AHC/WI: Royal Navy Copenhagen Italian Navy in 1935 - 1937

Mussolin behave more subtle would deprive Hitler of a big role model. It was Mussolini's success led Hitler firmly believe that he could violate everything but still get away.

Sure, but as i said it was not stupid and worked diplomatically before starting his war and without some serious political pod i don't see the UK really want to start a war for Ethiopia while he had not want to star a war for the Sudetenland.

I think the political/diplomatic objections are the strongest part of the argument you put forwards but I would also argue the strength of them actually comes from the awareness by the Italian Government that the British could do something along the lines that would be seen at Mers-el-Kebir even if they were not aware of the kind of thinking that would lead to Taranto.

Essentially the worry was that even if the Italian Navy hid in port British battleships could shell its units into scrap metal while even worse any such withdrawal from the high sea would abandon both the Italian Empire and the armies in Africa.

So what you would need is a really sneaky British Government that would artfully lure the Italians into some seeming show of aggression towards British interests that would allow the Admiralty at least a fig leaf claim that its actions passed the Caroline Test. Now normally it is a good thing that such British Governments generally reside only in the fever dreams of Perfidious Albion (the concept not the board member named for it) but for a writer looking for an ATL that heads off the Second World War such an unscrupulous regime would do nicely.

Don't use Mers-el-Kebir attack as an exact blueprint for any possible event, there were political issues that favored the surprise attack by the British and it's more probable that any direct attack on Taranto by the British Battleships will go against the italian coastal fortification and batteries, not considering the air forces...basically the entire point of the existence of the bases of Taranto, La Spezia and Trieste were to avoid an event like that.

And you also need someone idiot enough to being lured in a trap like that and frankly, except for that single moment during the Crisis in Abyssina everyone in the italian goverment was very keen to not do that...one just need to see the ROE for the italian pirate submarine during the Spanish civil war.

in OTL the attack was planned and practiced for pre war, they tried to collect the pre war pilots who were involved in this for the actual attack. The difficulties with the shallow depth were overcome by attaching a wire to the torpedo so it would not enter the water at a shallow angle. The attack was planned to be by two carriers but Eagle's fuel system was shaken up by Italian bombing. I also think the attack was launched from 170 miles rather than 130 miles From Taranto.

The Italians lost the Illustrious strike group before the attack because Radar directed fulmars could shoot down spotting aircraft prior to them spotting the fleet a greater number of carriers in the strike group would not greatly change the risk of detection.

Cheers Hipper

IRC the modification was used after Mers-el-Kebir and on torpedoes not in service in 1935...and in 1935 radar it's not really a thing
 
Sure, but as i said it was not stupid and worked diplomatically before starting his war and without some serious political pod i don't see the UK really want to start a war for Ethiopia while he had not want to star a war for the Sudetenland.

I actually do think this is a valid point, so do several who have pointed out it was the politics not the capacity of the RN that was at issue above.



Don't use Mers-el-Kebir attack as an exact blueprint for any possible event, there were political issues that favored the surprise attack by the British and it's more probable that any direct attack on Taranto by the British Battleships will go against the italian coastal fortification and batteries, not considering the air forces...basically the entire point of the existence of the bases of Taranto, La Spezia and Trieste were to avoid an event like that.

However Mers-el-kebir while not a perfect match for the situation is actually in many ways misleading in the wrong direction. The British can both concentrate more force and risk more damage by way of comparison. In 1940 for example they needed to retain units to cover against the Italian fleet which is both weaker in this scenario and the target. In 1940 they needed to retain units to cover against the German fleet which is almost a non-entity in this time frame so draws off less force and in 1940 they had to retain sufficient force to deter Japanese aggression, this is the only one that applies in this scenario. Further but the actual French fleet being engaged had more heavy gun ships with heavier guns than the Italian force which has to be weighed in the balance of risk. So you could see the Mediterranean Fleet main body rather than a detached squadron carry out the assault.

And you also need someone idiot enough to being lured in a trap like that and frankly, except for that single moment during the Crisis in Abyssina everyone in the italian goverment was very keen to not do that...one just need to see the ROE for the italian pirate submarine during the Spanish civil war.

Well given your claims for the detection power of Italian crystal balls and further that you expect them to do better not the same as OTL then well...yeah I have to say the problem is a more likely a lack of British evil genius than a shortage of Italian idiots. edit: upon further consideration in fact a British idiot or few might do as the AHC does not actually require it be a smart move by the British.



IRC the modification was used after Mers-el-Kebir and on torpedoes not in service in 1935...and in 1935 radar it's not really a thing

Or to put it another way you are simply repeating the fact that you ignored the points raised by post 33 and the fact is in this scenario the available evidence suggests the Italians would have even less chance of picking up on the strike force so the radar issue is rather less than vital.
 
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As for the seaward defences of Taranto, I'm unable to substantiate their scale. I have certainly found allusions to the idea that the RN was considering capturing Taranto as far back as 1935, and presumably that would involve a bombardment and neutralization of the sea defences - possibly the issue is the difference between having to deal with the German fleet, defending the UK and the Italians all at once and the simpler problem of just having to deal with Italy. (In 1935 the RN has about twelve BBs and three BCs, which should be quite enough to deal with unmodernized defences - the Mers-el-Kebir attack was against a port with modern defences and that involved only three battle-line ships.)

That's certainly an ambitious plan. I can think of very few instances of a port falling to invasion by sea. The first example I can think of where such a thing was even attempted is Oslo, where token defenses repulsed a surprise seaborne invasion and inflicted heavy losses. The Free French mission to take Dakar was abortive. I guess there's examples of ports being directly assaulted as a part of Operation Torch.
 
That's certainly an ambitious plan. I can think of very few instances of a port falling to invasion by sea. The first example I can think of where such a thing was even attempted is Oslo, where token defenses repulsed a surprise seaborne invasion and inflicted heavy losses. The Free French mission to take Dakar was abortive. I guess there's examples of ports being directly assaulted as a part of Operation Torch.

Well there was Operation Ironclad part of the Battle of Madagascar in 1942 for example. However taking the port was no walkover which is why the consensus is probably on disabling the Italian ships with naval gun fire or air attack.
 
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