AHC/WI: Americans beat Chinese back in Korea

[NotYetRegistered]

How could this have happened? No specific timeframe, can be from when the Chinese cross the Yalu to the UN forces pushing the Chinese back from the 38th parallel to Manchuria.

What effect would this have on America's foreign policy, China's foreign policy and the internal politics of both countries? How would the Soviets respond?

Also, one last question, were there ever plans of doing an Inchon-esque landing in North Korea after China intervened?

 

[NotYetRegistered]

bump

lo0jvt

 

[Dunning Kruger]

I seem to recall the UN mandate being to bring the lines back to their pre-war borders. It was MacArthur's ego that pushed him up the peninsula and nobody had the gumption to stop him after Inchon, particularly with the North Koreans seemingly routed. So, short of some debacle on the part of the Chinese, this wasnt likely to happen. And even if the Chinese lost an army, they probably would have sent in another.

 

[Just a Rube]

I seem to recall the UN mandate being to bring the lines back to their pre-war borders. It was MacArthur's ego that pushed him up the peninsula and nobody had the gumption to stop him after Inchon, particularly with the North Koreans seemingly routed. So, short of some debacle on the part of the Chinese, this wasnt likely to happen. And even if the Chinese lost an army, they probably would have sent in another.

The original mandate was that, because the Soviets were boycotting the Security Council. Once they returned, the UN forces expanded their mandate through a resolution in the General Assembly, which authorized the crossing of the 38th parallel. It may have been MacArthur's idea, but it had support from the Truman administration, so would probably still happen, even if MacArthur suffered a convenient heart attack. On the other hand, someone other than MacArthur might have been more prepared for Chinese intervention, and would almost certainly have avoided the massive ego trip that forced Truman to eventually fire him IOTL.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

...k. On the other hand, someone other than MacArthur might have been more prepared for Chinese intervention, and would almost certainly have avoided the massive ego trip that forced Truman to eventually fire him IOTL.

Maybe, tho my take is the bad decisions in 8th Army went beyond MacArthur. It has been implied by a couple writers that Gen. Walkers death was the 8th Armys good fortune at that moment. Despite Walkers good service in the Pusan perimeter battle. Overall there was a culture of sloppy thinking in the US Army in the far east, which might be ultimately traced to MacArthur, but which could not have been so peruasive if enough others had kept their heads between 1945 & 1950. The US Army did a lot better after Ridgeway took over and focused the thinking of the senior commanders and staff, which percolated down through the division HQ to the battalions.

 

[OnlyAlb]

If McArthur got his way and nukes were used...........

 

[Blackfox5]

If MacArthur had considered the possibility of Chinese intervention real, instead of letting his forces advance north willy nilly, he could have prepared a slower, more deliberate advance that was better prepared to handle a Chinese counter-offensive. Much of the Chinese success was based on the US forces being very disorganized and unprepared.

He would likely have still been driven back to some point, but could have stabilized his life north of the 38th parallel. Ideally it would have stopped the Chinese north of Pyongyang and Wonsan (perhaps even Hungnam). The frontline would be somewhere between the Chongchon and Taedong Rivers.

That would not have left North Korea with a really viable state. At best, it would be heavily dependant on Chinese or Soviet subsidies and probably fallen after the Cold War ended. The US would have three ways to win - 1) subsequent operations that drove out the Chinese, 2) negotiated peace that saw the Chinese withdraw, or 3) ceasefire along lines that gave the advantage to South Korea over North Korea.

 

[Simon]

Overall there was a culture of sloppy thinking in the US Army in the far east, which might be ultimately traced to MacArthur, but which could not have been so persuasive if enough others had kept their heads between 1945 and 1950.

Classic example of that has to be Task Force Smith. Lieutenant-Colonel Smith originally got a lot of bad press but he seems to have done incredibly well whilst being given an impossible task by higher command in the form of Brigadier Church and Major-General Dean, see also MacArthur's insistence on deploying them via air instead of by sea and then getting the hump and ignoring anyone that questioned the plan so that they arrived understrength and were thrown straight into things.