AHC: the best possible Luftwaffe for 1940

JAG88

Banned
From the Ju90? I said a a new wing was needed, not that the Ju90's was optimized for a strategic bomber, though the bomber variant of the Ju290 was apparently viable.

Same wing 90/290, the latter simply extended the outer panel...


Much depends on the layout of the design. But remember most of the potential bomb capacity of the Ju88 was external. It's max internal capacity was less than that of the Ju89 and that also reduced the range to something like 600 miles. Using the bomb bays as fuel tank holders and loading up the external bomb racks with max potential payload extended range, but only by consuming a bunch more fuel due to the much increased drag.

I was thinking of the He 111 for some reason.

Still, 1400Kg vs supposedly 1600Kg... can you smell it?

When I get home I can double check on the ramp. Not sure exactly you're referring to with the 'not drag, not speed'part.

That the items you mentioned, kitchen, etc, are all internal and do not add drag nor do they affect range nor speed.

I'll check my books on the bomber, but IIRC there was a version that could.

A project? Maybe. Service aircraft, no.

Are you talking production models? Because of course, they weren't even in production. I can check my book on the bomber when I get home to get the chart about their planned range.

I am talking about the prototypes they built and tested.

In Russia not an issue due to air defense being a point defense system rather than a nationally integrated system like in Germany or Britain. Even then air defenses were mostly concentrated in Moscow and Leningrad, with the rest being pretty inadequate for most of the war. Over Britain that wouldn't be needed, but of course the 5000k range was for the Ural Bomber and potentially VLR recon.

Try that a couple times, people wise up real fast in war, even with simple land observers the bombers would get tracked and crushed, and we are talking about 20+ hour missions...


Comparing a bomber without armor, bombs, and defensive weapons to production bombers that did really doesn't tell you much.

The Ju90 had a draggier fuselage and engines, the Ju89 still had turrets to add, plus clean the fuselage and add stronger and more aerodynamic engines... I doubt the difference would be too much.

As to the bomb load, again so much depends on the internal structure and ability to redesign it, it very well might not have been possible to put 500kg bombs inside. There must have been a reason the pro-strategic bomber Walter Wever cancelled the Ural Bomber project and started fresh with the Bomber A design shortly before his death.

Doubt it, even if you had to put them vertically with an ESAC type rack, it is an aircraft, not a honeycomb, and the fact that the contemporary Ju 88 used the ladder typical of the time is a good enough hint for me.

A lot depends on how effectively one bomber with bigger bombs would be vs. larger numbers of smaller bombers, especially when it comes to things like fuel consumption, complexity of construction, replacement cost if damaged or destroyed, etc. That said I do agree that something like a B17 in 1940, assuming it were technologically possible to have hundreds ready in time, would be superior IMHO to the OTL options, which included the Do17.

If you can fit large bombs you can fit smaller ones as needed, even if you lose some tonnage.

If Kesselring was right and it is a 2x3 affair I am sold, 2xJu89s=8t bombs, 12 crew, 3xHe111s=6t, 15 crew, add training an extra pilot, navigator/bombardier. More fuel? Maybe, but the real calculation is ton fuel/ton bombs...

The Perfect is the enemy of the Good Enough. The problem is it isn't clear than the Ju89, even developed, would have been Good Enough to justify the cost. Plus it wasn't really a 'bird on hand' yet due to the unpredictability of the how redesigns would work out.

That is it, beyond cleaning it up a bit, new rudders, new engines, revamped cockpit... I do not see the problem if it can already lift 10t, excellent for a mid-30s bomber.

You're forgetting all the redesign work that would have to be done, new prototypes needing to be built, construction of the new production facilities, not simply the lines being changed over due to how much larger the facilities would need to be to make them compared to twin engine bombers, and so on.
1940 is the earliest date it would be reason to enter production, but then you also need to train a bunch of crews from scratch on a bomber of that size and complexity. James Corum's "Creating the Operational Air War' has a good section on the issues that existed around building up a strategic bomber force, even tackling the 'why' of the death of the Ural Bombers project. E.R. Hooton's "Phoenix Triumphant" also covers it from a bit of a different angle.

First flight 1936, there are 2 full years to test it and set up production of an aircraft that was cancelled without mentioning a single defect or performance issue, not even to make up a pretext, sounds like enough time to me

Since we were talking about having the bomb bay inside and you said it did, citing the gondola....

We disagree as what inside means, lets leave it at that...

I'm not saying that, I'm saying that leaving all else the same would mean compromised performance compared to redesigning the aircraft around the much more powerful engines.

For me having no heavy bomber ASAP means compromised security, given the geopolitical context of the mid-1930s.

Perfect<Good.

Same exact wings on the Ju290 as the 90? I highly doubt that given the engine power upgrade.

They just enlarged the outer panels.

Well when you're talking about redesigns that didn't happen IRL...

You are the one arguing for their need, not me.

Hitler defense? He literally was in charge of the War Ministry and set national policy; since war wasn't being pursued by anyone but Hitler and as of 1936 there was no war on the horizon unless Hitler started it it was a reasonable assumption. Hitler's erratic foreign policy only came about later after the decision had been made. Since Wever died in 1936 there is no post-war rationalization there like with other generals.

Hitler denounced Versailles, remilitarized the Ruhr, reinstated conscription, created the LW, absorbed Austria, took the Sudetes, conquered the Czechs... and in the last of his "dont worry, they wont declare war" over Poland, well, they did. Stupidly, but they did.

The point is, war could have come over any of those before, you cant be certain of what the other is going to do, you cant guarantee "no war before XXXX", someone might simply come and declare it on you now rather than when it suits you...

And Hitler has been used as an easy pretext, he wasnt that thick, but since he was evil AND dead, it is an easy excuse...

Since the 'risiko Luftwaffe' strategy had already been laid out and worked out and the Ural Bomber project was for offensive war against the USSR, there really wasn't a risk of being caught flat footed on the horizon in 1936, especially when twin engine bombers were already available for a regional defensive or offensive war against likely enemies of the time. A huge amount of things changed from 1936-40 to even get into the situation in 1941 where a Ural Bomber would even have been needed and had Udet not screwed it up the He177 would have been in production by then IOTL. Plus it wasn't until late 1941 that they'd have the necessary based in the USSR from which to even reach the Urals...

The Ural bomber was supposed to make it from East Prussia.

Hindsight, you can never be certain the UK isnt going to turn on you... oh wait, they did... and the LW and KM were in no way ready to deal with them...

What is the point of a Ju89 with heavy defensive firepower and armor, not to mention the range, if you're going at night and can cut all of that to increase payload with a lighter bomber, like the British twin engine strategic bombers of 1939-41? Something like the Wellington bomber would have been ideal in that case, or even a stripped down He111.

Because the night thing was an accident, it wasnt really practicable until the beams were perfected and you cant rely on that, once you could, you can get rid of all the now unnecessary stuff.

Most things; it was capable of tactical, operational, and strategic level bombing provided the ranges are short enough and they were in 1939-40. Corum's book I mentioned earlier really covers the why's of all of this.

Too slow for tactical, too weakly armed and ranged for strategic, falls between 2 stools IMHO.

I honestly don't know why the Ju90 wasn't adopted as a military transport, especially since they were already flying a militarized transport prototype in December 1939 and could have adapted it to the Ju352 standard of three engines, one in the nose, well before the 252 prototype even flew.

Ju 352 used Jumos, just use 5 of the crappiest engines available for the Ju 89, it will even help to offset the ramp weight.
 
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JAG88

Banned
No, I just went off what info I could find about the author online, which every bookseller I could find had Guy Richards listed as having died in 1979 and being the author of that book.

And pray do tell, why did you go in that wild goose chase instead of waiting to get the book and make up your own mind instead of resorting to wild speculation?

Non-steerable is an irrelevant category for WW2 paratrooper parachutes, the big different was rigs allowing for vertical or horizontal landing, the former allowing for rifles to be carried in the jump.

Paratroopers beg to differ, they kinda like avoiding trees, power cables, razor wire fences and rocks...

Horizontal landing? What?

Camo canopy and semi-quick release (the RZ-20 did not have it all centralized, you had to QR four separate parts) are improvement on the basic design, but didn't address the main problem identified on Crete, that is the lack of ability to carry more than a MP40 during the drop.

Two movements with both hands and you are free, that is quick.

They could have easily shortened both the K98K and MG34 and jumped with them, they didnt bother, paid the price.

Literally your entire point is talking about different stuff than I was addressing in my original point.

You said Crete caused the LW to modify the parachutes, it didnt.

Sure, but they were hardly the only ones to make that mistake with Cold War battle rifle designs.

I dont know, it seems they did and forced the rest of NATO to follow.

Well, that is a partial solution and they wanted more than just adapting existing weapons, they wanted a full replacement of the different weapons with one unified system requiring one type of ammo to maximally simplify logistics and production, as well as have weapon weapon that could be jumped with. There is also the small issue of split weapons needing to be reassembled in combat situations, the potential for the parts to be lost, and of course the splits allowing for the weapons to potentially fall apart after heavy use, wear, or improper construction.

K98K and MG34 used the same ammo.

A side-folding aluminum-tube stock would need no assembly, and the one that split had no small pieces to be lost, if a gun wears out, congrats, here, have another one.

As they found out the MP40 did not have the range they needed on Crete and guys could already jump with them. They wanted the best of all worlds in one, which was achievable (see the Cetme designs of the 1950s or the small caliber designs later), but some technology and doctrine had not caught up, while having a different caliber added in production and logistics issues. They did the best with what they had given constraints and got the FG42, which was actually pretty good for what it was, but not ideal.

Yeah, it was almost impossible, see FAL, CETME, G3, M14, it was absurd to try to get that, much more mid war. That Stange managed to do it... in 3 years, mind you, doesnt make it any less absurd.

Now if they had done what you are talking about pre-Crete they'd have been better off than they were IOTL, but they'd have to identify a need pre-Crete, which apparently they did not despite the experiences in the Netherlands and Norway.

The soldiers did, the more experienced ones carried MP40s, quite a fe in the Netherlands already, up to 25% of them at Crete, it is astonishing the leadership didnt see the need or worse, didnt listen to the troops.

No worse than the FG42, but less heavy, lower recoiling, etc.
It is one of mine too, though the thread I did on it didn't seem to generate all that much interest.

I will look it up. The Geco was pretty much the AK bullet.

No need really, the Italians did a successful naval landing on the eastern part of the island with tanks from their garrison in Rhodes and could have done it sooner had they been asked; they offered and were turned down until it was clear the FJs were in trouble and they needed any help they could get.
Under the section Italian landing at Sitia:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Crete#Battle

They didnt want to do it at the start of the Greek campaign, just like with Malta, they didnt want to provide naval cover to Merkur when asked... they had already proved to be useless, why even ask?

They needed somewhat better intel and better concentration of forces (which were identified in the after action study of what went wrong by the Germans, described in the biography of Rudolf Witzig) where they could have been better supported by air support. That and not focusing on the main airfield where the Brits were bound to have concentrated the bulk of their forces.

Or common sense? The airport thing was already overdone at the Netherlands, I would have landed anywhere BUT there.

You didnt need ULTRA to know to secure the airports...
 
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Deleted member 1487

Same wing 90/290, the latter simply extended the outer panel...
The latter was a transport, so different needs than a combat bomber.

I was thinking of the He 111 for some reason.

Still, 1400Kg vs supposedly 1600Kg... can you smell it?
Not sure what you mean.

That the items you mentioned, kitchen, etc, are all internal and do not add drag nor do they affect range nor speed.
They add weight, especially when loaded, and change the internal balance.

A project? Maybe. Service aircraft, no.
Looks like it was the higher powered He277, not the He177; that apparently tops out at 4650km range with the A-5 service model.

I am talking about the prototypes they built and tested.
The model with the Jumo 223 engine was supposed to be able to reach up to 5000km with 500kg bombs.

Try that a couple times, people wise up real fast in war, even with simple land observers the bombers would get tracked and crushed, and we are talking about 20+ hour missions...
I'd suggest looking at the record of the historical bombing in the East. Outside of Moscow and Leningrad ground fire wasn't much of an issue and until L-L really kicked in the Soviets lacked radar sufficient for even point defense that was quality enough to allow for accurate interception. The PVO was fine for point defense, but they lacked a national radar grid, simply impossible given the lack of radar and was only created after WW2, while there was no observer corps at the national level for the USSR that could track bombers across 1000km, let alone more. Again it was mostly point defense in WW2. The Luftwaffe was even able to use the decidedly obsolete He111 during daylight even in 1944, while the He177 when bombing at altitude (20,000 feet), were able to operate in daylight hours in 1944 without interception, as the Soviet army air force lacked fighters capable of intercepting at that altitude. The PVO had them after 1943, but again they were basically concentrated in Moscow and later Leningrad. So if the Luftwaffe strategic bombers operated against deep targets at altitude they'd be able to skirt most of the Soviet air defenses and tracking systems as well as fighters capable of intercepting them until 1944 when sufficient high altitude foreign fighters and radar become available in quantity.

If they went at night against closer targets they'd be even better off, as the Soviets lacked effective night radar; historically they were able to bomb Gorky, East of Moscow, at night for weeks and only lost about 6 bombers:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bombing_of_Gorky_in_World_War_II#June_1943

The Ju90 had a draggier fuselage and engines, the Ju89 still had turrets to add, plus clean the fuselage and add stronger and more aerodynamic engines... I doubt the difference would be too much.
Right, the Ju89 was going to be much worse when all the combat add ons happen, like turrets, armor, full fuel load, etc. which will cut performance.

Doubt it, even if you had to put them vertically with an ESAC type rack, it is an aircraft, not a honeycomb, and the fact that the contemporary Ju 88 used the ladder typical of the time is a good enough hint for me.
Aircraft had internal structural support beams; one of the issues with the He177 was it had a load bearing beam bisecting the bomb bay, which limited what types of bombs could be carried and how many too. The Ju88 could only fit 50kg bombs internally.

If you can fit large bombs you can fit smaller ones as needed, even if you lose some tonnage.
Ok, sure?

If Kesselring was right and it is a 2x3 affair I am sold, 2xJu89s=8t bombs, 12 crew, 3xHe111s=6t, 15 crew, add training an extra pilot, navigator/bombardier. More fuel? Maybe, but the real calculation is ton fuel/ton bombs...
Ju89s were to have many more men that that to man the defensive guns; they weren't going to top out at two cannons and two MGs for an aircraft of that size, the HE111 had several more defensive MGs than that, up to 7, plus a 20mm cannon and 13mm HMG. The Ju290 had up to 8 defensive weapons, the FW200 had at least 6.
So that means more weight, drag, crew, etc. Plus there is no guarantee that the Ju89 would carry 4 tons of bombs each. The B24's heaviest load for short range (400 miles), was only 3.6 tons; normal range was 2.3 tons for 800 miles radius. If we are going to talk short range, then for the HE111 you have to factor in externally carried bombs, which could be increased to 3.6 tons.

If you want to calculate the fuel per ton cost I'm all for it.

That is it, beyond cleaning it up a bit, new rudders, new engines, revamped cockpit... I do not see the problem if it can already lift 10t, excellent for a mid-30s bomber.
Lift is different from being able to carry it to target. Since the payloads that even your chart talked about was maxed out at 4 tons, which probably required external bomb racks without a major internal change to expand the bomb bay and cut fuel capacity, ability to get it to any useful range with 10 tons is virtually nil.
Even the much more advanced He177 couldn't carry a 10 ton payload anywhere, it maxed out at 7.2 tons with external bombs in addition to a full bomb bay and the range was quite short, sub-400 mile radius.

First flight 1936, there are 2 full years to test it and set up production of an aircraft that was cancelled without mentioning a single defect or performance issue, not even to make up a pretext, sounds like enough time to me
Two years for a totally new class of aircraft assuming not significant redesigns of the aircraft is barely doable. Given the redesigns necessary they will need more than two years to go from first flight of the prototype to being able to enter production given the timeline of the He177.

For me having no heavy bomber ASAP means compromised security, given the geopolitical context of the mid-1930s.

Perfect<Good.
Then we disagree on what perfect and good enough are.

You are the one arguing for their need, not me.
Not just me, the Luftwaffe decided that, even the most important strategic bombing proponent Walter Wever who opted to kill the Ural Bomber prototype development for a new design. They decided it needed to be developed so much that it simply wasn't worth it compared to starting fresh with lessons learned.

Hitler denounced Versailles, remilitarized the Ruhr, reinstated conscription, created the LW, absorbed Austria, took the Sudetes, conquered the Czechs... and in the last of his "dont worry, they wont declare war" over Poland, well, they did. Stupidly, but they did.

The point is, war could have come over any of those before, you cant be certain of what the other is going to do, you cant guarantee "no war before XXXX", someone might simply come and declare it on you now rather than when it suits you...
They had the twin engine bomber fleet for war in that case. The Ural Bomber was needed for an invasion of the USSR, not fighting a region war near their borders with France, Poland, Britain, etc. The He111 was already enough to reach most places in England and into Scotland with basing near the Channel. Historically the strategic bomber was not needed before the invasion of the USSR, as the twin engine bombers of the Luftwaffe had sufficient range to do their jobs; the problem was the strategy of how to use them in the Battle of Britain, but prior to that what they had was more than enough to conquer the continent.

And Hitler has been used as an easy pretext, he wasnt that thick, but since he was evil AND dead, it is an easy excuse...
Yeah that's a misuse of the 'blame it on Hitler' trope. Hitler was quite thick in his military and political choices, after all he blundered into war over Poland convinced that the Allies had no intention to fight, then apparently threw a fit because he didn't know what to do. There is plenty of transcripts and documentation of his behavior and choices that survive, including from disinterested parties like his secretaries, who didn't have a reason to blame him for military failures like post-war generals did in their memoirs, yet they still cited him as the problem, one lady in particular saying he was the worst informed man in Europe because he refused to listen to anything he didn't want to hear, which only got worse as time got on. Kershaw's bio of Hitler's wartime is chock full of examples of his stupid military decisions. Yes it wasn't a total moron and was sometimes more right than his generals, but that doesn't mean he couldn't be exceptionally boneheaded.

The Ural bomber was supposed to make it from East Prussia.

Hindsight, you can never be certain the UK isnt going to turn on you... oh wait, they did... and the LW and KM were in no way ready to deal with them...
Other than the Uboats and existing bomber fleet that historically bombed Britain quite badly for years. I don't really see how a strategic bomber is going to really make things significantly better there.

Because the night thing was an accident, it wasnt really practicable until the beams were perfected and you cant rely on that, once you could, you can get rid of all the now unnecessary stuff.
It was recognized in the mid-1930s and the first units set up pre-WW2. It was good to go by the start of the war. Since night bombing was practiced by both sides since before WW2 it would have made sense to get a dedicated night bomber ready, especially since they were developing the night guidance system for years.

Too slow for tactical, too weakly armed and ranged for strategic, falls between 2 stools IMHO.
You're forgetting the operational level, which they were primarily intended for and of course ignoring the entire history of them being used successfully tactically and strategically:
https://www.amazon.com/Luftwaffe-Creating-Operational-Air-1918-1940/dp/0700609628

Ju88s and He111s were used tactically with enormous success throughout the Eastern Campaign, plus throughout the Battle of France. Strategically the Ju88 and He111s bombed strategic targets all around Britain with success during the Blitz and even during the BoB, hitting aircraft factories:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Britain
Göring ordered attacks on aircraft factories on 19 August 1940.[189] Sixty raids on the night of 19/20 August targeted the aircraft industry and harbours, and bombs fell on suburban areas around London: Croydon, Wimbledon and the Maldens.[218] Night raids were made on 21/22 August on Aberdeen, Bristol and South Wales. That morning, bombs were dropped on Harrow and Wealdstone, on the outskirts of London. Overnight on 22/23 August, the output of an aircraft factory at Filton near Bristol was drastically affected by a raid in which Ju88 bombers released over 16 tons of high explosive bombs. On the night of 23/24 August over 200 bombers attacked the Fort Dunlop tyre factory in Birmingham, with a significant effect on production. A sustained bombing campaign began on 24 August with the largest raid so far, killing 100 in Portsmouth

Ju 352 used Jumos, just use 5 of the crappiest engines available for the Ju 89, it will even help to offset the ramp weight.
That would be the 252, the 352 used the BMW 323:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Junkers_Ju_352#Specifications_(Ju_352A-1)

The Ju89, with suitable redesigns, could have used the same engines, like the Fw200 did and the US did with the B17 (same engine effectively, though they had the advantage of turbosuperchargers).
 

JAG88

Banned
The latter was a transport, so different needs than a combat bomber.

Exactly, hence the change of wing, I would not change it...


Not sure what you mean.

Something smells bad, those 1600Kg to be specific...

They add weight, especially when loaded, and change the internal balance.

If they change the balance and hence CoG, it wont fly until corrected, wont it?

Looks like it was the higher powered He277, not the He177; that apparently tops out at 4650km range with the A-5 service model.

I was correct then.

The model with the Jumo 223 engine was supposed to be able to reach up to 5000km with 500kg bombs.

223s? They cant even make the one with 222s work!

I'd suggest looking at the record of the historical bombing in the East. Outside of Moscow and Leningrad ground fire wasn't much of an issue and until L-L really kicked in the Soviets lacked radar sufficient for even point defense that was quality enough to allow for accurate interception. The PVO was fine for point defense, but they lacked a national radar grid, simply impossible given the lack of radar and was only created after WW2, while there was no observer corps at the national level for the USSR that could track bombers across 1000km, let alone more. Again it was mostly point defense in WW2. The Luftwaffe was even able to use the decidedly obsolete He111 during daylight even in 1944, while the He177 when bombing at altitude (20,000 feet), were able to operate in daylight hours in 1944 without interception, as the Soviet army air force lacked fighters capable of intercepting at that altitude. The PVO had them after 1943, but again they were basically concentrated in Moscow and later Leningrad. So if the Luftwaffe strategic bombers operated against deep targets at altitude they'd be able to skirt most of the Soviet air defenses and tracking systems as well as fighters capable of intercepting them until 1944 when sufficient high altitude foreign fighters and radar become available in quantity.

The LW had its hands full and tried strategic raids barely a couple times... no threat, no reaction.

MiG-1/3 would have loved to differ...

If they went at night against closer targets they'd be even better off, as the Soviets lacked effective night radar; historically they were able to bomb Gorky, East of Moscow, at night for weeks and only lost about 6 bombers:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bombing_of_Gorky_in_World_War_II#June_1943

Closer targets, not 5.000Km away...

Right, the Ju89 was going to be much worse when all the combat add ons happen, like turrets, armor, full fuel load, etc. which will cut performance.

German bombers dont carry that much armour, armored seats for SOME crew, some plates for the gunners, that is it.

Fuel depends on range to target...

Aircraft had internal structural support beams; one of the issues with the He177 was it had a load bearing beam bisecting the bomb bay, which limited what types of bombs could be carried and how many too. The Ju88 could only fit 50kg bombs internally.

That was Heinkel, this is Junkers, and the 88 gives a clue about what Junkers used as a solution in that regard.

Ok, sure?

Yep, use ladders or ESACs, all allow you to use smaller bombs.

Ju89s were to have many more men that that to man the defensive guns; they weren't going to top out at two cannons and two MGs for an aircraft of that size, the HE111 had several more defensive MGs than that, up to 7, plus a 20mm cannon and 13mm HMG. The Ju290 had up to 8 defensive weapons, the FW200 had at least 6.

Four positions are all you need if properly armed, German bombers ended up with a lot of gunners to try and make up for the lack of proper turrets and weapons...

So that means more weight, drag, crew, etc. Plus there is no guarantee that the Ju89 would carry 4 tons of bombs each. The B24's heaviest load for short range (400 miles), was only 3.6 tons; normal range was 2.3 tons for 800 miles radius. If we are going to talk short range, then for the HE111 you have to factor in externally carried bombs, which could be increased to 3.6 tons.

No, I intend for it to carry MORE! :biggrin:

It has the lift...

No clue about what the He 111 is doing here...

If you want to calculate the fuel per ton cost I'm all for it.

Short on time as it is.

Lift is different from being able to carry it to target. Since the payloads that even your chart talked about was maxed out at 4 tons, which probably required external bomb racks without a major internal change to expand the bomb bay and cut fuel capacity, ability to get it to any useful range with 10 tons is virtually nil.

LOL!!!

Please, seriously dont make stuff up...

Even the much more advanced He177 couldn't carry a 10 ton payload anywhere, it maxed out at 7.2 tons with external bombs in addition to a full bomb bay and the range was quite short, sub-400 mile radius.

No, again...

Max load INTERNAL was 2xSC1700 + 2xSC1800 IIRC, 7t, but the heaviest I have seen recorded was for 4,8t.

You are getting flustered over nothing, the test was with a 10t payload, NO ONE is claiming that to be BOMBS, it was a lift test, from that you detract the missing equipment and, OF COURSE, then play with the remainder for range/bombload...

HOWEVER, do remember that was with 910PS engines, the ones used on the Ju89 lift test, and that the one with 1200PS engines got a 3t increase on MTOW over the previous low-powered version?

Two years for a totally new class of aircraft assuming not significant redesigns of the aircraft is barely doable. Given the redesigns necessary they will need more than two years to go from first flight of the prototype to being able to enter production given the timeline of the He177.

Totally new? It is already flying.

You are assuming the need and calling for redesigns, I do not.

He 177 was a shitshow...

Then we disagree on what perfect and good enough are.

Indeed...

Not just me, the Luftwaffe decided that, even the most important strategic bombing proponent Walter Wever who opted to kill the Ural Bomber prototype development for a new design. They decided it needed to be developed so much that it simply wasn't worth it compared to starting fresh with lessons learned.

I would love a quote for that one.

They had the twin engine bomber fleet for war in that case. The Ural Bomber was needed for an invasion of the USSR, not fighting a region war near their borders with France, Poland, Britain, etc. The He111 was already enough to reach most places in England and into Scotland with basing near the Channel. Historically the strategic bomber was not needed before the invasion of the USSR, as the twin engine bombers of the Luftwaffe had sufficient range to do their jobs; the problem was the strategy of how to use them in the Battle of Britain, but prior to that what they had was more than enough to conquer the continent.

A fleet that could carry internally SC250 at best...

Oh? They didnt have strategic targets?

Can you plan a war on England in the mid 1930s based on the assumption of roflstomping FRANCE?

Oh, really? Not needed for the BoB, ok...

Yeah that's a misuse of the 'blame it on Hitler' trope. Hitler was quite thick in his military and political choices, after all he blundered into war over Poland convinced that the Allies had no intention to fight, then apparently threw a fit because he didn't know what to do. There is plenty of transcripts and documentation of his behavior and choices that survive, including from disinterested parties like his secretaries, who didn't have a reason to blame him for military failures like post-war generals did in their memoirs, yet they still cited him as the problem, one lady in particular saying he was the worst informed man in Europe because he refused to listen to anything he didn't want to hear, which only got worse as time got on. Kershaw's bio of Hitler's wartime is chock full of examples of his stupid military decisions. Yes it wasn't a total moron and was sometimes more right than his generals, but that doesn't mean he couldn't be exceptionally boneheaded.

Drugs will do that to you...

...and vegetarianism.

Other than the Uboats and existing bomber fleet that historically bombed Britain quite badly for years. I don't really see how a strategic bomber is going to really make things significantly better there.

What doesnt kill you makes you stronger... the LW didnt kill, neither did the KM.

It was recognized in the mid-1930s and the first units set up pre-WW2. It was good to go by the start of the war. Since night bombing was practiced by both sides since before WW2 it would have made sense to get a dedicated night bomber ready, especially since they were developing the night guidance system for years.

EXACTLY... and in that context, a bulky, slow, heavy bomber comes into its own...

You're forgetting the operational level, which they were primarily intended for and of course ignoring the entire history of them being used successfully tactically and strategically:
https://www.amazon.com/Luftwaffe-Creating-Operational-Air-1918-1940/dp/0700609628

Ju88s and He111s were used tactically with enormous success throughout the Eastern Campaign, plus throughout the Battle of France. Strategically the Ju88 and He111s bombed strategic targets all around Britain with success during the Blitz and even during the BoB, hitting aircraft factories:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Britain

No i dont, I am simply pointing at the failing of such outlook, they cant really do strategic work, they can reach strategic targets, but the bomb load is poor or of the wrong kind, the heavy can always trade range for extra bombs of the type actually needed.

yeah, and they never achieved good results, did they? They missed, they used weak bombs and then had to use external hard points to use the right kind which compromised range... band aids...


Yeah, mixed those.

The Ju89, with suitable redesigns, could have used the same engines, like the Fw200 did and the US did with the B17 (same engine effectively, though they had the advantage of turbosuperchargers).

Rather take better engines for a better payload and range, thx.
 
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Non-steerable is an irrelevant category for WW2 paratrooper parachutes, the big different was rigs allowing for vertical or horizontal landing, the former allowing for rifles to be carried in the jump.
Camo canopy and semi-quick release (the RZ-20 did not have it all centralized, you had to QR four separate parts) are improvement on the basic design, ......... not focusing on the main airfield where the Brits were bound to have concentrated the bulk of their forces.
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OTL RZ1 deployment system included an "innen" heullen" that was attached to the airplane with a rope (aka. static-line).
The basic function of a direct bag is keeping the canopy fabric contained until all the suspension lines are stretched out nice and neat. Tensioning suspension lines before the canopy fabric grabs air reduces opening shock. Keeping suspension lines neat improves deployment reliability. Deploying the parachute canopy's skirt hem neatly also improves reliability ... by reducing line-over/blow-under/inversion type malfunctions.
Brits adopted direct-bag deployment during their second round of testing.
The US Army waited until the 1950s to adopt direct-bag deployment.
Because DB is so reliable, it can be jumped from as low as 300 feet above ground level! During the Rhodesian War (1970s) Rhodesian Light Infantry consistently jumped from below 500 feet and ocassionaly from 300 feet because of rising terrain on jump run .... miss-calculations by aircrew ....
Direct-bag is the global standard for modern paratroopers and is consistently the most reliable way to deploy parachutes for junior jumpers.

On a personal note: I have less than 100 jumps on military round parachutes, but suffered two inversion type malfunctions. Both times the canopy fully inflated and landed me softly, but suffered so many small burn holes that they went straight to the trash.
 

Deleted member 1487

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OTL RZ1 deployment system included an "innen" heullen" that was attached to the airplane with a rope (aka. static-line).
The basic function of a direct bag is keeping the canopy fabric contained until all the suspension lines are stretched out nice and neat. Tensioning suspension lines before the canopy fabric grabs air reduces opening shock. Keeping suspension lines neat improves deployment reliability. Deploying the parachute canopy's skirt hem neatly also improves reliability ... by reducing line-over/blow-under/inversion type malfunctions.
Brits adopted direct-bag deployment during their second round of testing.
The US Army waited until the 1950s to adopt direct-bag deployment.
Because DB is so reliable, it can be jumped from as low as 300 feet above ground level! During the Rhodesian War (1970s) Rhodesian Light Infantry consistently jumped from below 500 feet and ocassionaly from 300 feet because of rising terrain on jump run .... miss-calculations by aircrew ....
Direct-bag is the global standard for modern paratroopers and is consistently the most reliable way to deploy parachutes for junior jumpers.

On a personal note: I have less than 100 jumps on military round parachutes, but suffered two inversion type malfunctions. Both times the canopy fully inflated and landed me softly, but suffered so many small burn holes that they went straight to the trash.
Any idea why it took the Germans so long to realize that themselves?
 
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The airport thing was already overdone at the Netherlands, I would have landed anywhere BUT there.

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Avoiding landing on airports would require a major change in FJ. Paratrooper Doctrine - even today - involves dropping enough paratroopers to capture an airport, then the second wave landing in transport airplanes with AT guns, more ammo, etc.
 

JAG88

Banned
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Avoiding landing on airports would require a major change in FJ. Paratrooper Doctrine - even today - involves dropping enough paratroopers to capture an airport, then the second wave landing in transport airplanes with AT guns, more ammo, etc.

Well, one thing is to aim to capture an airport, slowly flying in formation at 100m over one when you have reasons to believe the enemy expects you to, is another...

You can land on a suitable place and deploy for assault, somewhere where you are NOT certain to find AA weapons.
 
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Non-steerable is an irrelevant category for WW2 paratrooper parachutes, the big different was rigs allowing for vertical or horizontal landing, the former allowing for rifles to be carried in the jump.
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“Steerable” was not relevant to the majority of WW2-vintage parachutes.
First, Salvatore and RZ-1 harnesses made it almost impossible for jumpers to do anything to change their course under canopy.

Vertical harnesses - worn by everybody elses’ paratroopers and pilots at least allowed jumpers to pull down on risers (straps connecting shoulders to suspension lines). Pulling on risers is not really steering (an axi-symmetric) parachute canopy, rather it results in slow side-slips, forward-slips, rearward-slips, etc. .... enough to avoid a fence or other jumper, but not really “steerable.”
“Steerable” implies being able to turn ..... to change heading .... to change the view. This usually requires a canopy with a bit of forward speed.
In 1928, Major E.L. Hoffman invented his “Triangle” parachute canopy which was copied in the RZ 38. Triangle was almost axi-symmetric but was missing some fabric from the rear corner. This hole/vent allowed a bit of air to escape, driving the parachute forward (less than 10 miles per hour), making it easier to steer away from obstacles and other canopies. Pulling a “Triangle’s” rear risers allowed jumpers to steer away from small obstacles like buildings or individual trees.
A photograph and diagram of Hoffman’s Triangle Parachute are printed on page 235, section 5.570 of Dan Poynter’s “The Parachute Manual” Volume 1, Third edition, published in 1984. This is more of a practical manual than a history textbook, but Poynter did exhaustive research and is widely trusted by civilian parachute riggers.

Unfortunately the RZ 38 was introduced too late .... after Germany quit dropping significant numbers of Fallschirmjagers. Only a handful were jumped during the Battle of the Bulge (e.g. von der Heydte).
 
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