AHC/WI: Russian military rational/functional by WWI

So WWI topics tend to straddle the century divide for obvious reasons, but the POD for this one is probably going to be before 1900, so here we go.

The Russian high command in WWI was pretty dysfunctional, from what I've seen, in that the chain of command between the Ministry of War, the General Staff, and the Archdukes of Infantry, Cavalry, and Artillery was shall we say clouded. Withholding forces from eachother, failing to coordinate, always wrangling over appointing Front and Army commanders, etc.

So with a POD after 1870, how do you get a good chain of command and organization for the Russian Army, and how would it affect their chances against the Austrians and Germans in such a TL?
 

TFSmith121

Banned
So WWI topics tend to straddle the century divide for obvious reasons, but the POD for this one is probably going to be before 1900, so here we go.

The Russian high command in WWI was pretty dysfunctional, from what I've seen, in that the chain of command between the Ministry of War, the General Staff, and the Archdukes of Infantry, Cavalry, and Artillery was shall we say clouded. Withholding forces from eachother, failing to coordinate, always wrangling over appointing Front and Army commanders, etc.

So with a POD after 1870, how do you get a good chain of command and organization for the Russian Army, and how would it affect their chances against the Austrians and Germans in such a TL?

Couple of possible PODs;

1) The Russians do worse in 1877;
2) The Russians do (even) worse in 1904-05.

Have to think the later the defeat, the more significant the turnaround; at the same time, the earlier the defeat, the deeper the reforms can reach...

Best,
 

LordKalvert

Banned
A rather difficult question. First, the Russian Imperial Army makes its share of mistakes for sure but it's a bit of a reach to claim that the Officer's corps was rotten to the bone. It had a lot of exceptionally talent as well. Identifying it isn't all that easy but the Russians don't do all that bad. While the Germans would beat them, the Russians trounce the Austrians who in turn trounce the Italians. The officer's corps are often blamed for defeats when the problems lay elsewhere

Rather than simply say "Rennemkampf was an incompetent" to explain Tannenberg, the real blame lies in the command and control infrastructure- namely recon and communication. If the Russians had twenty recon aircraft available for the northern front, they would have picked up the 8th German army's move against the 2nd Russian army and could have pounced on the rear and won the war.

Communications were also crude. More field telephones and wireless would have allowed for a faster response to developments. The problem with intercepted communications is well known but the Russian Intelligence services also have their share of success in that department.

Turning to the officer corp itself- the Russians do have a small shortage in relation to the size of the army but not that great of one by contemporary standards. The number of NCOs is also low but manageable. The earlier reforms had lowered the ratio of nobles in the officer corp especially among the lower ranks

Stricter enforcement of mandatory retirement rules and rotating officers at set intervals would have done much.

As for the Archdukes- this is sort of necessary due to the nature of the regime. The Tsar needed multiple sources of information and someone to watch for revolutionary behavior. The Archdukes record is mixed sometimes stupid, sometimes brilliant. One could have improved the officer corps by promoting Jews but given the nature of the regime, that's not on the table
 
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