AHC: UK as Central Power

I think Snake has the right idea: if it's to work, you need a much earlier PoD that leads to a different war where France and Russia hold a stronger corner. Perhaps France retaining Alsace, Russia having the appearance of greater strength thanks to an imperial project in East Asia that doesn't get such a bloody nose (the R-J War was hardly inevitable), a more successful and aggressive French colonialism, perhaps Ottoman alignment with the other team, that sort of thing. And even then pro-*CP neutrality seems more likely. Perhaps we come in late to get a place at the peace table or something. It would help if Germany didn't go fleet-mad, but there was some structural reasons for that phenomenon that aren't easy to shake.

As it stood, this would have contradicted our whole interest in the balance of power. And don't assume that because Chamberlain was a Germanophile he expected to fight France or Russia: there had been no war involving more than two great powers for decades, and everybody was doing the alliance-shuffle to advance their diplomatic goals. Look what became of Italy's alliances, for the most outstanding example. When each Great Power decided to stick up for its allies in the summer of '14, it did so because to let that ally go hang would be an urgent danger to its own security.


France was more democratic than Germany, and Austria and Russia were at roughly the same point.

If you mean Austria (not Austria-Hungary), this is certainly not true. Austria had manhood suffrage and a pretty lively public debate and party scene, whereas Russia had an extensively fiddled suffrage and a rather busier apparatus for locking up socialists. Some Austrian local governments were fiddled, as against all Russian ones. And Austria's House of Lords had less oversight than the Russian opposite number.
 
Last edited:
Sometimes the most simple solution is the best: Let Germany wait for France to attack first (this will make France the aggressor) and let France attack through Belgium (which did not allow French troops to pass through). Because the United Kingdom is treaty-bound to guarantee Belgium's existence and neutrality.
 
Sometimes the most simple solution is the best: Let Germany wait for France to attack first (this will make France the aggressor) and let France attack through Belgium (which did not allow French troops to pass through). Because the United Kingdom is treaty-bound to guarantee Belgium's existence and neutrality.

Eh, I spend a lot of time exploring the whole Belgium neutrality violation, a lot of sources come to the conclusion the activation of theTreaty of London was merely the excuse to declare war on Germany. Without it, they would have found another excuse to declare war.

By 1914, they awknowledge who their enemy was, France walking into Belgium isn't going to reverse 14 years of diplomacy.
 
Sometimes the most simple solution is the best: Let Germany wait for France to attack first (this will make France the aggressor) and let France attack through Belgium (which did not allow French troops to pass through). Because the United Kingdom is treaty-bound to guarantee Belgium's existence and neutrality.

With OTL events that's, at best, a guarantee of British neutrality. They wouldn't be able to enter the war due to French violation of Belgian neutrality, but they certainly wouldn't declare war on France over it. Maybe send a stern note and quietly advise the Belgians to co-operate. There's too much hostility built up against Germany at the time.

Of course, with Britain neutral (and soon to be distracted with Ireland), WWI is pretty much in the bag for the Central Powers and if Britain chooses not to enforce it's blockade of Germany, then CP victory is practically certain (barring stunning idiocy on the part of the CPs).
 
I will say in the favor of this concept (UK on Germany's side) that to the Victorian Briton, the adversary of the week shifted between France and Germany, both being continental competitors. I think, therefore, that making France stand out as the one most at odds with Britain would help.
 
I think Snake has the right idea: if it's to work, you need a much earlier PoD that leads to a different war where France and Russia hold a stronger corner. Perhaps France retaining Alsace, Russia having the appearance of greater strength thanks to an imperial project in East Asia that doesn't get such a bloody nose (the R-J War was hardly inevitable), a more successful and aggressive French colonialism, perhaps Ottoman alignment with the other team, that sort of thing. And even then pro-*CP neutrality seems more likely. Perhaps we come in late to get a place at the peace table or something. It would help if Germany didn't go fleet-mad, but there was some structural reasons for that phenomenon that aren't easy to shake.

As it stood, this would have contradicted our whole interest in the balance of power. And don't assume that because Chamberlain was a Germanophile he expected to fight France or Russia: there had been no war involving more than two great powers for decades, and everybody was doing the alliance-shuffle to advance their diplomatic goals. Look what became of Italy's alliances, for the most outstanding example. When each Great Power decided to stick up for its allies in the summer of '14, it did so because to let that ally go hang would be an urgent danger to its own security.

I might note that my POD precedes the unification of Germany and that Russia is pretty transparently shifting into a military juggernaut by WWI and is one by WWII. While France's hold on Egypt and rather bellicose policies typical of a late 19th Century Imperial state when aimed at Britain by the Bonapartists seem like rubbing salt in the wound, so to speak. By the time the ATL WWI breaks out in 1916 Britain and Germany have evolved policies that leads each to side with the other, and facing France, Austria, and Russia they pretty easily slide into a mentality that the ATL Triple Entente is the "vast menacing horde."

I go into some detail about the political and cultural shifts required for all that to happen and the ATL WWI is not quite akin to ours.
 
I will say in the favor of this concept (UK on Germany's side) that to the Victorian Briton, the adversary of the week shifted between France and Germany, both being continental competitors. I think, therefore, that making France stand out as the one most at odds with Britain would help.

But this is difficult, and Germany winning implies German dominance on the continent.

I think an outright alliance is impossible, as Germany is to strong on the continent. The best is to have an alliance system onfold in which Germany and Britain end on the same side due to "the enemy of my enemy is my friend".

Another possibility would be to avoid German unification and Britain allying with a collection of German states, which unify in response to the common victory over France and Russia. Thus dominance on the continent happens as a surprise for Britain.
 
Sure, AH is always easier the earlier the PoD lies ...

I agree that if Britain should side with Germany after a PoD in 1910, say, that PoD would have to be, um, decisive. Generation of casus bellorum was legalistic in nature, so it's not that much use staring at Belgium alone.

However, there was quite a lot of leeway in diplomacy in the l1890s and at the beginning of the century. Fashoda was a turning point. If we were discussing in 1890, it would be conceivable that such a crisis might arise, and that Britain might win the lead in it. We may have had different opinions whether it would trigger a war or not. But that finally France and Britain would form an "Entente" would sound rather foolish. I suppose that even after Fashoda there are a lot of options, like a radicalization of France against Britain, or even a German-French rapprochement. The Balkan wars, for another factor, could well follow a completely different timetable, with all sorts of consequences in the relationship of the great powers.
So there is a large number of possibilities, starting from 1895 or even 1900.
But everything here is diplomacy-driven. To change the course of events, you need to change the acting staff. In particularly in Germany: In British and French eyes, Germany acted far too much like a inferiority-ridden parvenu aggressively claiming an ever larger piece of the pie. It's my impression that this attitude has thrown Germany out of the game, basically between 1895 and 1905. It also looks a bit like a vicious circle: The more Germany got isolated, the more pushy it tried to a foot into all sorts of doors.- I'm sure there were a lot of able diplomats in Germany who could have done better - in case the Emperor was somehow silenced.
I know that I might employ very outworn AH tools now, but an early death, or a severe illness (mental or somatic) looks quite promising for a start.
This is, of course, only one ingredient; but the others are not too hard to provide either:
Conflicts between Britain and France, conflicts between Germany and France or its allies lie all over the place. The only thing you still need are concrete steps in diplomacy.
 
Top