AHC: U.S. remains an industrial powerhouse

That's definitely a good one and there's a lot of evidence that's was the first sign of trouble. Maybe no Korean War so no battle between the President and the Steel industry, allowing Congress in its hearings on the Steel Industry in the late 1950s is able to force them to modernize?
I was thinking more like the Secretaries of Defense and Labor warn Ike of an impending steel strike that could get long and ugly. They make a case that steel is absolutely critical/vital to defense and economic interests. Ike buys in, but cannot act until something happens. Within hours after a strike is declared, Ike announces the creation of a mediation panel in the interests of national security.

VP Richard Nixon chairs the panel. It includes prominent labor and management figures, as well as both Democrats and Republicans. Nixon ensures the proceedings are always in the news so there's public pressure to settle-and to get back to work while talking. Maybe it runs 2-3 weeks with a new contract to be renegotiated with a new panel five years hence.

Ripple effect: big boost for Nixon in seeking the Oval Office . He beats Kennedy and serves 8 reasonably good years, remembered today as one of America's better presidents.
 
About "export discipline":

But by far the most readable account of the region’s industrial policy is “How Asia Works,” by journalist Joe Studwell. Breezy and readable yet exhaustively researched, Studwell’s book draws on the insights of some of the above economists — as well as various historians and his own reporting — to present a simple unified theory of how poor countries can use industrial policy to get rich.

Studwell believes that good industrial policy boils down to three things. First, developing countries should promote labor-intensive agriculture on small owner-operated farms. Second, once agriculture is going well, countries should focus on manufacturing, and use export promotion as a way to force companies to learn to be more productive. And third, bank-based financial systems should be directed to support export manufacturers.


The second of these turns out to be the centerpiece. Studwell asserts that developing countries grow by upgrading their technology, and that the only way to do this is to learn by experience. And the best way to do this, he says, is for developing-country governments to incentivize their manufacturers to sell their wares overseas. Exporting entails competing in world markets, which forces a country to acquire, adopt and improve on foreign technologies by any means necessary. In economics the bracing effect of international competition is called “export discipline”; Studwell uses this term a bit more expansively, to refer also to governments’ practice of disciplining their companies to export, export, export. This echoes the prescriptions of Harvard economist Dani Rodrik, who believes that exporting allows developing countries to discover their comparative advantages in the international trade system.

Notably, many discussions of development focus on net exports— i.e., trade surpluses. Studwell, in contrast, is talking about gross exports — it doesn’t matter if a country buys a lot from overseas, as long as it also sells a lot overseas too. South Korea, after all, ran trade deficits during much of its period of rapid growth. Thus, Studwell isn’t advocating mercantilism, or growth at the expense of other nations.

Studwell also is no advocate of picking winners, or of promoting national champions. Instead, he advises countries to start out with lots of competing exporters, and then cull the losers by letting incompetent companies go bankrupt, or forcing them to be swallowed by more successful exporters. He dismisses undervalued currencies as an overly blunt instrument, since these reward inefficient and efficient exporters alike.

It's nice when governments help a poor country to get rich, and I just got Studwell's book on your recommendation, but in America 1962-1999 a corrupt, incompetent, self-righteous government was helping a rich country get poor. Nobody invests in steel since 1962, when D JFK broke US Steel. Nobody hopes to get rich selling cars or planes with the Democrats slavering to break them if they try. Nobody expects another dot-com boom since the Clintons took a half billion dollar bribe to break the old one. These feckless crooks broke our prosperity.
 
Germany isn't a proper comparison for this issue though. The Germans have, going back to the early 20th century, maintained a comparative advantage in heavy industry. Some of this was focus on that sector, especially because it helps make up for Germany's not-great strategic position, but some of it was that frankly, the other sectors of Germany's economy were much weaker comparatively: Germany has worse farmland naturally than the U.S. or, say, France, arguably the weakest banking/financial sector of the major powers until well after WW2, and a massive brain drain from the Nazi regime.

In comparison, the U.S. has extensive farmland, the most innovative financial system in the world (for good or ill), a large and well-developed tertiary education system, an abundance of petroleum and most other natural resources. What I'm getting at is that in my perspective the U.S. being an industrial juggernaut in "regular" goods, like steel, textiles etc. was a fluke brought about by being the second country to properly industrialize and then the only country post WW2 to have a fully intact industrial base. This juggernaut status was unsustainable in the long term, as other countries rebuilt, especially countries which, like Germany and Japan, had comparative disadvantages in certain areas where the U.S. had comparative advantages.

So, to your point, I do not think government intervention would be sufficient to alter the U.S.'s "natural course." Significantly weakening other sectors of the U.S. economy is a possible solution, so that the U.S. has a comparative advantage in the industries you want to focus on. However, I think ripping Wall Street out of lower Manhattan, or nuking the Great Plains, would have rather more butterflies than you're looking for. A concerted German, and to a lesser extent wider European, effort to redress the loss of so many scientists and thinkers to the U.S. during WW2, would both weaken the U.S.'s academic advantage and strengthen Europe's post-war deficit, so that might help with your PoD. A Nationalist victory in China could weaken their industrial growth and increase their demand, which would at least reduce the U.S.'s competitors and increase demand. Similarly as I was saying, increasing global demand, by developing India and the former African colonies better and faster, would give the U.S. a comparative advantage over these nations for a time and give U.S. companies more incentive to increase production. Do any of these PoDs float your boat?

Edit: Kneecapping the U.S. financial industry might be the way to go here because it solves a bunch of problems. It reduces the U.S. comparative advantage in not-industry. It reduces the industrial brain-drain. Finally there's some work done that investing in the financial industry is a net drag on U.S. GDP growth, so removing it would increase total demand as well.

Alright, first, I'm interested to hear your ideas with regards to the financial industry before I respond to the rest of that? I recall seeing some studies on that so it's definitely interesting.
 
It really shouldn’t be controversial to say that demand growth slows down or stagnates at some point, because it’s a natural effect of technology penetration s-curves and can be observed in such phenomenon as the decline of agriculture and the transition of companies from “growth” to “value” investments (or in other words from rapid to slow demand growth for their products). Look at smartphones for a recent example: the iPhone has basically flatlined in terms of annual shipments since 2015, despite wear-and-tear, new models, and so on.

For the economy as a whole, this is masked by the fact that new products are always being invented and introduced, which then show rapid growth themselves until essentially everyone who wants one has one (or they fail), at which point there are new products, and so on and so forth. But in individual industries you can definitely observe it.

Periodic falls in demand isn't controversial; we have cyclical corrections/recessions obviously. The long term trend, however, is that demand goes up and with it the standard of living in tandem. And the last point is kinda the overall answer, in that we're talking about industrial output on the whole, with its wide range of production of products, rather than just individual niche goods.
 
I was thinking more like the Secretaries of Defense and Labor warn Ike of an impending steel strike that could get long and ugly. They make a case that steel is absolutely critical/vital to defense and economic interests. Ike buys in, but cannot act until something happens. Within hours after a strike is declared, Ike announces the creation of a mediation panel in the interests of national security.

VP Richard Nixon chairs the panel. It includes prominent labor and management figures, as well as both Democrats and Republicans. Nixon ensures the proceedings are always in the news so there's public pressure to settle-and to get back to work while talking. Maybe it runs 2-3 weeks with a new contract to be renegotiated with a new panel five years hence.

Ripple effect: big boost for Nixon in seeking the Oval Office . He beats Kennedy and serves 8 reasonably good years, remembered today as one of America's better presidents.

There's a really good article on this I posted last year:
Tata Steel has sent the British government scurrying into action after the Indian firm put its UK assets up for sale and left more than 15,000 jobs at risk. Debate has centred on whether the state should provide incentives to potential buyers, and how it should respond if no buyer can be found. The temptation is to protect the industry from “unfair” competition, but to intervene as little as possible so that markets can find some balance and the industry can rescue itself.

However, the experience of the US steel industry in the economic doldrums of the 1970s and 1980s shows what a painful path that can be.

From 1974 to 1986, the American steel industry was mired in a deep depression. The primary cause was the ten-year economic downturn sparked by the OPEC oil embargo and the Iranian revolution. During these recessions consumer markets contracted significantly and demand for steel weakened considerably. With markets for steel shrinking, America’s integrated steel manufacturers were forced to cut their production and sell steel at unprofitable prices.

Clearly, these conditions were not conducive to turning a profit and America’s steel firms lost a large amount of money on every tonne of steel that they sold for much of this period (in 1982 alone these losses amounted to US$3 billion)

As they sought to reduce their enormous losses America’s eight largest steel firms laid off large numbers of their workers and permanently closed a number of steel mills. The figures themselves are staggering. Between 1979 and 1982 more than 150,000 steelworkers were made redundant and hundreds of steel facilities were closed. Convinced that something needed to be done to ease their economic woes, steel producers also asked the government to impose trade restrictions and to take action to prevent foreign dumping.

Restrictions
In an era supposedly defined by growing belief in the sanctity of the free market, the US government proved pragmatic. In 1977 and again in 1979 President Jimmy Carter’s administration established minimum prices at which foreign-produced steel could be sold. In 1984, when it seemed as if the whole industry was on the brink of extinction the Reagan administration tightened America’s trade policies further by negotiating quotas with foreign countries.

Although both Reagan and Carter took steps to protect domestic steel producers from foreign competition, they ruled out much more interventionist and costly schemes that would have transformed the industry. The Carter administration, for example, refused to provide financial support to a group of community leaders in Youngstown, Ohio who were attempting to buy mills that America’s largest steel corporations had abandoned. Convinced that plant shutdowns were inevitable and that the nation’s largest steel corporations needed to tackle their own problems Carter also dismissed a US$10 billion publicly funded modernisation plan that was suggested by a government taskforce.

Adopting a similar hands-off approach, the Reagan administration also refused to bail out the steel industry, allowed two of America’s largest steel makers to declare bankruptcy and rejected calls for further protection from imports.

Unable to count on the government for direct financial support America’s largest steel producers were left with no choice but to resolve their economic woes and competitive problems on their own. Setting about saving the companies that they led, steel executives closed factories that they regarded as uncompetitive or too expensive to modernise, slashed their workforces, and demanded that their remaining workers take wage and benefits cuts.

The massive restructuring campaigns that America’s largest steel producers undertook in the 1980s proved successful, at least from the perspective of the business community. Companies that had spent most of the 1980s struggling survived the deep industrial depression of the late 1970s and early 1980s. Indeed, in 1987 the largest steel producers even reported profits and business analysts started to study the industry’s remarkable rebirth.

Yet, the steel industry’s rejuvenation was not a straightforward story of success. The reality of the US steel industry’s reinvention was that employment and production were slashed dramatically. In total, nearly 300,000 steelworkers lost their jobs between 1976 and 1986. In places like Youngstown, and Gary, Indiana, whole communities were left devastated by plant closures. As such, while the US steel industry did survive the crises of the 1970s and 1980s it did not do so unscathed.
Source
 

Thomas1195

Banned
It's nice when governments help a poor country to get rich, and I just got Studwell's book on your recommendation, but in America 1962-1999 a corrupt, incompetent, self-righteous government was helping a rich country get poor. Nobody invests in steel since 1962, when D JFK broke US Steel. Nobody hopes to get rich selling cars or planes with the Democrats slavering to break them if they try. Nobody expects another dot-com boom since the Clintons took a half billion dollar bribe to break the old one. These feckless crooks broke our prosperity.
Studwell never supports big monopolies indulging in anti-competitive behaviours, which was actually the case for the likes of US Steel or Big Three (their problems were way before those things happened, as management refused to innovate and to invest in modernization, instead they preferred to pay out dividends). Industrial relation was also a big problem, with labour laws pitting management against labour, and labour unions have never really been considered a legitimate party on negotiation table, unlike in Europe. In fact, regarding US Steel, the 1959 steel strike was way more significant, and problems had already emerged even before that.

OTOH, as mentioned in this article, Studwell wants to start with a large number of competitors that would be encouraged to export and compete in international markets. But he only talks about the developing phase. Once the developed/mature phase is reached, normally there will be concentration of industries, which can have negative impacts on consumers and more importantly, on democracy, and thus anti-trust and/or regulations are needed. In South Korea, the chaebols and their ruling families have shitload of political influences and often do lots of shady shits with their power.

By the way, fix it for you, it does not stop in 1999, Bush economic and especially fiscal policies sucked and also contributed a lot to the subprime crisis, and also made it worse.
 
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Periodic falls in demand isn't controversial; we have cyclical corrections/recessions obviously. The long term trend, however, is that demand goes up and with it the standard of living in tandem. And the last point is kinda the overall answer, in that we're talking about industrial output on the whole, with its wide range of production of products, rather than just individual niche goods.
The point was that for individual companies and industries automation at a certain point will tend to work to reduce employment because demand for their product is saturated and most purchases are simply demand maintenance instead of creation, as with the iPhone. Therefore, if you want to maintain growing industrial output in the United States, you need to be continually introducing new products and sectors that will create new demands, not just improving the efficiency of old sectors. Or--to be briefer--you need SpaceX and Apple, not just making the Big Three and U.S. Steel more nimble and competitive. That might help, but ultimately cars and steel are relatively saturated industries compared to space launch and personal computers.
 
Studwell never supports big monopolies indulging in anti-competitive behaviours, which was actually the case for the likes of US Steel or Big Three (their problems were way before those things happened, as management refused to innovate and to invest in modernization, instead they preferred to pay out dividends). Industrial relation was also a big problem, with labour laws pitting management against labour, and labour unions have never really been considered a legitimate party on negotiation table, unlike in Europe. In fact, regarding US Steel, the 1959 steel strike was way more significant, and problems had already emerged even before that.

OTOH, as mentioned in this article, Studwell wants to start with a large number of competitors that would be encouraged to export and compete in international markets. But he only talks about the developing phase. Once the developed/mature phase is reached, normally there will be concentration of industries, which can have negative impacts on consumers and more importantly, on democracy, and thus anti-trust and/or regulations are needed. In South Korea, the chaebols and their ruling families have shitload of political influences and often do lots of shady shits with their power.

By the way, fix it for you, it does not stop in 1999, Bush economic and especially fiscal policies sucked and also contributed a lot to the subprime crisis, and also made it worse.
Not a fan of Bush or later presidents. But you'd be fixing it for me only if Bush or later presidents had a manufacturing base to destroy. Nope. People stopped making big capital investments in the USA once it was clear it would be looted if they did. No big vulnerable capital investments, no manufacturing base. Even the dot-com boom was fed by capital flight from industries previously looted by the Democrats. Then the Clintons broke the dot-com boom.

I expect shady behavior from rich people and powerful people. If the chaebols do worse than the Clintons breaking an the dot-com boom for a bribe, or JFK breaking US Steel from negligence, of the feckless vandalism in between, then by all means go after them.

I'd like to live in a first world country again, and that requires a first world manufacturing base.
 
There’s not much shipbuilding anywhere except China, Korea, and Japan. It’s a little strange, really, because there’s no obvious reason why shipbuilders in Korea and Japan would be so much more successful than those in Europe and the United States. They are developed countries too, so it’s not like they have way cheaper labor.
And you forgot Finland. Half of the world's largest cruise ships are built there.
 

Thomas1195

Banned
If the chaebols do worse than the Clintons breaking an the dot-com boom for a bribe, or JFK breaking US Steel from negligence, of the feckless vandalism in between, then by all means go after them
Yes, they do loads of bad stuffs and have loads of scandals, they are simply not as well-known as Corporate America, and those are the natural results from oversized monopolies with outsized political influence. Breaking/restraining monopolies actually improves innovation, helps new entrants and allows them to grow instead of being eaten alive by large incumbents.

As for US Steel, its problems were already there (e.g. paying out like 85% of profits as dividends), and the Steel Strike in 1959 did way more damage to steel companies than JFK. By the way, US Steel did abuse their market power, and JFK put them in their place, just like TR, Taft and Wilson would have done.

As for the dotcom bubble, it was the result of financial deregulation and low interest rate set by Alan Greenspan that it became a bubble, and much of the so-called investments in the tech sector was speculative and "fad" rather than organic, focusing on marketing over substance. The Clinton Administration actually did aggressively invest in and boost the technology sector as well as Internet usage and application. The dotcom bubble, in the end, was a bubble and thus it would have to burst eventually. So, the solution for the dotcom bubble is to prevent it from becoming a bubble in the first place, by not pursuing overly low interest rate- cheap capital policy.

Even the dot-com boom was fed by capital flight from industries previously looted by the Democrats.
In fact the Reagan decade caused more long-term damage to US economic competitiveness than any Democrats, because it created the "starve the beast" (which involved slashing investments in public education and infrastructures) consensus, pushed forward aggressive deregulation (which eventually led to the GFC), turned the US into a net debtor, and led to NAFTA (which was initiated by Bush and signed by Clinton). In fact, just butterflying away NAFTA would slow down deindustrialization quite a bit.
 
There’s not much shipbuilding anywhere except China, Korea, and Japan. It’s a little strange, really, because there’s no obvious reason why shipbuilders in Korea and Japan would be so much more successful than those in Europe and the United States. They are developed countries too, so it’s not like they have way cheaper labor.

They are cheaper than Europe and USA with much more stringent work ethics. Much longer working hours, at the very least.
 
It's nice when governments help a poor country to get rich, and I just got Studwell's book on your recommendation, but in America 1962-1999 a corrupt, incompetent, self-righteous government was helping a rich country get poor. Nobody invests in steel since 1962, when D JFK broke US Steel. Nobody hopes to get rich selling cars or planes with the Democrats slavering to break them if they try. Nobody expects another dot-com boom since the Clintons took a half billion dollar bribe to break the old one. These feckless crooks broke our prosperity.

Have you hard about Chaebol?

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chaebol

The labour condition in ROK is not exactly good before democratizaton either.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Working_hours_in_South_Korea
 
And you forgot Finland. Half of the world's largest cruise ships are built there.

Which is sort of a fringe in the shipbuilding industry.

I think people need to realize 8 hour working day is an exception in many parts of Asia. I, a HK government lawyer, work at least 10 hours a day.
 

Thomas1195

Banned
I think people need to realize 8 hour working day is an exception in many parts of Asia. I, a HK government lawyer, work at least 10 hours a day
8 hour working-day is more about manufacturing and actually not that common if not rare in professional services and banking in general, especially in more highly-specialized fields like investment banking.
 
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Which is sort of a fringe in the shipbuilding industry.

I think people need to realize 8 hour working day is an exception in many parts of Asia. I, a HK government lawyer, work at least 10 hours a day.

That Finns still build ships today is exactly due to specialization. Building cruise ships in Turku and icebreakers (and other Arctic vessels) in Helsinki has been a case of specializing in demanding, complex niche production where the Finns have been able to beat Korean, Japanese and Chinese companies with well-honed skills and long experience. We realized long ago that in building bulk carriers and other comparatively easy and simple projects, we could not compete in terms of costs.

As of late, though, it does seem that China is moving into the cruise ship building business, too, and gathering experience in the field. While the learning curve is steep, in a decade or two we might lose what edge we still have.
 
That Finns still build ships today is exactly due to specialization. Building cruise ships in Turku and icebreakers (and other Arctic vessels) in Helsinki has been a case of specializing in demanding, complex niche production where the Finns have been able to beat Korean, Japanese and Chinese companies with well-honed skills and long experience. We realized long ago that in building bulk carriers and other comparatively easy and simple projects, we could not compete in terms of costs.

As of late, though, it does seem that China is moving into the cruise ship building business, too, and gathering experience in the field. While the learning curve is steep, in a decade or two we might lose what edge we still have.
Assuming the cruise ship market still stays the same size/expands by 2030.
 
Assuming the cruise ship market still stays the same size/expands by 2030.

Yes, we'll see how it all goes, COVID-19 sure has thrown a spanner into the works. The Meyer shipyard in Turku, as well as the German parent company, will see a few lean years at least as necessarily some orders will get cancelled and others postponed. The developments in China regarding cruise ships will take a hit of some sort, too.
 
Have Malcom McLean not be successful with Sea-Land shipping and the intermodal shipping container. This would keep shipping costs high and make the worldwide integrated market in-efficent enough that production of many items would remain in the U.S. because between pilferage, wasteage, and slower loading and unloading rates that it would be cheaper, even with higher labor costs to produce things in a decentralized manner.

Also keeping petroleum prices high would further discourage long-distance shipping.
Perhaps close the Suez Canal for more years or clog the Panama Canal during some banana republic rebellion.
 
8 hour working-day is more about manufacturing and actually not that common if not rare in professional services and banking in general, especially in more highly-specialized fields like investment banking.
The difference in hours per day is the difference between salaried (manufacturing) and owners/professionals.
Factory workers have little incentive to work longer hours because it makes little difference in long-term income.
OTOH many professionals (e.g. my dentist) owns his own practice and plans to finance his retirement by selling it to his junior partner. My dentist hopes to profit millions of dollars when he sells his practice.
 
This is the exactly the issue I'm saying you have to get around. While maybe in the long term you can increase demand by increasing outputs, the surefire bet to increase profits is to cut inputs. If I'm a firm owner, I'm not thinking on the 2 decade scale to get more bank tellers, and I don't really care about the economy in general. I'm forecasting out maybe 5 years at most for my particular business and its direct competitors, suppliers and buyers. That's why I keep hammering home the importance of changing the world conditions to make increasing outputs seem like a better payoff than cutting inputs.

Edit:


...... I was attempting to explain why any nation would double down on producing the goods it has a comparative advantage in and abandon producing others, opting to trade for them instead. That's peak Capitalism. .....

Agreed!
A nation or corporation can only charge top dollar if it remains a world-leader in some branch of technology.
For example: Sikorsky used to build every helicopter component (except engines, tires and instruments) in house. By the time Sikorsky started building helicopters, engines, tires and instruments were already “mature” technologies.
Now Sikorsky sub-contracts: sheet metal, composites, etc. to concentrate on only manufacturing the few components that are still world-leading: drive trains and control systems.
Sub-contracting is also important to negotiate export contracts for world-leading helicopters. For example: hundreds of second and third-world factories know how to buck the rivets used in conventional sheet metal airframes, so Sikorsky sub-contracts sheet-metal work to a Japanese sub-contractor as part of a deal to sell helicopters to the Japanese Self Defence Fo ce. The most efficient way is to sub-contract all left-hand sponsons to their Japanese sub-contractor and all right-hand sponsons to their South Korean sub-contractor. This allows both Japanese and South Korean politicians to “buy votes” in their home ridings while simultaneously importing the latest and fanciest helicopters designed by Sikorsky.
 
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