AHC: Try to make Ke Sangh into a victory.

Hey.

This thing's just popped into my head.

As you all may know from history, Ke Sangh was a major defeat for the Americans in Vietnam, and caused the retreat of the Americans in Vietnam.

What I wonder, and this is also a challenge for you guys, is to try to make Ke Sangh into a victory for the Americans. I don't care how you do it, even with major casualties, just make it a victory for the Americans.
 
The siege of Khe Sanh and indeed the wider Tet Offensive were not military defeats for the US. The Tet Offensive however was a political defeat thanks to the way it was covered by the media. In consequence of that the anti war movement was galvanised and the politicians convinced.

Apparently it was General Creighton Abrams who was interviewed by Walter Cronkrite and it was this intervew that resulted in Cronkriite'd famous report. Had Cronkrite spoken to a different general or had Abrams had a different attitude then maybe things would have been different. Or perhaps the same result would have happened after thousands more casualties.
 
Do you mean the Battle of Khe Sanh? The Americans won that battle. What happened is that afterwards the United States decided to abandon the base anyway, and the NVA subsequently occupied it. That decision was not because of an American tactical defeat, but a political or strategic decision to withdraw because the base was not seen as strategically important. Whether the decision to withdraw was correct or not, it was not something forced on the US. If you want Khe Sanh to continue to be occupied by the US, all you need is for the US commanders to want to continue to occupy it.

Khe Sanh was a very strange battle because no one really knew why the NVA was fighting there.
 
Do you mean the Battle of Khe Sanh? The Americans won that battle. What happened is that afterwards the United States decided to abandon the base anyway, and the NVA subsequently occupied it. That decision was not because of an American tactical defeat, but a political or strategic decision to withdraw because the base was not seen as strategically important. Whether the decision to withdraw was correct or not, it was not something forced on the US. If you want Khe Sanh to continue to be occupied by the US, all you need is for the US commanders to want to continue to occupy it.

Khe Sanh was a very strange battle because no one really knew why the NVA was fighting there.

The siege of Khe Sanh and indeed the wider Tet Offensive were not military defeats for the US. The Tet Offensive however was a political defeat thanks to the way it was covered by the media. In consequence of that the anti war movement was galvanised and the politicians convinced.

Apparently it was General Creighton Abrams who was interviewed by Walter Cronkrite and it was this intervew that resulted in Cronkriite'd famous report. Had Cronkrite spoken to a different general or had Abrams had a different attitude then maybe things would have been different. Or perhaps the same result would have happened after thousands more casualties.

Wait, Ke Sanh was a victory? I thought it was a defeat?
 
Contrary to popular belief, it was not the American Dien Bien Phu, despite superficial similarities (surrounded military base being resupplied by air and all that).
 
Khe Sanh was a very strange battle because no one really knew why the NVA was fighting there.

To draw attention north while Tet offensive was being prepared in the south. In that it worked.

It was a pyrrhic victory for the United States.

How so? Pyrrhic victory means that victor (in this case US) suffers so greatly it damages them in long term. US didn't suffer that much in terms of casualties and equipment.

You could say it was tactical victory which wasn't translated into wider victory. But then again, Vietnamese weren't that determined to take it anyway.
 
The Tet Offensive was a total US military victory; the Viet Kong and North Vietnam failed to secure any of their objectives, and suffered very heavy losses. The Viet Kong was essentially crippled as a serious fighting force. The only defeat was that the US, in failing to predict the offensive, suffered an enormous shock when it first opened. This lead the public to believe that the war was going far worse than the military had presented it, and that the US was actually losing. If the US detects and destroys the offensive before it even gets off the ground the impact of it on the public will be much less damaging.
 
The Tet Offensive was a total US military victory; the Viet Kong and North Vietnam failed to secure any of their objectives, and suffered very heavy losses. The Viet Kong was essentially crippled as a serious fighting force. The only defeat was that the US, in failing to predict the offensive, suffered an enormous shock when it first opened. This lead the public to believe that the war was going far worse than the military had presented it, and that the US was actually losing. If the US detects and destroys the offensive before it even gets off the ground the impact of it on the public will be much less damaging.

And the fact that US government/military has been saying for a long time VC is on the ropes and just about finished. so when Tet rolls in it's a shock to general population since they see that previous claims were lies (or at least dead wrong) and as such further such statements were considered to be lies (or at least dead wrong) as well.
 
Khe Sanh was a very strange battle because no one really knew why the NVA was fighting there.

To draw attention north while Tet offensive was being prepared in the south. In that it worked.

Another theory is the local NVA regional or corps commander hoped to recreate the Den Ben Phu thing as the Tet offensive unfolded.

Several of the Marines I served with in the 1970s & 1980s fought at Khe Sahn. They remembered the enemy getting into and through the wire/mines in their night attacks.
 
Another theory is the local NVA regional or corps commander hoped to recreate the Den Ben Phu thing as the Tet offensive unfolded.

Several of the Marines I served with in the 1970s & 1980s fought at Khe Sahn. They remembered the enemy getting into and through the wire/mines in their night attacks.

It's unlikely Vietnamese seriously tried to take it, considering forces (including artillery) commited.
 
It's unlikely Vietnamese seriously tried to take it, considering forces (including artillery) commited.

Probablly not. This theory floated by I Corps G2 suggests the condition for the actual effort would have been if the Tet assualts were more sucessfull. The assumption being air support for the Khe Sanh garrison would far below the necessary level. I think it was Lt Col Mastrion (a Captain at Khe Sanh) who told me the assaults made during the siege were not spoiling or diversionary. They made sense only if they were probes for opportunities & weaknesses for a serious assault. If the conditions had been right the NVA then might have made a all out try against the place. Wish I had time to re read the literature on this battle. At least a dozen of the US Marines involved have published magazine articles or books about their experience or observations.
 
Some kind of controls over the media, that prevent them from informing the people, or at least putting some kind of positive spin on the affair: "Look how we are massacring them! This is proof that they are desperate!"
 
Probablly not. This theory floated by I Corps G2 suggests the condition for the actual effort would have been if the Tet assualts were more sucessfull. The assumption being air support for the Khe Sanh garrison would far below the necessary level. I think it was Lt Col Mastrion (a Captain at Khe Sanh) who told me the assaults made during the siege were not spoiling or diversionary. They made sense only if they were probes for opportunities & weaknesses for a serious assault. If the conditions had been right the NVA then might have made a all out try against the place. Wish I had time to re read the literature on this battle. At least a dozen of the US Marines involved have published magazine articles or books about their experience or observations.

That sounds reasonable. If opportunity would present itself then Vietnamese would try to take it. If not they were willing to limit themselves to limited attacks ment to keep US troops in place and create illusion they are serious about taking it it.
 
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