I notice that document has Davis talk of peace "between the two countries." That doesn't sound like a prelude to returning to the Union, does it?
Jefferson Davis and the Hampton Roads Peace Conference: "To secure Peace to the two countries" by Charles W. Sanders Jr.,
The Journal of Southern History, Nov., 1997, Vol. 63, No. 4 (Nov., 1997), pp. 803-826
Blair returned to Washington as agreed and on January 18 reported the results of his Richmond visit to Lincoln. Although the president was very interested in the Marylander's perceptions of the state of morale in the Confederate capital, he showed no interest in continuing the talks based on the Mexican project. Still, Lincoln did not wish to forgo any opportunity to subvert the authority of the Confederate government, and he prepared a letter, dated January 18, which he authorized Blair to deliver to "Mr." Davis:44 "Sir: You having shown me Mr. Davis's note of the 12th instant, you may say to him that I have constantly been, am now and shall continue ready to receive any agent whom he, or any other influential person now resisting the National authority, may informally send to me, with the view of securing peace to the people of our one common country."45
On January 20 Blair boarded the Union warship Don for another trip to Richmond, and on January 21 he and Davis met again. Blair presented Davis with Lincoln's note of January 18, which the Confederate president carefully read twice in Blair's presence.46 Blair then weakly attempted to explain away Lincoln's refusal to support the Mexico proposal. As Davis later recalled, Blair described the "embarrassment" of Lincoln "on account of the extreme men in Congress" and reported that any future "arrangement" would have to be effected "without the intervention of the politicians."47 This led Blair to his second proposal, a plan that would, in fact, take the politicians out of the process. As Davis later recalled, Blair suggested that the two presidents authorize Generals Lee and Grant to "enter into an arrangement by which hostilities would be suspended, and a way paved for the restoration of peace."
As he had with Blair's first proposal, Davis quickly agreed to this second plan, responding that he "would willingly intrust to General Lee such negotiation as was indicated."48 Davis's response was certainly not what one would expect of a man whose sole objective was to discredit the Confederate peace movement. He had agreed in good faith to negotiations based on the Mexican proposal, only to be informed that the offer had been withdrawn by the side that had tendered it. When offered a second proposal, he again readily agreed to participate and expressed his willingness to grant Lee full negotiating powers. In so doing, Davis was placing the future of the negotiations in the hands of the most revered man in the South. As Lee was certainly no "croaker," there is nothing in this decision that could be construed as an attempt to discredit the peace movement or embarrass its leaders. If Blair's proposal had led to a cease-fire, the aims of the movement would have been vindicated. If it had failed, any "blame" for having pursued this line of negotiation would have fallen to Davis alone. Far from seeking to sabotage attempts at achieving a negotiated peace, Davis had now assumed the leading role in those efforts.
Davis's actions are all the more remarkable when one considers that had he wished to discredit the peace movement, he could very easily have done so at this point. To Davis, as to the vast majority of southerners, the one issue that was not negotiable was Confederate independence.49 Based on his initial conversations with Blair, he had agreed to enter into peace negotiations with but one precondition-that they have as their goal the securing of peace "to the two countries." Lincoln's answer as stated in the January 18 letter spoke of peace for "our one common country," clearly indicating that he considered the Confederate precondition unacceptable. Davis could have made the contents of Lincoln's note public, using it as clear evidence that the objective of the Union president was nothing less than the total subjugation of the South. Such a course of action would have severely weakened the arguments of those who favored negotiations while portraying Davis as a statesman whose sincere efforts for peace had been once again thwarted by Yankee duplicity. Davis could have publicized Lincoln's note with little effort and almost no political risk. Instead, he decided once again to continue the negotiations.
What happened next is a bit of a mystery. What is known is that Blair returned to Washington and informed Lincoln of Davis's willingness to authorize Lee to enter into negotiations and that Lincoln refused to provide Grant any such authority. What is not known is when or precisely why Lincoln refused to allow negotiations between the generals and how Blair informed Davis of Lincoln's decision.50 In his memoirs, Davis recorded only that Blair "subsequently informed me that the idea of a military convention was not favorably received at Washington, so it only remained for me now to act upon the letter of Mr. Lincoln."51 Once more Davis had been presented with a sterling opportunity to terminate the negotiations on grounds that although he, in good faith, had done all that was asked, Lincoln had again reneged on the conditions offered by his emissary. For a third time, however, Davis chose to continue to negotiate.
But, how best to "act" on Lincoln's letter? In making this decision, Jefferson Davis did something he had done only rarely: he sent for the vice president. On the day after Blair departed from Richmond, Davis, following the advice of Robert M. T. Hunter, president pro tem of the Confederate Senate and an active peace advocate, asked "little Aleck" to meet with him to determine future strategy. The president told Stephens of his meetings with Blair, showed him the two letters he and Lincoln had exchanged, and explained in detail Blair's Monroe Doctrine scheme, an idea that Davis continued to believe might serve as the basis of future talks. Davis then asked his vice president's opinion on two very important questions: should a conference with the Lincoln government be support- ed, and, if so, who should be sent as the Confederate negotiators?5
If Davis was unmovable on the matter of independence, his continuation of the peace talks repeatedly and the fact he sought out Stephens-a well known Peace advocate-for the Hampton Roads Conference does not make much sense. Rather, the sum total of the evidence suggests firmly he was open to peace, as Lincoln said, as one country but via the Mexican proposal.
