AHC Succesful overlord by September 1943

I think one PoD would be a different Norweigan campaign, apparently the British did have a fledgling amphibous fleet but lost it in Norway.

As for the rest I think maybe extracting a good chunk of the BEFs heavy equipment from France to avoid the invasion panic of 1940. Worldwide keeping the Axis contained is a ood thing, making less clean-up campaigns before the main event can occur. Avoiding the Greek debacle, pushing Italy out of Libya instead would be a good start. In the Pacific stretching the Malayan campaign out should be easy to achieve and produce positive results.

Well, it sent 6 landing craft to Norway out of around 1?? it had at the time, none came back, but they weren't carried 'phibs'.

The major loss to the then fleet was at Dunkirk when Clan MacAlister was sunk.
 
Well, it sent 6 landing craft to Norway out of around 1?? it had at the time, none came back, but they weren't carried 'phibs'.

The major loss to the then fleet was at Dunkirk when Clan MacAlister was sunk.

To amend my earlier thought about Dunkirk, perhaps it's a disaster in that the infantry are captured rather than evacuated, but the shipping sent OTL isn't sent, and is therefore available for any cross-channel operation in future. Probably a bit out there, but who knows.
 
Well, it sent 6 landing craft to Norway out of around 1?? it had at the time, none came back, but they weren't carried 'phibs'.

The major loss to the then fleet was at Dunkirk when Clan MacAlister was sunk.

I thought the Brits had built fledgling LSTs based on an oil taker design used on Lake Maracaibo in Venezuela. Anyway, the small phib force the British built up prior to 1940 was pretty much gone by June of that year, so they had to start again from scratch.

IIRC a phib force was sent to the Med in early 1941, capable of landing a brigade or so.
 
With a POD after June 1940 have anglo American forces able to land forces and support them on the West Coast of Europe by late 1943.

A truly US Europe First strategy which would mean that after Midway and initiation of the meatgrinder known as Guadalcanal a containment and guerre de course strategy is adopted against the Japanese. This should be combined with downscaling of ASW effort. Both are possible using the powers of Captain Hindsight, but with thougtful analysis possible even with a 1942 vision.
 
I thought the Brits had built fledgling LSTs based on an oil taker design used on Lake Maracaibo in Venezuela. Anyway, the small phib force the British built up prior to 1940 was pretty much gone by June of that year, so they had to start again from scratch.

IIRC a phib force was sent to the Med in early 1941, capable of landing a brigade or so.

The first Maracaibo LST didn't enter service until 1941, they were only thought up after the fiasco of Operation Menace.

3 Glen lines fast cargo liners (Glenroy, Glenaren and Glengyle) were turned into very successful Landing Ship Infantry, Large, 6 Belgium cross channel steamers into Landing Ship Infantry, Small, 2 cross channel rail ferries into Landing Ship Sternchute (for carrying up to 15 LCM) and 3 tankers into Landing Ship Gantry for carrying again 15 LCM. but none of them were around for Norway. Only the LSI(L) and LSG had the range to get to the Med.

http://www.navypedia.org/ships/uk/uk_amphibious.htm

http://www.navypedia.org/ships/uk/brit_aws_lst.htm

http://www.navypedia.org/ships/uk/brit_aws_lsil.htm

http://www.navypedia.org/ships/uk/brit_aws_lss.htm

http://www.navypedia.org/ships/uk/brit_aws_lsg.htm




I've never seen how the MLCs that were used in Norway got there, I suspect as deck cargo on a heavy lift ship although 2 were carried by HMS Resolution as part of one of the operations.
 
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That sort of info is hard to come by, I`ve looked!

What else have you got?!

Like you say information on UK amphibious forces is hard to come by, what i've got to date has largely come from 'The Watery Maze' by Bernard Fergusson,, US Amphibious Ships and Craft by Norman Friedman (there is a whole chapter on 'the British Connection'), and 'The Design and Construction of British Warships 1938-45: Amphibious Vessels and Auxiliaries: The Official Record' by D K Brown.

 
With a POD after June 1940 have anglo American forces able to land forces and support them on the West Coast of Europe by late 1943.

Bonus points for anything earlier.

By the way does this give a chance of Poland and Czechosovakia being liberated form he west?
Technically, Portugal is on the West Coast of Europe... Landing in Portugal would be easy. Wouldn't move the war forward, but it would be easy.

Franco succumbs to Hitler's enticements, Anglo-American forces land in Lisbon to protect Portugal from Axis forces....
 
You probably need a better outcome in the Battle of Atlantic to pull of Overlord in 1943. Up until Spring 1943 the Atlantic was still contested territory. Close the air gap earlier, concentrate more on bombing U-Boat production plants (not necessarily the shipyards, hit the battery factories and the transportation ways that were used to get the parts to the shipyards) and you may have a chance at turning the tide earlier in the Atlantic.
 
Early Sept '43 may be achievable - but a few factors to help:

Yes, earlier success with the U-boat war,

Earlier introduction of the P-51 (Merlin) Mustang into US service - to escort the bombers over Germany - it's better to defeat the Lw over Germany than over France.
Earlier construction of the Mulberry habours, not easy but maybe.
Torch happens, but the US agrees to a more eastern landing - therefore Bone is taken, and the campaign rather than dragging on is over by Christmas - thogh the prisonor haul isn't so high.
The US doesn't um & arr over what comes next, and the British agree to speed up planning for Overload.
Sicilly is taken in March (subject to weather conditions), followed by Sardinia and Corsica.
Late August or early September British & Canadian, together with US troops land on Normandy, three weeks later NA & Free French, together with US troops land on the South of France.
 
The absolute and only way this happens is if the Red Army wins a really, really, really big victory at either Moscow or Stalingrad, causing a spiraling collapse of the entire Nazi war effort, and providing at least a feasible means for the Alllies to end-run the multiple problems of logistics and leadership involved in Sledgehammer. Otherwise there is no reason for the Allies to risk an invasion of a continent they will not have any troops on at that point with a much greater proportion of Nazi military power entirely intact.
 
Landing craft is NOT an issue. If you read "1943: The Victory That Never Was," or even if you just do the math, you will realize this.

The Allies had enough landing craft to land SEVEN divisions in Sicily in 1943. These were slated to go back to England in time for Sledgehammer in late summer 1943. However, since Alan Brooke was so CHICKEN about landing in France in 1943, the U.S. Navy took all the landing craft off into the Pacific. If that hadn't happened, there would have been LOTS of landing craft of all types available in 1943.

I think the best scenario would have been if the French government had evacuated everything they could have to North Africa, as I recently posted in The Turning Point. With the French navy and allied French troops in Tunisia, Libya and the Italian empire in Africa would not have lasted long enough for Rommel to even be dispatched. The Mediterranean would have been a British/French lake and Malta would have been safe.

Also, remember the Reuben James. This sinking happened because Roosevelt was pushing for more and more active action by the U.S. Navy in the Atlantic. The RJ was the third U.S. destroyer to be torpedoed, because Roosevelt had the U.S. Navy actively convoying all Allied ships in the Atlantic, with orders to shoot German units on sight. FDR knew that Germany was the main problem for the Allies, and since Sept 1939 he had been looking for any provocative incident that would get the U.S. electorate behind him and into the war in Europe. If there had been one more incident like the RJ, one of two things would have happened: Hitler would have declared war on the U.S., or the U.S. would have declared war on Germany.

The main stumbling block to a successful landing in France in 1943 would have been the lack of training and proper equipment. Training has been covered above, so we'll just mention the equipment. Specifically, many of the armoured units of the U.S. Army were still equiped with things like the M-3 Medium Tank (the Lee-Grant) or the M-4 early, poorly-armoured version of the Sherman, while the main British tank was still officially the Crusader (They were just starting to introduce the Cromwell.) Up against the PzKw IV Gs, Panthers and Tigers of the Wehrmacht, they would have been slaughtered.
 
Landing craft is NOT an issue. If you read "1943: The Victory That Never Was," or even if you just do the math, you will realize this.

The Allies had enough landing craft to land SEVEN divisions in Sicily in 1943. These were slated to go back to England in time for Sledgehammer in late summer 1943. However, since Alan Brooke was so CHICKEN about landing in France in 1943, the U.S. Navy took all the landing craft off into the Pacific. If that hadn't happened, there would have been LOTS of landing craft of all types available in 1943.

The main stumbling block to a successful landing in France in 1943 would have been .... and proper equipment. Specifically, many of the armoured units of the U.S. Army were still equiped with things like the M-3 Medium Tank (the Lee-Grant) or the M-4 early, poorly-armoured version of the Sherman, while the main British tank was still officially the Crusader (They were just starting to introduce the Cromwell.) Up against the PzKw IV Gs, Panthers and Tigers of the Wehrmacht, they would have been slaughtered.

So just on the basis of equipment Brooke' wasn't being 'chicken' just realistc! On the other hand while, Marshall was enthusiastic about a cross-channel invasion in '42 or '43 with mainly British & Empire troops (especially in the former), he insisted on a Cassablanca landing for Torch - against British advice who wanted one further east - just in case of German intervention via Spain & Spanish Morrocco - Chicken !??
 
One problem I foresee is that Overlord itself won't be the name of the operation if its launched in 1943: this is Operation Sledge Hammer.


For Sledge Hammer to work, you'll need to get the German divisions sitting in France out of the picture. There are many ways to do it; it comes down the Eastern Front going a bit better for the Soviets.


The units sent to France to reinforce and be reconstructed instead go to Poland for refitting, or they're never pulled off the line in the Soviet Union.


The Western Allies have less forces for Sledge Hammer than Overlord, but should be able to prevail without those forces in France OTL.
 
Of course in 1943 the fixed-defences that faced the Overlord landing are much more crude where they exist at all.
 
Of course in 1943 the fixed-defences that faced the Overlord landing are much more crude where they exist at all.

On the other hand:
1. The U-Boats are more powerful in 1943 than in 1944.
2. The Luftwaffe is not broke yet.
 
I know, I was just pointing out probably the one part of Sledgehammer that would run in the allies' favour compared to Overlord.
 
It might be possible in the European Theater of CalBear's "Pacific War Redux". With the US going to full war production in the summer of 1940, there should be more than enough men and equipment in place by spring of 1943 to launch an Overload sized version of Sledgehammer. It took 30 months from December of 1941 to June of 1944 to set up and launch Overlord. From June of 1940 to to May of 1943 you have about 34 months. Assuming that production levels are similar, the Allies could be landing in France in May of 1943 with the same sized force used in OTL a year later.
 
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