AHC WI Japan loses faster than the Nazis

Of course any delay / setback for the IJA in Malaya - probably delays / removes the Battles of Bilin River and Sittang bridge altogether as these operations by the Japanese (Kicked off OTL 15th Jan) took place after the major fighting in Malaya had been conducted and it was obvious that they were winning - thus freeing up those Japanese divisions and more importantly the logistics necessary to support them to attack into Burma.

If the British/Commonwealth forces are reinforced with first tier troops, stronger, better led, better equipped (or even simply rolled less 1s) etc then those IJA forces, and more tellingly, the logistics used in Burma will have to be thrown into the battle for Malaya instead.
 
He didn't like the Marines a lot of army officers didn't.
He refused to let Marine pilots take out the V-1 launching sights. He didn't use Marine advisors on D-Day,Omaha beach was a result of that.

Thought it was something along the lines of the Marines getting more attention/PR out of their actions in WW1 that pissed off the Army Generals?
 
Thought it was something along the lines of the Marines getting more attention/PR out of their actions in WW1 that pissed off the Army Generals?

Yes according to the USMC lore their 2 Regiments at Belleau Wood won the war!

Bloody good troops though.

And a lot has to be said for long service volunteers (and in WW1 a majority of the Marines were 'College' men with good education) over a conscript army.
 

Japhy

Banned
He didn't like the Marines a lot of army officers didn't.
He refused to let Marine pilots take out the V-1 launching sights. He didn't use Marine advisors on D-Day,Omaha beach was a result of that.
Actually it never made it to Ike, it was George Marshall who refused to let the Marines into the ETO. As was previously said, because one Brigade of Marines wound up overshadowing the whole US Army in WWI, which was extra offensive to Marshall because as a young Staff Major to Pershing, Marshall made his reputation organizing the entire US Army shift to the Offensive while the Marines were in Belleau Wood.
 
Of course any delay / setback for the IJA in Malaya - probably delays / removes the Battles of Bilin River and Sittang bridge altogether as these operations by the Japanese (Kicked off OTL 15th Jan) took place after the major fighting in Malaya had been conducted and it was obvious that they were winning - thus freeing up those Japanese divisions and more importantly the logistics necessary to support them to attack into Burma.

If the British/Commonwealth forces are reinforced with first tier troops, stronger, better led, better equipped (or even simply rolled less 1s) etc then those IJA forces, and more tellingly, the logistics used in Burma will have to be thrown into the battle for Malaya instead.
Delaying the conquest of Malaya will definitely slow up the Burma Invasion.

QUESTION: All the Singapore/Malaya holds/delays TLs show what the Brits could have done to stop the IJA. And they all correctly point out that the 25th Army's logistics was shit. But by my memory, they never point out what more could have been done on the Imperial Japanese side to respond to a tougher Malaya campaign. What more could/would have been diverted to assist the 25th in conquering Malaya against a stouter defense? By my limited research, the following elements might have been available to varying degrees (I'm sure politics and the plan in place would be huge in determining who could be added to the 25th):

15th Army: OTL - The 55th Division started its invasion of Burma around January 15. The 33rd Division started into Burma around February 6.

16th Army: OTL - The 2nd and 48th Divisions started the invasion of Java on February 28. Would Malaya and Singapore have been viewed as important enough to shift these divisions there first? Or was Java of such importance that they'd only get pulled over to a harder Malaya after taking Java?

56th Division: OTL they first went to Davao (PIs), then to the DEIs, were slated to help in Malaya, but got transferred via ship to Rangoon in March when they weren't needed in Malaya after all.

38th Division: OTL took Hong Kong and then got reassigned to the DEIs.

If there were any other "available" forces, I don't know them. I'm not bothering to identify any of the small SNLF type forces used in the DEIs.


As for how else to help save Burma, the first thing to remember is that Monsoon season starts in May. The Brits more or less only need to hold out until then.

Second, the Australian 6th and 7th Divisions. Churchill asked that the 6th be deployed to Burma, but the Australian Government said no. Even if the 6th (or 7th or both) were allowed to go to Burma, it is debatable whether they could have made it in time. OTL They didn't start embarking on ships in the Middle East Theater (where I think both earlier had participated in taking Syria) until the end of January. And they didn't make it back to Australia until mid March.

The IJA 55th captured the port city Moulmein on the south side of the Salween River on January 31. They crossed the Salween on February 10. They crossed the Bilin River on February 17. The Sittang Bridge was blown by the Brits on February 23, forcing much of the Indian 17th Division to cross the river without their equipment. The 55th and 33rd Divisions started to cross the Sittang on March 2. The Brits retreated out of Rangoon on March 7 and the IJA marched in on the 9th.

If either the 6th or 7th can leave a month earlier and be allowed to land in Rangoon, holding on a Sittang line becomes plausible; however far from definite. It then becomes a question of how well the Aussies can handle the Imperials' infiltration tactics in an environment vastly different than the one they just came from. They at least would have the 7th Armored Brigade, who did excellent work OTL, to perhaps act as a mobile counter attack force against infiltrations. Holding a couple weeks on the Sittang then allows the Chinese 5th and 6th Armies to show up and reinforce the line (FYI I think a Chinese army was about the size of a Division. And their Divisions were the size of a regiment or brigade). And some of the Chinese Divisions were really, really good. OTL the Chinese fought in some excellent delaying battles starting in mid to late March as the British retreated to northern Burma.

OTL, the taking of Rangoon vastly helped the IJA's crappy logistics in Burma. Denying them Rangoon puts a big crimp in how much force projection they can do. Without Rangoon, 2 Divisions is probably their max coming over from Siam. With Rangoon, they were able to support 4 divisions in the drives north up the Irrawady and the Sittang to Mandalay.
 
Delaying the conquest of Malaya will definitely slow up the Burma Invasion.

QUESTION: All the Singapore/Malaya holds/delays TLs show what the Brits could have done to stop the IJA. And they all correctly point out that the 25th Army's logistics was shit. But by my memory, they never point out what more could have been done on the Imperial Japanese side to respond to a tougher Malaya campaign. What more could/would have been diverted to assist the 25th in conquering Malaya against a stouter defense? By my limited research, the following elements might have been available to varying degrees (I'm sure politics and the plan in place would be huge in determining who could be added to the 25th):

15th Army: OTL - The 55th Division started its invasion of Burma around January 15. The 33rd Division started into Burma around February 6.

16th Army: OTL - The 2nd and 48th Divisions started the invasion of Java on February 28. Would Malaya and Singapore have been viewed as important enough to shift these divisions there first? Or was Java of such importance that they'd only get pulled over to a harder Malaya after taking Java?

56th Division: OTL they first went to Davao (PIs), then to the DEIs, were slated to help in Malaya, but got transferred via ship to Rangoon in March when they weren't needed in Malaya after all.

38th Division: OTL took Hong Kong and then got reassigned to the DEIs.

If there were any other "available" forces, I don't know them. I'm not bothering to identify any of the small SNLF type forces used in the DEIs.


As for how else to help save Burma, the first thing to remember is that Monsoon season starts in May. The Brits more or less only need to hold out until then.

Second, the Australian 6th and 7th Divisions. Churchill asked that the 6th be deployed to Burma, but the Australian Government said no. Even if the 6th (or 7th or both) were allowed to go to Burma, it is debatable whether they could have made it in time. OTL They didn't start embarking on ships in the Middle East Theater (where I think both earlier had participated in taking Syria) until the end of January. And they didn't make it back to Australia until mid March.

The IJA 55th captured the port city Moulmein on the south side of the Salween River on January 31. They crossed the Salween on February 10. They crossed the Bilin River on February 17. The Sittang Bridge was blown by the Brits on February 23, forcing much of the Indian 17th Division to cross the river without their equipment. The 55th and 33rd Divisions started to cross the Sittang on March 2. The Brits retreated out of Rangoon on March 7 and the IJA marched in on the 9th.

If either the 6th or 7th can leave a month earlier and be allowed to land in Rangoon, holding on a Sittang line becomes plausible; however far from definite. It then becomes a question of how well the Aussies can handle the Imperials' infiltration tactics in an environment vastly different than the one they just came from. They at least would have the 7th Armored Brigade, who did excellent work OTL, to perhaps act as a mobile counter attack force against infiltrations. Holding a couple weeks on the Sittang then allows the Chinese 5th and 6th Armies to show up and reinforce the line (FYI I think a Chinese army was about the size of a Division. And their Divisions were the size of a regiment or brigade). And some of the Chinese Divisions were really, really good. OTL the Chinese fought in some excellent delaying battles starting in mid to late March as the British retreated to northern Burma.

OTL, the taking of Rangoon vastly helped the IJA's crappy logistics in Burma. Denying them Rangoon puts a big crimp in how much force projection they can do. Without Rangoon, 2 Divisions is probably their max coming over from Siam. With Rangoon, they were able to support 4 divisions in the drives north up the Irrawady and the Sittang to Mandalay.

Again this all comes down to logistics - the Java op for example used 56 Transport ships alone. If The Battle for Malaya is ongoing then I suspect that a large number of those ships will be required to support on going ops.

All 4 divisions might also get sucked into Malaya particulalrly if the original 25th Army formations suffer heavier casualties and / or the British have better/larger forces available.

Those AIDs that fought in Wavells army were very powerful formations - with large battalions (900 + men) and each alone had more (and superior gun for gun) artillery than the entire OTL IJA 25th Army

The same would be true of a regular British Division

Also tanks - pretty much any tanks greatly negates the Japanese tactic of infiltrating light infantry units behind a enemy formation and creating roadblocks (which often forced a retreating allied unit to abandon all of it heavy equipment, artillery and transport and flee on foot) as a combined armed force with Artillery, Infantry and Tanks has a far greater chance of defeating the light forces generally involved in making said roadblocks - which usually comprised of extensive machine gun and mortar covered Abatis (which trucks and Universal Carriers could not cross but a tank could).

As for Burma - getting a British infantry division or AID and a Brigade of armour to Rangoon by Dec 41 is a massive change as not all Divisions are created equally - take for example the 17th Infantry Division (Indian Army)* was an under strength and inexperienced division OTL having been formed in 1941 and two of its 3 Brigades had been sent to Malaya and ultimately lost after the surrender of Singapore.

At Balin River (which should never have been fought) it was only 2 Brigades strong (its remaining brigade and the newly arrived 16th Independent Brigade) and had taken the 2nd Burma Brigade (a militia police force in all but name) to provide a 3rd Brigade.

So in a situation where the IJA is bogged down in Malaya and elsewhere and where experienced first tier Imperial Reinforcements have been sent to Malaya - the 17th ID (with its original 3 Brigades) and Burma Division are probably enough as its unlikely that the 55th and 33rd IJA divisions could both be freed due to Logistic issues

*Let it be noted that later in the war this Division would be kicking arse and taking names with the best of them and eventually was part of the Allied Occupation force in Japan
 
One answer to speeding up the Pacific war is to cancel the South Pacific offensive of 1943 - 1944. That leaves more resources for progressing central Pacific ops from late 1943. Philippines can be attacked from central Pacific bases after mid 1944.
 
Delaying the conquest of Malaya will definitely slow up the Burma Invasion.

QUESTION: All the Singapore/Malaya holds/delays TLs show what the Brits could have done to stop the IJA. And they all correctly point out that the 25th Army's logistics was shit. But by my memory, they never point out what more could have been done on the Imperial Japanese side to respond to a tougher Malaya campaign. What more could/would have been diverted to assist the 25th in conquering Malaya against a stouter defense? By my limited research, the following elements might have been available to varying degrees (I'm sure politics and the plan in place would be huge in determining who could be added to the 25th):

15th Army: OTL - The 55th Division started its invasion of Burma around January 15. The 33rd Division started into Burma around February 6.

16th Army: OTL - The 2nd and 48th Divisions started the invasion of Java on February 28. Would Malaya and Singapore have been viewed as important enough to shift these divisions there first? Or was Java of such importance that they'd only get pulled over to a harder Malaya after taking Java?

56th Division: OTL they first went to Davao (PIs), then to the DEIs, were slated to help in Malaya, but got transferred via ship to Rangoon in March when they weren't needed in Malaya after all.

38th Division: OTL took Hong Kong and then got reassigned to the DEIs.

If there were any other "available" forces, I don't know them. I'm not bothering to identify any of the small SNLF type forces used in the DEIs.
On the topic of logistics....

The rail line from Siam into Malaya was crap. It operated at full capacity historically and only managed to supply the forces in Malaya with occasional naval support and with the aid of salvation (Japan needed to seize food and other resources to support their advance).

Japan will struggle to feed more troops into Malaya and doing so will strain their supply lines even further.

If Britain saves Malaya by keeping Force Z as a Fleet in Being the prospect of naval supply (needed to comfortably supply existing force and to sustain additional forces) disappears.
 
Actually it never made it to Ike, it was George Marshall who refused to let the Marines into the ETO. As was previously said, because one Brigade of Marines wound up overshadowing the whole US Army in WWI, which was extra offensive to Marshall because as a young Staff Major to Pershing, Marshall made his reputation organizing the entire US Army shift to the Offensive while the Marines were in Belleau Wood.
Ike personally cancelled the strike on the V-1 launch sites after finding out the pilots were Marines.
 
I am wondering if this is possible. My guess is that better intelligence analysis is carried out and noted. Competent defence in the Philippines and Malaya. Plus a prepared Pearl Harbor so that the attackers lose heavily.

In OTL Roosevelt was not sympathetic to European colonialism. So might they have allowed independent states in lands where the Japanese are driven from, most obviously Indo China, possibly also Indonesia/ Dutch East Indies.

And does this prevent North Korea?

Query is Mao prevented from winning Civil War?

Simple, Japan first. Also more efficient defence of the Philippines.
 
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