A Japanese invasion of Hawaii has been discussed at length on Navweaps over the years. The consensus was that the Japanese did not have the logistical capability to carry it out.
AHC/WI: Japanese Invasion of Hawaii ends in disaster
- Thread starter Mister Abbadon
- Start date
nbcman
Donor
I thought that was the Japanese invasion of California?
Why hasn't anyone written that one up..???
Someone did. But I warn you, you'll be seeing double if you read this 'timeline':
https://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showthread.php?t=229162&highlight=double+hull+japan
The problem with projecting the long term effects of a failed Hawaii is, curiously enough, Midway. Since the Japanese suffered pretty much a catastrophe in June 1942, a similar failure at Hawaii earlier becomes pretty much a 'wash' historically.
I do not think a Japanese invasion of Hawaii was plausible.
Even if it was, and if (even as the Americans repulse it) it damages Pearl enough to force the Americans to spend time and resources repairing it, what doe4s it really accomplish.
It buys the Japanese 3 more months and two more a-bombs.
Mike Turcotte
Even if it was, and if (even as the Americans repulse it) it damages Pearl enough to force the Americans to spend time and resources repairing it, what doe4s it really accomplish.
It buys the Japanese 3 more months and two more a-bombs.
Mike Turcotte
There is virtually no way Japan could have sucessfully invaded and held, even for a short time, all of the main islands of Hawaii and they knew that. Plus, as others have said, getting the IJA and IJN to cooperate in a plan of such magnitude is virtually impossible. It is true that formal invasion plans were formulated in the aftermath of Pearl Harbor that presumed effective interservice cooperation, and might have been attempted if the Midway operation had been a success, but it would have been a dangerous diversion of limited resources when the real theatres of concern lay in China and SE Asia
In actuality, any invasion taken as part of the Pearl Harbor operation would have likely been more like a large-scale raid, with a relatively small committment of manpower, and featuring the invasion of only one or two main Islands.
One option would have been to occupy one of the sparsely populated westernmost Islands to serve as a staging point for air attacks on Oahu, the hope being that the US would spend an inordinate amount of time and effort to retake the island, delaying other, more strategically important, operations.
The other would be to stage a massive raid on Oahu aimed not at occupying the island for any extended period of time, but at destroying key military and civilian infrastructure not damaged by the air attacks. Although it would be schemed as a hit-and-run affair with the hope that surviving troops could be withdrawn ater doing their jobs, the Japanese would expect that it might very likely turn into a suicide mission - the engineers, soldiers, and marines doing as much damage as they could until they were all killed or captured by US forces.
The second option seems to me the best (and most interesting). Further demolition of damaged warships, naval and civilian harbor facilities, oil storage, communication networks, power, and transportation facilities (bridges, etc) in the Honolulu area would cripple Hawaii as a functioning territory and force the US to reposition the fleet to California for a time and spend considerable time and effort restoring basic civilian and military services. None of this would change the ultimate course of the war, but it would substantially delay the eventual US responses.
In actuality, any invasion taken as part of the Pearl Harbor operation would have likely been more like a large-scale raid, with a relatively small committment of manpower, and featuring the invasion of only one or two main Islands.
One option would have been to occupy one of the sparsely populated westernmost Islands to serve as a staging point for air attacks on Oahu, the hope being that the US would spend an inordinate amount of time and effort to retake the island, delaying other, more strategically important, operations.
The other would be to stage a massive raid on Oahu aimed not at occupying the island for any extended period of time, but at destroying key military and civilian infrastructure not damaged by the air attacks. Although it would be schemed as a hit-and-run affair with the hope that surviving troops could be withdrawn ater doing their jobs, the Japanese would expect that it might very likely turn into a suicide mission - the engineers, soldiers, and marines doing as much damage as they could until they were all killed or captured by US forces.
The second option seems to me the best (and most interesting). Further demolition of damaged warships, naval and civilian harbor facilities, oil storage, communication networks, power, and transportation facilities (bridges, etc) in the Honolulu area would cripple Hawaii as a functioning territory and force the US to reposition the fleet to California for a time and spend considerable time and effort restoring basic civilian and military services. None of this would change the ultimate course of the war, but it would substantially delay the eventual US responses.
That's now about four different considerations, arguing that the offensive must fail. But the thread's topic is the consequences to a failed offensive, so failure is inherent - we're there already.
The Japanese had the shipping for a shot at Hawaii, but not Hawaii and the actual Southern offensive.
It kinda depends on what sort of invasion it was. Shipping for a small 5,000 man landing force might have been squeeezed out. just maybe if it were high speed transports, and if there was some really good intellegence & planning the transports might have got undetected to the landing site the night before the carrier strike - maybe.
This brings up all sorts of questions about what sort of warships would hang around to support the landing, and how long they could stay until fuel or ammunition gave out.
If anyone wants to understand the pros & cons of a large scale invasion then ask Glen239 nicely & he can provide links to several forums where this was discussed at length.
This brings up all sorts of questions about what sort of warships would hang around to support the landing, and how long they could stay until fuel or ammunition gave out.
If anyone wants to understand the pros & cons of a large scale invasion then ask Glen239 nicely & he can provide links to several forums where this was discussed at length.
I can't find it right but I swear to god that I saw book entitled "Battle Of Hawaii" which is about what if the Japanese went ahead with a land invasion after bombing pearl harbor. I saw it in a San Francisco book store in Japanese town three years ago.
Turtledove wrote a two-book series with this premise if I recall properly.
Indeed. Far from prolonging the war it's likely to considerably shorten the war, because the Japanese are going to have to bite deep into many of their maritime reserves, and I'd expect at least some of the ships would end up having to be abandoned either through lack of fuel, or through battle-damage, especially among the transports, many of which would have to get into range of enemy aircraft to deliver their consignments.
Which totally ignored the logistics issues.
If Japan were toeven attempt it, theyd have to divert all their transports and troops that, otl, went south to the dei.
Which means theyve given up on getting the oil which was the whole point of the war.
It's a pretty far-fetched idea. Even an occupation of Midway was known to be untenable; when one Japanese planner asked another how he expected to supply and defend Midway, the answer was (paraphrasing): "Well, if we can't hold it we'll just abandon it." That was apparently the whole logistical plan. Getting any farther seems pretty much fantastical.
Tough to see how failing to take Hawaii shortens the war - it's not like the A-bomb, B-29 and Essex Class programs all speed up because of it.
OTOH, taking Hawaii could have extended the war by as much as six months.