Please cite something that states British factories, by the late war period, were not operating at full production capacity.
I did. I said the issue was the lack of manpower, and I quoted the source. Read more carefully the posts you're replying to.
the source I mentioned said:
The reduced allocations of labour to munitions industries of December 1943(53)
made it no longer possible to contemplate the old aircraft programmes however realistic. Although the cut in the labour force employed at the end of the year was not great (some 105,000 in all), the expectations of the labour intake which M.A.P. considered necessary for the fulfilment of the existing programme were lowered by 155,000.
See. Look it up, will you.
Further, basic knowledge of industrial production will show that a factory, no matter how many resources you throw at it, has a maximum production ceiling. This means that, no matter how many bombers you cancel, you're not going to get more fighters without building new factories or re-tooling the old Bomber ones.
Yeah, it's so basic I didn't think it was needed to be stated. Note I always said "assuming" a 4:1 replacement ratio is feasible. That's obviously not a given. But I'd like you to note that if the British do need more fighters, for instance, that need will become apparent
way before 1944. In other words, they will not even start building the same immense bomber assembly lines they did in OTL, for then having to convert them. They will build start enlarging the facilities to produce fighters - which is something they were doing anyway back in 1940.
And as an additional side note, what do you think is easier, converting factories that produced bombers to produce fighters, or the contrary?
As for your comment on losses on the field, it's extremely relevant and downright bizarre to say otherwise. Let's do some simple math, like you suggested earlier.
It's entirely irrelevant as we are talking about industrial capacity.
However, if you wish to add that factor, then do the math for the germans too. Or do you think that in 1945, the Luftwaffe really had in the field those 40,000 aircraft produced the previous year?
If we get to this, you'll discover another little dirty secret of the Speer ministry's statistics: they were more than happy to count aircraft as having been built even if the Luftwaffe had not yet taken those in force. And the reasons why the Luftwaffe sometimes did not take aircraft in force were such little problems as:
- the aircraft had been counted as finished and produced - then the Allies came and bombed it to smitheerens,
- the aircraft had been counted as finished - but actually it still lacked small details such as guns,
- the aircraft had been counted as finished, and it did have all the parts it needed - but there was no fuel to move it to an operational airfield.
So if you want to add an extraneous aspect to the industrial output as the actual presence of stuff in the field, do so. You'll discover it worsens the mighty Germans' accounting.
Now for the figures you really needed since your first post in this thread:
British aircraft production in 1944, not in number of airframes but in millions of pounds of airframe weight:
208
German aircraft production in 1944, not in number of airframes but in millions of pounds of airframe weight:
175.
Note the sources I'm using (Ritchie, Overy, the British and US after-war reports on strategic bombing, etc.) don't include the Commonwealth production. Once you consider that, you're more on a 220 to 175 ballpark ratio.
The British aircraft industry outproduced the german one, including in 1944. Now, I see you still don't seem able to wrap your mind around the notion that producing a Lancaster means a greater industrial capacity than producing a Bf 109. Once you come to see that, the rest will fallin place.