AHC/WI: Danish Victory in the Second Schleswig War

How could Denmark win this conflict, and what would be the results? The war's usually presented as an important stage in the rise of Prussia, so would a Danish victory be enough to butterfly away the unification of Germany?
 
How could Denmark win this conflict, and what would be the results? The war's usually presented as an important stage in the rise of Prussia, so would a Danish victory be enough to butterfly away the unification of Germany?

They had a pretty bad leadership. Prime minister Ditlev Monrad and the leading generals like deMeza weren´t great military strateges. They made many horrific tactic decisions, for example, they prefered some defense lines over another, just because of romantic Pathos and stories of mythologic ancient victories (I think the old Viking Danewerk walls)

Like many threads und users suggested, Denmark might have had a better chance, if they didn´t loose Norway at the Vienna Congress in 1814.
On the other hand it was not possible to beat Prussia,Austria and the coalition of federals German states for Denmark, due to a lack of ressources, manpower and supplies. Another factor is the lack of international support. They had very little support from Scandinavian volunteers, mostly young adventureous carreer officers from Sweden and Norway.
 
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Saphroneth

Banned
This was before Krupp had really got the problems ironed out of his guns, I believe, so superior Danish artillery and comparable musketry might turn the trick. The result would/could be a Danish force capable of holding a defensive line to great effect (though not really able to go on the offensive - this would basically be a defensive force).

I'd say... Hythe Musketry Method in full (instituted for all militia as well as regulars), which would make Danish troops able to shoot as well as Prussian, and Armstrong field guns (which were quite fast firing and very accurate, and didn't have issues as large as those of the bigger Armstrong guns.)

This would be really, really expensive, but doable in principle. It would also need a PoD in the late 1850s just to get enough training time in.
 
I assume Denmark can't *win* straight out. But if it can turn the thing into a stalemate, they can probably get a compromise peace that at least lets them keep part of Schleswig. Keeping Holstein is probably impossible, though.

Would it be possible, though, to avoid the war entirely? What if Christian IX refuses to sign the new constitution? Would that keep the rickety personal union going and not give Bismarck a pretext? It would be hard to see Franz Joseph, at least, supporting nationalist agitation if Denmark hadn't violated any treaties.
 

Redbeard

Banned
The political leadership of Monrad certainly has been much critisised, but it probably wasn't that bad, but although their overall political plan (provoke a situation where other powers force through a compromise with Prussia) not necessarily was that bad, it wasn't backed up by the necessary military means and not at least politicians interferred too much in operational matters.

The Government for instance insisted that the army in the early months of 1864 took up positions at the ancient line at Dannevirke between Slesvig and Holsten for symbolic reasons. The line in no way was a modern field fortification and anyway, as soon as the water obstacles frose over, it could easily be outflanked.

The army commander de Meza instantly realised this and contrary to government orders withdrew the army from Dannevirke. He was sacked, but saved the army.

Next the Government however insisted that the army took up position at Dybbøl, halfway up Slesvig - again for symbolic reasons. Fredericia, a further 50 miles to the north would have been a much better positions as that was actually a propper fortress and could easily be supplied and reinforced across the Little Belt.

Dybbøl only had some half finished ramparts which couldn't stand up to the modern Prussian rifled artillery and the smoothbore Danish couldn't reach the Prussian batteries at Broager.

At the battle of Dybbøl 18th of April 1964 the Danish army was repelled from the ramparts but actually withdrew largely intact to the island of Als. Had that remained status there probably would have been a decent chance of an international agreement, but soon after the Prussian succeeded in crossing the narrow strait to Als and decisively defeat the Danish Army. Under slightly different circumstances the Danish navy would (should) have intervened and turned the crossing into a massacre (one of worlds most modern ironclads Rolf Krake was present nearby). If this had been the case the chances of a favourable agreement would of course have increased - and the question is if Bismarck would have fallen and Germany it as we know it (incl WWI-II) never had happened?!

The overall operational idea of the Danish army was to take up a flanking position on the east coast of Jutland, which could be supported by the Danish navy (by that time superior). From here it would be a flank threat to any enemy advancing up the peninsula and if pressed too hard could withdraw across the sea to be landed somewhere else. It worked fine in 1848-51.

But as Saphroneth note the Danish Army indeed had some potential for better armament. Much focus has traditionally been put on the Prussian breech loading rifles vs. the Danish muzzle loaders, but probably rifled artillery would be most important. If the Prussian batteries at Dybbøl could have been put under effective counter battery fire, the battle on 18th of April very well could have ended very differently.

Buying a number of Armstrong guns of course would have been an expense but the biggest barrier probably was the army and the government having become too self-confident after the tactical victories in the first S-H war 1848-51. "One Danish soldier will stand up against 10 German!" is stupidly was said.

Of course Denmark couldn't in the long run fight the combined might of Prussia, Austria and a number of smaller German states, but it was Bismarck's first gamble and he needed quick success to stay in war and in power.
 
Very close to impossible. Armaments were very poor on the Danish side, using front loaded muskets when the Prussians had just developed their new super-weapon, the Dreyse Needle rifle, and their Krupp artillery was vastly superior to the Danish artillery at the time. Rearming the Danish army with better artillery would be costly, and Denmark just did not have the money.

You will also need to alter basic Danish military thinking in the period. The navy was prioritized over the army, great importance was placed on almost non-existing fortifications at Dannevirke as has been pointed out. Revolutionary weapons like the espignol, a kind of early machine-gun, were not properly invested in due to an archaic reliance on the indidvidual bravery and fighting spirit of the Danish infantryman. For some reason the military establishment were convinced the Danes were still vikings, and relied on that idea in spite of all rational thinking. And the Danish government relied too much on a vague promise of help from Britain.

Another principal factor was the idea of Scandianvianism, big in intellectual circles at the time. It was widely believed by some nationalist elites that a union between Sweden, Norway and Denmark was the way forward, that Scandinavians possessed a bond of brotherhood. Not unlike the ideas of common Aryan ancestral bonds that German intellectuals would advance later.

However, this wildly optimistic idea did not materialize in Swedish or Norwegian aid to Denmark as the nationalists had seriously counted on. Neither country had anything to gain from a Danish war of conquest and wisely kept away.
 

Redbeard

Banned
Very close to impossible. Armaments were very poor on the Danish side, using front loaded muskets when the Prussians had just developed their new super-weapon, the Dreyse Needle rifle, and their Krupp artillery was vastly superior to the Danish artillery at the time. Rearming the Danish army with better artillery would be costly, and Denmark just did not have the money.

You will also need to alter basic Danish military thinking in the period. The navy was prioritized over the army, great importance was placed on almost non-existing fortifications at Dannevirke as has been pointed out. Revolutionary weapons like the espignol, a kind of early machine-gun, were not properly invested in due to an archaic reliance on the indidvidual bravery and fighting spirit of the Danish infantryman. For some reason the military establishment were convinced the Danes were still vikings, and relied on that idea in spite of all rational thinking. And the Danish government relied too much on a vague promise of help from Britain.

Another principal factor was the idea of Scandianvianism, big in intellectual circles at the time. It was widely believed by some nationalist elites that a union between Sweden, Norway and Denmark was the way forward, that Scandinavians possessed a bond of brotherhood. Not unlike the ideas of common Aryan ancestral bonds that German intellectuals would advance later.

However, this wildly optimistic idea did not materialize in Swedish or Norwegian aid to Denmark as the nationalists had seriously counted on. Neither country had anything to gain from a Danish war of conquest and wisely kept away.

A number of batteries of Armstrong rifled guns incl. ammo and modernisation of fortifications would not be outside realistic economical means, and would anyway only be a fraction of what was later invested in modernisation of the army and fortifications on a much smaller tax revenue (after loosing S-H).

A Government not interferring as much in operational matters would be free.
 

Redbeard

Banned
I assume Denmark can't *win* straight out. But if it can turn the thing into a stalemate, they can probably get a compromise peace that at least lets them keep part of Schleswig. Keeping Holstein is probably impossible, though.

Would it be possible, though, to avoid the war entirely? What if Christian IX refuses to sign the new constitution? Would that keep the rickety personal union going and not give Bismarck a pretext? It would be hard to see Franz Joseph, at least, supporting nationalist agitation if Denmark hadn't violated any treaties.

Keeping Holsten wasn't the goal, but separating Slesvig and Holsten by annexing Slesvig into the Kingdom and letting Holsten go was. That however broke the London agreement of 1852 and the very inflexible staunch of the Danish Government made an international agreement very difficult.
 
Keeping Holsten wasn't the goal, but separating Slesvig and Holsten by annexing Slesvig into the Kingdom and letting Holsten go was. That however broke the London agreement of 1852 and the very inflexible staunch of the Danish Government made an international agreement very difficult.

Right, although I'd thought that the Danes hadn't particularly been offering straight up to let the Prince of Augustenburg have Holstein.
 

Saphroneth

Banned
AFAICT the important Krupp gun for their 1870-1 superiority was the C/64, and I can't tell if this was in widespread use in early 1864. I suspect it was not.
 
Here is a language map of that time.

1838_Sprogforhold_i_Slesvig.jpg



In my opinion a really miraculous success for Denmark would be a military victory that would allow them to keep everything not-white and not-light blue, ie the Danish, Frisian and mixed Danish/German parts. The Duchies of Lauenburg, Holstein and a severely reduced Duchy of Schleswig (basically the area of Husum, the town of Schleswig and the Schlei inlet) would be lost.

Here is an more detailed map:
=25655731.601.png

It is rather obvious what the steps for a gradually smaller Danish succes would be.
 
AFAICT the important Krupp gun for their 1870-1 superiority was the C/64, and I can't tell if this was in widespread use in early 1864. I suspect it was not.
No, the majority of guns would have been the 9 cm Stahlkanone mit Kolbenverschluss, C/61. This has the Wahrendorff breach- they went to the Kreiner double-wedge breech with the C/64, which still had major issues, and then settled on Krupp's cylindro-prismatic wedge with the C/73.

Worth also bearing in mind that the Minie rifle is not necessarily as ineffective against the needle-rifle as suggested. Prussia's superiority reflects significant enemy weaknesses- the use of shock tactics by the Austrians and Danes, the sheer organisational chaos among the South German armies- as well as any inherent virtues in the Dreyse. It's possible to make small tweaks to tactics and training that would compensate for the Minie's deficiencies: the problem is that nobody's yet seen the Prussians in action and, as such, don't know what to expect.
 
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