AHC/WI- no triple intervention

In OTL, Japan made major gains against China in the 1st Sino-Japanese war, but due to Germany, France and Russia forced them to give Shangdong back to China and Mccarthur to Russia. The latter was later regained during the Russo-Japanese war, but it was quite costly. How could we have them gaining all this territory or even more without foreign intervention, and if so, what consequences would come out of this? No Russo-Japanese war? Early annexation of Korea? No Anglo-Japanese Alliance? No rise of extremism? Discuss.
 
I think the key here is to establish a major power as opposed to Russian ambitions. Germany and especially France had good reasons to side with Russia. When looking for anyone to oppose Russia from 1815 to 1907, Choice Number One is always Britain. But to get Britain engaged… Perhaps make Russia more aggressive and successful in the Far East (maybe Korea), so that Britain feels threatened by any further Russian expansion and decides upon Japan as a counter-weight earlier than it did IOTL. However, even then, the Germans are likely to continue to support Russia, as part of their continuing effort to isolate France (they may not realise the primacy that the Franco-Russian Alliance has already assumed in Russian foreign policy) by breaking the Franco-Russian Alliance. Success or failure of Japan (and thus of the OP) at this point will then depend on whether Russia continues to press its claims against Japan if Britain is pushing against it. But at that point the Russians might simply change their policy to requesting that Japan return its gains to China and not give anything to Russia, which Britain might agree to.

It's much easier to avoid Russian expansion, I think, than to get Japan to keep its gains entirely. But the situation above is the best that I can think of, barring very early PoDs. Avoiding the Franco-Russian Alliance, which is the key reason for the participation of both France and Germany on Russia's side, is extremely difficult to do, since it dates back to German decisions; the problem is the lack of centralisation and consistency in German foreign policy, whereby Germany declined to renew its treaty with Russia (thus opening the way to that alliance) in an attempt to ingratiate itself to Britain, then changed its mind and tried to keep Russia on its side too; and that lack of centralisation is part of a system shaped by Bismarck in the 1860s.
 

LordKalvert

Banned
The triple intervention occurs at a very favorable time for Russia- Nicholas is new to the throne and everyone is anxious to see where his foreign policy is headed. England is courting Russia as a means to calm France and for support in England's Armenia policy

Germany is certain to side with Russia as the benefits are so obvious- Russia deflected from the Balkans, alienated from England and France forced to go along.

Russia's biggest mistake is not pressing the advantage to the fullest. Japan had no choice to yield to France, Germany and Russia. The only risk, very small, of English interference is avoided. England would rather pick a different time than to fight all three. Spanish help could also have been secured- Spain objected to Japan's taking Taiwan. While she accounted for little by herself, her geographic position would give Spain great weight.

Russia should have simply stripped Japan of all her gains, taken a port in Korea, given Germany Taiwan and split the indemnity three ways. Japan would be out as a Pacific Power
 
The triple intervention occurs at a very favorable time for Russia- Nicholas is new to the throne and everyone is anxious to see where his foreign policy is headed. England is courting Russia as a means to calm France and for support in England's Armenia policy

Germany is certain to side with Russia as the benefits are so obvious- Russia deflected from the Balkans, alienated from England and France forced to go along.

This is interesting stuff. I'm just wondering: what is known about the intentions of German foreign policy in this era? Of course it's known that Germany was trying to isolate France from 1871 to 1892, but once the Franco-Russian Alliance was already in existence did elements in the German government still consider the break-up of France and Russia a plausible German diplomatic goal? It's beyond doubt that the German government didn't consider it a plausible goal by 1914 and it's probable that they didn't at the time of Nicholas and Wilhelm's aborted attempt at an alliance (though that might have been just that anything touched by Wilhelm II was toxic due to him being so discredited by his own clumsiness even then) but I'm not sure when the transition occurred (presumably at different points for different people in the German government).

Russia's biggest mistake is not pressing the advantage to the fullest. Japan had no choice to yield to France, Germany and Russia. The only risk, very small, of English interference is avoided. England would rather pick a different time than to fight all three. Spanish help could also have been secured- Spain objected to Japan's taking Taiwan. While she accounted for little by herself, her geographic position would give Spain great weight.

Russia should have simply stripped Japan of all her gains, taken a port in Korea, given Germany Taiwan and split the indemnity three ways. Japan would be out as a Pacific Power

I wonder what the British do if the Russians do this one. On the one hand, Russian interference in general is regarded with continual mistrust ("Russian diplomacy, as you know, is one long and manifold lie.") but on the other hand it might be considered a positive for Russia to be busy in East Asia and thus the bear's nose kept out of South Asia.
 

LordKalvert

Banned
This is interesting stuff. I'm just wondering: what is known about the intentions of German foreign policy in this era? Of course it's known that Germany was trying to isolate France from 1871 to 1892, but once the Franco-Russian Alliance was already in existence did elements in the German government still consider the break-up of France and Russia a plausible German diplomatic goal? It's beyond doubt that the German government didn't consider it a plausible goal by 1914 and it's probable that they didn't at the time of Nicholas and Wilhelm's aborted attempt at an alliance (though that might have been just that anything touched by Wilhelm II was toxic due to him being so discredited by his own clumsiness even then) but I'm not sure when the transition occurred (presumably at different points for different people in the German government).
The Germans are all over the place at this time. They see an opening to maybe wean Russia from France At the same time, there's the Armenia affair which has to be taken into account.

The British have allowed their foreign policy to be hijacked by "humanitarians" who know nothing of the reality. They've gotten it into their heads that they should actually enforce the Congress of Berlin and give the Armenians some autonomy. For some reason, they convince themselves that the Russians are going to help

This horrifies the continent. Nobody wants to see the Ottoman Empire break up. Austria and Germany see the Sultan as an ally if Russia attacks. France has huge business interests and the Russians not only have an understanding with the Sultan (keep the straits close and we'll leave you alone) but are scared that their own Armenians will get uppity. So everyone agrees to help Turkey.

Now the English don't know this yet because the Russians are pretending to help all the while reassuring the Sultan that there's nothing to worry about.

The Russians actually had asked for England to join the intervention

I wonder what the British do if the Russians do this one. On the one hand, Russian interference in general is regarded with continual mistrust ("Russian diplomacy, as you know, is one long and manifold lie.") but on the other hand it might be considered a positive for Russia to be busy in East Asia and thus the bear's nose kept out of South Asia.

I think they back down. First, Spain, France, Germany and Russia are a very powerful coalition. Might want to pick a better time for a fight

Then there's the little problem that the English had assured the Russians that they wouldn't object if Russia took a port in Korea (that Armenia thing again) and had in fact proposed something along the same lines (Korean independence and Japan to get an indemnity)

Its really going to be awkward to explain to the public that you want to fight the world over the size of an indemnity.

I have never figured what the Russians were thinking here. I could see deciding on an accord with Japan but if your going to push them back, push them all the way back.

You might, if your really clever and lucky, even get a clause stuck in there that Japan can't buy any battleships.
 

LordKalvert

Banned
In OTL, Japan made major gains against China in the 1st Sino-Japanese war, but due to Germany, France and Russia forced them to give Shangdong back to China and Mccarthur to Russia. The latter was later regained during the Russo-Japanese war, but it was quite costly. How could we have them gaining all this territory or even more without foreign intervention, and if so, what consequences would come out of this? No Russo-Japanese war? Early annexation of Korea? No Anglo-Japanese Alliance? No rise of extremism? Discuss.

If the Japanese get away with it:

It would have made China a Japanese protectorate

Perhaps no Russo-Japanese War since you would have to assume a Russia indifferent to the Far East (hard to see that one- the Sino-Japanese War was preemptive attempt to cut Russia out of the Far East)

Japan's peace terms included a de facto annexation of Korea (Korean "independence" guaranteed by Japanese troops

The extremists get into the saddle all that much earlier having had their appetite whetted.
 
Top