AHC WI Japanese Militarists do not take over

[Craig_Truglia]

Yes, but anything Japan could have gotten by peace would not nearly have amounted to 'control' of Manchuria or Hainan island. The US did not mind if Japan had extensive interests in China, but it really did not want Japan to actually cut off a slice of China and puppetize it, or anything close to that. Japan if she is not aggressive will have the same influence in Manchuria that the US has in Shenzhen, which is far from control, but not unprofitable. The whole point of US policy in China was to ensure that China remained a stable and whole state, from which everyone had profitable relations (the Open Door policy), and Japanese aggression flies straight in the face of that.

True, but control of Hainan, Taiwan and Manchuria were all secured before 1940, so a Japan that backed off the brink of insantity could have retained these regions, including Korea, and avoided a war. Arguably, they could have also absorbed French colonies AND avoided war too. Pretty much they could have kept pushing until the US threatened to cut off trade. Then, the best course of action would have been to stop and just bargain from a higher position instead of getting into an impossible war with UK and USA.

Basically, control of Manchuria is synonymous with friggin' stupid. Unless you think economic investment amounts to control. In which case I should probably tell the people of Toledo, Ohio that they're part of Italy now.

Probably, though if Manchuria was part of Imperial Japan for 7 decades, it might pay dividends by then.

Errr...could you explain this in a somewhat more clear manner?

If Japan was anything other than insane, such as plain stupid but not batshyt crazy, they would have avoided war with both the UK and USA. It's like Iraq invading Kuwait...you can't get away with it. Any scenerio where Japan avoids complete insanity leads to a modern day Japan that is in a whole other league, which is actually pretty incredible to contemplate.

On one note, however, there's no reason for Stalin not to avoid war with Japan, at least not for the reason you listed, because as far as anyone knew, and history bore this out, the Red Army was a far more capable fighting force than the IJA.

Yes, but that was an IJA fighting both the UK, USA and being bombed into the ground. To fight Japan one on one in a region as large as Manchuria will result in the Russians being ground down to a halt. Furthermore, without being at war with the USA and UK, Japan is likely to have millions of troops deployed in the regions of China they control. The USSR has a stnading army of about 5 million in 1945. They are not going to commit 60% of their army to the far east, where they cannot possibly supply it and leave all of eastern europe undefended after they essentially conquered a bunch of countries.

If she declared war on the Axis, she would be on the same side of Free France, whose territory she would be invading. Remember that the Allied powers wouldn't recognize Vichy France as the government of France, or France as an enemy country.

Perhaps you are right, though I believe in WW1 this is essentially what Japan did against germany.

Japan becoming a nuclear power so quickly is a very questionable premise, for that matter. Japanese nuclear research was heavily behind even Britain and Germany, and the former didn't get the bomb until 1952.

Yes, but Japan would be in this scenario the only other large power on earth not bombed extensively. They would probably have the bomb by the early 60s at the very latest.

You know how big a problem for Japan Korean and Chinese nationalism was in Korea and Manchuria, right? East Asians aren't some monolithic block of drones who worship authority. Japan ruled Korea and Manchuria by virtue of a combination of state terror, extensive militarization, and ruthless repression. This is rather like saying that Nazi Germany, if she annexed all of European Russia, would have absolutely no problems holding down European Russia because Russians are inherently authoritarian and won't mind being under the Nazi jackboot.

I just came back from Cambodia, so I'm not saying average Asians worship authority, but in the face of force, they do generally accept it. They are not rebellious culturally and Japan could probably effectively control these areas using puppet leaders and their vast economic prowess. Plus, unlike western Europe after WW2, they'd be brutal enough to stay in power. Their undoing would be if their colonies, by vitrue of their connection to the Japanese bloc, became too wealthy. We will have to see what happens in present-day China where they are starting to get wealthier and start feeling entitled to stuff like smart phones that can work with facebook. People with something to lose can be harder to control than people with nothing.

 

[Kome]

True, but control of Hainan, Taiwan and Manchuria were all secured before 1940, so a Japan that backed off the brink of insantity could have retained these regions, including Korea, and avoided a war. Arguably, they could have also absorbed French colonies AND avoided war too. Pretty much they could have kept pushing until the US threatened to cut off trade. Then, the best course of action would have been to stop and just bargain from a higher position instead of getting into an impossible war with UK and USA.

They tried. Japan didnt want to keep fighting. Remember that it was Chiang who (justifiably) declared there would be no peace with Japan, even for minor concessions. Because he'd tried appeasing Japan in the past and obviously it wasnt working out for him.

I just came back from Cambodia, so I'm not saying average Asians worship authority, but in the face of force, they do generally accept it. They are not rebellious culturally and Japan could probably effectively control these areas using puppet leaders and their vast economic prowess.

Okay no, if this was true then China wouldnt have had to gone through the whole warlord period thing.

The thing you forget is that while Asian cultures may be more deferential to authorities, that only applies to authorities that they recognize. Japan was an alien culture, to be fought and expelled, its legitimacy was not recognized by the majority of occupied Chinese and Koreans.

 

[Fredrick II Barbarossa]

its simple really. Keep the rikken minseito in power. Prevent assassination of prime minister osachi hamaguchi. Perhaps have him shift his economic policies away from keeping yen on gold standard. With Osachi still strong and popular for his good economic policies, the foreign minister kijiro shidehara would have more maneuvering room against the army. Also in otl shortly before the mukden incident a general was dispatched by the japanese war minister to prevent the incident from ocuring after he heard about it..

Simply have the general arrive in time and arrest the colonels planning the incident. Ergo no mukden incident leading to no big Japanese involvement in Manchuria.

With the Minseito strong and in power relations will become warmer between japan and the west. plus it was the minseito that pursued policies of fair treatment for all members of the empire and were a party that was looking to reform japan. Basically meaning no batshit slaughtering non japanese japan. With them in power the nationalists remain marginalized.

At the same time have tojo die due to some incident. With Tojo's death, the arrests and imprisonment of the perpetrators of the mukden incident the Japanese militarists would have their base of power gutted.

Really that is all that needs to occur for the militarists not to take over. it is a very simple POD.

Plus it would lead tothe possibility of japan retaining at least taiwan and the kurills and sakalkhan, and posibly korea if they play their cards right.

 

[Vingilótë]

True, but control of Hainan, Taiwan and Manchuria were all secured before 1940, so a Japan that backed off the brink of insantity could have retained these regions, including Korea, and avoided a war. Arguably, they could have also absorbed French colonies AND avoided war too. Pretty much they could have kept pushing until the US threatened to cut off trade. Then, the best course of action would have been to stop and just bargain from a higher position instead of getting into an impossible war with UK and USA.

My point actually was that after 1931, Japanese relations with the US, and really everybody, had gone into the toilet. Japan had permanently (until the end of WWII, obviously) thrown away US friendship, or even amity and understanding, by urinating all over the Open Door Policy. Manchuria, all the incidents, Shanghai, the Second Sino-Japanese War, and eventually, the conquest of Indochina, they aren't something which Japan can just do and avoid the US's wrath, those all led directly to the embargo. If you want to prevent that, you need a stupidly isolationist US President who doesn't mind Japan destroying everything the US has worked to build in East Asia and China for the past forty years.

That, and sheer inertia means that Japan can't simply say, 'okay, we have Manchuria and North China now. We're happy. Please let us be.' Their presence on Chinese soil means that some conflict with China is inevitable, and nobody, for reasons that gamblers and casinos understand the best, in Japan would have countenanced simply stopping.

Probably, though if Manchuria was part of Imperial Japan for 7 decades, it might pay dividends by then.

For the reasons above, the key isn't holding Manchukuo for 7 decades, it's keeping everybody else who wants them out (read: everybody except the Axis powers) from throwing them out.

If Japan was anything other than insane, such as plain stupid but not batshyt crazy, they would have avoided war with both the UK and USA. It's like Iraq invading Kuwait...you can't get away with it. Any scenerio where Japan avoids complete insanity leads to a modern day Japan that is in a whole other league, which is actually pretty incredible to contemplate.

I actually agree completely with this. We can start with not invading Manchuria or any other territories of China or the West, who have the power to give Japan a very bad day. Which is far from impossible, mind. By the 1920s, most people accepted Japanese rule over Korea, and even Taiwan (well, not the Chinese, but Taiwan was nothing compared to everything else).

Yes, but that was an IJA fighting both the UK, USA and being bombed into the ground. To fight Japan one on one in a region as large as Manchuria will result in the Russians being ground down to a halt. Furthermore, without being at war with the USA and UK, Japan is likely to have millions of troops deployed in the regions of China they control. The USSR has a stnading army of about 5 million in 1945. They are not going to commit 60% of their army to the far east, where they cannot possibly supply it and leave all of eastern europe undefended after they essentially conquered a bunch of countries.

You realize, that the USSR did fight Japan in the Far East. Both of those campaigns were overwhelming Soviet victories, and the second is one of the very rare examples of an actual perfect campaign, where literally everything went right. Both were for the same reason, the IJA was actually a fairly backwards and poorly run fighting force.

Perhaps you are right, though I believe in WW1 this is essentially what Japan did against germany.

Japan was actually at war with Germany's accepted government then. Now, to be fair, you could say that this was what Japan did to China in WWI, but nobody cared about China back then, people do care about France in 1940, and in any case, even the Shandong problem was such a gigantic public relations disaster that Japan backtracked anyhow. Bear in mind that the invasion of Indochina was actually the direct trigger of the embargo.

Yes, but Japan would be in this scenario the only other large power on earth not bombed extensively. They would probably have the bomb by the early 60s at the very latest.

Fair enough. So long as they manage to survive decolonization.

I just came back from Cambodia, so I'm not saying average Asians worship authority, but in the face of force, they do generally accept it. They are not rebellious culturally and Japan could probably effectively control these areas using puppet leaders and their vast economic prowess. Plus, unlike western Europe after WW2, they'd be brutal enough to stay in power. Their undoing would be if their colonies, by vitrue of their connection to the Japanese bloc, became too wealthy. We will have to see what happens in present-day China where they are starting to get wealthier and start feeling entitled to stuff like smart phones that can work with facebook. People with something to lose can be harder to control than people with nothing.

But, the thing is, Manchuria and Korea were hotbeds of unrest for the entirety of the Japanese period. Even Taiwan had its moments. The people of Korea, Manchuria, and honestly, even Taiwan had full and quite well-developed national consciousnesses that were at odds fully with Japan's plans. Japan spent the entirety of the occupation of Manchukuo fighting guerillas. In Korea, there was an extremely active resistance movement to Japan, which was active throughout most of WWII, and long before that as well. If Japan stays in power, it'll be because she's a totalitarian state on the level of the USSR which keeps the subject states under what is effectively permanent military occupation, and it'll still be a cauldron of disorder.

So what I'm saying is that, yes, your argument basically amounts to stereotyping all Asiatics as monolithic authoritarians who just need a strongman to tell them what to do.

 

[Rich Rostrom]

A Japan won't fight a hot war over ex-french colonies (which, depending upon butterflies, they might actually control being that they were in vichy french hands. Japan could have declared war on the axis and just gobbled up French colonies, and send some token support to the allies).

If she declared war on the Axis, she would be on the same side of Free France, whose territory she would be invading.

Japan invading Vichy Indochina would be comparable to Britain invading Vichy Syria and Vichy Madagascar.

De Gaulle would demand authority over Indochina after the Japanese take it. There could be friction about that.

Remember that the Allied powers wouldn't recognize Vichy France as the government of France, or France as an enemy country.

The U.S. maintained relations with the Vichy government right up to Operation TORCH. So, incidentally, did Canada. And even the British government extended the rights of belligerents to the Vichy forces. On the other side, the Vichy authorities in North Africa held many Britons as PoWs (mostly stranded aircrew).

 

[Vingilótë]

Japan invading Vichy Indochina would be comparable to Britain invading Vichy Syria and Vichy Madagascar.

De Gaulle would demand authority over Indochina after the Japanese take it. There could be friction about that.



The U.S. maintained relations with the Vichy government right up to Operation TORCH. So, incidentally, did Canada. And even the British government extended the rights of belligerents to the Vichy forces. On the other side, the Vichy authorities in North Africa held many Britons as PoWs (mostly stranded aircrew).

Yeah, but what I mean is that unless France invades Indochina for France's benefit, as you say, it'll cause friction. Possibly a falling out.

 

[mcdo]

Hey everyone, I returned for some reason.
Today I'm going to outline my thoughts for the cultural reasons behind the rise of the Militarists.

In some ways, it's hard to nail down what ideas the Militarists represented. Clearly they were pro-military, and they had no respect for democracy or civilian government. But the heart of their ideology seems to be simple ultranationalism. So perhaps it is best to start by talking about how ultranationalism became popular among a wide swath of the Japanese public in this time.

To start with, I think it is worth noting that the main three nations in the Axis were Japan, Italy, and Germany. These three nations have something in common. Italy and Germany, of course, were both unified in their modern form in the middle of the 19th century. Japan was already unified, but really it was not so different. After the Restoration, many of the genro were seriously worried about disunity--people felt they were "Japanese' in a vague way, and local identity tended to be much more important. So began efforts towards "patriotic education", where one of the main goals of the new universal education system was to instill a deep sense of emperor-centric nationalism. It's only a general, 80-year-long trend, but I do feel like in there is a similarity between Italy, Germany, and Japan here: all three had this idea that the nation's work was unfinished, that greater unity and patriotism was needed. If those nations face times of turmoil, I think they are more likely to see nationalism as a potential solution, like how it was a "solution" during the 19th century.

The second long-term trend I think is worth mentioning is the huge levels of economic inequality present in the Empire of Japan. People today tend to think of Japan as a very equal place, and rightly so, because the postwar economic expansion created with a very low Gini coefficient. But in many ways the Empire of Japan was the opposite. Land was distributed very unequally, with millions of families farming tiny, unproductive plots of land. It was very difficult if not impossible to get ahead.

But a career in the military was a viable career path for many. A lot of people had to drop out of school after grade 8 because their families couldn't afford the tuition for high school. Without a strong education, middle class jobs like a clerk in a factory or a firm were simply out of reach. But military schools were cheap, and they offered generous scholarships to those who tested well. (Going to military school also meant that you'd be a corporal or better when you started conscription at age 18, which made your service a hell of a lot easier.) Nobody ever became rich as a Sergent, but it was a steady job that one could raise a family on. I think it's worth mentioning that in general I think Japanese culture favors steady work over potentially higher-paid by risky occupations, like starting a small business.

The other aspect of this was the social status. Just another farmer or factory worker was not a prestigious job. But there was something approaching prestige for a military man. He was someone serving the nation, potentially at the risk of his own life, and that was respected. For those that wanted respect, it was possibly the only way to achieve it. One interesting feature of the IJA was that they gave bayonets to everyone, even second-line units like cooks and quartermasters who didn't have rifles. The significance of the blade was very symbolic--it represented the swords of the samurai. By the 1930's, of course, the samurai were long gone, but the young had grown up in a culture steeped in it--or a weird perversion of it. It was deliberately spread to evoke an ethos of self-sacrifice. For a young person who had to bow and scrape in life to their social betters in life, who had no hope advancing into the middle class, such a status symbol was powerful bait.

In the 1920's, there was actually an important debate within the military (mainly the various staff colleges) and the government about the future direction of the military. Many were of the view that any future war would be a long war, and would be increasingly decided by industrial output. These men favored cutting the size of the military, and plowing the savings into government-backed projects to build factories. Others, however, thought that Japan's future enemies (according to the Army, most likely the Soviets) would be short, decisive engagements. According to this view, the government needed to maintain the largest possible body of men under arms at all times, to rush these men to the battlefield in the decisive early stage.

In the end, this conflict was settled in favor of the latter group by default. (Although arguably Manchuria was an example of the first group's ideas.) After the economic turmoil struck, there were ever-increasing groups of desperate jobless young men out in the streets, and the government knew that meant trouble. The army had long served to tamp down on social unrest by vacuuming up jobless young men, and they chose to expand this program. But this lead to other issues. Most of the rural peasants were just barely holding on in the economic good times. When the Great Depression hit and real rural incomes fell by 50% or more, this group became very vulnerable to radicalization. The Militarists were preaching that Japan needed men of action, machismo, and loyalty--and that these poor soldiers were just the men to do it. Obviously, for poor farmers who had the shit end of the stick their whole lives, being told that they were the "true Japan" and the saviors of the nation had a lot of appeal...

The Militarists had been promoting this sort of ideology since the 1920's. The military had actually been quite unpopular in Japan following the expensive and seemingly-pointless misadventure (and deaths) in Siberia, and the early phase of the movement was in many ways a counter-reaction to that.

Another aspect that I should bring up is traditionalism. This is actually another thing that Japan of this time period shares with Germany and to a lesser extent Italy. Remember how wrenching industrialization was in the US and Britain, and then remember that in Japan it was compressed and happened at the same time as general "westernization". A lot of people, even those in government, were deeply unhappy with the radical ways in which Japanese society had changed and continued to change. They railed against "modern women" who stayed unmarried into their 20's, had their own jobs (sometimes jobs like "disk jockey girls", who stood next to jukeboxes in jazz clubs and exuded sex appeal) and dated without intending to marry. Personally, I believe that the great fear many ordinary people had of communists and anarchists was not based on these actual ideologies, but because they seemed very radical in a nation that was already uneasy with the amount of change that had already occurred. The Militarists (and to some extent the Nazis) appealed to many by seeing to embody a return to traditional values, but with a twist. They offered to keep the parts of modern life people liked, the industries that made the nation strong, but to harness these in service of the nation and its traditional values. People in the US often don't hear about this aspect of the Militarists, as it didn't impact the rest of the world. But many ordinary Japanese first got to know the Militarists as those young soldiers who went around harassing young mothers in Western clothing for not being good role models to their children, and a lot of traditionalists supported that.

The last thing I'd like to mention is the general sense that many people had that the military was not corrupt. This is a period in Japanese history with many, many political corruption scandals, which tainted the image of early political parties. Many people supported the Militarists for the simple reason that they seemed to genuinely care about the national interest, not their own personal fortune. When you add that to their image as people doing dramatic things to save Japan in desperate times, as men of action and leadership... it's easy to see why even some who hated their ideas were willing to give them a chance early on.

I feel like I am forgetting many things, and I hate how disjointed this post was. But anyway, I hope you can understand what I meant to say. In general, the social factors leading tot he Militarist takeover was the support they got from the rural poor, their image as decisive and incorruptable leaders, public support for radical solutions, public disgust with elected officials, and appeal to tradition and patriotism.

Let me know if you have any questions.

 

[Tyr]

Waving away the depression isn't as hard as it seems. Of course, the business cycle always has its ups and downs, but preventing the Treaty of Versailles, which did in large part cause the Depression by encouraging unsustainable borrowing which was the only way to meet the crushing obligations it presented would be a good place to start.

No Chinese Civil War would also help, but seeing as to how Japanese imperialism in China extended all the way back to the 1890s, I think that more substantial changes would also be needed.

Sort of. But not in the way people normally think of rich developed Japan picking on poor little China just for the hell of it.
In the 1890s it was Japan who was the underdog and Chinese imperialism was far more at fault than Japanese.
Japanese policy in China was always motivated by fear. Japan knew China was bigger and naturally richer and stronger than Japan, and that it would always seek to control Japan.
Even by the 30s when Japan was clearly the dominant there was still a lot of this thinking. China had to be controlled or else it would try to control Japan.
How much truth there is to this is debatable, but many in Japan really believed it.

Its tough to think of a solution in China really short of balkanising it and making everyone believe that this balkanisation will last and foreign powers won't move in. Which is of couse pretty tough.

 

[Fredrick II Barbarossa]

got a question for you mcdo if they were so popular these militarist why was the government always opposed to them till the assassination of osachi hamaguchi. If the government of japan represented the people and the government was anti militarists till the mukden incident what makes you think they were so popular during that time frame late 20s early 30s. I think they were not really. Plus early on the militarists were mainly junior officers or colonels in essence. The Japanese general staff as demonstrated by the order oft he war minister at the time to arrest the colonels was not really militarists. To be more accurate one faction of the military made up of mainly junior officers was militarists and once the minseito government collapsed due to bad economic policies the government of japan could no longer oppose this faction that eventually won out.

Throughout this entire thread people forget the fact that Japan during the interwar period till the mukden incident was not expansionist and was actively carrying out social and political reforms that if the minseito government did not institute disastrous economic policies would've worked.

 

[Craig_Truglia]

My point actually was that after 1931, Japanese relations with the US, and really everybody, had gone into the toilet.

Yes, but embargoes took another 10 years to materialize. Look at what Iran is doing now. They are probably months away from a bomb, already have nuclear reactors, and are now ready to start negotiating. They will have a better position because they are negotiating from a better position. Japan already got away with being imperialists in the 1930s. War with America wasn't inevitable, they just had to consciously avoid starting it the moment the US government spoke of embargos. After that, they can keep their gains and start negotiating.

That, and sheer inertia means that Japan can't simply say, 'okay, we have Manchuria and North China now. We're happy. Please let us be.'

yes and no. I know where you are going, but a conqueror can conquer and then stop where going farther is suicidal, unless he is a megalomaniac. So, I am positing non-insane, incredibly selfish Japanese, no more.

You realize, that the USSR did fight Japan in the Far East. Both of those campaigns were overwhelming Soviet victories, and the second is one of the very rare examples of an actual perfect campaign, where literally everything went right. Both were for the same reason, the IJA was actually a fairly backwards and poorly run fighting force.

Yes, but the USSR was facing a heavily split Japan. The first engagements were singular battles, not out and out campaigns of conquest. If Japan retained a defensive posture in manchuria, they had a very large standing army. The Russians could win if they wanted to, but in 1945 or 1946 (the earliest they can force the issue) it wouldn't be worth the cost. And by the late 40s, early 50s, it is likely Japan would be even more modernized and could hold their own against the Russians in a defensive war. I just don't see it happen. Add butterflies and at this point, Japan might have certain alliances in the region to bolster them as well.

What's more important, an open door to china or resistance to the eastern bloc by the time after the berlin air lift?

So what I'm saying is that, yes, your argument basically amounts to stereotyping all Asiatics as monolithic authoritarians who just need a strongman to tell them what to do.

No, but peoples will continue to do business and make economic contributions under authoritarian rule (see China, South korea in its early days) and under foreign domination (i.e. Cambodia.) In Manchuria, Korea and Taiwan are under Japanese rule for decades, just like Hong Kong being under UK rule, they will grow economically and do business. It is not impossible that these regions can be controlled and dominated by an imperial power.

 

[Vingilótë]

Sort of. But not in the way people normally think of rich developed Japan picking on poor little China just for the hell of it.
In the 1890s it was Japan who was the underdog and Chinese imperialism was far more at fault than Japanese.
Japanese policy in China was always motivated by fear. Japan knew China was bigger and naturally richer and stronger than Japan, and that it would always seek to control Japan.
Even by the 30s when Japan was clearly the dominant there was still a lot of this thinking. China had to be controlled or else it would try to control Japan.
How much truth there is to this is debatable, but many in Japan really believed it.

Its tough to think of a solution in China really short of balkanising it and making everyone believe that this balkanisation will last and foreign powers won't move in. Which is of couse pretty tough.

With all due respect, I think characterizing China in the late 19th century as 'imperialist' requires an extraordinary amount of mental gymnastics. A lot of the commonly cited examples don't really hold water; 'ie, the Nagasaki incident is like saying that the First Opium War began as a British reaction to Chinese imperialism.' Arrogance, probably, but imperialism is somewhat ludicrous. By contrast, the Taiwan Expedition, the Ganghwa incident, and really the entire Seikanron debate are rather more clearly examples of imperialism (lack of respect for national sovereignty of other states, willingness to use force to demonstrate will and power, etc.) albeit, with varying degrees of success. I mean, in the thousand and a half years of Sino-Japanese relations, how many times can you name when a Chinese military force launched any sort of attack or raid on Japanese soil?

That's not to say that fear wasn't a primary motivator. I'd say actually that that basically defined Japanese policy, and by extension, a desire to balkanize China in the 30s (ie, creating Manchukuo and Mengjiang; Autonomous Hebei as well, fwiw, I think there were Japanese approaches to Tibet as well. But it was also rather nakedly imperialist.

Yes, but embargoes took another 10 years to materialize. Look at what Iran is doing now. They are probably months away from a bomb, already have nuclear reactors, and are now ready to start negotiating. They will have a better position because they are negotiating from a better position. Japan already got away with being imperialists in the 1930s. War with America wasn't inevitable, they just had to consciously avoid starting it the moment the US government spoke of embargos. After that, they can keep their gains and start negotiating.

yes and no. I know where you are going, but a conqueror can conquer and then stop where going farther is suicidal, unless he is a megalomaniac. So, I am positing non-insane, incredibly selfish Japanese, no more.

I think you make a good point; but the resource question is not something which popped up right after the embargo. The lack of resources was a defining element of Japanese foreign policy in the 20s and 30s. The annexation of Korea (which was acceptable to America at the time), the war in China (much less so), and the planned invasion of the Dutch East Indies (significantly less so) were all things which had been in the pipeline for many years. It wasn't a case of, 'let's see how far we can push America and stop,' but, 'how can we get this and not piss off America too much?" To change this mindset requires a massive turnaround in Japanese foreign policy.

Mind, I don't think your basic premise is totally impossible, if, you know, any Japanese leaders had thought that way. But you have to realize that after creating Manchukuo, Japan was little more than an international pariah; most significantly, while a major war goal of the war in China was to secure recognition of Manchukuo, and an understanding with China; conflict was basically inevitable unless they could resolve the same issue with the West. When you consider how nobody other than Japanese allies and puppet states recognized Manchukuo, you can imagine how they felt about that.

So basically, occupying Manchukuo, then throwing down stakes, is not unviable as a policy, but even that requires a big turnaround in Japanese policy, and is not necessarily going to succeed.

Yes, but the USSR was facing a heavily split Japan. The first engagements were singular battles, not out and out campaigns of conquest. If Japan retained a defensive posture in manchuria, they had a very large standing army. The Russians could win if they wanted to, but in 1945 or 1946 (the earliest they can force the issue) it wouldn't be worth the cost. And by the late 40s, early 50s, it is likely Japan would be even more modernized and could hold their own against the Russians in a defensive war. I just don't see it happen. Add butterflies and at this point, Japan might have certain alliances in the region to bolster them as well.

It's not so much a question of quantity so much as quality. The IJN was one of the finest navies in the world until WWII took its toll. The IJA, not so much. By contrast, even the purged Red Army easily outfought a similar Japanese force at Nomonhan, and the veteran Red Army is a very different beast indeed. Japan, not Russia, is the one who needs to seek the USSR's tolerance. Now, Sakhalin and Korea may very well be within the USSR's zone of tolerance. Those are easily within the USA's zone of tolerance. A Japan with decent diplomacy certainly could see to that. Manchukuo...not so much. Basically, the problem isn't ultimately whether Japan could repress Manchukuo enough (it might be be able to) or whether it would be beneficial (it could be). I'm not arguing those points. It's whether that bevy of stronger powers would see Manchukuo as being a legitimate construct (they didn't, and for this to happen is singularly unlikely).

What's more important, an open door to china or resistance to the eastern bloc by the time after the berlin air lift?

For the USA? They could easily have both, if China doesn't fall to Communism. Why should they let Japan brutalize their long-time regional ally, when the USSR is not likely to be fond of Japan either, and when a strong Japan is less reliable and less potentially powerful than a strong anti-communist China?

Mind, if China goes Communist, strong Japan just became a lot more valuable to the US. But then, the USSR would really not like the idea of Manchukuo. And Korea is threatened as well at this point.

No, but peoples will continue to do business and make economic contributions under authoritarian rule (see China, South korea in its early days) and under foreign domination (i.e. Cambodia.) In Manchuria, Korea and Taiwan are under Japanese rule for decades, just like Hong Kong being under UK rule, they will grow economically and do business. It is not impossible that these regions can be controlled and dominated by an imperial power.

Sure, but my point is that state terror isn't something unique to East Asia, and it certainly isn't especially effective on East Asians. Honestly, the insinuation strikes me as being more than a little racist.

Now, you could just be saying that Japan will use state terror to maintain control over Korea and Manchukuo. Ok, sure. Militarist Japan wasn't actually that bad at that.

Incidentally, I'm not really foreseeing much prosperity for the local people. China's liberalization has brought great wealth, albeit not equally distributed, but it was with the intention of creating wealth for the Chinese. Japanese rule in Korea, Taiwan, and Manchukuo was all about creating wealth for Japan, and Japan alone.

 

[Craig_Truglia]

It's not so much a question of quantity so much as quality. The IJN was one of the finest navies in the world until WWII took its toll. The IJA, not so much. By contrast, even the purged Red Army easily outfought a similar Japanese force at Nomonhan, and the veteran Red Army is a very different beast indeed. Japan, not Russia, is the one who needs to seek the USSR's tolerance. Now, Sakhalin and Korea may very well be within the USSR's zone of tolerance. Those are easily within the USA's zone of tolerance. A Japan with decent diplomacy certainly could see to that. Manchukuo...not so much. Basically, the problem isn't ultimately whether Japan could repress Manchukuo enough (it might be be able to) or whether it would be beneficial (it could be). I'm not arguing those points. It's whether that bevy of stronger powers would see Manchukuo as being a legitimate construct (they didn't, and for this to happen is singularly unlikely).

Let's pretend then it is 1946. Japan never entered WW2. Russia might muster 2 million men for the invasion. Japan will likely have 2 to 3 million men, being that they had about six million men in their army. Now, 2 million battle-hardened russians are better than even 3 million japanese, but manchuria is gigantic. The Japanese can allow the russians to over extend themselves and wear them out. Plus, unlike OTL they will not be stripped of all their heavy equipment and they will probably have air superiority over the russians, as the japanese would have had years to train even more pilots and not be losing all of them fighting the usa.

To be honest, I don't see Stalin risking it here, the odds wouldn't be enough in his favor. Instead, Russian military presence will force the Japanese to have a very strong military presence. It will mean in the long run japan will misallocate much more of its gdp to its military, but that will probably keep their colonies in line. Korea wouldn't be able to overthrow a million japanese troops with much better technology.

Sure, but my point is that state terror isn't something unique to East Asia, and it certainly isn't especially effective on East Asians. Honestly, the insinuation strikes me as being more than a little racist.

I guess I'm trying to think like an imperialist. Historically, many imperial possessions were net drains, such as eastern european powers, Ireland, certain German colonies in Africa (I think.) Now, including asian (and excluding ireland) all these different people have accepted dictatorial rule. Now, many asian colonies were money makers, and like these other peoples, can be made to accept colonization (i'm not saying they want it, but they will live with it.) Cambodia is a modern example of this, and some ways also Hong Kong (as they accepted british rule and prc rule, but both countries also didn't abuse hong kong in recent history.) Tons of chinese didn't like mao, but he subjugated the country using brute force.

So, I think it is probable that Japan could have pulled it off, made money doing it, and as it modernized and exported enough of their zany culture, probably by the 60s and 70s have colonies that are relatively happy to be in the more prosperous sphere of influence of the japanese. Just like HK was happy to be with the uk, and taiwan being an US puppet.

When I was in Cambodia, I was asked by two guys (who, ironically work for the government there) that why doesn't the US invade them.

I asked, why on earth they would want that (with my wife translating.)

One responded in khmer, "It's better to be a rich man's servant than a poor man's servant."

Meaning, they prefer us domination over vietnamese domination. And, they will accept domination if like what occurred in west germany, japan and south korea, it will bring them prosperity.

A wealthy japanese sphere ultimately would bring its subjects prosperity. I think, they would ultimately even like being in that sphere.

 

[Vingilótë]

Let's pretend then it is 1946. Japan never entered WW2. Russia might muster 2 million men for the invasion. Japan will likely have 2 to 3 million men, being that they had about six million men in their army. Now, 2 million battle-hardened russians are better than even 3 million japanese, but manchuria is gigantic. The Japanese can allow the russians to over extend themselves and wear them out. Plus, unlike OTL they will not be stripped of all their heavy equipment and they will probably have air superiority over the russians, as the japanese would have had years to train even more pilots and not be losing all of them fighting the usa.

To be honest, I don't see Stalin risking it here, the odds wouldn't be enough in his favor. Instead, Russian military presence will force the Japanese to have a very strong military presence. It will mean in the long run japan will misallocate much more of its gdp to its military, but that will probably keep their colonies in line. Korea wouldn't be able to overthrow a million japanese troops with much better technology.

Air superiority is possible; but I have doubts about everything else. The Red Army really was better than the IJA in every way; but I'm not experienced in war-gaming by any means, so I'll leave off there.

I guess I'm trying to think like an imperialist. Historically, many imperial possessions were net drains, such as eastern european powers, Ireland, certain German colonies in Africa (I think.) Now, including asian (and excluding ireland) all these different people have accepted dictatorial rule. Now, many asian colonies were money makers, and like these other peoples, can be made to accept colonization (i'm not saying they want it, but they will live with it.) Cambodia is a modern example of this, and some ways also Hong Kong (as they accepted british rule and prc rule, but both countries also didn't abuse hong kong in recent history.) Tons of chinese didn't like mao, but he subjugated the country using brute force.

So, I think it is probable that Japan could have pulled it off, made money doing it, and as it modernized and exported enough of their zany culture, probably by the 60s and 70s have colonies that are relatively happy to be in the more prosperous sphere of influence of the japanese. Just like HK was happy to be with the uk, and taiwan being an US puppet.

When I was in Cambodia, I was asked by two guys (who, ironically work for the government there) that why doesn't the US invade them.

I asked, why on earth they would want that (with my wife translating.)

One responded in khmer, "It's better to be a rich man's servant than a poor man's servant."

Meaning, they prefer us domination over vietnamese domination. And, they will accept domination if like what occurred in west germany, japan and south korea, it will bring them prosperity.

A wealthy japanese sphere ultimately would bring its subjects prosperity. I think, they would ultimately even like being in that sphere.

That's great. I haven't contested that point at all. Now what does being Asian have to do with it?

Probably no point to making that response, since he's banned now, but whatever.

 

[General Tirpitz]

Korea, Japan and Taiwan today are about 7.5 to 8 trillion in GDP. Add a bunch of Islands, Manchuria, no nukes and being bombed into the ground, avoiding WW2, I think a 20% increase in GDP is modest.

The combined GDP of NK, SK, Taiwan and Japan would be about 10,5 billion if all those countries had the same GDP per capita than Japan. Without destruction and population losses wars brought to those countries, the economy would very likely be significantly larger today, maybe around 12-13bln (or even higher).

 

[Admiral Fischer]

its simple really. Keep the rikken minseito in power. Prevent assassination of prime minister osachi hamaguchi. Perhaps have him shift his economic policies away from keeping yen on gold standard. With Osachi still strong and popular for his good economic policies, the foreign minister kijiro shidehara would have more maneuvering room against the army.

Here's the problem 1 - The whole 'Free-Gold' cause was one main central principle of the Rikken Minseito. The party's economic policy was all about the Gold standard.

EDIT: I also must stress that the Rikken Minseito never abandoned their economic policies until everything went wrong in 1931.

Also in otl shortly before the mukden incident a general was dispatched by the japanese war minister to prevent the incident from ocuring after he heard about it.. Simply have the general arrive in time and arrest the colonels planning the incident. Ergo no mukden incident leading to no big Japanese involvement in Manchuria.

The problem 2 - That general, Tatekawa Yoshitsugu, actually arrived in time, and got drunk with Itagaki Seishiro, probably on purpose.

With the Minseito strong and in power relations will become warmer between japan and the west. plus it was the minseito that pursued policies of fair treatment for all members of the empire and were a party that was looking to reform japan. Basically meaning no batshit slaughtering non japanese japan. With them in power the nationalists remain marginalized.

3 - Indeed the Rikken Minseito was very reform-minded, but its main opponent, the Rikken Seiyukai, can always use some nationalistic rhetoric or whatever weird thing to bring politics into the mess. They did in 1926, in 1931, in 1932 and 1936.

At the same time have tojo die due to some incident. With Tojo's death, the arrests and imprisonment of the perpetrators of the mukden incident the Japanese militarists would have their base of power gutted.

Really that is all that needs to occur for the militarists not to take over. it is a very simple POD.

Plus it would lead tothe possibility of japan retaining at least taiwan and the kurills and sakalkhan, and posibly korea if they play their cards right.

4 - Tojo was never been the supreme leader of any militarist cabal until 1940. In fact, he was not even a full general until his ascension to the post of Prime Minister in 1941, when he was simultaneously promoted to the rank of General and appointed the Prime Minister.

 

[LeX]

About the China issue: I'm not sure how you could get rid of the fear Japan had towards a strong China, but it could be solved with increased pressure early on from Western powers that overshadow the ROC as the greater threat in Japanese eyes. Some kind of second Russo-Japanese war (perhaps a Russian rather than Japanese invasion of China) could do this.

Hey everyone, I returned for some reason.
Today I'm going to outline my thoughts for the cultural reasons behind the rise of the Militarists.

<...>

I feel like I am forgetting many things, and I hate how disjointed this post was. But anyway, I hope you can understand what I meant to say. In general, the social factors leading tot he Militarist takeover was the support they got from the rural poor, their image as decisive and incorruptable leaders, public support for radical solutions, public disgust with elected officials, and appeal to tradition and patriotism.

Let me know if you have any questions.

This effectively is my understanding of the matter as well. A specific cause of militarization, which I am currently reading about, might also be found in the so-called "Ugaki era" from 1924 to 1931 - in which the military reforms he introduced while serving as army minister failed and in fact backfired, creating dissent in both senior and junior officers and sowing the seeds that directly resulted in radicalism.

 

[Admiral Fischer]

A specific cause of militarization, which I am currently reading about, might also be found in the so-called "Ugaki era" from 1924 to 1931 - in which the military reforms he introduced while serving as army minister failed and in fact backfired, creating dissent in both senior and junior officers and sowing the seeds that directly resulted in radicalism.

But such of military disarmament and reform appears to be inevitable, considering the prevalence of anti-military sentiment of the time, at least to me.

Many radical junior officers were born in the agricultural society, and the experience of rural poverty deeply affected their political views. As such, I think one effective way to counter the radicalization would be the Land reform.

 

[LeX]

But such of military disarmament and reform appears to be inevitable, considering the prevalence of anti-military sentiment of the time, at least to me.

Many radical junior officers were born in the agricultural society, and the experience of rural poverty deeply affected their political views. As such, I think one effective way to counter the radicalization would be the Land reform.

I'm just about to read the chapter of a book that covers this exact subject. I'll take notes and see what it says about the Ugaki reforms themselves.