25,000 infantry (1/2 regular, 1/2 green). 3:1 advantage = 75,000 infantry. At that range, 10:1 tons per man = 750,000 tons.
AHC/WI: Japanese Invasion of Hawaii ends in disaster
- Thread starter Mister Abbadon
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25,000 infantry (1/2 regular, 1/2 green). 3:1 advantage = 75,000 infantry. At that range, 10:1 tons per man = 750,000 tons.
Which, given the Malaya campaign involved 5300 japanese troops, shows how implausible this is.
I think the Combined Fleet page does an adequate job of that - not that I would mind another tour de force Calbear TL...
The question I have is reflected by some of the answers here: Are we talking a December 1941 invasion, following on from Pearl Harbor, or some post-Midway, fall 1942 invasion?
Mind you, neither one is logistically possible; but the scenarios would play out differently.
I just can't see the Pacific version of Sealion even playing out, because even if the Japanese reached the point of serious planning for it, they would realize quickly enough just how absurd the operation would be, even if they underestimated US ground forces on Oahu. They would be tackling a significant landmass with highly defensible terrain, defended by thousands of ground troops and hundreds of land-based fighters, at the end of a ridiculously long logistic supply train, with absolutely zero land-based air support, a modest ability to barely transport three divisions, forced to plod along at 10-12 knots, with no real amphibious doctrine to speak of, against severe Japanese army general staff opposition...really, next to this, Sealion almost looks sane and realistic. At some point, general staff pipedream files would have to become operational realities, and Yamamoto, whatever his flaws, would see that readily enough.
A far more plausible Japan-wank scenario (or what Japan might hope is a wank) would be an Operation FS timeline that the IJN attempts to execute. Unlike Hawaii, significant planning had been done for it, and there was actually a significant chance that Japan might be able to pull off such an operation.
Exactly.
It makes no strategic sense for Japan. Hawaii was a resource sink. The East Indies were a resource treasure trove (even if Japan lacked sufficient tankage to exploit them).
And unlike Oahu, Japan had a real chance to pull off an amphibious conquest of Malaya and the East Indies.
A lot of transports and a few big warships sunk for no gain in resources, plus their hold on the SRA is a lot more tentative. Hard to see how it doesn't put them in a worse position from the moment they try to land.
No, 5,300 will be Kota Bharu all on its own - about 5 tons per man. First flight to Malaya was about, IIRC, 26,000 troops in four convoys,
Kra (Malaya)..................46,453 tons
Singora (Mal).................84,877
Patani (Mal)..................47,781
Kota Bharu(Mal)............26,751
So, about 26,000 on 205,000 tons. Something like 7.9 tons per man.
MarshalBraginsky
Banned
I'm not sure if there are any local Japanese who would work with the invaders, especially the Nisei (second generation) Japanese who are born in the USA. Some of them would even be in the US Army.
Out of curiousity, what does the CF article say will happen if, as per its standard doctrine, the IJA takes the relatively undefended Maui, the Big Island, and Kauai and establishes strong airpower there?
The reason that the Japanese are no further behind losing at Hawaii is because of Midway; all they do is catch up to their historical defeat.
Flubber
Banned
The CF article deals with logistics and logistics are the fatal flaw in your suggestion that Japan grab Maui etc. and turn them into airstrips. Put your troops ashore, build the airstrips, land the planes, and then supply them with Oahu right next door.
The Kido Butai only made it to a few hundred miles north of Hawaii with oil drums stacked on the decks of it's destroyers, but delivering the millions of gallons of avgas, tons construction equipment and supplies, plus the uncounted amounts bombs, bullets, food, and other fungibles to airbases on Maui will be a piece of cake, right?
The OTL Japan defeated at Midway already controlled Guam, Midway, the Philippines, Malaysia, Burma, Singapore, and the DEI among other places. The ATL Japan defeated in this insane attempt on Hawaii will not control any of those places and will have lost most of it's capability to seize those places in the future.
This war will be shorter because Japan's initial gains will be much smaller.
Grand Admiral Thrawn
Donor
As I remember the CF article points out that Japan gets a Solomons type meatgrinder right off the bat. Convoys have to run in, at least to replenish ammo. Subs can do daily sorties, and will sink something. San Diego is closer than Yokohama to Hawaii, so the US can keep this up as long as Japan wants. Most of the 75,000 troops are written off, as destroyers cannot evac out. Too far, they will run out of fuel. If Guam and Wake are held, almost certain as no transports and troops, mean the US can take tje Solomons in 1942.
Midway cost the Japanese their big carriers (and the air-arms on those carriers), but little else, trying to support an occupation of Midway or Hawaii will cost them in transports, well even more in transports since the US forces were already doing a reasonable job in the south-west despite their worthless torpedoes.
So, judging from your reply the answer is, no, the CF article did not specifically address the scenario where the IJA follows its standard doctrine and lands on the outlying islands.
So I guess that leaves two possibilities for us to pick between. Do you think they didn’t realise the Hawaiian Islands have more islands than Oahu, or do you think they actually started to write an opinion piece on the outlying islands, but redacted it from the final article because it was going in a “wrong” or “confusing” direction in relation to the strong conclusions they have in rest of the piece?
Actually, no, not one IJN destroyer had drummed oil aboard for the Pearl Harbor Operation, but what’s a casual whopper between friends, hmmmn?
I think you meant Wake. As for the rest, you appear to be saying that a defeat at Hawaii shall cause the Japanese to “lose” their ability to capture Guam and Luzon. That’s a rather ambitious interpretation of the Allied situation in early 1942, don’t you think?
I'm not seeing where this translates into a war decided by something other than a 100 carrier USN fleet, A-bombs and Russian invasions. Can you direct my attention to which of those three depended on Hawaii?
Question - how exactly does Guam and Wake relate to the question of the Solomons? Also, how precisely do the Allies hold either of these, given that Guam had basically no garrison and Wake's had been ordered evacuated within 2 weeks of the start of the war?
Grand Admiral Thrawn
Donor
1) It is far easier to hold a fort than to take one.
2) The US started attacking from Midway; TTL the starting line is several hundred, if not thousands, of miles closer.
3) How did the IJN take them? They had a fixed troop and transport number. If Hawaii is attacked, even if lost, then where did the ships come from? Check the Combined Fleet article, it lists where you can pick from. 500 troops can defend an attack from 0 IJN troops. I figure Wake and Guam are part of those skipped, as if Hawaii falls, they are alone. If there is an assault on Hawaii in 1941, then ships to evac Wake are not available.
If the Japanese lose more transports early they can't resupply their pacific forces as well, which means that those forces are overcome sooner. How much sooner I don't know, but I'd think probably a few weeks per operation, so maybe a couple of months or so at Guadalcanal.
The point, which I would have thoughht was pretty clear, was not that those things depended upon Hawaii but that a disaster at Hawaii would have impaired Japan's later ability to resist; more so than it was already impaired by the grossly uneven odds against them IOTL.
I think in the book they removed some troops from china which was the POD. In the end the Japanese lose alot more soldiers and 3 carriers. So it's more of Japan being stupid in the long run
Guam was basically ungarrisoned and Wake was being evacuated. This was because, due to geography, these bases were impossible to hold. Wake was so undesirable as a base that, despite the political prestige associated with its occupation, it was bypassed in 1944 as irrelevant.
Eliminate Guam, Gilberts, Wake and the Philippines and 700,000 tons is immediately made available, along with about 3 divisional equivelents.