AHC/WI: Japanese Invasion of Hawaii ends in disaster

[Johnrankins]

The way the end of the war actually played out completely eliminates any possbility that sub warfare in and of itself could or would have caused an unconditional Japanese surrender. There was simply no way for the Allies to force a Japanese surrender prior to 1945. It just was not in the cards.

In OTL no, in a TL where the Japanese are stupid enough to actually try and invade Hawaii and wreck a good portion of their fleet, and either conquer the PI late or not at all it is a different matter. Japan is far weaker in such a scenario.

 

[phx1138]

And then you get the Tale of Dan Daspit and USS Tinosa, vs Tonana Maru No. 3, 15 torpedoes fired, 13 hit, but only 2 exploded, and those only because they hit as glancing blows. Also, how many of the early misses were due to bad fire-control, and how many were due to running deep is up for debate, certainly the care taken by USS Sargo seems to suggest that at least some of her misses were due not to poor fire-control but to faulty ordinance.

You'll notice I mentioned Daspit & Jacobs.

Neither am I saying the Mark XIV didn't have a myriad of problems. I am in no way nohow defending it. It just didn't have the crushing impact most people think. (I used to get it wrong, too.) Plus, as said, the 8 fish/sinking was the overall force average, so patrols like Tinosa's & Sargo's were accounted for. (Do the math for yourself: in '42, it was 1442 fish fired {including maybe a hundred or so Mark Xs, to be sure}, 180 ships confirmed sunk.)

That's all irrelevant to the question of basing.

You were the one arguing for operations in the South China & Java Sea, not me.

you can't run a submarine fleet from an isolated base deep behind enemy lines under enemy skies.

Not for long, no. Until the P.I. fell, Tawi Tawi beat Manila all hollow.

The notion that US subs could force Japanese unconditional surrender on their own is patently absurd.

I didn't say that. I said the Bomb was unnecessary. I also said the Sub Force could cripple Japan's ability to fight on. With small changes, the victories that OTL took until January '45 to achieve could have been achieved by the end of '44. Change the resources Japan has available, you've changed her ability to resist, & where.

By 1944, the Sub Force had already dramatically limited IJN's ability to fight. This was perfectly possible much sooner, since the change putting tankers at #1 was comparatively late. (I can't find it in Blair without reading it again...)

Don't forget, the Sub Force in '44 sank more ships than in '42 & '43 combined. Basing all boats in Hawaii could have doubled or tripled the OTL sinkings. (Blair says 15% of all patrols, those from Hawaii into Home Waters, sank 45% of all ships in '42. My own examination, which didn't count only Empire waters, still puts the dry patrol rate from Oz higher. The patrols to Midway & the Aleutians were a total waste of effort, too.)