AHC/WI: Hood gets a Golden BB on Bismarck

[HMS Warspite]

With 11" guns? At what level of sub-battleship armament will you refuse to consider her a battleship? If Scharnhorst was armed with 5" main guns is she still a battleship?

USS Wyoming had nothing bigger than 5 inch/38 since 1940! She was still a battleshiphull, although limmited to an auxilliary role (AA gunnery training)

As for the Kongo's their sidearmor was not upgraded throughout their lives, but their horizontal protection was improved on several occasions, ending up to slightly more than 5 inch over the vitals in 1939, the same as on USSS Iowa and South Dakota and slightly more than North Carolina! This alone might legitemately classify them as (fast) battleships indeed, though normally speaking, they remained battlescruisers as their role was the same as that of the brainchild HMS Invincible class of Admiral Fisher. Namely hunting down anything faster and running away form anything stronger. (Which also was the main purpose of the Iowa class, when designed by the way.)

Battleships are ships with heavy guns from 8 inch and larger normally, combined with strong protection. 11 inch is seriously larger than 8 inch, making it more than adequate as a battleship's main weapon, depending on what the role of the ship was supposed to perform (in Scharnhorst's case political) Coastal battleships in especially Scandinavian countries often had 8 inch, or something like that as main weapons as well. Only the Japanese and US prefered generally larger guns, although just as the other did so. More normal states often choose to do what was in their own interest, normally what they could do, not the other way around.

As for overrated battleship designs, I can also suggest to include the USN BB's of the 3rd generation (Starting with the North Carolina's and including the (1939) South Dakota and Iowa classes in as well. None actually had shown itself in a role it was supposed to perform in (Battleline vs battleline Jutland style) which is fortunate, as the three classes were not the most protected classes around at the time. Actually the North Carolina's came close to be the best of the three classes in general layout, as the other two were technically brilliantly thought through in theory, but not very practical in terms of easy acces to internal parts, in case repairs were needed, or so. the canceled Montana's were to follow the North Carolina's design, as the Iowa and South Dakotas were too disappointing in layout and level of protection.

My choice for best battleship design ever is based on actual performance and longlivety in difficult times. Only the British Queen Elizabeth Class performed well in both worldwars and fought in the front line in both conflicts. No other class did something like that, which can say something about their flexibility and thought through design.

 

[HMS Warspite]

I just went for 42 as I don't want allied radar tech to distort the result.(and as IJN crews got much worse in comparison to others later on)

I don't see on average Tirpitz, North Carolina or SoDak (or even Iowa) wining 1 on 1 with 9 18 inch guns (yes Yamato isn't a efficient use of 65,000t but I don't think its that bad that it will lose till you fight it with radars/airpower).

JSB

It would have been better to fight a fight unfair. Just use other means and ignore battleships as such, as they are a burden, not an asset in naval warfare, soaking up precious resources (both materiel and manpower), for little or no return. Just let them plotter around and bankrupt their own navies in doing so. (especially the fuel starved IJN offcourse.) If necessary, use airpower, light forces and submarines to finnish them off, when they get in the way, that would be all.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

.... Just let them plotter around and bankrupt their own navies in doing so. (especially the fuel starved IJN offcourse.) If necessary, use airpower, light forces and submarines to finnish them off, when they get in the way, that would be all.

Hmm the USN laying down more aircraft carriers & heavy cruisers and none of the new battleships classes. So, in the Solomons campaign of 1942 a couple more US carriers and a half dozen more cruisers?

 

[HMS Warspite]

Hmm the USN laying down more aircraft carriers & heavy cruisers and none of the new battleships classes. So, in the Solomons campaign of 1942 a couple more US carriers and a half dozen more cruisers?

If those cruisers and aircraft carriers were deployed logically, and commanded cleverly, yes.

Detail: USN cruisers lacked a punch, due to the absence of torpedoes carried. OK, the 1942 state USN torpedo was not to be thought of high, but at least it was something the opposing force had not to take lightly. More problematic was the use of lumbering low rate of fire unaided 8 inch guns, where in these circumstances rapid fire 6 inch guns would have been a more logical choice. So better have Light cruisers in the fleet in close to shore fights, rather than heavy cruisers. (Not even mentioning large numbers of DD's as well, as these were best suited in these barfights.

Historically, the Carrierforce under Fletcher was tight down too much, lacking freedom to operate in the more open seas nearby. Have them have their freedom of operation and put down a landbased local airforce on Henderson field as soon as possible. (At least one squadron of strikeplanes adn one with fighters that is.) Allow Fletcher to seek out battle at his choice, possibly striking Rabaul itself, to prevent IJN forces to use that base as a jumpingpoint of operations in the entire Solomon Archipello. (at least for a while.) By hittign Rabaul, the IJN would be forced to retreat to Truk itself as a startingpoint of operations, which is too far away to offer direct support. Note Fletcher at the start of the campaign had three aircraft carriers available, USS Enterprise, Hornet and Saratoga.

Light cruisers, such as the Brooklyn class as well as the Leander class of ANZAC, were perfectly suited to do the job in the Solomon Archipello, being fast, versatile and packing a more serious punch than the 8 inch cruisers in the Allied fleet. They could smother any opponent in concentrated 6 inch fire, fire torpedoes (ANZAC ships at least) and they were expendable, if needed. DD's too were very suited in the early stages of this fight, untill an MTB base could be set up, to allow larger ships to stay away in more open waters. MTB's were perfectly suited to dominate locally in these confined waters at night, while the local airwing could do so during daytime.

 

[jsb]

What about just fixing the subs torpedo's !

Just a (slightly) joking strategy,

1937 - use the cash for the North Carolina to test torpedoes use the rest of the USN battle line as test ships and sink them. (this may also fixes the air/DD ones to)

1942 - use the fixed torpedo's to blockade japan starting with oil tankers from the south.

Would this strategy result in a quicker win for the USN ?

JSB

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

If those cruisers and aircraft carriers were deployed logically, and commanded cleverly, yes.

Detail: USN cruisers lacked a punch, due to the absence of torpedoes carried. OK, the 1942 state USN torpedo was not to be thought of high, but at least it was something the opposing force had not to take lightly. More problematic was the use of lumbering low rate of fire unaided 8 inch guns, where in these circumstances rapid fire 6 inch guns would have been a more logical choice. So better have Light cruisers in the fleet in close to shore fights, rather than heavy cruisers. (Not even mentioning large numbers of DD's as well, as these were best suited in these barfights.

This makes sense in terms of the Solomons. Would a too light a fleet be a handicap in other Pacific campaigns?

Historically, the Carrierforce under Fletcher was tight down too much, lacking freedom to operate in the more open seas nearby. Have them have their freedom of operation

This might have happened with one or two more carriers and very likely with three or four more. Building carriers instead of the battleships floated in 1941-42 implies a acceptance of the carriers as the main capitol ship & hence to be used a bit differently. Having five or six at hand vs three or four, or less, gives a slight reserve allowing a bit more risk. I'm also thinking that with a focus on carriers the construction of the Essex class might have started a few months earlier and moved along a few months faster.

...and put down a landbased local airforce on Henderson field as soon as possible. (At least one squadron of strikeplanes adn one with fighters that is.)

That was wanted, but seems to have floundered on logistics. The dive and torpedo bombers based at Henderson field were fairly effective, when operational. But, keeping a large enough operational force there was difficult September through November.

...
Light cruisers, such as the Brooklyn class as well as the Leander class of ANZAC, were perfectly suited to do the job in the Solomon Archipello, being fast, versatile and packing a more serious punch than the 8 inch cruisers in the Allied fleet. They could smother any opponent in concentrated 6 inch fire,

A point Hornsficher touches on in 'Neptunes Inferno' his descriptions of the USN cruiser actions of Oct-Nov indicate the power and effects on ships of the 6' guns in rapid fire.

... MTB's were perfectly suited to dominate locally in these confined waters at night, ....

Were the US MTB actually that effective? They seem a good fit on paper, and the Italians seem to have accomplished some thing with theirs. But, what was the USN record with them?

 

[Admiral Halsey]

Would you want to fight a surface action v Yamato in 1942 in any other ship ?

JSB

Yes I would actually. Give me a night fight and the USS Washington, South Dakota or North Carolina and i'd say the chances are fairly in my favor. And once the Iowa's come into service i'd take them over any other BB any day.

 

[Ato]

The KGVs should have been able take the Yamato as well, probably the Bismarck too.

The Yamato's had the biggest guns and the heaviest armour, but quantity didn't equate to quality. Their guns were short ranged, and inaccurate compared to contemporaries, and the armour was less effective per ton than used by other ships.

 

[HMS Warspite]

The KGVs should have been able take the Yamato as well, probably the Bismarck too.

The Yamato's had the biggest guns and the heaviest armour, but quantity didn't equate to quality. Their guns were short ranged, and inaccurate compared to contemporaries, and the armour was less effective per ton than used by other ships.

Since when were the 18.1 inch/45 short ranged? I don't recal 38,000 meters a short range. (Yoshimura, A; Battleship Musashi, ISBN 4-7700-2400-2) If you say there was a battleship short ranged, it would more likely have been the not fully refitted Bretagne class of France, whcih had not increased the elevation of the main guns that much as others did.

 

[HMS Warspite]

More likely, you need a warship with torpedoes to realy hurt a Yamato. Only a torpedo could mission kill such a thing with one blow, if not sending it to the bottom directly. All ships have a weak spot in the same place, their shaft driven propellors. A detonnation of a large enough warhead, either mine, or torpedo, as shells and bombs in general lack that explosive power as most of it is metal, will certainly cause damage of a serious enough level to either send it to a lengthly repair, or sinking it outright, due to secondary damage caused by the still turning shafts. Both HMS Prince of Wales and USS Pennsylvannia had been hit in this way, with the former running at a speed at the time of 26 knots, but the later stationary at anchor. Both were CTL by just this hit, HMS Prince of Wales eventually going down, due to the menioned secondary damage adn the USN ship not worth repairs, being just prior to the end of hostilities.

 

[Johnrankins]

Since when were the 18.1 inch/45 short ranged? I don't recal 38,000 meters a short range. (Yoshimura, A; Battleship Musashi, ISBN 4-7700-2400-2) If you say there was a battleship short ranged, it would more likely have been the not fully refitted Bretagne class of France, whcih had not increased the elevation of the main guns that much as others did.

From what I have read the Yamamoto's guns has slightly longer range but significantly less accuracy. They could shoot far and dish out a hell of a hit IF they could hit the target, which is considerably less likely than the Iowa would hit its. The Yamamoto had only general purpose radar to fire her guns with while the Iowa had top of the line fire control radar. The Iowa had excellent damage control while the Yamamoto had very poor damage control. All in all I would take the Iowa.

 

[jsb]

Doesn't a early night battle come down to luck ?

Without much radar they will be shooting at very close range and nothing will stop 18 inch guns (or 16 inch) at close range ? So who hits something vital first wins.

The Yamamoto had only general purpose radar to fire her guns with while the Iowa had top of the line fire control radar. The Iowa had excellent damage control while the Yamamoto had very poor damage control. All in all I would take the Iowa.

How much of that is USN development and the IJN getting worse as the war went on ?

JSB

 

[Johnrankins]

How much of that is USN development and the IJN getting worse as the war went on ?

JSB

In the end it doesn't matter. What the ship in question actually had is more important then why it did or didn't have it. You were just as dead either way.

 

[Tallil2long]

Out of curiosity, why did the British send Hood against Bismarck?

I assume they had no other BBs and figured the risk was justified, especially since she'd be teamed with PoW.

Or did they think that upgrades to her armor, and the changing circumstances of contemporary warfare, had alleviated the BB-BC mismatch?

Certainly the shock with which they allegedly greeted her destruction suggests they expected a better outcome.

 

[jsb]

In the end it doesn't matter. What the ship in question actually had is more important then why it did or didn't have it. You were just as dead either way.

Yes but when did it have it ? I think a 42 match would be different from a 45 one!

Out of curiosity, why did the British send Hood against Bismarck?
had alleviated the BB-BC mismatch?

Was Hood actually badly protected (for a WW1) ship ?
I thought by WW1 standards she was as good as any unmodernized ship (R or QE) so she is more fast BB than a BC (just an old one) and yes GB didn't have sufficient fast BB to cope in 1941. (what better fast ships did they have 2 KVGs ?)

JSB

 

[Johnrankins]

Yes but when did it have it ? I think a 42 match would be different from a 45 one!


JSB

The fire control was there at the time it was launched.

 

[Admiral Halsey]

Doesn't a early night battle come down to luck ?

Without much radar they will be shooting at very close range and nothing will stop 18 inch guns (or 16 inch) at close range ? So who hits something vital first wins.


How much of that is USN development and the IJN getting worse as the war went on ?

JSB

The USS Washington and USS South Dakota which were present at the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal in November of 42 already had fire control radar installed. In fact i'm pretty sure every modern US Battleship already had some type of fire control radar installed by the time the Yamato entered full service. The only ones that didn't had been sunk at Pearl.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

Out of curiosity, why did the British send Hood against Bismarck?

I assume they had no other BBs and figured the risk was justified, especially since she'd be teamed with PoW.

Or did they think that upgrades to her armor, and the changing circumstances of contemporary warfare, had alleviated the BB-BC mismatch?

Certainly the shock with which they allegedly greeted her destruction suggests they expected a better outcome.

Two cruisers had already been shadowing the Bismarck & Prinz Eugene for many hours. The Hood & Prince of Wales were just two of several ships sent on a intercept course, they happened to be the closest on patrol & arrived long before the others could. Because of the bad weather it was very possible the contact would be lost, so there was the desire to attack and damage the Germans ships before they could elude pursuit.

To understand why the Brits were concerned about that study up on the German operations 'Berlin' http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Berlin_(Atlantic) , the 'Atlantic sortie' of the Admiral Scheer http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_cruiser_Admiral_Scheer#Atlantic_sortie

and the Atlantic sorties of the Admiral Hipper http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_cruiser_Admiral_Hipper#Atlantic_operations

Some 45 cargo ships sunk in those raids totaling around 250,000 tons. All that had occured just a few months before the Bismarck sortied. the Scharnhorst, Geisnau, and Admiral Hipper were all in the French Atlantic ports. Had the Bismarck & PE reached thse ports then the German could have sortied 4-5 battle ships and heavy cruisers, plus Adm Scheer from the North Sea. All that would have been 'difficult' for the British to deal with.

Add in a surge of submarines, and the armed merchant cruisers already at sea and the Brits would have been having a very bad day in the Atlantic. so, it is understandable they wanted to turn back the Bismarck, even at risk.

 

[HMS Warspite]

From what I have read the Yamamoto's guns has slightly longer range but significantly less accuracy. They could shoot far and dish out a hell of a hit IF they could hit the target, which is considerably less likely than the Iowa would hit its. The Yamamoto had only general purpose radar to fire her guns with while the Iowa had top of the line fire control radar. The Iowa had excellent damage control while the Yamamoto had very poor damage control. All in all I would take the Iowa.

While the suggested Firecontroladar on the Iowa class was considered top of the line, which I do not object too, it was installed only in 1946, after the war had ended. In 1944 Iowa still had to use the older Mk-38 director in combiation with the Mk.8 rangekeeper, which was situated below the armored deck, deep inside the ship. The Mk.13 radarset for electronic firecontrol was not that advaced yet, as in order to calculate accurately the fall of shot. It was still one of the best sets of the war itself, but it was not the magic warwinner, some would want it to be.

Problem is the main gun of the Iowa class as the leightweight 16 inch/50 Mark.7 was not as heavy a barrel as the older 16 inch/50 Mark 2, intended for the canceled South Dakota class of 1922. (108,5 kg for Mark 7 to 128,15 kg for the Mark 2.) This reduction in barrelweight created more flexing of the barrel when fired, creating more dispersion of the salvo's, rather than concetrated fall of shells. The shorter barrels on the two other new battleship classes of the USN had less range, but tended to be more accurate, with slightly less dispersion, although even these were inacurate at longer ranges (as most build up guns actually were compared bored out riffled ones.)

By the way, Japanese observers originally found the fall of shot in testfire excercises quite accurate, but in wartime, with a demotivated, fatigued and not very fit (actually starved) crew, the shooting of Yamato at Samar was not very good, to say the least. (only 108 shots of the main artillery with one debatable claimed hit, shared with Kongo. Kongo was the top gun ship in the battleline that day, responsible for the destruction of the DD Johnston and DE Samuel B. Roberts)

 

[Tallil2long]

Two cruisers had already been shadowing the Bismarck & Prinz Eugene for many hours. The Hood & Prince of Wales were just two of several ships sent on a intercept course, they happened to be the closest on patrol & arrived long before the others could. Because of the bad weather it was very possible the contact would be lost, so there was the desire to attack and damage the Germans ships before they could elude pursuit.

To understand why the Brits were concerned about that study up on the German operations 'Berlin' http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Berlin_(Atlantic) , the 'Atlantic sortie' of the Admiral Scheer http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_cruiser_Admiral_Scheer#Atlantic_sortie

and the Atlantic sorties of the Admiral Hipper http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_cruiser_Admiral_Hipper#Atlantic_operations

Some 45 cargo ships sunk in those raids totaling around 250,000 tons. All that had occured just a few months before the Bismarck sortied. the Scharnhorst, Geisnau, and Admiral Hipper were all in the French Atlantic ports. Had the Bismarck & PE reached thse ports then the German could have sortied 4-5 battle ships and heavy cruisers, plus Adm Scheer from the North Sea. All that would have been 'difficult' for the British to deal with.

Add in a surge of submarines, and the armed merchant cruisers already at sea and the Brits would have been having a very bad day in the Atlantic. so, it is understandable they wanted to turn back the Bismarck, even at risk.

Oh, okay. Thank you for the rundown.