AHC: Strong post-war Royal Navy?

[Riain]

The problem is no one, not even the USAF think like that back then. Neither the nascent civilian think tanks/ academics. Also, it is highly likely that SLBM would be acquired as air-borne nuclear force too vulnerable for the UK. Given that the UK nuclear forces targeted

The RN figured it out, so it's not impossible.

Also, the ongoing cost of maintaining a larger fleet, both material and personnel costs, need to be conside

Of course, but these are marginal costs over what was spent. For example the aircraft that were to be flown from CVA01/02 were IOTL flown by the RAF, while the RN flew the Sea Harrier. ITTL the RN will keep its Phantom and Buccaneer fleets and use the money used by the RAF and Sea Harrier fleet. Similarly the money used to operate the Ark Royal, Hermes, Bulwark, Blake, Tiger and 3 I class will be used to operate CVA01/02. Any shortfalls can be met by cuts in capabilities of lower priority.

 

[Jukra]

IIRC from Friedman's Postwar Naval Revolution the British Chiefs of Staff in 1948 calculated that the USSR wouldn't be ready to start World War III until 1957 and that in British defence planning it was termed, "The year of maximum danger."

The 1948 Fleet Plan and Revised Restricted Fleet of 1949 were to provide the best possible Royal Navy by that date.

The fighter and bomber specifications issued by the RAF in the late 1940s were intended to provide the RAF with the best possible aircraft that could be developed and put into service by 1957.

If the objective was to provide best defense for 1957, I wonder why production of atomic weapons was not taken into account - both from viewpoint of defender and attacker. By late 1950's US had nuclear weapons by the thousands, USSR by the hundreds. Even from 1948 viewpoint, but after Hiroshima, Crossroads and Hurricane, this would surely mean something for projections of a long war.

 

[Riain]

If the objective was to provide best defense for 1957, I wonder why production of atomic weapons was not taken into account - both from viewpoint of defender and attacker. By late 1950's US had nuclear weapons by the thousands, USSR by the hundreds. Even from 1948 viewpoint, but after Hiroshima, Crossroads and Hurricane, this would surely mean something for projections of a long war.

In 1948 the Soviets hadn't exploded a nuclear device, and wasn't suspected to be able to do so for many years in the future. Further, given the resilience of populations in the face of bombing, it wasn't until there were hundreds of A bombs and H bombs that the British and other began thinking in terms other than WW3 as a re-run of WW2.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

If the objective was to provide best defense for 1957, I wonder why production of atomic weapons was not taken into account - both from viewpoint of defender and attacker. By late 1950's US had nuclear weapons by the thousands, USSR by the hundreds. Even from 1948 viewpoint, but after Hiroshima, Crossroads and Hurricane, this would surely mean something for projections of a long war.

They were.

However, "galloping technology" often ruined British long and even medium-term defence plans from 1945 to 1965.

One of the reasons why 1957 was chosen as the Year of Maximum Danger was that it was thought that the USSR wouldn't have enough atom bombs to deter a US first strike until then.

Furthermore until the early 1950s it was thought that all sides would possess a relatively small number atomic bombs. IIRC from Friedman again the USAF was planning a massive conventional bombing campaign against the USSR after it had expended its small stock of atom bombs.

It wasn't until the early 1950s that "mass production" of atomic bombs became possible.

Also the early atom bombs were so heavy that only heavy bombers and medium bombers could carry them. "Lightweight" atom bombs didn't become available until the late 1950s for the Americans (IIRC) and the British Red Beard atom bomb which was light enough for the Canberra to carry didn't become available until about 1962.

The 1951 Rearmament Programme provided for a force of 304 V-bombers in 38 squadrons of 8 by March 1958 and about one thousand fighters in Fighter Command to shoot down Soviet bombers carrying atomic bombs. AFAIK the British didn't expect the Soviets to develop ballistic missiles capable of reaching the UK until the early 1960s.

 

[Riain]

In the late 40s and 50s people weren't pussies like we are today; the British lost 50,000 during the Blitz and killed hundreds of thousands during the bombing campaign. A few atom bombs weren't particularly frightening, worse than the blitz and probably worse than the bombing of Germany, but certainly not out of the realms of survival.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

In the late 40s and 50s people weren't pussies like we are today; the British lost 50,000 during the Blitz and killed hundreds of thousands during the bombing campaign. A few atom bombs weren't particularly frightening, worse than the blitz and probably worse than the bombing of Germany, but certainly not out of the realms of survival.

It had changed by the early 1950s though.

Nigel Kneale in the Quatermass Memoirs said that the Quatermass Experiment, Quantermass II and Quatermass and the Pit were all allegories about the Cold War and being virtually defenceless against the atom bomb.

Then in 1957 we had the formation of CND.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

The problem is no one, not even the USAF think like that back then. Neither the nascent civilian think tanks/ academics. Also, it is highly likely that SLBM would be acquired as air-borne nuclear force too vulnerable for the UK. Given that the UK nuclear forces targeted

Also, the ongoing cost of maintaining a larger fleet, both material and personnel costs, need to be considered.

If the CVA 01/02 actuallty get built, it is highly likely that the op tempo of RN would decrease as the government struggle to keep up with ongoing operational costs without increase in revenue.

The original plan in 1960 was for five ships of what became the CVA.01 class for a one-to-one replacement of the 5 existing strike carriers.

I'm not sure, but I think this had been reduced to 3 ships by February 1966 and because of the "rule of three" (that is in peacetime you need 3 ships to have one available at all times) 3 ships of the CVA.01 type is really the minimum force. After all 3 Invincible class were built - although they were theoretically replacing the 3 Tiger class cruisers. IIRC also the CVA.01 class would be operating in pairs in wartime and 3 ships were necessary to ensure that 2 were always available in wartime conditions.

Incidentally the American requirement for 15 attack carriers was based on a requirement to have 5 of them forward deployed at all times in peacetime (3 western Pacific and 2 in the Mediterranean) and (IIRC) because in wartime they would be operating in 5 groups of 3. Furthermore the post-Vietnam requirement for 6 ASW support carriers (which wasn't met) was based on the need to have 2 forward deployed at all times (one western Pacific and one Mediterranean).

 

[Jukra]

They were.

However, "galloping technology" often ruined British long and even medium-term defence plans from 1945 to 1965.

Naturally one should not be too harsh on British or other countries leadership on issues of technology. After all, British PM's were born in 1874 and 1883 and had to adjust to things such as jets, missiles and hydrogen bombs during his lifetime, not to mention all the societal changes. I wonder if any other generation of leaders have had to show such flexibility, ever. British naval leadership had fought Battle of Atlantic 1 and 2 during their career and fixation with Battle of Atlantic, 3.0 was understandable.

Also the early atom bombs were so heavy that only heavy bombers and medium bombers could carry them. "Lightweight" atom bombs didn't become available until the late 1950s for the Americans (IIRC) and the British Red Beard atom bomb which was light enough for the Canberra to carry didn't become available until about 1962.
.

First small nuclear bomb, Mark 7 of 1600 pounds, entered service in 1952 although I don't know about the numbers. But if the spectre of hundreds or thousands of atomic bombs available for US was at sight, even as fission weapons, surely that would degrade Soviet warfighting capability fairly rapidly or at very least make striking at source far more effective method than fighting the subs at sea?

What I'm saying is, that I think there's a slight but realistic chance of POD already in late 1940's for a radical reappraisal for a possible future war, based on reports of the Soviet Navy as well as possibilities of atomic bomb production, and thus radical reappraisal for priorities of RN.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

First small nuclear bomb, Mark 7 of 1600 pounds, entered service in 1952 although I don't know about the numbers.

That's interesting because the British didn't detonate their first nuclear device until 1952 and (according to Wikipaedia - I'm on holiday in Spain so I can't check my reference books) the first Blue Danube was delivered to the RAF at the end of 1953. According to Wikipaedia Red Beard weighed 1,750 pounds and entered service in 1962, which IIRC is the correct year.

However, before that the RAF and RN might have borrowed American lightweight atom bombs. About 25 years ago I worked with someone who was on HMS Victorious in the late 1950s after her 1950-58 refit. He said he was an electrician in the atom bombs section. IIRC he told me that they used to sit on them.

He also witnessed the first landing of a Scimitar on Victorious, which went wrong because the arrester gear was set for a different type of aircraft. The wires weren't strong enough to stop the aircraft so it went over the side. The pilot drowned because neither he or the crew of the plane guard helicopter couldn't open the canopy.

 

[Cryhavoc101]

That's interesting because the British didn't detonate their first nuclear device until 1952 and (according to Wikipaedia - I'm on holiday in Spain so I can't check my reference books) the first Blue Danube was delivered to the RAF at the end of 1953. According to Wikipaedia Red Beard weighed 1,750 pounds and entered service in 1962, which IIRC is the correct year.

However, before that the RAF and RN might have borrowed American lightweight atom bombs. About 25 years ago I worked with someone who was on HMS Victorious in the late 1950s after her 1950-58 refit. He said he was an electrician in the atom bombs section. IIRC he told me that they used to sit on them.

He also witnessed the first landing of a Scimitar on Victorious, which went wrong because the arrester gear was set for a different type of aircraft. The wires weren't strong enough to stop the aircraft so it went over the side. The pilot drowned because neither he or the crew of the plane guard helicopter couldn't open the canopy.

The FAA was murdering its pilots during this period

I recall an interview with the late Major General Sir John Jeremy Moore KCB, OBE, MC & Bar - where he spoke about nearly joining the FAA but instead joining the Marines instead - and went on to say that this was a good career move as everyone he knew from that time that joined the FAA as a pilot was killed in accidents!

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

The FAA was murdering its pilots during this period

I recall an interview with the late Major General Sir John Jeremy Moore KCB, OBE, MC & Bar - where he spoke about nearly joining the FAA but instead joining the Marines instead - and went on to say that this was a good career move as everyone he knew from that time that joined the FAA as a pilot was killed in accidents!

I have heard this too and that it was a consequence of trying to operate high-performance jet aircraft from relatively small aircraft carriers.

Though I have also heard that the USN had a high accident rate at the time too so some of it might have been the nature of the beast. IIRC one of the Group Two NASA astronauts trained to be a pilot in the USN but transferred to the USAF because he didn't fancy his changes of survival as a naval aviator.

Does anyone know if it was even worse for the pilots flying jets from the rebuilt Colossus and Majestic class carriers? E.g. what was the accident rate for Sea Hawks flying from the Karel Doorman or Skyhawks when she became 25 de Mayo? Or Banshees from Bonaventure and the Sea Venoms and Skyhawks from Melbourne.

 

[Zheng He]

I have heard this too and that it was a consequence of trying to operate high-performance jet aircraft from relatively small aircraft carriers.

Though I have also heard that the USN had a high accident rate at the time too so some of it might have been the nature of the beast. IIRC one of the Group Two NASA astronauts trained to be a pilot in the USN but transferred to the USAF because he didn't fancy his changes of survival as a naval aviator.

Does anyone know if it was even worse for the pilots flying jets from the rebuilt Colossus and Majestic class carriers? E.g. what was the accident rate for Sea Hawks flying from the Karel Doorman or Skyhawks when she became 25 de Mayo? Or Banshees from Bonaventure and the Sea Venoms and Skyhawks from Melbourne.

In 1954 alone the Navy and Marine Corps lost 776 aircraft to accidents, and 536 aircrewmen and passengers were killed.

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5136&context=nwc-review

 

[Barry Bull]

The RN figured it out, so it's not impossible.



Of course, but these are marginal costs over what was spent. For example the aircraft that were to be flown from CVA01/02 were IOTL flown by the RAF, while the RN flew the Sea Harrier. ITTL the RN will keep its Phantom and Buccaneer fleets and use the money used by the RAF and Sea Harrier fleet. Similarly the money used to operate the Ark Royal, Hermes, Bulwark, Blake, Tiger and 3 I class will be used to operate CVA01/02. Any shortfalls can be met by cuts in capabilities of lower priority.

The V familes, even equipped with skybolt and flying low, are going to be sufficient for the 'Moscow Option'. UK would need to obtain SLBM which would be more expensive and difficult to get without the Nassau agreement.

What capabilities are lower priority? Maintainence of safe SLOC is arguably the most important task of RN.

 

[Barry Bull]

Naturally one should not be too harsh on British or other countries leadership on issues of technology. After all, British PM's were born in 1874 and 1883 and had to adjust to things such as jets, missiles and hydrogen bombs during his lifetime, not to mention all the societal changes. I wonder if any other generation of leaders have had to show such flexibility, ever. British naval leadership had fought Battle of Atlantic 1 and 2 during their career and fixation with Battle of Atlantic, 3.0 was understandable.

It is less about politicans, but that every tech and equipmemt R&D project has lead time which usually takes years and there is the problem that tech advanced when one's project is still developing but rendered obsolote.

The Battle of Atlantic would remain important in NATO-WP war as reinforcmemt convoys sailing from N.America would need to be escorted to UK and France safely.

 

[steamboy]

My thoughts on the matter - albeit from a while ago.

https://www.alternatehistory.com/fo...r-on-the-strength-of-the-armed-forces.442563/

An interesting idea but one that's largely not sustainable due to the UK's funds or lack thereof.

As has been said, it would be lovely to have the Warspite as a museium, but she was basically a wreck at the end of the war, the Fritz hit and the mine damage she suffered would mean that she was nearly a near TCL and to get her back into a condition to be a museium would have meant some serious work refitting her. IIRC the Rodney was utterly worn out by 1944 and was good for little more than surface bombardment. The Renown was also worn out as was Furious.

If there was the money and will then keep one of the QE's, probably the Queen Elisabeth herself. The Valiant was badly damaged in a dry dock collapse and never really returned to service, and the Malaya was exhausted. The R's, Nelsons, Renown, all the QE's would probably go to the scrappers yard and the KGVs instead would be left as the only BBs in service and joined by the Vanguard.

You'd want to scrap/sell any cruiser that isn't a Town or Colony class. The rest can be sold and scrapped.

The CVs - Scrap Furious, retire the most badly damaged AFD's, as I recall that one of them never could hit her max speed and had problems with her rudder following damage sustained in the war (I think it was the one stuck at Malta). You'd definately want to finish the Audacious class, at least 2 (Ark II and Eagle II) and maybe, maybe if you could, get a Malta done. The AFDs because of their design are not worth refitting. We saw what happened with the Victorious' refit, hugely expensive for very little actual performance.

So, keep the Implacables, at least 2 more AFD's to give you 4 decks. Retire the other two ships when the Audacious' complete and keep working on the light carriers as they were perfectly fine and were actually more flexible than the AFDs as was proven.

But the biggest problem is money or a lack of it, the UK was massively bankrupt, and there was a series of very expensive failures in government spending when it came to the armed forces, combined with the austerity of the post war period. The problems not hulls or tech, its money and the development of future weapon systems. And ensuring Duncan Sandy's gets hit by a car.

 

[Jukra]

The Battle of Atlantic would remain important in NATO-WP war as reinforcmemt convoys sailing from N.America would need to be escorted to UK and France safely.

Of course it's nice to have some units out safe at sea who can keep order in UK which has been destroyed by nuclear strikes... actually a scenario I remember reading about in some 1950's naval magazine.

 

[Marquis]

Ensuring Duncan Sandy's gets hit by a car.

Mmmm... indeed. Or getting caught in flagrante with a Muscovy Duck.

Yes, I admit a degree of wishful thinking, but I implemented a significant degree of austerity. Renown was actually in good condition, still working until the day of decomissioning.

 

[Finbarr the Fair]

As others have said, the best way to get a stronger Royal Navy post-1945 is a better long term British economy. I have some thoughts on that but it's very difficult given the structural problems it had in 1945-6.

The other core problem is the pace of technological change that outpaced the decision making process within the Admiralty and Whitehall. Plus one would need to reform the Treasury and its 'penny wise, pound foolish' accounting procedures.

With our hindsight there's a number of points where wrong paths were taken. The costly rebuild of Victorious and Hermes completion as a too small carrier. The Tiger and Blake conversions or even building them in the first place. But, this might not be obvious with only the knowledge available to the UK authorities at the time.

The sketchy "plan" I would work with would involve more drastic cuts in 1945-7 to allow a clean slate from 1950. Only plan totcomplete one Audacious (Eagle) and scrap the others on the slips. Similarly keep only Vanguard and scrap the KGVs - OK maybe the last two in reserve and KGV as a museum ship. Work to complete 3-4 Hermes to replace the older AFD carriers. Illustrious is probably not worth retaining even in reserve.

The long term plan as at 1948-9 would be 12-15 carriers available. The Implacables and perhaps Indomitable, plus Eagle, 4 Hermes, similar number of Triumphs and 3 "Maltas", to be ordered after 1950.

The Korean War would delay ordering the new carriers but accelerate the obsolescence of the light carriers and the Implacables/Indomitable.

So a possible carrier fleet entering the 1960s would be four strike carriers, 3x 1952 "Maltas," plus Eagle and four Commando or ASW carriers, from the Hermes class.

I'd expect Eagle to be phased out by the early1970s but the "Maltas" could last as long as the USN Forrestals, provided the RN could man them.

Or it felt they met its strategic needs.

Hmm, need to do some spreadsheet work on cost estimates up to the 1980s and see what the RN would have to do better than OTL to get this to work.

 

[Riain]

Skyhawks from Melbourne.

50% in 11 years.

 

[Viper91]

Find some way for Britain to make it through the war less banged up. Maybe a few minor battles go more their way. Maybe a few German U-boats get what they deserve months or years sooner and by default numerous British warships and merchant ships plus countless lives aren't lost.

Have it so that maybe they have enough money and good will in the post war world to retain a half dozen or so extra small islands or island groups in the Caribbean and Indian Ocean, a few tens or hundreds of thousands of people to protect, and thus a greater need and justification for a larger fleet.