AHC/WI: Alternate British Military Nuclear Program (Cold War)

[Delta Force]

The United Kingdom had a fairly extensive independent military nuclear program prior to being granted access to American nuclear weapons and reactor designs under the 1958 Mutual Defense Agreement. What if the Mutual Defense Agreement had failed to happen as historically or even entirely? Perhaps Rickover and Naval Reactors pull strings to prevent export of the then state of the art S5W naval reactor for the HMS Dreadnought and the British end up with an S3W naval reactor or even nothing at all. Perhaps the British aren't granted access to the most advanced weapons information or are barred from resource sharing.

In any case, what happens if it doesn't go quite as planned? Is a joint British-French program possible? Could the British develop their own naval reactors, and if so might it result water cooled designs such as the Steam Generating Heavy Water Reactor being selected to follow Magnox instead of the Advanced Gas Cooled Reactor? Could the British even follow in the steps of France and do everything in house?

 

[RLBH]

Could the British develop their own naval reactors, and if so might it result water cooled designs such as the Steam Generating Heavy Water Reactor being selected to follow Magnox instead of the Advanced Gas Cooled Reactor? Could the British even follow in the steps of France and do everything in house?

We had our own PWR design for submarine use coming along, the US deal saved time and reduced risk - that would certainly see service. I don't particularly see naval PWRs translating into civil water-cooled reactors, IOTL there was rather strong opposition to the idea. SGHWR in the late 1970s is possible, but more AGRs more probable.

 

[Delta Force]

We had our own PWR design for submarine use coming along, the US deal saved time and reduced risk - that would certainly see service. I don't particularly see naval PWRs translating into civil water-cooled reactors, IOTL there was rather strong opposition to the idea. SGHWR in the late 1970s is possible, but more AGRs more probable.

Most countries with naval reactors have standardized on PWRs for commercial reactors as well. I'm not sure why that's the case since BWRs has safety and potentially cost advantages over PWRs and both are water cooled designs.

 

[pdf27]

The United Kingdom had a fairly extensive independent military nuclear program prior to being granted access to American nuclear weapons and reactor designs under the 1958 Mutual Defense Agreement. What if the Mutual Defense Agreement had failed to happen as historically or even entirely? Perhaps Rickover and Naval Reactors pull strings to prevent export of the then state of the art S5W naval reactor for the HMS Dreadnought and the British end up with an S3W naval reactor or even nothing at all. Perhaps the British aren't granted access to the most advanced weapons information or are barred from resource sharing.

Keeping the British away from nuclear reactors is pretty simple, and doesn't even need much of a POD because it came down to one man - Louis Mountbatten. He went over to the US and charmed the pants off Rickover, who up to that point had been really hostile to the UK getting US reactor technology. No Mountbatten as First Sea Lord (not difficult - half the crew of Kelly were killed off Crete when she was sunk, and he was associated with various political disasters such as Dieppe and the partition of India which Churchill was mad at him for for some years) means nobody capable of charming Rickover into getting the technology handed over.

In any case, what happens if it doesn't go quite as planned? Is a joint British-French program possible? Could the British develop their own naval reactors, and if so might it result water cooled designs such as the Steam Generating Heavy Water Reactor being selected to follow Magnox instead of the Advanced Gas Cooled Reactor? Could the British even follow in the steps of France and do everything in house?

There are several things happening in parallel here:

1. The Euratom agreement is unlikely to be affected - that means the French go for PWRs for civil power on schedule anyway. It didn't affect the British much, so they probably continue with the Magnox/AGR route.
2. As already mentioned, the British had already decided that a naval reactor needed to be a PWR for various reasons. Developing one is within their competence, although it will have a knock-on effect on other projects due to a lack of staff. Best guess is that MAGNOX continues a bit longer as a programme, and when AGR comes along it is a clearer evolution of/closer relation to MAGNOX than it was in OTL.
3. Cooperation between the British and French is problematic - the 1958 US-UK Mutual Defence Agreement rather restricts what the UK can share in nuclear terms, and the UK interpretation of it was rather paranoid in that if in doubt they wouldn't talk about things. An additional cooperation is that the 1958 act gave the UK access to highly enriched Uranium of which their own supplies were inadequate - and which is required for a submarine reactor of reasonable size and lifetime. Not impossible - the French have built one capable of using low-enrichment fuel - but the performance is very much inferior to one using weapons-grade fuel.

 

[Delta Force]

Keeping the British away from nuclear reactors is pretty simple, and doesn't even need much of a POD because it came down to one man - Louis Mountbatten. He went over to the US and charmed the pants off Rickover, who up to that point had been really hostile to the UK getting US reactor technology. No Mountbatten as First Sea Lord (not difficult - half the crew of Kelly were killed off Crete when she was sunk, and he was associated with various political disasters such as Dieppe and the partition of India which Churchill was mad at him for for some years) means nobody capable of charming Rickover into getting the technology handed over.

How did Mountbatten manage to pull that off with Rickover? That's a story in its own right.

The Euratom agreement is unlikely to be affected - that means the French go for PWRs for civil power on schedule anyway. It didn't affect the British much, so they probably continue with the Magnox/AGR route.

As already mentioned, the British had already decided that a naval reactor needed to be a PWR for various reasons. Developing one is within their competence, although it will have a knock-on effect on other projects due to a lack of staff. Best guess is that MAGNOX continues a bit longer as a programme, and when AGR comes along it is a clearer evolution of/closer relation to MAGNOX than it was in OTL.

I'm wondering more if the British would adopt water cooling earlier due to its development for the military program, or perhaps join Euratom and potentially push for commercial gas cooled reactors. At the time many were impressed with the British and French gas cooled reactors, and they actually led water cooled reactors in terms of number of operating hours achieved for several years (I think until the 1970s).

Apart from naval reactors, the British didn't really push much for light water designs, so they could have an interesting impact on the development of nuclear energy if they have to go it alone for naval reactors and/or join Euratom. The 1958 Euratom Cooperation Act represents the point at which the United States flipped most of Europe to light water (specifically PWR), and it's possible earlier British involvement could lead to a different outcome. In 1958 the British were the experts in nuclear energy, not the United States, so the British stance could have significant weight.

Cooperation between the British and French is problematic - the 1958 US-UK Mutual Defence Agreement rather restricts what the UK can share in nuclear terms, and the UK interpretation of it was rather paranoid in that if in doubt they wouldn't talk about things. An additional cooperation is that the 1958 act gave the UK access to highly enriched Uranium of which their own supplies were inadequate - and which is required for a submarine reactor of reasonable size and lifetime. Not impossible - the French have built one capable of using low-enrichment fuel - but the performance is very much inferior to one using weapons-grade fuel.

A French agreement would be an alternative to one with the United States, not one that would take place at the same time.

 

[Riain]

I think Anglo-French cooperation is inevitable, Britain would be screaming for a partner to share the cost and the French would love to get hold on the more advanced British programme to jumpstart their own.

What do the British do with their deterrent? Presumably they weaponise their Grapple designs, but do they go with Blue Steel MkII or Blue Streak and do the French get on board with either of these?

 

[pdf27]

How did Mountbatten manage to pull that off with Rickover? That's a story in its own right.

From what I've read he was a bit star-struck. Mountbatten was very blue-blooded (uncle-in-law and second cousin to the Queen at the same time, and his father was also First Sea Lord and a Prince in his own right), and personally very charming too.

I'm wondering more if the British would adopt water cooling earlier due to its development for the military program, or perhaps join Euratom and potentially push for commercial gas cooled reactors. At the time many were impressed with the British and French gas cooled reactors, and they actually led water cooled reactors in terms of number of operating hours achieved for several years (I think until the 1970s).

From very, very early on they were planning to use water cooling, the main issue is enrichment - the UK never really had enough enrichment for both a civil and military programme, and traded several tonnes of weapons-grade Plutonium for American HEU. Gas or heavy water cooling allows you to get away with lower levels of enrichment, which was a major factor for the British and indeed the French in the early days. For that reason light water reactors are I think just impractical for anything but a small number of submarines.

 

[Riain]

French naval reactors use LEU Caramel fuel, which specifically maximises the benefit of LEU. If Britain and France combined perhaps they could accelerate the deployment of LEU Caramel fuelled sub propulsion.

 

[pdf27]

French naval reactors use LEU Caramel fuel, which specifically maximises the benefit of LEU. If Britain and France combined perhaps they could accelerate the deployment of LEU Caramel fuelled sub propulsion.

As I understand it the reactors don't work terribly well and given a free choice the French would have gone for a HEU design. How much of this is a function of the low power density inherent to a lower enrichment design (with effects on speed of reaction, max power per unit of machinery, etc.) and how much is simply that the French reactor designs require far more frequent refuelling because they are less able to make use of burnable poisons like a HEU design would be I'm not sure.

The problem is that the French in large part fund their arms industry via exports, and IAEA safeguards prevent the export of reactors using HEU - the enrichment level the French have chosen is exactly the maximum permitted for export under those safeguards.
Now if the UK and France are combining, that has the same effect as exports in that the total number of reactors to a particular design built is increased (rather better in fact - so far the French haven't actually successfully sold a naval reactor abroad, although they have got an agreement with Brazil to do so). With the UK and France both as nuclear weapons states, the objection to a HEU design goes away.

You still come up against the HEU problem though - the UK at least was always short of fissile material right into the 1980s (although we now have huge stockpiles of the stuff), so if they're unable to obtain HEU by trade from the US I could see them going for a lower enrichment option. I can't see it being chosen unless they just can't get the enriched fuel however.

 

[Delta Force]

The Eurodif gaseous diffusion plant was operating at half capacity for most of its service life. Perhaps something could have been done to separate things and allow for that capacity to be used for naval propulsion purposes? Would using it to enrich to the legal export maximum and then sending it to a military plant for further enrichment have been an option?

Also, my understanding is that HEU allows for more swift reactor response and improves a reactor's ability to turn on if it has to restart. There are also core life and size advantages. If lower enrichment levels were determined to be more cost effective and didn't compromise performance too much it is likely the United States Navy and Royal Navy would transitioned to them on later designs to reduce costs following the end of the Cold War.

 

[pdf27]

The Eurodif gaseous diffusion plant was operating at half capacity for most of its service life. Perhaps something could have been done to separate things and allow for that capacity to be used for naval propulsion purposes? Would using it to enrich to the legal export maximum and then sending it to a military plant for further enrichment have been an option?

Realistically once material has entered an IAEA safeguarded plant I don't think that there is any way to divert it without breaching the NPT - they're very strict on it for obvious reasons. I think the only way to make more use of the plant would be to not have the plant itself under safeguards in the first place: this has all sorts of implications for where you can source parts and the like from, and what technical help you can get - one of the suppliers I deal with at work for instance has a policy of not selling to anybody involved in Weapons of Mass Destruction - meaning this plant could not buy from them. Once you've done that then a portion of the output could then be placed under IAEA safeguards just fine.

 

[jsb]

The problem is that the French in large part fund their arms industry via exports, and IAEA safeguards prevent the export of reactors using HEU - the enrichment level the French have chosen is exactly the maximum permitted for export under those safeguards.

involved in Weapons of Mass Destruction

Does anybody know what the IAEA safeguard rules are?

- If you are not exporting it (at least to none nuclear weapons states) would the rules stop you from using civilian (IAEA) HEU fuel in a SSN reactor (or does it count as as WMD use)?

 

[Delta Force]

Realistically once material has entered an IAEA safeguarded plant I don't think that there is any way to divert it without breaching the NPT - they're very strict on it for obvious reasons. I think the only way to make more use of the plant would be to not have the plant itself under safeguards in the first place: this has all sorts of implications for where you can source parts and the like from, and what technical help you can get - one of the suppliers I deal with at work for instance has a policy of not selling to anybody involved in Weapons of Mass Destruction - meaning this plant could not buy from them. Once you've done that then a portion of the output could then be placed under IAEA safeguards just fine.

The British, French, and Soviets had fairly extensive dual purpose programs that used reactors to produce weapons materials and electricity. Unless Magnox, UNGG, and RBMK reactors weren't safeguarded, they would have been supplying plutonium for military applications. They were recognized weapons states of course. I know power reactors are safeguarded even in weapons states, but is there as much concern about material getting into military stockpiles of the host country or other weapons states? What kind of firewall exists between commercial, military, and research facilities in weapons states?

Also, HEU and plutonium is traded between countries for commercial and research use, and also for military use. The United States supplied many non-weapons States with such materials (and still does with Euratom), and non-weapons state Canada supplied materials for the British and American military programs. It seems some trade in sensitive materials is allowed.

 

[Delta Force]

Does anybody know what the IAEA safeguard rules are?

- If you are not exporting it (at least to none nuclear weapons states) would the rules stop you from using civilian (IAEA) HEU fuel in a SSN reactor (or does it count as as WMD use)?

The amount of HEU in a naval reactor core is likely enough for a decent nuclear arsenal if it's diverted. It's probably not a good idea.

 

[jsb]

The amount of HEU in a naval reactor core is likely enough for a decent nuclear arsenal if it's diverted. It's probably not a good idea.

Yes but is it any more of a threat than a civilian nuclear power station filled with HEU (or even a reprocessing facility with stocks lying around) in a nuclear weapons state ?

As long as you gave up on export (say joint GB/F program) would it matter if it was or was not IAEA safeguarded HEU in side the SSN?

The British, French, and Soviets had fairly extensive dual purpose programs that used reactors to produce weapons materials and electricity. Unless Magnox, UNGG, and RBMK reactors weren't safeguarded, they would have been supplying plutonium for military applications.

In GBs case where 2 (Calder Hall and Chapelcross) of them not civilian (and therefore not under IAEA) at least early on till 1995? So NWS get to have 2 separate piles one civilian use only and one for anything they like bombs/SSN/reactors with swapping of material only allowed one way? (but even in GBs case some sources mention 2 of the other civilian reactors being prepared to make plutonium so where any of the early reactors IAEA safeguarded? does anybody have a list of what was and what wasn't?)

 

[pdf27]

Yes but is it any more of a threat than a civilian nuclear power station filled with HEU (or even a reprocessing facility with stocks lying around) in a nuclear weapons state?

No such thing. Enrichment to HEU is seriously expensive, and there is no benefit to doing so for a civilian reactor - low-enriched fuel is perfectly adequate for just about anything. There are a very few research reactors out there using HEU, which are under enhanced IAEA safeguards and there are ongoing attempts to phase them out and replace them with something posing less of a proliferation risk.

As long as you gave up on export (say joint GB/F program) would it matter if it was or was not IAEA safeguarded HEU in side the SSN?

Yes. If you want to use the submarine for military purposes, you need to have non-safeguarded fuel. In practical terms, the main benefit of a submarine (being able do disappear) also contradicts the whole point of unannounced IAEA inspections somewhat!

In GBs case where 2 (Calder Hall and Chapelcross) of them not civilian (and therefore not under IAEA) at least early on till 1995? So NWS get to have 2 separate piles one civilian use only and one for anything they like bombs/SSN/reactors with swapping of material only allowed one way? (but even in GBs case some sources mention 2 of the other civilian reactors being prepared to make plutonium so where any of the early reactors IAEA safeguarded? does anybody have a list of what was and what wasn't?)

Yep, as I understand it when built Calder Hall, Chapelcross and Capenhurst were outside the IAEA safeguards programme (Capenhurst has since been rebuilt to produced only low-enriched fuel, which is now within the safeguards programme).
Incidentally, for the latter half of it's life Capenhurst was only operating at about half capacity, while at the same time the UK was importing HEU from the US. I can only assume that the US process was cheaper and it made more sense for us to export Plutonium (our reprocessing capacity has always been very good thanks to being forced to do so with MAGNOX) than to manufacture our own.

 

[Delta Force]

Yes but is it any more of a threat than a civilian nuclear power station filled with HEU (or even a reprocessing facility with stocks lying around) in a nuclear weapons state ?

Reprocessing facilities would have plutonium, not HEU (unless possibly they reprocessed HEU fuel). Military propulsion reactors probably carry more HEU than research reactors too. Research reactors generally aren't concerned with power generation and focus more on thermal output, but propulsion reactors need electrical output (around 25% to 33% of thermal output) to move the ship/submarine. They need a lot of that too.

As long as you gave up on export (say joint GB/F program) would it matter if it was or was not IAEA safeguarded HEU in side the SSN?

It's a tad difficult to do a safeguards inspection on ships since they move around, and especially on a submarine since they are designed to hide.

In GBs case where 2 (Calder Hall and Chapelcross) of them not civilian (and therefore not under IAEA) at least early on till 1995? So NWS get to have 2 separate piles one civilian use only and one for anything they like bombs/SSN/reactors with swapping of material only allowed one way? (but even in GBs case some sources mention 2 of the other civilian reactors being prepared to make plutonium so where any of the early reactors IAEA safeguarded? does anybody have a list of what was and what wasn't?)

Didn't the Magnox reactors produce military material until the mid-1960s or so? Of course the safeguard agreements were reached later, but the provision for a military fuel cycle was retained on Magnox. I think it was even an option on the AGR.

 

[Delta Force]

No such thing. Enrichment to HEU is seriously expensive, and there is no benefit to doing so for a civilian reactor - low-enriched fuel is perfectly adequate for just about anything. There are a very few research reactors out there using HEU, which are under enhanced IAEA safeguards and there are ongoing attempts to phase them out and replace them with something posing less of a proliferation risk.

Yes. If you want to use the submarine for military purposes, you need to have non-safeguarded fuel. In practical terms, the main benefit of a submarine (being able do disappear) also contradicts the whole point of unannounced IAEA inspections somewhat!

Isn't it not too much difficulty to enrich material at 20% U-235 up to HEU levels? Could a facility in a weapons state enrich material up to the maximum limit for commercial purposes and then send it into the military program so it can be further enriched?

Yep, as I understand it when built Calder Hall, Chapelcross and Capenhurst were outside the IAEA safeguards programme (Capenhurst has since been rebuilt to produced only low-enriched fuel, which is now within the safeguards programme).

It seems that materials have been transferred between safeguarded and unsafeguarded facilities. Many commercial reactors in the United States and Japan run on British and Soviet plutonium. How does that work out?

Incidentally, for the latter half of it's life Capenhurst was only operating at about half capacity, while at the same time the UK was importing HEU from the US. I can only assume that the US process was cheaper and it made more sense for us to export Plutonium (our reprocessing capacity has always been very good thanks to being forced to do so with MAGNOX) than to manufacture our own.

The United Kingdom has been an exporter of plutonium and an importer of tritium and HEU under the 1958 Mutual Defense Agreement. British civilian produced plutonium was sent to the United States for civilian use, but since plutonium is fungible it would have allowed plutonium that would have been used for those programs to go to military applications.

 

[pdf27]

Isn't it not too much difficulty to enrich material at 20% U-235 up to HEU levels? Could a facility in a weapons state enrich material up to the maximum limit for commercial purposes and then send it into the military program so it can be further enriched?

You aren't allowed to transfer materials from a safeguarded programme to a non-safeguarded one, of you'd basically be giving places like North Korea carte blanche to claim they're building a bunch of research reactors using HEU and then transfer out the material to the bomb programme when they've got several tonnes of HEU - and until that point they can claim IAEA support to get their enrichment programme working right.

It seems that materials have been transferred between safeguarded and unsafeguarded facilities. Many commercial reactors in the United States and Japan run on British and Soviet plutonium. How does that work out?

You can happily transfer from one safeguarded facility to another, and you can extend safeguards to material not previously subject to them - both are positively encouraged and are rather the whole point of the agreement. What you can't do is transfer safeguarded material out to a weapons programme short of withdrawing from the NPT, so far as I understand it.

The United Kingdom has been an exporter of plutonium and an importer of tritium and HEU under the 1958 Mutual Defense Agreement. British civilian produced plutonium was sent to the United States for civilian use, but since plutonium is fungible it would have allowed plutonium that would have been used for those programs to go to military applications.

I know (we get most of our Tritium from Canada nowadays, at least for safeguarded purposes - I deal with it at work) - but the interesting thing is that the UK was capable of producing far more HEU at Capenhurst than it did from some time in the seventies onwards. Instead, they traded for it with the US - and I'm not quite sure if that says something about the price of UK Plutonium or US HEU.

 

[RLBH]

Didn't the Magnox reactors produce military material until the mid-1960s or so? Of course the safeguard agreements were reached later, but the provision for a military fuel cycle was retained on Magnox. I think it was even an option on the AGR.

Calder Hall and Chapelcross were primarily built to produce weapons material, their electrical output was seen as a bonus.

This passage in Hansard makes it clear that Hinkley Point and at least the next two Magnox stations - Trawsfynydd and Dungeness - were capable of producing weapons material. Subsequent reactors I don't know about, but the fact that modifications were necessary implies that Berkeley and Bradwell weren't capable of a military fuel cycle as built.