Stalin throughout this rule went for the safest, most cautious option available in every instance.Stalin was hyper-expansionist.
The Soviet Union, from when it joined the League of Nations in 1933 through until mid-1939 was the consistently strongest supporter of the concept of Collective Security the formed the foundation of the League. While the governments of Britain and France were happily throwing one country after another to the wolves, Stalin had his foreign Commissar flying backwards and forwards across Europe trying to hammer home an alliance to confront Germany and Italy and guarantee the security of the smaller states of Europe.Then what do you call the events of 1939/1940, apart for naked expansionism?
It was exactly that: securing of a de facto Soviet province.What do you call the Mongolia affair, where he eliminated every single Communist leader apart for his personal puppet, turning the MPR into a de facto province of the Soviet Empire?
It was a border conflict to defend the Soviet Far East from Japanese encroachment, and that was all that it was; the Soviet armies did not press further into Manchuria despite winning a decisive victory over the Japanese and clearly being capable of doing so. BTW, yours is the first time I’ve ever seen anyone accept the Kwantung Army’s interpretation of who was responsible for the conflict.What do you call the Soviet-Japanese conflict of the mid-late-30s (instigated and waged primarily through Stalin's Mongol proxies)?
He was a weird mixture of Old Russia imperialism and turbo-Bolshevism.
This is essentially correct but needs one slight change:
The USSR under Stalin wasn’t an expansionist state. Stalin was very defensive in nature and openly feared a coalition war against him. Provoking a war against the world would run counter to his interests.
And how does that contradict my assertion? Being strongly inclined towards expansionism doesn't automatically come prepackaged with a gambling addiction.Actually no, he wasn’t. Stalin throughout this rule went for the safest, most cautious option available in every instance.
The whole 'collective security' thing didn't appear due to Stalin wanting it, because he didn't; he preferred seeing the Western powers tear each other apart in a Warhammer 40k-style war; after which, evidently, the proletariat would be liberated from under the now-completely exhausted imperialist yoke by the glorious soldiers of the Workers Paradise. It didn't appear because he needed it, stricto sensu; it appeared because the potential prospect of an eventual pan-European coalition of ultra-nationalist/Fascist states messed with his plans, and decided to pre-empt any possibility of such a thing appearing. And the 'collective security' charade was it.The Soviet Union, from when it joined the League of Nations in 1933 through until mid-1939 was the consistently strongest supporter of the concept of Collective Security the formed the foundation of the League.
Masterful scenography, don't you think? "The impotent Western powers are so pitifully and pitiably keen on appeasement; how could we, the Great Socialist Paradise, put any trust in them? In fact, how could anyone?" Pravda-quality, that. Amazing how it survived nearly unchanged throughout the decades.While the governments of Britain and France were happily throwing one country after another to the wolves,
Read: "Making a great deal many promises, most of which he had absolutely no desire of keeping".Stalin had his foreign Commissar flying backwards and forwards across Europe trying to hammer home an alliance to confront Germany and Italy and guarantee the security of the smaller states of Europe.
See above. Stalin had precisely 0 intentions to enter the war. Had the Western powers attacked Germany he would've pulled the ol' switcheroo and simply said "We reconsidered, we're sitting it out for now", then simply swooped in and picked up any juicy pieces were left by the end. After all, it wasn't like anyone could prevent him from doing so once the war had started, nor could he be punished for his doublecross; France and Britain were a continent away, with hostile Germany inbetween. Being kept out from the conference did indeed irk Stalin considerably, since he was denied a potentially perfect opportunity to grandstand, something he absolutely loved to do.Even in 1938, when Chamberlain declared Collective Security dead, the Russians persisted; pressing for action over Czechoslovakia, mobilising forces and pressing the French to do the same, only to be frozen out of the mockery of negotiations that took place in Munich by the British and the French, who were meant to be their allies along with the Czechs!
Stalin never had any intention of forming an alliance with the Entente. They couldn't give him what he wanted, and whatever 'assurances' they could offer were empty to him (and the Entente was constantly suspicious of him simply deciding to sit on his butt doing nothing while they were embroiled in battle with Germany). Do remember that the man didn't believe in the idea of 'allies'. To him, the Western powers (during the war) weren't his allies, but rather enemies which currently happened to be fighting against the same guys he was. Also, he knew post-Munich-humiliated Britain and France would declare war over Poland, meaning Hitler would have to move against them sooner rather than later. Which fit perfectly into his long-term plans. In the short run, he greatly preferred playing upon Hitler's neurosis about the danger of two-front wars. Which he did eminently. He gained the Old Empire's territories in exhange for a neutrality promise he would've kept anyway, even without a written treaty; until the proper moment, of course.Despite that, the Stalin and Litvinov persisted in trying to form an alliance with Britain and France. It was only after negotiating for five months and being stalled every step of the way that Stalin decided to abandon any hope of making an alliance with the western democracies and opted for an accommodation with Hitler.
And doing everything in his power to have a common border with the Nazis, instead of a buffer string of 3rd parties helped that, how exactly?in those circumstances it was safest to look to the Soviet Union’s defences and do everything in his power to secure the approaches to the Russian heartland.
The occupation of the Baltic States, Eastern Poland, Bessarabia and Karelian Isthmus were all part of that; former Russian territories he considered essential to securing the western approaches.
He was a weird mixture of Old Russia imperialism and turbo-Bolshevism.
Nope. He was afraid the Western powers would somehow pull a double-blind trick on him ending up fighting the Germans, while they sat and watched. His plan of a great European war would, in that case, go into the shitter, to put it plainly.It is important to note that he did not take any action prior to German action; Stalin was constantly afraid that he would be drawn into a war with one of more of the Capitalist nations.
Except Khorloogyin Choybalsan was only one of 11 original Mongolian Communist leaders; without the assassinations (he ended up being the only one left), Mongolia's trajectory wouldn't have necessarily been that of Stalin's plaything; after all, China was Communist (heavily so), and it wasn't a de facto Soviet province/puppet; neither was Yugoslavia. Oh, and puppeteering is expansionism.It was exactly that: securing of a de facto Soviet province.
Except they all had invariably begun (a long series of them; Lake Khasan and Khalkin Gol being but the latest) with Mongolian cavalrymen 'mistakenly wandering' with their 'grazing horses' over some vaguely defined part of the border; most of them ended with Mongolian(/Soviet) victory.It was a border conflict to defend the Soviet Far East from Japanese encroachment, and that was all that it was
Y'know, just because someone is a vile fuckwad, doesn't necessarily make that someone automatically wrong. TBT, I'd never heard their interpretation before. It does sound like something Stalin would demand his puppets to do.BTW, yours is the first time I’ve ever seen anyone accept the Kwantung Army’s interpretation of who was responsible for the conflict.
The Soviet leadership was a refined conclave of duplicitous whores, with Stalin their ur-typ. Everything he/they said was a lie, even the truth; in fact, especially the truth. He/they lied to everyone, particularly to their own people. It's pretty much the only thing which kept the old carcass aloft in the latter years; see what happened when Gorby demanded that bureaucrats stop lying all the time.No, Stalin’s maintained his policy of ‘Socialism in One State’ from the time he established himself as undisputed ruler through until war became inevitable in 1939.
Stalin grew increasingly bitter and disillusioned as time went on. His dream of a great Soviet Socialist German Republic had fizzled, and he didn't even have the entirety of Berlin under his grasp (as a legitimising factor for the GDR as the sole 'true' Germany). Note that under his rule not a single V-Day parade was held, apart for the very first (it was Brejnev who would introduce the national free day + yearly parade) and here was a man who relished the masses' adulation. He sincerely didn't believe the USSR truly 'won' the war (for whatever measure of 'winning' he held as yardstick).Even after that his confrontations with the west were all very calculated and cautious, designed to secure what he already controlled.
Korea was a test of the West's power, resolve, but also restraint. They passed it with flying colours (much to Stalin's dismay and despair). It was supposed to embroil the West (the US, in particular) into an all-out to-the-bitter-end shooting war with Mao's China, taking their attention and resources away from Germany (and Western Europe in general), allowing Stalin to leisurely ply his trade. That didn't happen.Even in Korea, he only gave approval of the actions of his proxies after the Americans had indicated that they had no interest in the region.
Read Cook's post again. Stalin's aquisitions of territory didn't begin until the German threat appeared to be growing without being checked.And how does that contradict my assertion? Being strongly inclined towards expansionism doesn't automatically come prepackaged with a gambling addiction.
While Stalin would have liked to have seen his enemies fight each other rather than himself, there is no denying that Stalin genuinely did try as hard as possible to cobble together some kind of collective security against the fascist threat. Remind yourself that Stalin was a "Socialism in one Country" type rather than a world revolution type.The whole 'collective security' thing didn't appear due to Stalin wanting it, because he didn't; he preferred seeing the Western powers tear each other apart in a Warhammer 40k-style war; after which, evidently, the proletariat would be liberated from under the now-completely exhausted imperialist yoke by the glorious soldiers of the Workers Paradise. It didn't appear because he needed it, stricto sensu; it appeared because the potential prospect of an eventual pan-European coalition of ultra-nationalist/Fascist states messed with his plans, and decided to pre-empt any possibility of such a thing appearing. And the 'collective security' charade was it.
This is particularly bad. Rather than attack Cook's statement on any kind of logical basis, you decide to paint a huge strawman of his argument, seemingly painting Cook (of all people!) as making a argument sympathetic to the cause of communism. Are you actually trying to deny that Britain and France did nothing to help Czechoslovakia, or no concrete action to aid Poland?Masterful scenography, don't you think? "The impotent Western powers are so pitifully and pitiably keen on appeasement; how could we, the Great Socialist Paradise, put any trust in them? In fact, how could anyone?" Pravda-quality, that. Amazing how it survived nearly unchanged throughout the decades.
Except the smaller states of Europe made great buffers for the Soviet Union to keep it safe from the encroachment of greater powers.Read: "Making a great deal many promises, most of which he had absolutely no desire of keeping".
Do you have any evidence at all that this was part of some Machiavellian scheme to throw Germany and the Western powers into war. Stalin was a very wily politician, but it seems highly suspect that anyone could be that smart. And it is certainly something I have not come across in my admittedly limited reading around the subject.See above. Stalin had precisely 0 intentions to enter the war. Had the Western powers attacked Germany he would've pulled the ol' switcheroo and simply said "We reconsidered, we're sitting it out for now", then simply swooped in and picked up any juicy pieces were left by the end. After all, it wasn't like anyone could prevent him from doing so once the war had started, nor could he be punished for his doublecross; France and Britain were a continent away, with hostile Germany inbetween. Being kept out from the conference did indeed irk Stalin considerably, since he was denied a potentially perfect opportunity to grandstand, something he absolutely loved to do.
Defense in Depth? If the Nazis are going to be going on a seemingly unstoppable conquering spree, it is best to be able to rely on your own defensive capabilities rather than the questionable ones of the Baltic States.And doing everything in his power to have a common border with the Nazis, instead of a buffer string of 3rd parties helped that, how exactly?
Or his plan for any kind of security for the Soviet Union.Nope. He was afraid the Western powers would somehow pull a double-blind trick on him ending up fighting the Germans, while they sat and watched. His plan of a great European war would, in that case, go into the shitter, to put it plainly.
No doubt the 50 or so Mongolian Horsemen were a key plan in Stalin's hyper-expansionist plan to occupy Manchuria. Considering that the border was ill-defined, and that the violating force was so minuscule, it very well may have been a mistake.Except they all had invariably begun (a long series of them; Lake Khasan and Khalkin Gol being but the latest) with Mongolian cavalrymen 'mistakenly wandering' with their 'grazing horses' over some vaguely defined part of the border; most of them ended with Mongolian(/Soviet) victory.
Unless, apparently, the vile fuckwad in question is Stalin.Y'know, just because someone is a vile fuckwad, doesn't necessarily make that someone automatically wrong. TBT, I'd never heard their interpretation before. It does sound like something Stalin would demand his puppets to do.
So what exactly was he planning if the Korean war dragged on longer than it did OTL?Korea was a test of the West's power, resolve, but also restraint. They passed it with flying colours (much to Stalin's dismay and despair). It was supposed to embroil the West (the US, in particular) into an all-out to-the-bitter-end shooting war with Mao's China, taking their attention and resources away from Germany (and Western Europe in general), allowing Stalin to leisurely ply his trade. That didn't happen.