AHC/WI: Japaense-American War Before WWI
- Thread starter Statesman
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That depends on how the Alt-Historian wants to tackle the topic in their answer.
cpip
Gone Fishin'
Well, there were two war scares between the end of the Russo-Japanese War and the outbreak of World War I -- one in 1907 and one in 1913, both brought on by Japanese outrage over American racism in California. In 1907, it was school segregation; in 1913, the passage of the Alien Land Act that forbade Japanese immigrants from owning land in California as part of a general movement towards exclusion.
Part of the response to the 1907 war scare was the dispatch of Roosevelt's Great White Fleet, that demonstrated that the United States could indeed move their navy from the Atlantic to the Pacific and keep them together, in a demonstration of American naval might.
In 1913, President Wilson and Secretary of State Bryan did their level best to calm Japanese anger. The General Board (the precursor to the Joint Chiefs of Staff) had considered war "not only possible but probable" and had issued orders to begin moving the United States fleet into position, including consolidating the Asiatic Fleet from across China and the Philippines to Subic Bay; when Wilson found out about it, he ordered them to cease at once lest it be seen as provocative, asserting most solidly civilian control over the military.
I've actually put together notes on the 1913 crisis for a TL I'm working up. The Panama Canal still wasn't ready at either point, so the US would have to send their fleet the long way around. Exercises conducted suggested that it would take over 3 months to get the fleet from Hampton Roads around to the war zone, and possibly longer, depending on Japanese actions.
The Japanese strategy, for their part, echoes some of what they did in the 1940s: defend far forward (probably seizing Guam), and harass the American fleet as it progressed west. At this point, the USN strategy was led heavily by the "Thruster" and "Through Ticket" groups -- so the intent would be to drive across the Pacific into the Philippines and meet the Japanese fleet there; the Japanese were equally as willing to oblige.
Technologically, the war is tilted in favor of the American fleet in 1913: they bring dreadnoughts, and quite a few of them, while the Japanese have primarily the same vessels they won the Russo-Japanese War with, amplified by a few new capital ships.
On the other hand, the Japanese also have advantages:
Part of the response to the 1907 war scare was the dispatch of Roosevelt's Great White Fleet, that demonstrated that the United States could indeed move their navy from the Atlantic to the Pacific and keep them together, in a demonstration of American naval might.
In 1913, President Wilson and Secretary of State Bryan did their level best to calm Japanese anger. The General Board (the precursor to the Joint Chiefs of Staff) had considered war "not only possible but probable" and had issued orders to begin moving the United States fleet into position, including consolidating the Asiatic Fleet from across China and the Philippines to Subic Bay; when Wilson found out about it, he ordered them to cease at once lest it be seen as provocative, asserting most solidly civilian control over the military.
I've actually put together notes on the 1913 crisis for a TL I'm working up. The Panama Canal still wasn't ready at either point, so the US would have to send their fleet the long way around. Exercises conducted suggested that it would take over 3 months to get the fleet from Hampton Roads around to the war zone, and possibly longer, depending on Japanese actions.
The Japanese strategy, for their part, echoes some of what they did in the 1940s: defend far forward (probably seizing Guam), and harass the American fleet as it progressed west. At this point, the USN strategy was led heavily by the "Thruster" and "Through Ticket" groups -- so the intent would be to drive across the Pacific into the Philippines and meet the Japanese fleet there; the Japanese were equally as willing to oblige.
Technologically, the war is tilted in favor of the American fleet in 1913: they bring dreadnoughts, and quite a few of them, while the Japanese have primarily the same vessels they won the Russo-Japanese War with, amplified by a few new capital ships.
On the other hand, the Japanese also have advantages:
- they're closer to home waters (depending on how quickly the Philippines fall, they may even be sortieing out of Manila), not exhausted or harried, and can supply at shore, rather than in an improvised anchorage somewhere in the Philippines; and
- have a significant number of light ships they can deploy compared to the Americans, while the Americans have precious few cruisers to deploy and their destroyers will have to be either trailing along or being towed by the battleships; and
- they have actual combat experience of battleships fighting each other, which the Americans are lacking in.
Here is a really good book to help on the back ground for War Plan Orange. I have read it and it does provide lots of information.
https://www.amazon.com/War-Plan-Orange-Strategy-1897-1945/dp/1591145007
https://www.amazon.com/War-Plan-Orange-Strategy-1897-1945/dp/1591145007
Really good. Any ideas on what the Entente and Central Powers would view war in 1913? And the affairs on both WW1. (If it stay happens in 1914.) and the affects on the US?
cpip
Gone Fishin'
A war between both sides would be relatively nasty, brutish, and short from a naval perspective, I think, lacking either side being able or willing to deploy serious ground forces, so there's no new lessons for Europe that aren't being taught in the Balkan Wars at the same time. At sea, there's a chance of learning some of the lessons earlier than the RN and the KM learned them, but not necessarily in time to really make a difference.
From the Entente side, it's a bad time. The British would try to get everyone sitting down at the table -- but there were some small tensions between Britain and the USA that, if everyone's being stupid enough to let a minor crisis explode into war, could equally blow up and damage British-American relations. From a military perspective, the British also were relying on the Japanese fleet to watch the Pacific so that they could consolidate their forces. With a reduced Japanese navy, the German East Asia Squadron either has a broader ability to act without fearing immediate reprisals in the Yellow Sea, or the British have to reinforce the China Station after drawing it down.
From the Central Powers side, this could actually be a big favor. As above, the RN now must decide if it wants to let the East Asia Squadron operate more freely in the Pacific or if it wants to reinforce the China Station. If it does the latter, it tilts what's deployed in the North Sea.
Additionally, at the same time, there was actually a great deal of debate in the Japanese government on whether or not Britain was a worthy partner to ally with; several high-ranking Japanese officials had suggested looking to Germany or Russia instead. The Russian and Japanese governments were signing treaties and achieving an understanding in 1912-14, and some Japanese had entertained the idea of some sort of German-Russian-Japanese alliance. (Whether the Germans and Russians wanted to join such a thing is another matter entirely.) If the Japanese feel that Britain was insufficiently helpful during their war with the Americans, then that may lead to a tilt away from helping the British and moving into a different alliance.
Lastly, to get back to Britain and the United States: if the US feels that Britain was insufficiently on their side, this may impact the willingness of Americans to subscribe to loans to Britain, and reduce the flow of money across the Atlantic that kept the British war machine going. This, of course, can have all sorts of butterflies if a World War still breaks out in a year or so.
Whilst I think that the war scares are important, its also key to try and put these into a bit of context.
War with the USA would be a major, major, gamble for Japan. Whilst strategy might be the same as in the 1940s, between 1900 and 1914 Japan was nowhere near as powerful as it would be decades later. It is still in the process of modernisation. It is unlikely to actively seek war with the United States, particularly as it is not a power that Japan needs to combat as a threat [unlike Russia or China]. Japan isn't really going to go to war over school segregation in California without vastly important other motives.
But to think about plausible or semi-plausible PODs in the period:
To nip this in the bud before people raise it - I really don't think that this is going to be a UK and Japan vs USA war. Whilst not impossible, I think that despite the Anglo-Japanese naval agreement the UK would need significant incentive to engage in this conflict.
Realistically, I think the most plausible root of conflict is some Boxer-style outrage in Japan that leads to American intervention. In this period there were plenty of tensions about foreign influence in the country, and Christianity, and its not impossible to see an attack on American merchants/missionaries lead to a punitive expedition from the USA.
BUT Japan at this time was not China - it was trying very hard to be seen as a Great Power and modern nation. You would need a good POD to make this a plausible cassus belli as realistically the result would likely simply be a Japanese Government crackdown on the anti-Western rebels and the USA being content with compensation.
War with the USA would be a major, major, gamble for Japan. Whilst strategy might be the same as in the 1940s, between 1900 and 1914 Japan was nowhere near as powerful as it would be decades later. It is still in the process of modernisation. It is unlikely to actively seek war with the United States, particularly as it is not a power that Japan needs to combat as a threat [unlike Russia or China]. Japan isn't really going to go to war over school segregation in California without vastly important other motives.
But to think about plausible or semi-plausible PODs in the period:
To nip this in the bud before people raise it - I really don't think that this is going to be a UK and Japan vs USA war. Whilst not impossible, I think that despite the Anglo-Japanese naval agreement the UK would need significant incentive to engage in this conflict.
Realistically, I think the most plausible root of conflict is some Boxer-style outrage in Japan that leads to American intervention. In this period there were plenty of tensions about foreign influence in the country, and Christianity, and its not impossible to see an attack on American merchants/missionaries lead to a punitive expedition from the USA.
BUT Japan at this time was not China - it was trying very hard to be seen as a Great Power and modern nation. You would need a good POD to make this a plausible cassus belli as realistically the result would likely simply be a Japanese Government crackdown on the anti-Western rebels and the USA being content with compensation.
cpip
Gone Fishin'
I wouldn't argue any of that in the slightest. If Japan is going to war with the US, it's more likely out of a series of miscalculations and gross misinterpretations of each other's intent leading one or both sides to mistakenly believe that the other is about to make war on them. Japanese activity in Mexico, American activity in China, any number of missteps that could lead to mistakes in diplomacy.
While there were certainly plenty of jingoes and advocates that a war was going to happen at some point on both sides, the decision makers generally were considerably saner than their European counterparts during this period.
Especially as the British were actively trying to make the Anglo-Japanese Treaties specifically give the UK an out -- the 1911 version of the treaty included the language "Should either High Contracting Party conclude a Treaty of general arbitration with a third Power, it is agreed that nothing in this agreement shall entail upon such Contracting Party an obligation to go to war with the Power with whom such Treaty of Arbitration is in force" -- and in 1911, there was the pending Anglo-American Arbitration Treaty (that the US Senate then failed to ratify...).
I'd argue that would be part of a collection of steps that made it appear that a war was imminent, and that the other side needed to throw the first punch. Civil disorder in Japan, possibly conflict in China (there were Japanese military officers advocating even in the 1910s that Japan should invade China), American racism, all of this could set a kettle just so that would lead to people scratching their heads and wondering how this war really started, much as happened in Europe in 1914.
The war would probably be limited to Japan versus the US due to the terms of Anglo-Japanese Alliance (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anglo-Japanese_Alliance#Terms_of_the_1902_treaty).
That's unless Russia wants to escalate this and go to war against Japan and the UK.
@cpip I agree entirely, any such war would be a series of escalations (although I find it hard to imagine that the Japanese would not have the good sense to put the brakes on at any point in the process). Although I must say the trope about people in WWI having no idea why they were at war is a little overplayed - in 1914-1915 many felt they had a good idea of why they were fighting and it was only after grinding years of carnage that those motivations started to ring hollow for many.
But what if it is the US driving the process?
Perhaps a battleship blows up in San Diego or Pearl Harbour & is blamed on 'Japanese Sabotage' and the US press magnifies the 'Yellow Peril' until the public is demanding war.
I agree, but my point wasn't about drivers necessarily. In your scenario, what is to stop Japan bowing and scraping and being hugely apologetic, maybe offering financial compensation, rather than risking war with a Great Power? Nations don't go to war lightly in this period - they are well aware of the risks involved.
I'm not saying this scenario is impossible, not at all, just pointing out as @cpip says you would need an escalating process of tensions that BOTH SIDES were unwilling to back down from.
cpip
Gone Fishin'
I would hope the Japanese would have the good sense to do so -- but let's take, for instance, the period between the end of the Russo Japanese War (September 1905) and Japanese entry into World War I (1914) -- the Japanese government changed hands six times in 9 years. A collapse of government at the wrong time during a crisis could easily make matters worse.
My comparison to 1914 is more the fact that several of the powers during the July Crisis had the capability to put the brakes on as it unfolded, and each time someone chose to ratchet up the stakes a little farther, sometimes without realizing just how they'd raised the stakes.