The war played a great deal in the internal history of the Revolution. Rapidly speaking, war (against Austria at first) was the combination of the interest of two group : the Girondins, being the leading leftwing group in 1792, wanting to get the definite leadership of the Assembly by a victorious war, and the court and King Louis XVI, wanting to re-establish the absolutism by a lost war. When started, war had consequences none of the planners had in mind. The first defeats brought insecurity, more men were called to arms, starting the Vendée civil war, the king was deposed and executed as he seemed (justly) to hope for the french defeat, reinforcing the hostility of the foreign powers. At this point, the Montagnards took control, eliminated opposition by ruthless policies and proceed to win the war, both civil and foreign. The Terror was brought by the war, not the other way around.
In order to have a Peaceful France, you need to have working institutions in 1790. The first compromise put the king and the assembly in a perfect equilibrium, meaning no one could solve the deadlocked bills when the king vetoed them. This too stable compromise satisfied none of the two and let to the scale up of the flight of the king and the declaration of war. So change the institutions (a good way os getting rid of Marie Antoinette, who was a conservative force at court) with the final say to the Assembly, and you could see a TL where the war follows more classical international power game. But this compromise would not lead to the more advanced political rights in France like universal male vote and abolition of slavery.