Well I can think of a couple of related scenarios which would involve at most a few PODs (some as a result of the initial POD). Both scenarios would revolve around a POD in 1969 with
Brezhnev being assassinated and Andropov getting a kidney transplant with the drug cyclosporin (which was new in the 1980s).
Scenario 1 would go as follows:
- Brezhnev (General Secretary) is assassinated on January 22, 1969 (main POD).
- Nikolai Podgorny (Chairman of the Presidium since 1965) is elected the new General Secretary after winning over Fyodor Kulakov and Andrei Kirilenko and assuring Mikhail Suslov that there would be no straying from the communist doctrine as advocated by Suslov and that there would be no attempt to combine the two positions with that of Chairman of the Council of Ministers (Suslov was against one-man rule and advocated collective leadership; he was instrumental in the separation of the 3 roles (Chairman of the Council of Ministers, General Secretary of the CPSU and Chairman of the Presidum ) and prevented Brezhnev in OTL from becoming Chairman of the Council of Ministers in 1970).
- From 1969 to 1980 Podogorny as both Chairman of the Presidium and General Secretary and Alexei Kosygin as Chairman of the Council of Ministers manage to work together enough (despite their frequent disputes and arguments) to give more impetus to the 1965 reform program (adjusting it after some minor reviews in 1969 before it ended in 1971) and launching the 1973 economic reform which in this TL is fully implemented and more closely follows Esvei Liberman's theories. By the time the 1973 reform program ends in 1977 things are better off in TTL's USSR than in OTL's USSR but the USSR is by no means a more fantastic place to live than the USA.
- In 1980 Nikolia Tikhonov replaces Kosygin (who dies) as Premier (Chariman of the Council of Ministers). He only works with Podgorny for about two years before the latter's retirement in 1982 as a result of cancer. There is some stagnation of the Soviet economy between 1980 and 1982 with Tikhonov in power as Premier.
- In 1982 the leadership is again split amongst 3 persons with Tikhonov as Premier, Yuri Andropov as General Secretary and Vasili Kuznetsov as acting Presidium Chairman. With Suslov dead (from January 1982), Andropov is able to take up the position of Presidium Chairman without much ideological opposition although Kuznetsov continues to act in his stead as Presidium Chairman whenever he is too ill.
- Sometime between 1982 and 1984 Andropov gets a kidney transplant while using the drug cyclosporin - let's use 1983 after cyclosporin's approval (second main POD). This DOES NOT give Andropov everlasting life of course, but could prolong his life by about 4 years (which is the average prolongation gained for 75 years old who have a kidney transplant).
- Andropov revives the 1979 reform (which stagnated between 1980 and 1982) as part of a general series of reforms in 1982. There is some stagnation again in late 1983 to mid 1984 as Andropov undergoes his kidney transplantation and recovers, but the reforms pick up again in 1984 and take off in 1985 with Tikhonov's replacement by Heydar Aliyev (OTL's long serving Azeribajani president whom Andropov had favoured to become Premier following Aliyev's success with the economy of Azerbaijan).
- With Aliyev as Premier and Andropov as General Secretary and Presidium Chairman a new reform effort is launched to coincide with the Twelfth Five-Year Plan (1986-1990). Andropov meanwhile is busy grooming younger successors including Mikhail Gorbachev and Grigory Romanov who are seen as the top two contenders in any race to replace Andropov when he finally retires or dies. Ultimately Andropov heads off any bruising contest by getting Romanov to permanently replace him as Presidium Chairman in 1986 (so as to allow him to focus more on his work as General Secretary) and then heavily comes down (publicly) in favour of Gorbachev to replace him as General Secretary when he retires from the post or dies.
- Andropov dies in 1988 and Gorbachev is elected to replace him as General Secretary. Although initially competitors, Gorbachev and Romanov manage to work together although they have differences of opinion about political reform. With the "team" of Aliyev, Romanov and Gorbachev the 1986 reform and Twelfth Five-Year plan manage to exceed expectations in 1990 (and also in late 1988/early 1989). Gorbachev wishes to move further with the reforms for the next Five-Year Plan but experiences opposition from hardliners in the CPSU who think reforms have gone too far. Gorbachev decides to circumvent them by introducing the concept of "internal democracy" within the CPSU system and Soviet legislative system alongside "glasnost" in late 1988. This results in the hardliners being swept in elections to Congress of People's Deputies in 1989 (just over 80% of the deputies are Gorbachev-endorsed). Romanov and Aliyev were not in favour of this move by Gorbachev, but did not oppose it as they had recognized that their reforms would need to be unhindered by the hardliners (Romanov and Aliyev would have preferred to basically crush the unreformist hardliners and get some of the other hardliners who were neutral on economic reform but against political reform to back the "team").
- By 1994 a lot of change has happened or is about to happen as Aliyev resigns in 1993 over differences between himself and Gorbachev (Aliyev is replaced by Nikolai Ryzhkov) and the glasnost and "internal democracy" reforms lead to more demands for wider democracy. The Congress of People's Deputies itself has divided into factions (even though all members are officially CPSU members) with a governing pro-Gorbachev faction and various opposition factions composed of hardliners, liberals and nationalists. The 1994 elections saw Aliyev giving support to a group of rival reformers. The results were a majority of pro-Gorabachev deputies (about 53%) with the next largest group being the pro-Aliyev (and pro-Romanov though Romanov keeps aloof from the controversy splitting the party) with about 33% of the deputies. The rest of the deputies are liberals, nationalists and true hardliners.
- Between 1993 and 1996 the CPSU monopoly on power was ended (first in a party conference and then at the 29th Congress of the CPSU in 1996) and the CPSU itself split as a result of Gorbachev's attempt at the end of the Congress to restore the original name of the Social Democratic and Labour Party (though not the full original name which had the word "Russian" in it, but based off that name with the proposed name of "The Social Democratic and Labour Party of the Soviet Union" or SDLP(SU) for short). The Aliyev-faction opposed this and attempted to initiate the expulsion of the Gorbachev-faction (which failed) and then declared itself to be the continuation of the CPSU after the slightly larger Gorbachev faction managed to vote through the name change. The absolute hardliners who were opposed to both factions split off as the Workers' Party of the Soviet Union. Protests in the Baltic States in favour of independence and the changing nature of the Soviet system led to the SDLP government proposing a new Constitution to be accompanied by a two-part referendum which would ask first for the Union's citizens in the various republics to determine if they wanted continued unity and then secondly if they accepted the new constitution. The initiative managed to pass with a strange alliance of nationalists (who were hoping for independence), SDLP deputies and liberals (who wanted to ride the wave of popularity for a new, openly democratic constitution).
- A 1996 Union-wide referendum on the continuation of the Union as a democratic country, with guaranteed autonomy for the republics and social welfare for all was passed in all republics save the Baltics by majorities (in most cases by large majorities about 75-90%). The Baltics alone voted for independence, while in Moldavia and Georgia the majorities were smaller (about 50-60%). Union-wide it was passed by a majority of over 75% and the new constitution was also passed by a similar majority. In 1996 the Baltic States received independence and the new Union Treaty and Constitution was signed by the leaders of the remaining republics, delegates of the constitutional convention which drafted both the new treaty and the constitution and various deputies of the Congress of People's Deputies. As a result of the new Constitution, the post of Presidium Chairman was converted into the post of President of the Soviet Union and the post of Chairman of the Council of Ministers was officially re-titled as "Premier" (with the continued description and title of "chairman of the cabinet of ministers"). Ryzhkov had no need to seek a renewed mandate as Premier under the new Constitution as he was already a member of the current Congress of People's Deputies (which was set to continue until 1999 when new elections were due) but the post of President required new elections starting immediately (this was because as a result of the democratization, Gorbachev was now without any official power in the new Soviet Union as he was general secretary of the SDLP but the the SDLP had no official role in the governance of the Soviet Union and he hoped to get Romanov's job so provisions were written into the constitution for a popularly elected president with elections occurring within 6 months of the adoption of the constitution). Romanov was now openly with the (new) CPSU and so the first Presidential elections of the Soviet Union saw Mikhail Gorbachev (SDLP) facing off against Grigory Romanov (CPSU) and Gennady Zyuganov (Worker's Party or WPSU) and Vladimir Zhirinovsky (Liberal Democratic Party)..........
Scenario 2 would be very similar. The only internal difference being:
- In 1969 Fyodor Kulakov replaces Brezhnev as General Secretary after receiving the back of the other persons who were both in the Secretariat and the Politburo (Andrei Kirilenko and Mikhail Suslov) and the support of Podgorny.
- Kulakov dies in 1978 and is replaced by Podgorny who is General Secretary and Chairman of the Presidium from 1978 to 1982
Other differences which may result from scenario 2 would be no halting the reversal of Dubček's reforms and his removal as secretary in April 1969 in Czechoslovakia. I suspect Podgorny would be more sympathetic to Dubček and attempted a kind of partial rehabilitation officially (although Dubček probably needed no rehabilitation unofficially). So in scenario 1 the 1969 Czechoslovak Hockey Riots probably don't occur as Dubček isn't removed and the reversal of his reforms is halted (and in some cases some of his reforms which may have coincided with Kosygin and Podgorny's ideas would be re-implemented). Certainly not all Soviet leaders were in favour of the invasion in the first place - Suslov, Kosygin, Podgorny and Voronov (or Mazurov - sources differ) were the 4 who voted to oppose the invasion in the Politburo (7 voted in favour) and they alongside Andropov and Ponomarev were apparently opposed to it out of fear of what it would do to Soviet relations with the wider world and eastern Europe, and Mikhail Ilyich Kazakov (Warsaw Pact chief of staff before the invasion) and some other military brass were opposed to in on the grounds that it would have negative repercussions on the Czechoslovak army which they viewed as key within the Warsaw Pact. Once it had happened, a different leader other than Brezhnev may have been more inclined to try to repair the damage whilst still saving face.
As for other events and places in both scenarios:
Afghanistan
Afghanistan could:
(a) not have Soviet intervention. Kosygin was opposed to it if I remember some of what I've read (and I think Kirilenko and Gromyko was too), as were other Soviet leaders but the USSR was slowly drawn into intervening. Without Brezhnev the intervention might never have gained enough approval to go ahead and the Soviet leaders might have more or less abandoned the Afghans as "heretics". Andropov and Ustinov were in favour but this was due to fear that the the new Afghan leader (Amin) would end up switching support to the Americans and providing them with facilities to spy on the USSR and also denying the Soviets the existing facilities then in use. Without Brezhnev to be persuaded, an invasion might have been delayed for a few years (until 1982 when Andropov comes to power), but by then the potential problem that Andropov and Ustinov had feared may have been resolved in some other way (possibly with Soviet special forces and super-reliable Afghan allies killing Amin in a covert operation that would look like an accident such as a helicopter or airplane crash or perhaps his motorcade is blown up and the blame placed on the rebels). If this happened, Andropov might not see the need for an invasion at all by the time he comes to power in 1982.
(b) still have had Soviet intervention, but Charlie Wilson's drunk driving accident (prior to his trip to Pakistan and deeper involvement in the Afghanistan issue) is worse and he either (i) dies or (ii) ends up injured and gets arrested. The US still supplies the Afghan rebels, but not at the same kind of level as in OTL and the Soviets still lose men, but don't find Afghan resistance as troublesome (perhaps Pillsbury's efforts to get Stingers to the rebels doesn't happen in the face of more bureaucratic resistance as a result of Wilson not being there to promote the Afghan effort). Eventually they (the Soviets) withdraw after building up the forces of their local allies and implementing Soviet style reforms which manage to win over some (but by no means all or even the majority) of the locals - their local allies then have enough local support and weaponry to continue more or less "governing" Afghanistan in the face of widespread resistance.
Chernobyl
Chernobyl may or may not happen.
Czechoslovakia
Czechoslovakia probably would not split in either scenario. Without the late 1980s/early 1990s rapid rise in nationalism and rapid collapse of communism coupled with Soviet reforms emanating out to the Warsaw Pact/Comecon allies, Czechoslovakia is likely to remain united, probably with a similar unity referendum as happened in the USSR (which itself may be renamed as the "Union of Soviet Democratic Republics" or "Union of Sovereign Soviet Republics").
Yugoslavia
Yugoslavia may or may not break up, but without the nationalist forces sweeping Eastern Europe in the late 1980s and the collapse of communism at the same time it is possible that Yugoslavia avoids a complete breakup and may in fact remain completely united. Certainly without the distractions at home I would expect the Soviet leadership to get involved in trying to broker resolution to the various crises in Yugoslavia which could result in success and either the removal of Milosevic and other nationalists or in those persons not being as inflammatory. Perhaps the Soviets attempt to encourage the Yugoslavs to ditch the 1974 constitution and work out compromises (such as one man, one vote in the party system for Yugoslavia at the federal level in return for more autonomy for the republics and for the provinces to retain most of their autonomy but to no longer have a veto over Serbia level legislation except insofar as it applies within the bounds of the province and the formation of new autonomous provinces in the other republics for minorities there) for a new constitution. With Andropov still around until 1988 it is also possible that the West may have given Yugoslavia a bit more slack economically (so no pressure on Yugoslavia economically and perhaps more loans to help keep it afloat and able to repay the IMF). The reformed USSR might also have extended further loans (to relieve pressure on Yugoslavia from the IMF and give it breathing room in hopes that Yugoslavia would be persuaded to fully commit to the Soviet bloc) and a better economy with less debt-pressure (though not necessarily less debt) might have made the richer republics of Slovenia and Croatia less resentful of the poorer republics as their economies might continue to grow. That kind of climate might have made compromise easier.
EDIT: Although the USSR cannot go "the China route" because it doesn't have as large a population, I think the USSR could become "Europe's China" because relative to Europe it has a large population which would probably work for wages lower than can be found in Western Europe. If the USSR reforms itself successfully in the 1970s then it would have the advantage of a large, well-educated population that would work for lower wages than in the West and it would be able to use this advantage over China until China begins to really open up to the West in the 1990s (thereafter China's manpower advantage would trump the USSR's education advantage in getting more of the world's business). Even after that though I would expect the USSR to be a "China" to Europe as long as it can compete with China in terms of relative wages, quality of goods, etc.
