AHC: WI no Franco-German Friendship after WWII
- Thread starter Anja
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With the USSR breathing down West Germany's neck it would be hard to see how or why they wouldn't have good relations. France had the best military occupation commanders of the war who treated their population very well compared to those in the East.
It wouldn't be hard to get real hatred between the French and Germans with a timeline starting in say 1941 by giving France German military occupation commanders to the kind that foster real hatred between Germans and the French.
Won't matter, Germans would still be more focused on survival as the WAllies were just giving up their plan that would starve half the German population.
If the Soviets had treated the East Germans better. IE no mass rape of German women and girls and not giving so much of East Germany to Poland and ethnically cleansing the Germans from the area then it's a different ball game if the French do such things in the West.
How about the Nazis order a scorched earth withdrawal from France in 1944, something along the lines of that in Anglo-American/Nazi War with historic monuments being demolished and works of art looted. After the War the French demand massive reparations including cession of the Saar, they also take a much harder line on the occupation and oppose the creation of a unified German state preferring a break up, not Morgenthau but Germany gets split into 4-6 smaller states and prevented from re-unifying?
Hitler did order that, while he was hiding in his bunker asking if Paris is burning the generals in the West were tossing his orders in the trash can.
An earlier POD were where you had a different occupation commander in France where he brutalizes the French people and causes a Warsaw like uprising in France would do the trick instead of an occupation commander that the French resistance bragged during the war they saved the life of.
MSZ
Banned
IIRC, it was during the official celebrations of signing the Franco-German Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in 1963 that De Gaulle, after asked by Kissinger how France would maintain its position in relation with Germany once it (inevitably) exceeds France in economic potential, his anwser would be "par la guerre" ("through war"). Franco-German friendship might be something we talk about, and view the period of time after WW2 as this being the case in retrospect, but at those times in the past it often wasn't the case. France was particularly not too comfortable with those parts of "western unity and integration" that breached its national interest. The crisis of the "empty seat" comes to mind, but Franco-German relations being cold, either due to the "small reunification" with Saarland, "large unification" with DDR, formation of the Bundeswehr and other situations could have resulted in the post-war period being viewed as "traditional Franco-German rivalry" rather than "friendship".
Anything ending the cold war eariler could do the trick really, once the USSR is gone, the lack of a common foe would inevitably shake the "Franco-German motor" - how fragile it is we saw during the last French elections and the time before that with different ideas on how to stop the Euro crisis. Maybe Beria takes power after Stalin and goes through with the "Stalin note" proposal fairly. Or the Suez Crisis goes awry leading to NATO structures being significantly loosened, France sticking to itself, Germany keeping with the USA. To better anwser the question, one would have to say what constitutes "friendship", and what the lack of it. If France and Germany had more conflicting interests either in Europe or elsewhere, media reported things differently or the two countries not changing their education systems to end the mutual hostility, we could easily see the two entering the XXIth century in the same relations they had pre-1870 or post-WWI.
Anything ending the cold war eariler could do the trick really, once the USSR is gone, the lack of a common foe would inevitably shake the "Franco-German motor" - how fragile it is we saw during the last French elections and the time before that with different ideas on how to stop the Euro crisis. Maybe Beria takes power after Stalin and goes through with the "Stalin note" proposal fairly. Or the Suez Crisis goes awry leading to NATO structures being significantly loosened, France sticking to itself, Germany keeping with the USA. To better anwser the question, one would have to say what constitutes "friendship", and what the lack of it. If France and Germany had more conflicting interests either in Europe or elsewhere, media reported things differently or the two countries not changing their education systems to end the mutual hostility, we could easily see the two entering the XXIth century in the same relations they had pre-1870 or post-WWI.
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given post WW2 France had control of 1/3 of what became West Germany ( 1/4 of post war Germany) as part of the 4 way split between the allied powers of WW2 ...
As I've hinted elsewhere a major post war PoD would be the lack of creation of West Germany as a nation and the British, US and French sectors remaining under the control of the respective nations- probably combined with the policy of keeping Germany artificially under developed.
In that case most of Europe might keep "under developed" too for a much longer period than in OTL.
Hoover report to Truman 1947 (19 pages).
I posted a short summary of some of the main points already in another thread, so it´s copy and paste here.
A summary of some points (any errors are mine):
- The rebuilding of (Western) Europe outside Germany has slowed down. Partly because of a lack of iron, steel and heavy machinery formerly produced in Germany. Likewise producers of raw materials - for examples iron mines in Sweden and France - now lack the Ruhr region / German customers.
- The economies of Europe pre-war were highly dependent on each other. Removing now the German economy as producer and customer simply means that the rest of Europe can´t rebound on its own. Even countries as far away as Turkey and Greece were connected to the German economy.
- Re-creating these heavy industries outside Germany (and training the skilled workers) would take time and money. Money the European countries don´t have. So the American taxpayer would have to fund it over many years.
- The plans made during the war proposed that Germany is only allowed to have some light industry. Using exports from those to pay for needed imports (food, oil, raw materials etc.). However the proposed allowed light industry levels are even lower than Germany´s pre-war levels. It´s impossible that Germany can generate enough exports to pay for needed imports.
- Germany lost traditional agricultural regions annexed by the USSR and Poland after the war. So the land available for agriculture is down compared to pre-war. At the same time the population in remaining Germany now is larger than pre-war (refugees from all of Eastern Europe). The restrictions for light industry in place also restrict for example the production of fertilizer to less than what Germany needs itself. So to even have enough fertilizer for the remaining agricultural regions Germany would need to import fertilizer. Which means that Germany can´t feed its population. And given that exports won´t be enough to pay for needed imports it´s either:
- the USA gets accustomed to donate food each year and forever or
- 25 million Germans either have to emigrate (good luck in 1947) or starve.
Couple that with the strong Communist parties in France and Italy and you might see some real political problems in Continental Europe in the early 1950s.
This is actually quite easy I think, considering that OTL Franco-German friendship is the product of a very unique set of circumstances.
If we don't change the conduct of the war itself, an obvious way to avoid Franco-German friendship is to actually have the multiple efforts aimed at created a Franco-British Axis post war succeeding. Britain and France conclusively winning the Suez war would be enough to do the trick as it would lead to a Franco-British Axis becoming the core of an alternative European Comunity.
An harsher German occupation as a result of France continuing the war would be enough to delay and retard Franco-German friendship as well. Especially as the links and networks created by the collaboration won't happen. Moreover the fact that France wil still be fighting alongside the British Empire will hugely strenghtens the Franco-British alliance.
A French annexation of the Saarland would also helps in creating more tensions post war. But in the grand scheme of things I think that it is somewhat unimportant.
The lack of a Franco-German strategic partneship would be a huge blessing for France. It would have the effect of forcing France to look beyond the confines of Europe for partners and for areas in which to gain influence.
If we don't change the conduct of the war itself, an obvious way to avoid Franco-German friendship is to actually have the multiple efforts aimed at created a Franco-British Axis post war succeeding. Britain and France conclusively winning the Suez war would be enough to do the trick as it would lead to a Franco-British Axis becoming the core of an alternative European Comunity.
An harsher German occupation as a result of France continuing the war would be enough to delay and retard Franco-German friendship as well. Especially as the links and networks created by the collaboration won't happen. Moreover the fact that France wil still be fighting alongside the British Empire will hugely strenghtens the Franco-British alliance.
A French annexation of the Saarland would also helps in creating more tensions post war. But in the grand scheme of things I think that it is somewhat unimportant.
The lack of a Franco-German strategic partneship would be a huge blessing for France. It would have the effect of forcing France to look beyond the confines of Europe for partners and for areas in which to gain influence.
Except that the British since the end of WW1 were keeping one eye on the USA and would never have accepted a British-French relationship keeping out the "special relationship with the USA".
A French annexation of the Saarland would have poisoned French-German relations for decades. Given your British-French Axis you have three options in Europe:
- The USA leave Europe. In which case Italy and West Germany will become Communist countries pretty soon. Other countries too. Maybe including France?
- The USA stay in Europe and both France and Great Britain pretty soon have to acknowledge that they aren´t real Great Powers anymore.
- The USA stay in Europe and decide to ignore France? As I said I doubt that Great Britain would ignore the USA?
For the last 50 years France could only pretend to be a Great Power because it had the backing of the EU. Mainly the economic power of Germany.
Without that backing France would be a second or third rate power.