AHC/WI: Japan takes Ceylon

Same source, pg 524, indicates that the 3rd Air Division (Java) had 560 aircraft.
Which suggests that the IJAAF in the area outnumbered the BEC Air Forces in India by 2 to one. But they also had the Allied air forces in Australia to contend with. I do have the RAAF strength in Australia from research I did for a Japan Invades Australia thread, but I was unsuccessful finding the USAAF strength in Australia in the middle of 1942. In terms of airpower it looks as if the "iron was white hot" for the Japanese in the summer of 1942, but they did not have enough troops and sea transport to exploit it.
 
Off the top of my head, Squadron No. 27 had Beaufighters, and was deployed to India in the summer of 1942 - I don't have the exact date at hand. They ended up being used in ground support operations in Burma by '43.

In terms of fighters, most of what was in theater were Hurricanes at that point.

OOB in April was 11 squadrons in theatre (66 squadrons were requirement). By September there were 11 fighter squadrons (10 Hurricane, 1 Mohawk), 8 attack, Blenheim, Hudson, Wellington, Beaufighter (1 sqd of these). 7 liason and 4 flying boat SQD's.

The British *did* have plenty of fires, and the ones in the Far East consistently ranked lowest in priority for Churchill throughout the war. No one argues otherwise.

Roskill says if the Japanese captured Ceylon, "it will be extremely difficult but not...impossible, to maintain our communications to the Middle East. But, if the Japanese capture Ceylon and destroy the greater part of the Eastern Fleet, then...the situation becomes really desperate."

Which meant the Eastern Fleet would not be risked to save Ceylon, but would be preserved to guard SLOC to the ME.

All that the Ceylon garrison needs to do is hold out until reinforcements arrive, and it's quite difficult to see how they couldn't. The Indian Division may be an unknown quantity, but the Australian and British brigades were very solid, and they would have the depth of a 25,000sq mi island (almost the size of Hokkaido) to defend in depth. Even with the securing of a port (say, Trincomalee) and some airfields, the Japanese are simply not going to be in a position to cut them off from supply and reinforcement from India - at worst, even if the Kido Butai could somehow be sustained for a lengthy period time (something they never achieved otherwise), the most the Japanese could hope for is to establish daytime air superiority over the Palk Strait and Laccadive Sea - the British could still move in a great deal at night.

Quite possible, but what I don't see is any elements of the Indian army to throw in to help them - the IA looks to have been fully or nearly fully committed to guarding the LOC to Burma along the shores of Bay of Bengal, (of which Calcutta was of absolute paramount importance). There were a couple newly commissioned divisions, but these were not properly trained or equipped.

And just how are the Japanese going to get them to Ceylon?

By direct flight for the KI-21's, by carrier ferry for the KI-27's and KI-43's. (ie, same way the British got 140 Hurricanes to Malaya by February 1942).

This assumes a long-term commitment to the Bay of Bengal by Kido Butai and Combined Fleet, though - not just a limited-time invasion support campaign.

No, it assumes no carrier campaigns outside the range of land based airpower in the South Seas, no 'Midways'.

This leaves the Americans free to launch counteroffensives later in 1942 - either in the Solomons, New Guinea, or the Gilberts/Marshalls. And it is hard to see the IJN simply ignoring that until 1943 - just as it is hard to see them not reacting vigorously to the Doolittle Raid. The reaction doesn't have to be Midway, to be sure, but it would be something.

Pin pricks can be annoying, but pin pricks can also be ignored.

Japan was at her strategic limit by the spring of 1942. The only thing that made serious strategic sense was to fortify what she had as well as possible, with no more than the most marginal rounding out of the the perimeter (such as Port Moresby, for example).

Japan was at end of her strategic limit by the end of June 4th, 1942.
 
Which suggests that the IJAAF in the area outnumbered the BEC Air Forces in India by 2 to one. But they also had the Allied air forces in Australia to contend with. I do have the RAAF strength in Australia from research I did for a Japan Invades Australia thread, but I was unsuccessful finding the USAAF strength in Australia in the middle of 1942. In terms of airpower it looks as if the "iron was white hot" for the Japanese in the summer of 1942, but they did not have enough troops and sea transport to exploit it.

At the start of April 1942 the British had about 11 squadrons in the BoB area, plus another 4-6 in Burma - most of these were on Ceylon and were taken out in the carrier raid. By the end of April 1942 they had rebuilt to about 170 aircraft, by the end of May about 270.
 
Pin pricks can be annoying, but pin pricks can also be ignored.

Not by Yamamoto. For whom destruction of the US carrier force was a central passion in 1942.

In the OP the US lost three carriers at Pearl Harbor. Even assuming they can't be raised and brought back to active duty in 1942, the US could and likely would have 3-4 fleet carriers in EastPac. And Yamamoto would still want them eliminated, because they're still the most dangerous threat to IJN domination of the Western Pacific. This is the personality you have to work with, unless you're killing him off somehow. He isn't going to change.

Japan was at end of her strategic limit by the end of June 4th, 1942.

Japan was at the end of her strategic limit before that, Glenn. Come on. Again and again, you overestimate Japanese capabilities. It's a pattern with you.

It had an outside shot at securing some very minor acretion to her perimeter here or there (like Port Moresby), but that's about it. And it wouldn't be a sustainable long-term.
 
At the start of April 1942 the British had about 11 squadrons in the BoB area, plus another 4-6 in Burma - most of these were on Ceylon and were taken out in the carrier raid. By the end of April 1942 they had rebuilt to about 170 aircraft, by the end of May about 270.

Taken out? What were the total losses sustained by the RAF during the Indian Ocean Raid?
 
In the OP the US lost three carriers at Pearl Harbor. Even assuming they can't be raised and brought back to active duty in 1942, the US could and likely would have 3-4 fleet carriers in EastPac. And Yamamoto would still want them eliminated, because they're still the most dangerous threat to IJN domination of the Western Pacific. This is the personality you have to work with, unless you're killing him off somehow. He isn't going to change.
True, but as they are all the Americans have until the Essex and Independence class become available in 1943 they are likely to use them extremely prudently. Until then the Japanese have the 6 big KB carriers, Ryuho, Soho and Zuiho plus Hiyo and Junyo arriving as reinforcements in the middle of 1942. The Japanese are screwed in the long term, but until the end of 1942 they outnumber the Americans 11:4 in terms of hulls, but IIRC it is not so bad in aircraft capacity, but bad enough.
 
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Which suggests that the IJAAF in the area outnumbered the BEC Air Forces in India by 2 to one. But they also had the Allied air forces in Australia to contend with. I do have the RAAF strength in Australia from research I did for a Japan Invades Australia thread, but I was unsuccessful finding the USAAF strength in Australia in the middle of 1942. In terms of airpower it looks as if the "iron was white hot" for the Japanese in the summer of 1942, but they did not have enough troops and sea transport to exploit it.

Regarding USAAF strength in Australia, according to Williford in Racing the Sunrise,

"By February 17 the Army was able to report that 326 fighter planes had arrived in the ABDA/Australia area, and another 240 were en route. Scheduled for the month of February were a total of 245 P-39s. Light bombers were also being dispatched by ship. After an initial sixty-seven dive bombers received in theatre (the fifty-two A-24s on board Pensacola convoy and fifteen on Convoy No. 2030), the effort continued with two-engine A-20 light bombers. Forty-two airplanes of this type were scheduled for delivery in February."

Also 114 B-26 medium bombers were scheduled for transfer in January and February by ship and flights from Hawaii via the Southern Ferry Route. The ground echelons for these units were on Convoy 2030 that arrived in Australia in February. So the buildup early in 1942 in Australia was well underway and was continuing.

Another consideration for this scenario should be the African Air Ferry Route. This route had been established in mid-1941 from Natal in Brazil to Takoradi, in the Gold Coast, to Lagos, Nigeria, to Khartoum, Sudan and then the Middle East. PBYs, B-17s, B-24s, LB-30s and transports had flown this route from the U.S. to the Middle East. The infrastructure was there and if there was an actual conflict in India/Ceylon, aircraft could be sent rapidly this way. There is no way the Japanese could interrupt this route.

"
 
Not by Yamamoto. For whom destruction of the US carrier force was a central passion in 1942.

We're Yamamoto on this thread.

In the OP the US lost three carriers at Pearl Harbor.

Never saw that. Why did the OP introduce multiple AH variables when we're unlikely to even get one alternative factor right? :^)

Japan was at the end of her strategic limit before that, Glenn. Come on. Again and again, you overestimate Japanese capabilities. It's a pattern with you.

No, I mark them bang on to what they actually were. Where this becomes a problem is with the school of thought that thinks the actual historical results represented the 'best case' Japanese high water mark and not an 'average' or even 'below average' showing. You wanna talk impossible IJN offensives, talk 1943. But in May 1942? Forget it. They were good for a 3-division assault landing if the navy and army were both on board. How do we know this? Because in May 1942 the army and navy actually agreed to do a 3-division assault landing later that year.

It had an outside shot at securing some very minor acretion to her perimeter here or there (like Port Moresby), but that's about it.

The Japanese had the capacity to do another Java scale landing right up until Nagumo decided that Tone 4 must be looking at a cruiser group with a converted carrier for ASW. What the Japanese didn't have was any agreement in Tokyo as to why they should bother themselves with the trouble of doing another one. The Japanese were simply too overconfident with the British - had they know that by 1944 the shoe would be on the other foot, the IJA might have looked much more seriously at extending the period of offensive to cave in the Burmese front and end that threat once and for all.
 
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