AHC: Sustained European presence in Africa with post-WW2 POD

With A POD after World War II and the formation of the United Nations, what's the maximum plausible number of possessions (whether colonial or incorporated into the metropole like France's OTL modern overseas possessions) that European colonial empires could retain in Africa? The only ones that seem easy to pull off are Djibouti and the Indian Ocean islands.
 
There is Ceuta and Melilla of course as remnants of European rule in Africa. maybe there could be several similar cities. One or two cities in Algeria remaining French, Portuguese Cabinda, etc. could be possible I think. Not sure about specifics however.
 
They won the wars, but lost the political debates. Maybe have the insurgents be more openly Commie so the USA is more open to colonization?
 
They won the wars, but lost the political debates. Maybe have the insurgents be more openly Commie so the USA is more open to colonization?
Not politically viable after the Civil Rights Movement. Reagan playing footsie with South Africa got enough flack as it did.
 
Not politically viable after the Civil Rights Movement. Reagan playing footsie with South Africa got enough flack as it did.
There would have to be other stuff like a colonial civil rights as well, i mainly thought of it as a jumping off point in the early insurgencies in the early 50s
 
There would have to be other stuff like a colonial civil rights as well, i mainly thought of it as a jumping off point in the early insurgencies in the early 50s
Then problem then becomes, are the Europeans willing to extend equality and the franchise to the natives?

EDIT: Not to mention natives moving to the metropole. DuGaulle noted that the last one was a dealbreaker for the average Frenchman.
 
Then problem then becomes, are the Europeans willing to extend equality and the franchise to the natives?

That question needs a far back POD, as in all of the colonies some of the natives were indeed willing to join the colonial authorities. Perhaps those people are enfranchised along with the colonials both to reward them and make it clear to the others that supporting the colonial authorities would make you have control over your destiny, and make sure this is well known to everyone?

EDIT: Not to mention natives moving to the metropole. DuGaulle noted that the last one was a dealbreaker for the average Frenchman.

The presence of African descendants in Britain and France makes it clear that some of the people from the colonies did indeed make their way to the metropole. I'm not sure that with a far enough POD that this is a total dealbraker.
 
If Salazar can bring it upon himself to cut awy the more rebellious parts of Portugal's African colonies, he might be able to keep some bits. Cape Verde, Sao Tome and Princep, Cabinda, and Northern Angola are definitely possible for Portugal to retain.
 
That question needs a far back POD, as in all of the colonies some of the natives were indeed willing to join the colonial authorities. Perhaps those people are enfranchised along with the colonials both to reward them and make it clear to the others that supporting the colonial authorities would make you have control over your destiny, and make sure this is well known to everyone?



The presence of African descendants in Britain and France makes it clear that some of the people from the colonies did indeed make their way to the metropole. I'm not sure that with a far enough POD that this is a total dealbraker.
It's one thing to grant equality to some of the natives. Granting all (or a majority of them) would be face much higher political hurdles in the metropole (not to mention temper tantrums from lower-middle class Europeans in places with large European populations).
 
No Carnation Revolution in Portugal, resulting in Cabinda getting annexed and that Angola and Mozambique become "Dominions" starting in the 1990s. Avoid Vietnam and I bet France could hold onto Algeria too; Gabon IIRC wanted to be directly annexed as well.
 
Sierra Leone was technically divided into SL Colony (basically just Freetown) and SL Protectorate (basically the rest), where the tribes had some degree of autonomy.

Make the Protectorate independent, watch it descend into violence, and Freetown will be begging the British to stay.

Gambia could probably have also been kept with enough subsidies and if something other than chickens (most of whom died of typhoid fever) had been chosen as an investment
 
Algeria is too big and too poor unless France wants to fight a perpetual war .

They had essentially defeated the Algerian Nationalists, with the decision to pull out being a political one. not driven by the military reality on the ground. They had also had an economic incentive to stay, with the idea being to develop the oil and gas of the region.
 
They had essentially defeated the Algerian Nationalists, with the decision to pull out being a political one. not driven by the military reality on the ground
What do you mean by that ? The FLN was still kicking around and that doesn’t prevent future resurgence .

They had also had an economic incentive to stay, with the idea being to develop the oil and gas of the region.
which would be counteracted by costs both political and economic in occupying a large hostile and growing population of Algerians. Also political instability is not good for development.
 
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What do you mean by that ? The FLN was still kicking around and that doesn’t prevent future resurgence.

The FLN had been reduced to an entity incapable of seriously contesting the French militarily; they could be a nuisance, of course, but they could no longer achieve a military end to the conflict.

which would be counteracted by costs both political and economic in occupying a large hostile and growing population of Algerians. Also political instability is not good for development.

By 1961, there was probably 50,000 in the FLN as opposed to ~200,000 or more Harkis. There wouldn't be much in the way of instability with the FLN largely defeated.
 
You need to act on either or several of the three drivers of decolonisation: african opposition to european rule, external pressure on european powers to decolonise, and european fatigue leading them to pull out. The problem is that twitching some of them is mutually exclusive with a post-45 POD.

For instance, you can try to generalise the Portugal-path: ideological commitment to upholding the colonial order militarily, tolerated by the US out of anticommunism. For instance, you can imagine that communist insurgencies in 1944-1947 lead to reactionary governments in France and the UK taking power with tacit US consent; those governments would then pour ressources in defending their empires out of prestige/ideological concerns.

Problem 0 with that path: it's a crapsack world for Africans. Problem 1: in OTL, the French *did* pour considerable ressources in defending the Empire in the 50s and 60s; one can consider that with even more efforts, they could have quashed the Algerian insurgency and maaaaaybe kept the Indochina war going, but no ammount of military pressure could turn the tide, and european resistance would probably have collapsed in the late 60s - early 70s. Problem 3: that path reinforces driver 1, native opposition, and makes independances more likely, albeit at a later date.

On the other hand, you can imagine that Communists are more successful than OTL in France, and seek to enfranchise the Africans (which is not a given!). Then, sure, Africans are more ok with staying in, and we can imagine that under a communist government the French public's consent is not going to matter that much - buuut the Americans are going to panic if France goes commie along with half of African, and will probably encourage local independentism.

The problem, then, is that with a post-45 POD we still have a world dominated by two competing ideologies/block, neither of which allows to tune down all three factors.

So we have to imagine that somehow a "3rd way" will arise that wil be acceptable to the Europeans, the Africans, the Soviets, and the US. I don't need to explain why OTL's Europeans didn't find it...

Let's try in their place. The most promising faction to this purpose is the center-left, which were the most liberal in colonial matters (see the Blum-Violette plan), along with black or afropean personalities from the fringes of the communist parties, like Aimé Césaire, who had both the radicalism and, unlike most CP members, the brains necessary. We thus have to prop up these guys into power *and* make sure colonial reforms become an item on their agenda *and* make their rule palatable to the US. .

My proposal for that is a failed communist uprising in France and Italy in 1944 (which they historically considered) leads to the communists becoming weaker and the socialists, having fought against them, becoming both more popular (due to CP collapse + defeating the insurgents + "wait, those guys *don't* want to kill us and eat our bones?" effect on the right) and more effective/compelled to rethinking more of their assumptions (historically, they clung to a lot of outdated marxist rhetoric because the commies were breathing down their necks in every election). Bonus point if, as would be very likely, the insurrection is defeated thank to colonial troops - not only because the socialiss will be grateful and because Thiaroye won't happen, but also because the remaining communists will hate Africans' guts, which will make them more sympathetic to everyone else).

The certitude, then, is that the socialists will double down on their OTL efforts for developping the colonies and extending civil rights there (which they did in OTL to great effect in French Africa), while the 1944-1947 cycle of repression in the Empires will be butterflied away. From there, all the 3 decolonisation drivers will be reduced: the French will (well, might) be ideologically more committed to keeping their empire together, the Africans will have it better (at least at the start), and the US will see no objection to a socialist but anticommunist government safeguarding them against a perceived greater commie threat.

From there, we can envision a range of outcomes : a federalised, decentralised but intact french African empire; integration of some colonies (Gabon, notably) as departments; etc.

Of course, this only concerns directly the French Empire, but we might imagine that more progressive and successful policies in it might get adapted elsewhere.
 
The FLN had been reduced to an entity incapable of seriously contesting the French militarily; they could be a nuisance, of course, but they could no longer achieve a military end to the conflict.

By 1961, there was probably 50,000 in the FLN as opposed to ~200,000 or more Harkis. There wouldn't be much in the way of instability with the FLN largely defeated.

The idea that a purely military solution to the Algerian conflict existed was, and i can't emphasise it enough, pure wishful thinking. Even french military thinkers of the time, like Galula, realised it. To end the war on a French victory, three things would have been needed: neutralisation of the FLN, building a fair society in which "muslims" would have had the same economic and political standing as Europeans, and adhesion of all algerians to this social and political project.

Granted, point 1's achievement is debatable and debated in military terms - you should take the military's postwar boasts with a grain of salt, though. But point 2 was a pure utopia by 1958, with the pieds-noirs being stubbornly opposed to anything resembling equality and the Republic not having funds to pour in both the largest counterinsurgency war in history and a massive development project. As for point 3, the point that even a weakened and divided FLN managed to be the only party with a signifiant audience among "muslim" algerians speaks for itself!

All of this is true of every other decolonisation conflit. The only thing more military means would have achieved is more protracted wars and maybe one or two temporary "victories" in which european military would have kept control of a ruined and hostile country for a few years before the next uprising.
 
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The idea that a purely military solution to the Algerian conflict existed was, and i can't emphasise it enough, pure wishful thinking. Even french military thinkers of the time, like Galula, realised it. To end the war on a French victory, three things would have been needed: neutralisation of the FLN, building a fair society in which "muslims" would have had the same economic and political standing as Europeans, and adhesion of all algerians to this social and political project.

Granted, point 1's achievement is debatable and debated in military terms - you should take the military's postwar boasts with a grain of salt, though. But point 2 was a pure utopia by 1958, with the pieds-noirs being stubbornly opposed to anything resembling equality and the Republic not having funds to pour in both the largest counterinsurgency war in history and a massive development project. As for point 3, the point that even a weakened and divided FLN managed to be the only party with a signifiant audience among "muslim" algerians speaks for itself!

All of this is true of every other decolonisation conflit. The only thing more military means would have achieved is more protracted wars and maybe one or two temporary "victories" in which european military would have kept control of a ruined and hostile country for a few years before the next uprising.

Arguably 1 and 3 had been achieved, while 2 could be done because Paris was able to ignore them in bugging out afterall. With military victory on the ground, seeking the political ends would've been the prudent next step and could've solidified the political win. Long term, colonialism was on the way out but the French could've stayed long enough to do the needed reforms.
 
Arguably 1
Even if France totally crushed the FLN. Another group is bound to come up by the 1980s or 1990s likely Islamist.

3 had been achieved
How ?
seeking the political ends would've been the prudent next step and could've solidified the political win.
Expect granting political rights to the Algerians would have been unacceptable to the French population. Also what’s the point of doing any reform if you have won the military conflict and your goal of maintaining the status quo is achieved?
 
3 had not been achieved, by any mean - just look at the result of the autonomy/independance referendums: there was *no* platform among "muslim" Algerians for supporting integration or assimilation.

Even if France totally crushed the FLN. Another group is bound to come up by the 1980s or 1990s likely Islamist.

Oh, if there had been a purely military crackdown, i don't even think it would have lasted that long - what we're looking at is low-intensity fighting throughout the 1960s in remote areas, then a revival of independentist struggles in the 70s, I think. Look at the next best thing to a war of independance "won" by colonial powers in OTL, the Malaya emergency: the Brits had to fight on for twelve years and then got a mere seven years of "peace" before another similar insurgency resumed. Apples and pears, of course, but I highly doubt the legacy of the FLN would vanish into thin air.

Also what’s the point of doing any reform if you have won the military conflict and your goal of maintaining the status quo is achieved?

This. The thing is, if we want France to "win" the Algerian war, we need Paris to decide *at once* that they are going to send a massive military force and start a sweeping program of reforms. Moreover, they have to do it at the beginning of the war, before they have locked themselves into the escalation that the FLN deliberately sought to trap them into and which alienated most "muslim" Algerians from them very quickly. - imho the war is not "winnable" after the Constantinois massacres of august of 1955, because by then the French have shed too much innocent blood for any "muslim" to buy their promises and the pieds-noirs are too bitter and angry to agree to anything bar a return to their domination over the "muslims".

So we need Paris to understand, after the first beginnings of the insurrection and as the situation appears under control, that they need to consent an enormous effort to avoid the situation spinning out of control. That's not happening with OTL's IVth republic.
 
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