AHC/WI: Holding Hong Kong, 1941?

The prevailing view on this board, and elsewhere nowadays seems to be that holding Hong Kong was a hopeless endeavour. However my recent readings suggest an alternative view to that - the locals and the garrison seemed to feel that although the Mainland could only be held as a delaying action, the 'fortress' proper, that is the Hong Kong Island itself is impregnable.

Losing Hong Kong in just 18 days came as a great surprise to those involved. 2 Btn Royal Scots lost the Shing Mun Redoubt early on, and a retreat from Kowloon was soon ordered. In just 4 days the whole Mainland was lost, but the battle for the Island lasted from 18 Dec to 25 Dec with much less space to trade.

Although the force ratio was not in favour of the defenders, it was the deployment of forces and the fighting spirit of the troops that mattered more in the early stages IMO, comparable to France in a way. The garrison fought with great ferocity and tenacity on the Island proper, much greater than that seen on the Mainland.

I argue that if the garrison could fought with the same efficiency on the Mainland as they had on the Island, and that the original plans for a defense in depth was properly implemented, Hong Kong could have been held, or at least holding on for a much longer time.

Of course, the greater picture must be considered, and (at least the Canadians) considered Hong Kong as the outpost of the main post in Singapore, this would probably require Malaya to be held in the first place. Thus I reckon that this may happen in timelines that UK and the Commonwealth does better (such as A Blunted Sickle and the Whale has Wings among others).
 
What does the garrison eat, what do they fire (the ammo compound's only so big), what do they drink (I believe that most of HK's water comes from the New Territories), how do the wounded get treated and how are reinforcements moved in?

Hong Kong's too far from any other UK/Allied foothold in the Far East/Pacific to hold for longer than it takes for the water reservoirs, ration store, ammo compound or the medicine cupboards at the hospitals to empty.
 
The prevailing view on this board, and elsewhere nowadays seems to be that holding Hong Kong was a hopeless endeavour. However my recent readings suggest an alternative view to that - the locals and the garrison seemed to feel that although the Mainland could only be held as a delaying action, the 'fortress' proper, that is the Hong Kong Island itself is impregnable.

Losing Hong Kong in just 18 days came as a great surprise to those involved. 2 Btn Royal Scots lost the Shing Mun Redoubt early on, and a retreat from Kowloon was soon ordered. In just 4 days the whole Mainland was lost, but the battle for the Island lasted from 18 Dec to 25 Dec with much less space to trade.

Although the force ratio was not in favour of the defenders, it was the deployment of forces and the fighting spirit of the troops that mattered more in the early stages IMO, comparable to France in a way. The garrison fought with great ferocity and tenacity on the Island proper, much greater than that seen on the Mainland.

I argue that if the garrison could fought with the same efficiency on the Mainland as they had on the Island, and that the original plans for a defense in depth was properly implemented, Hong Kong could have been held, or at least holding on for a much longer time.

Of course, the greater picture must be considered, and (at least the Canadians) considered Hong Kong as the outpost of the main post in Singapore, this would probably require Malaya to be held in the first place. Thus I reckon that this may happen in timelines that UK and the Commonwealth does better (such as A Blunted Sickle and the Whale has Wings among others).

I doubt Hong Kong falling came as much as a surprise to those in Whitehall The Japanese had a force of 50+ Thousand men - many of them veterans of the War in China plus air power vs a Garrison of barely 15 thousand from assorted nationalities including the locally raised forces and the relatively inexperienced Canadians (no offence to those brave Canadian boys but they were garrison troops) with no air power.

My opinion was that Whitehall had to be hard headed about this and appreciate that the Colony could not be held and had very little value even if it was.

Those regular troops which formed 2 Infantry Brigades + 3 Artillery Regiments (3 artillery Battalions for you non commonwealth types) - which where 1 of AAA and 2 of Coastal Artillery + all of their supporting troops in my mind are of greater value than the Colony of Hong Kong and they would have served the British Commonwealths cause far more by forming the core of an additional Division to fight in Malaya or even Burma.

While they might still have 'gone into the bag' in Malaya and possibly even Burma they would have stood a better chance than being trapped in HK where they had no chance of Victory and having no impact on the conduct of the war.

For me the choice was a simple yet stark one - evacuate the regular forces (and all non essential Europeans) of the Garrison to Singapore - expand the Hong Kong Regt - to a Brigade, Hong Kong Volunteers and Hong Kong Artillery Regt expanded to replace those 3 Regular RA formations and support troops.

The Job of this formation would be to make a showing for honours sake with the Artillery and volunteers units jobs to destroy anything of value (Fixed arty, Fuel and Ammo dumps etc) and once fighting commences to declare Kowloon and Hong Kong as 'open cities' (for the sake of the locals) prior to surrendering.
 
What does the garrison eat, what do they fire (the ammo compound's only so big), what do they drink (I believe that most of HK's water comes from the New Territories), how do the wounded get treated and how are reinforcements moved in?

Hong Kong's too far from any other UK/Allied foothold in the Far East/Pacific to hold for longer than it takes for the water reservoirs, ration store, ammo compound or the medicine cupboards at the hospitals to empty.
Hong Kong now is quite, actually very different compared to that of 1941. And the planning of the Garrison reflected that very clearly - all the provisions were stored on the Hong Kong Island. The various supplies were first stored in Barracks around Victoria (the north coast) and as the battle developed, they were shifted southwards to the south coast around Stanley. In fact it was probably the loss of these supplies and the reservoirs on Hong Kong Island that forced the Garrison to finally surrender, 25 Dec.

The population back then was way smaller, and the large reservoirs in the New Territories were built after the war, in light of the Chinese migrants.

The Canadian Report mentioned that Hong Kong was regarded as the outpost of the post of Singapore, and that Canada would only be responsible for supplying the men of Force 'C', while all other supplies would be provided by the British, of which the Canadian presumed to have SLoCs through Singapore to India and beyond. Which is why keeping the South China Sea open and holding Singapore would be crucial in the long term.

I doubt Hong Kong falling came as much as a surprise to those in Whitehall The Japanese had a force of 50+ Thousand men - many of them veterans of the War in China plus air power vs a Garrison of barely 15 thousand from assorted nationalities including the locally raised forces and the relatively inexperienced Canadians (no offence to those brave Canadian boys but they were garrison troops) with no air power.

My opinion was that Whitehall had to be hard headed about this and appreciate that the Colony could not be held and had very little value even if it was.

Those regular troops which formed 2 Infantry Brigades + 3 Artillery Regiments (3 artillery Battalions for you non commonwealth types) - which where 1 of AAA and 2 of Coastal Artillery + all of their supporting troops in my mind are of greater value than the Colony of Hong Kong and they would have served the British Commonwealths cause far more by forming the core of an additional Division to fight in Malaya or even Burma.

While they might still have 'gone into the bag' in Malaya and possibly even Burma they would have stood a better chance than being trapped in HK where they had no chance of Victory and having no impact on the conduct of the war.

For me the choice was a simple yet stark one - evacuate the regular forces (and all non essential Europeans) of the Garrison to Singapore - expand the Hong Kong Regt - to a Brigade, Hong Kong Volunteers and Hong Kong Artillery Regt expanded to replace those 3 Regular RA formations and support troops.

The Job of this formation would be to make a showing for honours sake with the Artillery and volunteers units jobs to destroy anything of value (Fixed arty, Fuel and Ammo dumps etc) and once fighting commences to declare Kowloon and Hong Kong as 'open cities' (for the sake of the locals) prior to surrendering.
It should be noted that the 'line' formation that supplied the main forces of the invasion, the 38th Div (consisting of 228, 229 and 230 regiments) counted roughly 25000 men only. And it was also formed as a garrison unit in 1939, responsible for garrison duty around Canton before the war. It was claimed that they trained ~9 months for night attack and infiltration tactics for taking the Shing Mun Redoubt, but qualitatively they are not that superior to the Garrison.

After the Battle of Hong Kong the same division also provided around half (~24000) of the invasion force to the Dutch East Indies, and later on Guadalcanal on where the division was broken. The Japanese were operating on a shoestring that relies on their operations going smoothly one by one.

It is also problematic that the higher-ups were split on defending Hong Kong or not. The result was an under-strength garrison that tried to do what was planned with more in mind and failed. The original defense planed called for (at least) 2 brigades and that strength was only reached with the arrival of the Canadians, which caused the 2 Royal Scots and the 5/7 Rajput to be shifted to the Mainland to bolster the 2/14 Punjab (responsible for the center of the line) without much preparations.

Something to note is that the 5/7 Rajput held the 'inner' line covering the retreat of the 2/14 Punjab gallantly, but the 2 Royal Scots was criticized by both Wallis and Maltby, OC Mainland Brigade and OC China Command respectively for their basically useless officers and poor discipline among the troops. By the way the 1 Middlesex was a 'static' unit that manned the MG pillboxes on the Island and fought as piecemeal companies after their pillboxes were lost. Then the Canadians were there because of Grasett, the previous OC China Command who was a Canadian. I doubt this formation would be much of a division if shifted elsewhere - it only existed due to circumstances and would be pretty much best used to defend Hong Kong.
 
While I do believe Hong Kong could have held longer with a few butterflies here and there but it will inevitably fall for several reasons. 1. How does one send reinforcements into Hong Kong? It is way too far from Allied footholds in the Pacific. 2. They are outnumbered by veteran Japanese troops.3. British forces only had FIVE aircraft in Hong Kong against the Japanese Air Force.The Japanese Air Force has complete air dominance. The Japanese could just bomb them with little risk of retaliation.4. In the event of a siege, British forces ,heavily outnumbered, would eventually run out of food,water and ammunition. Morale would also be an issue since the Japanese Air Force could basically bomb them without opposition. 5. The British are going to take serious losses, could the hospitals in Hong Kong provide aid to all of the wounded soldiers and civilians? They would eventually run out of medical supplies.
 
It should be noted that the 'line' formation that supplied the main forces of the invasion, the 38th Div (consisting of 228, 229 and 230 regiments) counted roughly 25000 men only. And it was also formed as a garrison unit in 1939, responsible for garrison duty around Canton before the war. It was claimed that they trained ~9 months for night attack and infiltration tactics for taking the Shing Mun Redoubt, but qualitatively they are not that superior to the Garrison.

25000 Men? Bloody hell that's almost twice the size of a European infantry Division

And the British opposed them with 5 Infantry Battalions - each with about 800 men of which 450-500 are in the fighting companies

Its pretty clear to see that the Japanese held a massive - insurmountable superiority in numbers.

And while the 38th Division might not have been a veteran formation - the IJA had been fighting a bloody campaign in China for some years so many of the Officers, Specialists and NCO's very likely had campaigning experience.





After the Battle of Hong Kong the same division also provided around half (~24000) of the invasion force to the Dutch East Indies, and later on Guadalcanal on where the division was broken. The Japanese were operating on a shoestring that relies on their operations going smoothly one by one.

I'd say providing 2 Infantry Brigades and the manpower for an Artillery Brigade (if not the majority of its guns) to the Malaya or Burma theatres would have delayed other IJA units and derailed other parts of their time table.

And this 'time table' is only something that we know after the event so should not be a consideration - had Hong Kong been a real threat to Japanese ambition and had a larger or more effective defence delayed the fall of the Colony then the Japanese Army could simply have decided to call off the attack and besieged it with perhaps 1 of the 38th Regiments freeing up the remaining 2 for service elsewhere much sooner.

The Defenders in Hong Kong simply wither on the vine.

The Allies could afford to lose Hong Kong - it gave little strategic advantage to either side.

Malaya and ultimately Singapore on the other hand........



It is also problematic that the higher-ups were split on defending Hong Kong or not. The result was an under-strength garrison that tried to do what was planned with more in mind and failed. The original defense planed called for (at least) 2 brigades and that strength was only reached with the arrival of the Canadians, which caused the 2 Royal Scots and the 5/7 Rajput to be shifted to the Mainland to bolster the 2/14 Punjab (responsible for the center of the line) without much preparations.

This here is the crux of the issue for me.


To successfully Defend Hong Kong (and I'm not entirely sure what that 'Victory' gains the Allies) required far more troops than the ones provided.

More troops were not available so its clear to me and I am sure that even without the benefit of hindsight it was equally clear to those in Whitehall at the time that the attempt to defend the Colony was doomed.

I'm afraid its no more than an another example of heart over ruling the head that saw too many examples of precious troops being squandered rather than even contemplate a loss in prestige that not attempting to defend the place would bring.

Hong Kong should have been treated in exactly the same fashion as British Somaliland was the previous year - Wavell saw no strategic importance in holding the place and saw the troops as being more valuable (much to Churchill's dismay and disgust) and in the face of overwhelming numbers withdrew the Imperial forces to fight another day.

Something to note is that the 5/7 Rajput held the 'inner' line covering the retreat of the 2/14 Punjab gallantly, but the 2 Royal Scots was criticized by both Wallis and Maltby, OC Mainland Brigade and OC China Command respectively for their basically useless officers and poor discipline among the troops. By the way the 1 Middlesex was a 'static' unit that manned the MG pillboxes on the Island and fought as piecemeal companies after their pillboxes were lost. Then the Canadians were there because of Grasett, the previous OC China Command who was a Canadian. I doubt this formation would be much of a division if shifted elsewhere - it only existed due to circumstances and would be pretty much best used to defend Hong Kong.

With the exception of those formations that fought in the BEF and those fighting in Africa only the Indian Army had any real experience so its no surprise that the 2 Indian units proved to be the better units.

As for the 2 Royal Scots - it was a long term regular formation and had been in existence since before WW1 and was one of the 'Old Contemptible' units of the original BEF so it might come as a surprise to hear that it was poorly led etc - however 1 Royal Scots had been shattered near La Paradis while defending the Dunkirk perimeter in May 1940 - so I imagine that a portion of the 2nd Battalion (and I would not be surprised if this did not include the better soldiers of the 2nd leaving it with the 'Gin Drinkers') would have returned to the UK to help rebuild the first Battalion and help defend Britain against the expected German invasion.

Also if I had been a member of the 2 Royal Scots at the time my morale would be low as well!

(The rebuilt 1 Royal Scots would later see action vs the IJA in Arakan, Kohima and Mandalay)

And this is another problem - the British Army was having to replace losses suffered in France while expanding the army so men in far flung garrisons particularly the better men - would have returned during 1940/41 leaving the 2nd string behind.

While these units might not have made a very good division in Malaya or Burma they were trained personnel and trained personnel were at a premium in the far east in late 1941 and they should have been used where they would have been of the maximum use. And that is not holding Hong Kong.
 
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