AHC: US-India Special Relationship

kernals12

Banned
Being the world's two largest democracies, you'd think India and the US would have a strong relationship. But that was not so. India frequently refused to back America's foreign policy goals and even received aid and bought weapons from the Soviet Union. In return, the US backed the more autocratic Pakistan, particularly in the 1971 war. Given India's size and its strategic location near China, India would be an extremely useful ally. So how can we have Washington and New Delhi be the best of friends?
 
1) Nehru and his successors fight to dismantle the caste system even more than they did IOTL. That's a must because otherwise Washington is going to object to state-sponsored discrimination at some point.

2) Having New Delhi not see the United States as an extension of a colonial power is difficult but I would guess possible. Washington's disdain for colonialism after the war doesn't hurt that mind you.

3) The easiest single way to get New Delhi and Washington on the same page all the time is Pakistan, of course. Have Pakistan be anywhere near the Soviet Union and the odds of an alliance there increase dramatically.
 
1) Nehru and his successors fight to dismantle the caste system even more than they did IOTL. That's a must because otherwise Washington is going to object to state-sponsored discrimination at some point.

The US didn't care about that at all. What it objected to in Nehru was his socialism and neutralism.
 
The US had strong relations with the socialist leaders who backed US interests. It was the neutralism that was the problem.

I agree it was more the neutralism than the socialism, but the latter aggravated US distaste (especially among Republicans) and was often seen as the reason why Nehru was neutralist.
 
I think things might have been different in Indira hadn't succeeded her father. The soviets treated her like a pet.
 
Have the Bharatiya Jana Sangh or the Swatantra Party be more successful in India's political scene could be a start.
 
Avoid Partition. Indians strategic use for the US would grow greatly if it retained an Afghan border.
Basically almost all of the strategic Cold War importance of British India went to Pakistan after 1947. Not the present Republic of India.
If no Partition, then the presence of OTL Pakistan, at worst moderates the Congresses socialist tendencies. OTL, the Muslims were over represented in professional and merchant classes and they migrated to a Pakistan in far greater numbers. Avoid that and suddenly you have sufficient resistance to the policies that were enacted.
 
India without partition and with Muslims being over-represented in its educated classes is a very volatile mix later on. India already has a big (and growing) problem with Hindu nationalism. No partition would make that considerably worse in all likelihood.
 
India without partition and with Muslims being over-represented in its educated classes is a very volatile mix later on. India already has a big (and growing) problem with Hindu nationalism. No partition would make that considerably worse in all likelihood.
True. The question is closer Indian-US relations.
That’s a separate matter.
 
1) Nehru and his successors fight to dismantle the caste system even more than they did IOTL. That's a must because otherwise Washington is going to object to state-sponsored discrimination at some point.

2) Having New Delhi not see the United States as an extension of a colonial power is difficult but I would guess possible. Washington's disdain for colonialism after the war doesn't hurt that mind you.

3) The easiest single way to get New Delhi and Washington on the same page all the time is Pakistan, of course. Have Pakistan be anywhere near the Soviet Union and the odds of an alliance there increase dramatically.

1) As other posters have said, #1 makes no sense. The current "state sponsored discrimination" you refer to in India is the policy of "reservations" under which lower caste people get reserved University admissions and civil service jobs. It is almost exactly the same policy and done for the exact same reason that US governments have put in place for African Americans under Affirmative Action. Why would the US object to the Indian Government doing for lower castes, what it does for African Americans?

Because other than the policy of "reservations" (basically Indian "Affirmative Action"), there is no state sponsored discrimination.

I see no problems with #2 and #3.
 
I wonder if US-Indian relations would have been better had Vallabhbhai Patel https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vallabhbhai_Patel enjoyed better health and longer life, and if he instead of Nehru had been Prime Minister during the 1950's (and how you get that I don't know--presumably something has to happen to Nehru...) Patel seems to have been considerably less friendly to Communist China than Nehru was. See his letter to Nehru of November 7, 1950:

"...even though we regard ourselves as the friends of China, the Chinese do not regard us as their friends. With the Communist mentality of "whoever is not with them being against them", this is a significant pointer, of which we have to take due note. During the last several months, outside the Russian camp, we have practically been alone in championing the cause of Chinese entry into UN and in securing from the Americans assurances on the question of Formosa. We have done everything we could to assuage Chinese feelings, to allay its apprehensions and to defend its legitimate claims in our discussions and correspondence with America and Britain and in the UN. Inspite of this, China is not convinced about our disinterestedness; it continues to regard us with suspicion and the whole psychology is one, at least outwardly, of scepticism perhaps mixed with a little hostility. I doubt if we can go any further than we have done already to convince China of our good intentions, friendliness and goodwill. In Peking we have an Ambassador who is eminently suitable for putting across the friendly point of view. Even he seems to have failed to convert the Chinese. Their last telegram to us is an act of gross discourtesy not only in the summary way it disposes of our protest against the entry of Chinese forces into Tibet but also in the wild insinuation that our attitude is determined by foreign influences. It looks as though it is not a friend speaking in that language but a potential enemy.

"In the background of this, we have to consider what new situation now faces us as a result of the disappearance of Tibet, as we knew it, and the expansion of China almost up to our gates... All along the Himalayas in the north and north-east, we have on our side of the frontier a population ethnologically and culturally not different from Tibetans and Mongoloids. The undefined state of the frontier and the existence on our side of a population with its affinities to the Tibetans or Chinese have all the elements of the potential trouble between China and ourselves. Recent and bitter history also tells us that Communism is no shield against imperialism and that the communists are as good or as bad imperialists as any other. Chinese ambitions in this respect not only cover the Himalayan slopes on our side but also include the important part of Assam. They have their ambitions in Burma also. Burma has the added difficulty that it has no McMahon Line round which to build up even the semblance of an agreement. Chinese irredentism and communist imperialism are different from the expansionism or imperialism of the western powers. The former has a cloak of ideology which makes it ten times more dangerous. In the guise of ideological expansion lie concealed racial, national or historical claims. The danger from the north and north-east, therefore, becomes both communist and imperialist. While our western and north-western threat to security is still as prominent as before, a new threat has developed from the north and north-east. Thus, for the first time, after centuries, India's defence has to concentrate itself on two fronts simultaneously. Our defence measures have so far been based on the calculations of superiority over Pakistan. In our calculations we shall now have to reckon with communist China in the north and in the north-east, a communist China which has definite ambitions and aims and which does not, in any way, seem friendly disposed towards us.

"Let us also consider the political conditions on this potentially troublesome frontier. Our northern and north-eastern approaches consist of Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim, Darjeeling and the tribal areas in Assam. From the point of view of communication, there are weak spots. Continuous defensive lines do not exist. There is almost an unlimited scope for infiltration. Police protection is limited to a very small number of passes. There, too, our outposts do not seem to be fully manned. The contact of these areas with us is by no means close and intimate. The people inhabiting these portions have no established loyalty or devotion to India. Even Darjeeling and Kalimpong areas are not free from pro-Mongoloid prejudices. During the last three years, we have not been able to make any appreciable approaches to the Nagas and other hill tribes in Assam. European missionaries and other visitors had been in touch with them, but their influence was in no way friendly to India or Indians. In Sikkim, there was political ferment some time ago. It is quite possible that discontent is smouldering there. Bhutan is comparatively quiet, but its affinity with Tibetans would be a handicap. Nepal has a weak oligarchic regime based almost entirely on force: it is in conflict with a turbulent element of the population as well as with enlightened ideas of the modern age. In these circumstances, to make people alive to the new danger or to make them defensively strong is a very difficult task indeed and that difficulty can be got over only by enlightened firmness, strength and a clear line of policy. I am sure the Chinese and their source of inspiration, Soviet Union, would not miss any opportunity of exploiting these weak spots, partly in support of their ideology and partly in support of their ambitions. In my judgement the situation is one which we cannot afford either to be complacent or to be vacillating..."

http://www.friendsoftibet.org/main/sardar.html
 
China and india went to war briefly during the 60s have that spiral out of control and have the US and commonwealth jump in to save india and your going to have a very tight Indian American relationship.
 
India would be an extremely useful ally. So how can we have Washington and New Delhi be the best of friends?
To return to the original question
India, since Mahatma Gandhi, has valued its independence and self-sufficiency above all else. The business community like the idea of one large internal market, and keeping foreign interest out. India has failed to develop an internal business that can produce high tech and advanced engineering, so has been backpedalling on it'd ideals for years. America has an exaggerated opinion of its self. It is not really interested in equal partnerships, but it likes counties to open itself to American exploitation. Trump success has been on the slogan Ameriac first, and keep out the foreigners. However, America is massively in debt and has been living beyond its means for years. Cooperation between India and America would be beneficial to both and is happening, but, openly it will never happen.
 
I'm repeating some of the points already made in the thread but...

1) Avoid Indian Partition. If the Indian border is with Afghanistan, then the geopolitics that New Delhi faces are now considerably more Soviet-wary. It's easy to be friendly with the USSR when there's a country neither of you like (Pakistan) in between yourselves. If you're bordering the USSR more or less and you're in a state of geopolitical chess over the fate of the small-ish nation in between yourselves, you're more likely to be open to good relations with an outside power that also doesn't like the USSR.
2) Have Jinnah or Patel be the first PM of India rather than Nehru. Jinnah supposedly as late as 1945-1946 was willing to drop ideas for an Independent Pakistan if he could be the first PM of a united independent India. Either would be more open to the US and less socialist, I would think.


But these are things that would mean a good US-India relationship, not an Indo-American Special Relationship. I think to have a special relationship, the US would need to split with Britain and France. Perhaps the US pushes harder for decolonization post-WW2. The British and French post-Suez opt to go their own way, and the Americans decide they need to make new friends. A non-Nehru united india that's wary of the Soviets is a natural choice.
 
Nitpick on Jinnah. He was willing to drop the demand for Partition, in exchange for a confederation with vast autonomy. Not to become PM. For his faults, corruption was (as many internal Congress memos grudgingly note) something he abhorred.
Plus by 1946, he was already suffering the cancer which would kill him in 1948.
Patel, as PM means a civil war. He was already uncompromising and anti-Muslim too boot.
Otherwise, I agree.

OTL, both Pakistan and India supported the Suez operation and opposed the seizure.
 
Being the world's two largest democracies, you'd think India and the US would have a strong relationship.
I’ve seen sentiments like that expressed before and I always found them utterly baffling and perplexing.

Assuming for the sake of this argument that democracy actually works as advertised, it would mean a democratic government reflects the aspirations and values of the majority of the nation’s society.

US and India have societies that are very different from each other in terms of morals, values, social problems, cultural standards and goals.

Expecting US & India to have a “strong relationship” just on the basis of them being “two of the largest democracies” in the world is to deny the uniquenesses and differences of both India’s and USA’s populations.
 

kernals12

Banned
I’ve seen sentiments like that expressed before and I always found them utterly baffling and perplexing.

Assuming for the sake of this argument that democracy actually works as advertised, it would mean a democratic government reflects the aspirations and values of the majority of the nation’s society.

US and India have societies that are very different from each other in terms of morals, values, social problems, cultural standards and goals.

Expecting US & India to have a “strong relationship” just on the basis of them being “two of the largest democracies” in the world is to deny the uniquenesses and differences of both India’s and USA’s populations.
Japan and the US have close ties despite also having different morals, values, social problems, cultural standards and goals and despite having fought a brutal war.
 
Top