AHC: The Wehrmacht Inflicts a Humiliating Defeat Upon US Forces

Except that when the allies had control of the sea and air, there's no way the forces on either beachhead (Salerno in 1943 or Anzio in 1944) were going to "collapse" ... NGF has that effect.

Same goes for a major landing in France in 1943.



The only Allied amphibious operation designed to hit and stay the Axis defeated after the US entered the war were the British operations in the Dodecanese, and those were a textbook example of how not to plan or execute an amphibious operation.

Best,

I don't think it can be assumed that the Allies would have air superiority for a 1943 landing in France. IIRC the Luftwaffe was still a formidable force at that point. This is an assessment I found by CalBear from a thread on the subject some years ago:

Could the Allies have invaded? Sure.

Could the Allies have succeeded? Almost certainly not.

Among other problems is that the Luftwaffe was still open for business and the Allies would have had, at best, air parity.

The American Army was still learning its trade and was, frankly, in no shape to take on the Heer in France (look at the problems it encountered in North Africa IOTL, and that was against a fraction of what the Heer could havethrown at them in France).

Allied fighter designs did not yet have the range to provide any sort of reasonable cover, and CAS tactics were not even partly vetted.

The number and types of amphibious landing craft and ships were insufficient to put a sufficiently large force over the beach, and more critally, keep them supplied.

Allies land in France in 1943 and they get their asses kicked.
 

TFSmith121

Banned
The Allies had air superiority over Sicily and Italy,

I don't think it can be assumed that the Allies would have air superiority for a 1943 landing in France. IIRC the Luftwaffe was still a formidable force at that point. This is an assessment I found by CalBear from a thread on the subject some years ago:


The Allies had air superiority over Sicily and Italy in 1943, operating in theaters that were much more austere and much more distant from the centers of the Allied aviation and POL industries than southern England and the Channel; the only place the Axis managed air superiority against the Allies in 1943 was the Aegean, for obvious reasons.

Best,
 
The Allies had air superiority over Sicily and Italy in 1943, operating in theaters that were much more austere and much more distant from the centers of the Allied aviation and POL industries than southern England and the Channel; the only place the Axis managed air superiority against the Allies in 1943 was the Aegean, for obvious reasons.

Best,

The overwhelming bulk of the Luftwaffe wasn't in the Mediterranean, which was a secondary theater. The Germans don't necessarily have to get air superiority themselves in order to defeat the invasion if we're willing to give them a decent amount of luck for the reasons CalBear laid out. In any case, can you think of a better way of fulfilling the OP?
 

TFSmith121

Banned
The overwhelming bulk of the Allied

The overwhelming bulk of the Luftwaffe wasn't in the Mediterranean, which was a secondary theater. The Germans don't necessarily have to get air superiority themselves in order to defeat the invasion if we're willing to give them a decent amount of luck for the reasons CalBear laid out. In any case, can you think of a better way of fulfilling the OP?

The overwhelming bulk of the Allied air forces weren't in the Med either.

As far as fulfilling the OP, there are some OPs that require vast levels of ahistorical and frankly stupid decision-making by those (historically) in charge of a given operation to achieve.

Putting 100,000 US troops into the sack in the ETO at anytime between November, 1942 and December, 1944, would require stupidity of astronomical proportions on the part of various Americans - from FDR on down - who, based on their historical performance, were not stupid.

Best,
 
The overwhelming bulk of the Allied air forces weren't in the Med either.

As far as fulfilling the OP, there are some OPs that require vast levels of ahistorical and frankly stupid decision-making by those (historically) in charge of a given operation to achieve.

Putting 100,000 US troops into the sack in the ETO at anytime between November, 1942 and December, 1944, would require stupidity of astronomical proportions on the part of various Americans - from FDR on down - who, based on their historical performance, were not stupid.

Best,

And from what I remember of the OTL outcome of the bulk of the Allied air force vs the bulk of the Luftwaffe in 1943, I don't see why it's such a given that the former would be able to achieve air superiority when the latter was still, as CalBear put it, "open for business." Besides, if a landing in France in 1943 would have been a guaranteed success, why didn't the Wallies do it?
 
One of the beaches at Salerno, not both.

And even then, the VI Corps held - the link below is more journalistic than academic, but it sums it up - steady infantry and artillery on the defensive, supported by air and sea power the Germans could never match, could not "collapsed.'

http://www.historynet.com/avalanche-how-both-sides-lost-at-salerno.htm

Best,

the closest we have in OTL to meeting the requirements. Generally speaking the Western Allies were pretty cautious nearly all of the time and made it a point to watch their flanks. Tie that in with incredible mobility with all those trucks, and encircling an entire Allied Field Army was just never in the cards.

Not even for the Ardennes Little Solution. Eisenhower starting moving divisions by December 18, and all of those desperate stands by the 1st Army were enough to buy time for all those troops to get there.
 
The overwhelming bulk of the Allied air forces weren't in the Med either.

As far as fulfilling the OP, there are some OPs that require vast levels of ahistorical and frankly stupid decision-making by those (historically) in charge of a given operation to achieve.

Putting 100,000 US troops into the sack in the ETO at anytime between November, 1942 and December, 1944, would require stupidity of astronomical proportions on the part of various Americans - from FDR on down - who, based on their historical performance, were not stupid.

Best,


Dude this is Alternate History. There are lots POD here about some genius guys suddenly make some stupid mistakes. I admit its implausible, But implausibilities happened a lot in real life...
 
A predicted/discovered Normandy invasion (by means of espionage and foiling Allied disinformation plots) could lead to this, if the Germans let the Allies land into a trap.
 
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