AHC/WI: FLQ attacks in Quebec lead to major armed insurrection in Quebec

The Front de libération du Québec (Quebec Liberation Front) aka the FLQ was a Marxist-nationalist paramilitary terrorist organization founded in the early 1960s whose main goal was to use violent means to overthrow "the Anglo-Saxon imperialism" and bring about Quebec independence. In OTL he were responsible for approximately 160 bombings in Quebec through the 1960s killing a total of 8 people and injuring dozens, the biggest of which was the bombing of the Montreal Stock Exchange in 1969. Their attacks culminated in October of 1970 when they kidnapped a British diplomat; James Cross and the Quebec Labour Minister; Pierre Laporte. The FLQ communicate a list of demands, including the release of "political prisoners" in exchange for the release of Cross and Laporte.

The Lawyer for the FLQ Robert Lemieux organizes a 3,000 student rally to show support for the FLQ; labour leader Michel Chartrand announces that popular support for FLQ is rising and states "We are going to win because there are more boys ready to shoot members of Parliament than there are policemen." The rally frightens many Canadians, who view it as a possible prelude to outright insurrection in Quebec.

After negotiations with the FLQ break down and in response to the rising public unrest, the Canadian Government under Prime Minister Pierre Elliot Trudeau (father of the current Prime Minister Justin Trudeau) controversially invoked the "War Measures Act" for the first and only time outside of the World Wars, which limited civil liberties and gave the Quebec police far-reaching powers. In addition, at the request of the Quebec Provincial Government the Canadian Army was also deployed throughout the province in support of Quebec's police force. Nearly 500 suspected FLQ members and sympathizers were quickly arrested by the police. When asked by a reporter at the time how far he was willing to go to stop the FLQ, Trudeau famously replied: "Just watch me." In response the FLQ murder Pierre Laporte. Ultimately, on December 4, 1970 James Cross is released in exchange for safe passage of five of the kidnappers to Cuba, while the rest of the members of the main FLQ cells are hunted down, including those who are later convicted of murdering Pierre Laporte.

In OTL the violent actions of the FLQ, particularly their kidnapping and murder of a government minister hurt their popularity among Quebecers and ultimately accelerated the movement towards electoral means of attaining greater autonomy and independence for Quebec (there would be two independence referendums in Quebec in 1980 and 1995, the last one ultimately only failed by a 1% margin). However, what if the actions of the FLQ in the 1960s and in particular had been successful in gathering popular support for a significant armed insurrection? What would it have taken for the FLQ to gather the support necessary to catalyze the outbreak of an armed independence conflict in Quebec the scale of something like The Troubles in Ireland? Just how far would Trudeau really have been willing to use armed force to put down an insurrection?

Furthermore, how would the international community react? Particularly, what would have happened if the FLQ had turned to striking out against the US? In OTL in June 1970 Quebec police raided a house north of Montreal where they found firearms, ammunition, 300 pounds (140 kg) of dynamite, detonators and a draft of a ransom note to be used in the kidnapping of the United States consul. How would a US in the midst of the Cold-War react to a Marxist terrorist group right across its border in Quebec bombing their consulate in Montreal, or worse launching an attack across the border on US territory?
 
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Is this a Challenge(as per the title), or a WI(as per the OP)?

Going with the Challenge, I think it's a pretty tall order. The fact that almost all support for violent insurrection in Quebec vanished after the WMA was imposed probably indicates that there was never much support to begin with. Maybe if the cops or some other armed authorities in the 1960s had gone berzerk at one point and mowed down a bunch of pro-independence protestors(a la Kent State or Bloody Sunday), it might have galvanized a bit more resistance, but even then, I'm guessing not.
 
Is this a Challenge(as per the title), or a WI(as per the OP)? Going with the Challenge, I think it's a pretty tall order. The fact that almost all support for violent insurrection in Quebec vanished after the WMA was imposed probably indicates that there was never much support to begin with. Maybe if the cops or some other armed authorities in the 1960s had gone berzerk at one point and mowed down a bunch of pro-independence protestors(a la Kent State or Bloody Sunday), it might have galvanized a bit more resistance, but even then, I'm guessing not.

Admittedly, it is a bit of both an AHC and WI (edited the title to better to reflect that). As you say it is tough to make the FLQ actually pull this off and I would definitely be interested to see if it would have been possible for them to galvanize the support of the people the way the their contemporaries, the Irish Nationalists did. Also given that the government of Canada has not had to put down a real rebellion since colonial times and given the international angle (particularly if the United States gets dragged in), the "What if" possibilities of such an insurrection are worth examining.

PS: The Ireland/Troubles comparison is because it was a contemporary situation with some pretty striking parallels.
 
The problem is, if I remember correctly, the FLQ had little to no public support in Quebec. Especially when they kidnapped Cross and Laporte; the plot caused some issues within the Front and practically destroyed any support they had previously. Hell, I don't remember them having much more support when they were bombing the Mailboxes of Anglophones on the West Island in the first place...

The FLQ was pretty much a fringe group from the beginning to the end, with the October Crisis being their claim to fame (which, admittedly, did succeed in scaring the crap out of people around Montreal). I'll have to say thay an earlier PoD is needed to create support for the Felquistes.
 
The problem is, if I remember correctly, the FLQ had little to no public support in Quebec. Especially when they kidnapped Cross and Laporte; the plot caused some issues within the Front and practically destroyed any support they had previously. Hell, I don't remember them having much more support when they were bombing the Mailboxes of Anglophones on the West Island in the first place...

The FLQ was pretty much a fringe group from the beginning to the end, with the October Crisis being their claim to fame (which, admittedly, did succeed in scaring the crap out of people around Montreal). I'll have to say thay an earlier PoD is needed to create support for the Felquistes.
That is the crux of the challenge: how does the FLQ manage to turn widespread public francophone sentiment for its ultimate goal (an independent Quebec) and a degree of public sympathy for the terrorists themselves (exemplified by incidents such as the 3000 strong pro-FLQ rally at UdeM, Parti Quebecois political pressure for negotiations) into actual, substantial public support in the 1960s that could have allowed this to turn Sovereignist sentiment in Quebec towards armed attacks as opposed towards a peaceful political movement (as it became in OTL)? Essentially what POD in the 1960s would it have taken to turn the FLQ attacks and the October Crisis from largely isolated incidents to being the spear-tip of a popular insurrection?
 
As the previous posters suggested, this is almost ASB. Basically, an independantists movement using terrorism will have an extremely hard time building support when the central government allow independantists to simply run in elections, like it was the case in qc.

Basically, you can't get the FLQ to be more then a marginal party if nothing prevent parties like the PQ and their predecessors of the RN, RIN and the Mouvement Souveraineté Association to compete with everyone else in the political arena.

To actually have Canada forbid them to run or even prevent will necessitate a POD far enough that it would probably buterflies the FLQ as we know it.
 
As the previous posters suggested, this is almost ASB. Basically, an independantists movement using terrorism will have an extremely hard time building support when the central government allow independantists to simply run in elections, like it was the case in qc.

Basically, you can't get the FLQ to be more then a marginal party if nothing prevent parties like the PQ and their predecessors of the RN, RIN and the Mouvement Souveraineté Association to compete with everyone else in the political arena.

To actually have Canada forbid them to run or even prevent will necessitate a POD far enough that it would probably buterflies the FLQ as we know it.
The thing is though, getting a successful democratic independence movement though government takes time (decades in the case of Quebec) and furthermore requires the people (including the Sovereignists themselves) to believe that the federal government will be acting with a degree of good faith. The hard-core Sovereignists need to believe that they can actually succeed in a reasonable time period for this to work; there does need to be a degree of trust and understanding between both sides (and admittedly letting openly Sovereignist parties contend local elections goes a long way to directing these efforts towards non-violent means), but I can imagine a situation arising where a larger chunk of the separatist movement in Quebec ends up thinking that the only way they can end up actually getting independence is through violence. Remember, if The Troubles in Ireland tell us anything it is that you don't need to get the whole or even the majority of the local population to support a serious armed insurrection, just a substantial portion of it. I think we might be writing off a little to quickly the possibility that those really deep historical sentiments and resentments in Quebec could have been redirected from peaceful outlets towards violence if the situation had been different. This wouldn't be the first time in the 20th century that a supposedly civilized, democratic and peaceful society had turned towards mass violence.
 
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The FLQ was basically a few people in basements with virtually no support from Quebecers. To turn it into something like the IRA is implausible.
 
The thing is though, getting a successful democratic independence movement though government takes time (decades in the case of Quebec) and furthermore requires the people (including the Sovereignists themselves) to believe that the federal government will be acting with a degree of good faith. The hard-core Sovereignists need to believe that they can actually succeed in a reasonable time period for this to work; there does need to be a degree of trust and understanding between both sides (and admittedly letting openly Sovereignist parties contend local elections goes a long way to directing these efforts towards non-violent means), but I can imagine a situation arising where a larger chunk of the separatist movement in Quebec ends up thinking that the only way they can end up actually getting independence is through violence. Remember, if The Troubles in Ireland tell us anything it is that you don't need to get the whole or even the majority of the local population to support a serious armed insurrection, just a substantial portion of it. I think we might be writing off a little to quickly the possibility that those really deep historical sentiments and resentments in Quebec could have been redirected from peaceful outlets towards violence if the situation had been different. This wouldn't be the first time in the 20th century that a supposedly civilized, democratic and peaceful society had turned towards mass violence.
You also have to keep in mind that Quebec was already going through a massive wave of socio-political reforms since 1960 (Révolution Tranquille) after the fall of PM Duplessis. Really, only the hardcore radicals felt that the Liberal provincial government was doing too little (while the conservatives felt it was way, way too much) and went against them. Meanwhile, Duplessis was an ultraconservative with French-Canadian nationalistic tendencies and the left, both moderate and radical, was heavily suppressed. Considering Duplessis' more nationalistic stance, there's little chance for an FLQ-like organisation to appear. If it does, it would be less nationalistic.

It's also implausible before Duplessis since the Quebec independence movement didn't exist and it is unlikely to exist that early since the nationalist movement was more of a conservative, Canadien nationalism with a heavy emphasis on Catholicism (again, see Duplessis).
 
The thing is though, getting a successful democratic independence movement though government takes time (decades in the case of Quebec) and furthermore requires the people (including the Sovereignists themselves) to believe that the federal government will be acting with a degree of good faith. The hard-core Sovereignists need to believe that they can actually succeed in a reasonable time period for this to work; there does need to be a degree of trust and understanding between both sides (and admittedly letting openly Sovereignist parties contend local elections goes a long way to directing these efforts towards non-violent means), but I can imagine a situation arising where a larger chunk of the separatist movement in Quebec ends up thinking that the only way they can end up actually getting independence is through violence. Remember, if The Troubles in Ireland tell us anything it is that you don't need to get the whole or even the majority of the local population to support a serious armed insurrection, just a substantial portion of it. I think we might be writing off a little to quickly the possibility that those really deep historical sentiments and resentments in Quebec could have been redirected from peaceful outlets towards violence if the situation had been different. This wouldn't be the first time in the 20th century that a supposedly civilized, democratic and peaceful society had turned towards mass violence.

Northern Ireland is a pretty horrible analogy to understand Quebec. In one case you have a former colony where the colonial power settled part of his own people in own region and used the situation to keep it after independance, while cutting the area of the said regions where catholic irish where a strong majority (traditional Ulster include counties who are part of Ireland today). Bassicaly, even if the UK would have been cool with the election and referendum from the get go the very map of Northern Ireland would have screwed the catholic over. Needless to say, they didnt do that and decades of political repression added to centuries under the plantation. Hence how you end up with the IRA.

In Canada you have a bunch of former colony turned into a country where one of them, Quebec, had a somewhat different culture. At no time was the french majority in there treathened in a an imminent way or did they have political measure where french-speakers where disposessed to place brits in their place or the french catholics of the place where politicaly disfranchised in Ireland. From the foundation of the confederation onward Quebec was given seats proportional to its population and was more then representated in cabinet, Quebec grievance went for more autonomy not basic human rights! Admitedly, they had their issues on the economic side of things but that was due to educational factors (thank you catholic church) and discrimination in the workplace by management not political oppressions ilke Ireland in the 19th century. No one even entertained the tought, for even a second, that sovereignits parties wouldnt be able to run and the french-speaking population, who was in solid majority, was free to vote for them on the get go.

Last but not least, you overestimate the support the FLQ has, by far! Most of the people at the rally where more protesting against the war measures then really showing support and Levesque rationele to go far negociations was that it was worth it to save two lives, including one of a friend, not sympathy for the PLQ. Last but not least, I have no clue where you get the idea that it took several decades for the sovereignist movement to build up. The first signs of sovereignism as a movement where seen in 1960 with the foundation of the RIN, in 1963 the RN was founded and the first attacks by the FLQ happened, in 1966 the two parties ran candidates for the first time and got 8%, not a big score but not insignificant either, in 1967 They got their first MP in Levesque when he got out of the PLQ, in 1970 they had multiple MP's and 23%, in 1973 they became the official opposition and got 30% and in 1976 they took power. This is not only a relatively short timeframe but one where they constantly whent up.

So, in all due respect, I feel that you got a bit carried away with very superficial similarities with a movement you know very well and that a more torough ressearch of the circumstances surrounding your WI would have led you to the conclusion that seem to have reached conscensus among other posters.
 
Northern Ireland is a pretty horrible analogy to understand Quebec. In one case you have a former colony where the colonial power settled part of his own people in own region and used the situation to keep it after independance, while cutting the area of the said regions where catholic irish where a strong majority (traditional Ulster include counties who are part of Ireland today). Bassicaly, even if the UK would have been cool with the election and referendum from the get go the very map of Northern Ireland would have screwed the catholic over. Needless to say, they didnt do that and decades of political repression added to centuries under the plantation. Hence how you end up with the IRA.

In Canada you have a bunch of former colony turned into a country where one of them, Quebec, had a somewhat different culture. At no time was the french majority in there treathened in a an imminent way or did they have political measure where french-speakers where disposessed to place brits in their place or the french catholics of the place where politicaly disfranchised in Ireland. From the foundation of the confederation onward Quebec was given seats proportional to its population and was more then representated in cabinet, Quebec grievance went for more autonomy not basic human rights! Admitedly, they had their issues on the economic side of things but that was due to educational factors (thank you catholic church) and discrimination in the workplace by management not political oppressions ilke Ireland in the 19th century. No one even entertained the tought, for even a second, that sovereignits parties wouldnt be able to run and the french-speaking population, who was in solid majority, was free to vote for them on the get go.

Last but not least, you overestimate the support the FLQ has, by far! Most of the people at the rally where more protesting against the war measures then really showing support and Levesque rationele to go far negociations was that it was worth it to save two lives, including one of a friend, not sympathy for the PLQ. Last but not least, I have no clue where you get the idea that it took several decades for the sovereignist movement to build up. The first signs of sovereignism as a movement where seen in 1960 with the foundation of the RIN, in 1963 the RN was founded and the first attacks by the FLQ happened, in 1966 the two parties ran candidates for the first time and got 8%, not a big score but not insignificant either, in 1967 They got their first MP in Levesque when he got out of the PLQ, in 1970 they had multiple MP's and 23%, in 1973 they became the official opposition and got 30% and in 1976 they took power. This is not only a relatively short timeframe but one where they constantly whent up.

So, in all due respect, I feel that you got a bit carried away with very superficial similarities with a movement you know very well and that a more torough ressearch of the circumstances surrounding your WI would have led you to the conclusion that seem to have reached conscensus among other posters.

Speaking as someone who has half his whole family who lived in Quebec as blue collar, catholic francophones throughout the 1950's, 60s and 70's I can tell you that you are really underestimating and perhaps misunderstanding the perspectives of this demographic of people at this time. For a working class francophone Quebecker the differences the saw between themselves and the anglophones in say Westmont, Montreal is a lot more than just a "somewhat different culture"; people very much did see an occupying and oppressive culture. The perspective, especially in the 1950s was that the Anglos were the managers who controlled the all the wealth while the francophones were consigned to being distinctly second tier working as lower skilled labourers (although the very Francophone Catholic Church in Quebec is also looked at quite bitterly by the same people who saw them as corrupt and parasitic) and that unless you were English you would never be able to climb up the social ladder. There was definitely the sentiment of being part of a very distinct group that was being exploited by another, foreign group and the injustice of the situation did indeed rankle very deeply; although indeed most francophone Quebecers did not agree with the violent actions of the DLQ, you can find this same popular sentiment of resentment against the "Anglophone Bosses" right in the FLQ manifesto. As to the French majority in no way being imminently threatened; there was indeed a definite fear that English would take over as the dominant language Quebec (and Montreal in particular) and that the status of French in Quebec was definitely under imminent threat; we can see this with all the subsequent "language laws" and cultural protection measures and we see the legacy of this siege mentality to this day. The views of francophones in Quebec, particularity among the working and lower classes during this period is very different from what you will see today, even among the Sovereignist camp (which is at the core of the Sovereignist movement's current existential crisis) and I would caution you to avoid assuming too much of a presentist perspective.

I fully admit that I am no expert on the situation in Northern Ireland during The Troubles, and I totally agree that the situations have some very substantial differences, however, since I presume you have a lot more first hand knowledge of the Troubles, you can tell me: are there really no more than just superficial similarities with a culturally distinct Catholic majority in Quebec in the 1960s who very much does feel oppressed, disadvantaged and resentful of a Protestant Anglo-Saxon elite who they see as controlling the wealth, business and politics of their homeland while keeping the native majority largely powerless?

In OTL we know the Quebec public was deeply repelled by the violence of the FLQ at the time (indeed the major public opposition to the use of War Measures Act was only really after the fact, when it became clear that the government had abused it), but the sort of deep resentment and feeling of oppression at both a individual and societal level at the hands of a foreign culture is the sort of environment that, given the "right" events could be fertile for supporting a very dangerous violent movement; hence why this is an AHC.

From my perspective, things could have gone far worse than they did in OTL and the outcome that we have today is pretty much one of the best possible.
 
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