AHC: The U.S. Joins the Central Powers

With whatever PoDs you wish (within reason), find a way for the United States to fight alongside the German Empire, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and the Ottomans.
 
My favorite POD for the admittedly very unlikely prospect of the US going to war with the Entente (and even that is not quite the same thing as "joining the Central Powers" as I note below) is the Ship Purchase Bill.

Four accounts of the struggle over Woodrow Wilson's (actually William McAdoo's) Ship Purchase Bill in 1915, raising the question of whether the bill could have led to a US clash with the UK and France:

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(1) "In his annual message, Wilson set off an even more bitter political fight with his legislation that the United States purchase German ships that had been caught in American harbors at the beginning of the war and could not return home without being intercepted by the British navy. The money would be paid to the German government and the ship would be added to the merchant marine. The initiative outraged Republican senators and an intense battle ensued in the upper house in the winter of 1915. More than any other single event of Wilson's first term, the ship purchase controversy foreshadowed the ideological struggle the 1916 election would become.

"There was much in the bill to provoke Republican opposition. The money would go to Germany, an unneutral act. The scheme could bring on a confrontation with Britain and France if those countries treated the purchased ships as belligerent vessels. [my emphasis--DT] The greatest ideological objection was to the very character of what Wilson and McAdoo sought to do. 'It means a departure on the lines of government more important and more fateful in its results than any act passed by this Congress since I became a member,' said Elihu Root." A British observer found Republican opposition fascinating. 'Isn't it astonishing that the two great po-litical parties in America exchange positions? Root who is a great leader of the party of protection and paternalism is now the leader of the opposition to state socialism, while Wilson, the successor of Jefferson and Cleveland, both as President and leader of the party of individualism, has become the champion of a state owned merchant marine.'...

Lewis L. Gould, The First Modern Clash Over Federal Power: Wilson Versus Hughes in the Presidential Election of 1916, p. 32.

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(2) "The administration's most important effort to meet the economic needs created by the war situation was its vigorous, almost frantic campaign to obtain passage of a bill to provide $30 million for the purchase of a governmentally owned and operated shipping line. The author of the ship purchase bill introduced in August, 1914, was McAdoo, who brought the President to his side and led the fight for its adoption. As the bill provided for the purchase, not for the construction, of ships, the question of what ships would be purchased immediately arose. Obviously, the only vessels available in quantity were the German ships, totaling half a million tons, lying in American harbors. Wilson was reluctant to take the step, but McAdoo convinced him there was no other way to get the ships quickly. Moreover, as McAdoo pointed out, the government 'would not ... be confined to the purchase of German ships only.'

"Wilson's insistence on pushing the measure provoked a bitter fight in Congress. The Republicans, led by Henry Cabot Lodge and Elihu Root, opposed the bill because it would project the government into the business field. They opposed it, also, because they suspected the administration planned to buy the German ships and operate them in the Atlantic trade; and this, they asserted, would inevitably involve the United States in a serious and entirely needless dispute with the British government. Administration spokesmen were not frank with Congress and refused to affirm or deny the charge that they contemplated purchasing the German ships. Like most other leaders, Bryan saw the issue clearly and begged the President to come out frankly and tell the American people and the Allies that he had no intention of buying the disputed vessels. But Wilson would not surrender. On the contrary, he grew sullen and bitter and privately charged Lodge and Root with lack of conscience and with using 'insincere and contemptible methods of fighting.' After the defeat of the bill in early March, 1915, moreover, he wrote a long and bitter indictment of the Republican senators and the seven Democrats who had joined them in defeating the measure. Someone must have persuaded him to withhold the statement, for it was never published....

"Lodge's and Root's fear was well grounded, as was evidenced by the bitter protest of the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, against the ship purchase bill (Grey to Spring Rice, Jan. 22, 1915, House Papers). It is certain the British would not have acknowledged the legality of the American government's purchase of the German vessels. Moreover, the British would probably have seized the ships if the government shipping corporation had tried to use them in the Atlantic trade. This action, in turn, would have compelled the United States either to abandon its shipping venture or else to resort to strong diplomacy or force to maintain its illegal position..."

Arthur S. Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 1910-1917, pp. 152-3 https://archive.org/stream/woodrowwilsonand007665mbp#page/n195

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(3) Bryan had urged Wilson to allay the fears of Root and Lodge by giving assurances that the proposed government shipping company would not buy belligerent ships. But "The President, alas, could not give any such assurances. To begin with, he and McAdoo did intend to purchase German vessels (and British and French ships too, if they could be found) as there simply seemed to be no other way to assemble a merchant fleet quickly. Precisely what Wilson proposed to do with the ships once he got them—that is, whether he intended to use them in the European trade or only in commerce with Latin America-is not at all clear. Wilson would not heed Bryan's suggestion, in the second place, because he believed that the United States had a right in international law to purchase belligerent ships, and it would be unneutral for him publicly to abandon the right." And, as Link notes, the third and most important reason Wilson would not yield on this point is that he was stubborn, saw the bill as a test of his leadership abilities, and would concede nothing to appease Lodge and Root, whom he saw as evil reactionaries. Arthur S. Link, Wilson, Volume III: The Struggle for Neutrality, 1914-1915, p. 150. https://books.google.com/books?id=dRfWCgAAQBAJ&pg=PA150

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(4) "'The ship purchase bill,' he [Lodge] told Roosevelt, '. . . is one of the most dangerous things internationally--I say nothing of its viciousness economically--which could be imagined. The plan is to buy the German ships. If this is done and the Allies refuse to recognize the transfer of the flag, which France and Russia certainly will do ... we shall find ourselves with Government-owned ships afloat which the Allies regard as German ships and therefore good prize and which are liable to be fired on and sunk. In the case of a private transaction this would not be very dangerous, but when it comes to dealing with Government-owned ships . . . they bring us within measurable distance of war.' He warned his friend that 'this incompetent Administration may flounder into war, just as they blundered and floundered into bloodshed at Vera Cruz..'..." Karl Schriftgiesser, The Gentleman from Massachusetts: Henry Cabot Lodge, p. 267. https://archive.org/stream/gentlemanfrommas001537mbp#page/n279

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Even if the Ship Purchase Bill had passed (and without the Lodge Amendment prohibiting the purchase of belligerent ships) I doubt that the US would have gone to war against the Entente, but it's the most plausible path to such a war I can see. (Of course even such a war wouldn't technically mean the US joining the Central Powers--the US could just be a "co-belligerent"...)
 
In 1911, Champ Clark said “I look forward to the time when the American flag will fly over every square foot of British North America up to the North Pole.”

If Clark gets elected instead of Wilson and tries to invade Canada, that’s going to automatically put America in the German sphere. Of course, the issue is going to be Congress and their likely opposition.
 
In 1911, Champ Clark said “I look forward to the time when the American flag will fly over every square foot of British North America up to the North Pole.”

If Clark gets elected instead of Wilson and tries to invade Canada, that’s going to automatically put America in the German sphere. Of course, the issue is going to be Congress and their likely opposition.

Clark was of course not advocating invasion; he was only arguing that the proposed US-Canada reciprocity treaty (which he supported) should and would eventually lead to complete integration of Canada with the United States. This statement was of course widely quoted in Canada and helped defeat Laurier and reciprocity.

There are, I suppose, two possible explanations of Clark's behavior: (1) He was stupid enough not to realize that he was dooming reciprocity to defeat in Canada, or (2) he was very smart, and wanted reciprocity to be defeated, so that Taft (whom he expected to run against in 1912) couldn't take credit for it...
 
Might be a longshot, but a masagaing of German command means that they win the Race to the Sea and set up naval bases as far south as Boulogne. These forward bases make blockade running a bit more possible than OTL, thus keeping a bit of high value trade going and allowing the Germans to raise a few loans.

American adventurer-seaman acquire blockade runners and with speed and deception are able to make furtive but extremely profitable trade voyages. The RN takes extreme measures to stop these blockade runners, pissing off America immensely, so for the same reasons the US went to war with Germany ITOL they declare war on Britain in 1917.
 
There are, I suppose, two possible explanations of Clark's behavior: (1) He was stupid enough not to realize that he was dooming reciprocity to defeat in Canada, or (2) he was very smart, and wanted reciprocity to be defeated, so that Taft (whom he expected to run against in 1912) couldn't take credit for it...

My guess would be the latter. Istr a newspaper article (possibly by Charles Willis Thompson) describing him as "a very intelligent man who has built a career on pretending to be a hayseed".
 
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