Relatively simple, have any of the
Texas Divisionist schemes go through. Specifically having Isaac Van Zandt live longer and potentially become Governor.
I discussed the possibility of division in 1868-9 some years ago in soc.history.what-if:
***
Although on several occasions in this newsgroup we have referred to the
possibility of Texas dividing itself into several states, we have never
AFAIK considered in detail the one time when this came closest to
happening--the Texas Constitutional Convention of 1868-9, where the
"divisionists" actually had a majority. Charles W. Ramsdell explained the
situation as follows in his *Reconstruction in Texas* (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1910), pp. 212-216:
http://books.google.com/books?id=cvRYAAAAMAAJ&pg=PA212
"The proposition to divide Texas into two or three states brought about
another sharp fight that helped to widen the breach and intensify the
bitterness between the two factions ["Radicals" and "Conservatives"--DT];
for the alignment here was nearly the same as in the ab initio
controversy. [The "ab initio" doctrine was the doctrine, held by the
Radicals, that *all* acts of the Texas legislature after secession were
void; this doctrine would be rejected by the US Supreme Court in *Texas v.
White*--DT] The [Edmund J.] Davis faction favored division almost to a man
and on this issue gained over a sufficient number of A. J. Hamilton's
followers to secure a slight majority. The division question, however, was
not strictly a party issue, for both Conservatives and Radicals were to be
found on each side. It was rather sectional than political. Nor was it a
new thing; for the idea had been entertained and occasionally brought
forward from the time Texas had first become a member of the Federal
Union. The terms of her admission in 1845 had provided for a future
division into five states; and the problems at that time incident to her
vast territorial extent had kept the question alive. The lack of
railroads, except for a few short lines, inadequate means of travel and
communication, the long, harassed frontier line, the peculiar grouping of
the population, had made the problem of administration a difficult one for
the state government even before the war. Now there were additional
incentives. It was urged by many of the Radicals that the arm of the state
government was too weak to reach into the far-out districts and preserve
order, that only by a division into separate states could the people be
assured of security and peace. East Texas was then the wealthiest part of
the state and complained of bearing more than its share of the public
burdens; it was also the stronghold of the Conservatives, many of whom
were doubtful of their ability to control the whole state with the foreign
and the negro vote against them. The south and the southwest were peopled
largely by Germans and were predominantly Radical or Republican; hence
political interests also seemed to call for separation. But more potent
reasons, perhaps, in the convention of 1868, were the ambitions of
political leaders. Three states would offer more opportunities for
political advancement than one; and moreover the faction opposed to A. J.
Hamilton feared that he could not be eliminated from the control of the
Republican party in the state, which would surely mean political
subordination for themselves. If Hamilton could not be thrust out of the
leadership of the party, he might be eliminated, so far as the most of
them were concerned, by so slicing up the state as to leave him the
central region only. It was perhaps this fear of Hamilton's dominance that
led E. J. Davis, of Nueces, to come to terms with Lemuel Dale Evans, the
able Conservative from East Texas, on the matter of division. Both were
ambitious, each represented a section upon which he might confidently
reckon for support, but neither enjoyed much of a prospect for support in
sections other than his own. The southwest delegation was solid for
division and a large number of Republicans from the eastern districts
supported it also. What sort of understanding there was between them and
L. D. Evans in the event of the success of the measure is not clear, but
it is almost certain that some agreement existed.
"In addition to the certain and powerful opposition of A. J. Hamilton, the
plans of the divisionists were embarrassed by two other propositions. One
of these was the proposal submitted by Governor Pease to sell the
northwest territory to the United States; the other was the petition
brought by W. W. Mills, a young delegate from El Paso, for Texas to cede
that remote corner of her territory to the United States, provided it
should be joined with the county of Dona Ana, New Mexico, in a territorial
government.1 Neither of these propositions suited the divisionists of the
southwest, for either would subtract a substantial portion from the state
of which they dreamed. In the meantime, however, the divisionists had
secured help in another quarter. As early as December 3, 1867, Thaddeus
Stevens had introduced a resolution into the national House of
Representatives directing the reconstruction committee to enquire into the
expediency of dividing Texas into two or more states. Considerable
pressure seems to have been brought to bear at Washington--by whom, it is
difficult to say though it is easy to conjecture: for the idea cropped up
now and then during the spring.1 Just before the convention assembled,
Beaman, from the reconstruction committee of Congress, reported a bill to
divide Texas into three states. One line was to cut the state along the
San Jacinto and Trinity rivers, up to the East Fork of the Trinity and
thence to the Red river along the western boundary of Fannin County. The
other was to follow the Colorado river to the thirty-second parallel of
latitude, thence west to the Rio Grande along the northern edge of El Paso
County. The bill further provided that the Texas convention should divide
itself into three conventions representing respectively three new states,
East Texas, Texas, and South Texas.
"On June 9th, a special committee of fifteen was appointed to consider the
subject of division. The Beaman bill, still before Congress, was
telegraphed for, referred, and on June 24th, favorably reported, with a
few trifling amendments, and the request that it be recommended to
Congress for speedy action.2 An effort to get rid of the whole matter by
referring the subject of division to the legislature was unsuccessful.
Since the divisionists had a slight majority, their opponents determined
either to prevent a decisive vote by filibustering, or to divide the
forces of the three-state party. The latter manoeuver was tried first. A.
J. Hamilton introduced a substitute proposing other lines of division,
namely, to make the Brazos the boundary between East and West Texas and to
create a third state north of the thirty-second parallel of latitude. It
was hoped, not that this substitute l would really be adopted, but that it
would divide and confuse the advocates of division. It was finally voted
down.2 But Congress had not yet acted upon the Beaman bill, and until that
should be passed it was urged that the convention had no authority to pass
finally upon a subject of such paramount importance, one that had not been
contemplated by the Reconstruction Acts nor by the people of the state in
the election of the delegates. Some of the lukewarm divisionists, too,
were beginning to fear that the subject was being made paramount to the
proper work of their body, and that it was only driving further asunder
the two wings of the Republican party in Texas; and on July 16th, several
of them voted for a resolution by Thomas that no question relating to a
division of the state would thereafter be entertained unless by the
authority of Congress. It was carried, 47 to 37; the Republican vote
standing 39 to 35. Two days before adjournment an attempt was made to
bring the matter up again, but it failed. The subject was revived,
however, in the next session and precipitated a most violent conflict.
Governor Pease's proposition to sell the northwest had, in the meantime,
been quietly shelved. The El Paso cession, championed by the energetic
Mills, seemed on the point of going through, but it succumbed finally to a
combination of divisionists, chiefly from the southwest, and a few anti-
divisionists, by a vote of 38 to 32."
Anyway, the convention recessed for the remainder of the summer and
autumn. When it met again in December, according to Ramsdell, pp. 243-
250,
http://books.google.com/books?id=cvRYAAAAMAAJ&pg=PA243
"It was known before the convention assembled that the question of
division of the state would come up again. Upon this question the Davis
faction had resolved to make their fight. Ab initio appeared hopelessly
dead; but division had commanded a slight majority in the summer session
until it began to crowd out other matters, and it seemed a promising
issue. From the very start, therefore, a fight was begun to secure
reconsideration or rescission of the Thomas resolution, passed in July,
setting aside the subject. On December 10th, Newcomb of Bexar moved to
rescind. Thomas replied with another motion to the effect that the
convention would entertain nothing that did not relate to the formation of
the constitution. A trial of strength on this last resulted in its
rejection by 35 to 24. The anti-divisionists resolved, therefore, to
filibuster against all attempts to rescind the original Thomas resolution,
and when Newcomb's resolution came up next day it was met by a 'call of
the house.' Sixteen members were absent, most of whom had never reported
for this session. In a rage, Newcomb moved to adjourn sine die, and was
supported by twelve other members. Every time the resolution came up
thereafter for nearly three weeks, it was checked in the same way. Feeling
was rapidly rising. An effort of McCormick to amend the rules so as to
allow consideration of other matters pending a call was voted down by the
angry divisionists.1 Possibly foreseeing that they could not hold out
forever, the 'anti's' endeavored to secure the passage of a resolution
binding the convention to submit the question--along with the
constitution--to a popular vote. This also was voted down by the
suspicious divisionists, for fear that it might in some way embarrass them
later.2
"It was urged in extenuation of reviving the question that the members of
Congress had indicated that Texas must take the initiative before the
national legislature could act, and that the popular sentiment for
division had grown enormously since the summer session. It was argued on
the other side that the convention, was restricted solely to the powers
granted it by the Reconstruction Acts, and that these had given it no
authority whatever to consider such a question; that by the Constitution
of the United States, the matter must be passed upon by the state
legislature; and that before anything was done the people should be
allowed to vote upon it, since the creation of additional states would
entail heavy expense for duplicating buildings and offices. The
southwestern delegates, among whom were Davis, Degener, Newcomb, Varnell,
and Morgan Hamilton, were determined not to depend wholly upon the
convention and appointed a committee of seven to draft a constitution for
'West Texas,' to be submitted to Congress for approval. It does not appear
that they expected to submit it to their people first, though they
asserted that west Texas had a right to separate itself from the rest of
the state without waiting for the permission of the people in the other
parts,--a statement of the right of secession that must have sounded
strange from the lips of radical unionists. In this they seem to have
received the sanction of the divisionists of east Texas, and together they
agreed to prevent the convention from completing the constitution until it
had agreed to division. The way was opened for them on December 29, when,
a call of the house having failed, Newcomb's motion to rescind the Thomas
resolution finally came to a vote and was passed. The question now took a
sudden turn, to explain which necessitates a slight digression.
"Much had been said in the press and on the stump of the disorder in the
state, and of the hostility manifested toward radicals. Maintaining that
rebel intolerance would not permit of free discussion or a fair and free
vote, many influential Republicans were of the opinion that no general
election should be held either to vote on the constitution or for officers
under it, until the fall of 1869. On December 16, J. R. Burnett introduced
a resolution providing for the appointment of a special committee of
thirteen to enquire into and report upon the condition of the state in
this respect; and in case they found conditions unfavorable, to report
what additional legislation was necessary to effect the speedy
reorganization of a loyal civil government that would protect the people
in their lives, liberty, and property, and meet their present necessities
for special and general legislation. The resolution passed.1 Of those
appointed, eight were for division, five against it; of the latter, two
were Democrats. The report of this committee, rendered December 23, was
based upon statements of General Reynolds, Governor Pease, Bureau
officers, judicial and other civil officials, and private citizens, and
asserted that no fair and impartial election could be held at this time
and probably not until several months after the inauguration of Grant,
though it was admitted that there was general evidence of a decrease of
crime and lawlessness and of better feeling toward the government. With
regard to the additional legislation necessary, a resolution was reported
calling upon Congress to give the convention the powers of a state
legislature; provided that every act passed by the convention should be
approved by the provisional governor . before it should take effect, or
else be passed by a two-thirds vote after his veto, and that the
provisional governor should make removals and appointments of state
officers and that no other oath should be required of such officers except
that prescribed in the Reconstruction Acts for electors and the oath of
office prescribed by the state constitution. The reason assigned for
setting aside the test oath still required of all appointees, was that it
shut out many competent and loyal persons and left the offices to become
vacant or to remain in the hands of the disloyal. What relations this
anomalous government was to have with the military was not stated, but the
effect would have been virtually to supplant the district commander by the
governor. The proposition is curious as a declaration from Republicans
that the Reconstruction Acts had failed.1
"Two minority reports were made. One by Armstrong and Kirk, the two
Democrats, denied at some length the allegations of the majority with
respect to the wide extent of lawlessness and the absence of freedom of
speech and of the press,--citing against the last ten very radical papers
then flourishing in various parts of the state. The other minority report
was by James P. Newcomb, the rabid divisionist, who insisted that the
temper, loyalty, and conduct of the people living west of the Colorado
River,--in the proposed state of West Texas,--were exceptionally good, and
that those people should be allowed a separate state government, or else
that the dual form of military and civil government, which was a manifest
failure, should be replaced by a territorial government in order that the
United States might be able to maintain order and peace.
"As soon as the reports were taken up, it became evident that the majority
report was not acceptable to the Davis faction, who had no intention of
prolonging and increasing the power of Pease's administration, and who
were not so much concerned about a general election as about their project
of division. A substitute, therefore, was offered by Davis, declaring that
the extent of the territory, the conflicting sectional interests and
general disorganization rendered, in the opinion of the convention, a
division of Texas necessary; and that six commissioners elected by the
convention, one each from the northern, eastern, middle, and western
sections, and two from the state at large, should be sent to Washington to
acquaint Congress with these conditions and necessities. Nothing could
make clearer the determination of this party to force division upon the
convention as the paramount issue. For two weeks the subject was thrashed
out in a committee of the whole, consuming during that time almost
exclusive attention. On the night of January 13 the substitute was
reported from the committee, and a furious fight began to get it adopted
over the majority report. The anti-divisionists filibustered successfully
until nearly daylight.1 The next day the president wrote to General
Canby,1 explaining the impossibility of getting a vote under a 'call of
the convention' until four absent members should arrive, lamenting the
consequent waste of time, and requesting the commanding general to apply
whatever remedy he was authorized to use.
"In the meantime, the filibustering continued and the divisionists decided
to amend the rules. Under cover of making inquiry concerning the tardy
delegates, a committee was appointed to propose the necessary change and
immediately reported a new rule to the effect that only those members who
had been present within five days preceding a call should be counted. The
report came up for passage on January 16, and was promptly met by a call.
Here the president, Davis, clearly violated the rules by entertaining the
resolution anyway,--reporting the convention as full despite the four
absentees,--and hurrying it to a vote. Immediately the body was in an
uproar. The anti-divisionists saw the ground cut from under their feet by
these tactics, and three of them,--Bryant of Grayson, A. J. Hamilton, and
Cole, a Democrat,--refused to vote and were placed under arrest. The last
two agreed to vote, and Bryant resigned. The new rule was declared adopted
by a vote of 42 to 28. Thus armed against a call, the divisionists hurried
immediately to a vote on the more important measure and succeeded in
substituting Davis's resolution for the majority report of Burnett's
committee.4 It came up again for final passage on the 2Oth, and probably
in anticipation of a 'call', one anti-divisionist, Sumner, deliberately
walked out in order to prevent a vote. When the call was made and he could
not be found, the majority forthwith expelled him by a vote of 38 to 32,--
the president ruling, again in defiance of parliamentary law, that a vote
of two-thirds was not necessary to expel.1 The Davis resolution was then
finally passed, and the next day was fixed for electing the commissioners
for which it provided. Unable any longer to make use of the call, the
minority absented themselves next day and broke the quorum. On the second
day they returned and A. J. Hamilton read a protest, signed by thirty
members, against Sumner's expulsion, but the majority would not allow it
to be spread on the minutes and themselves appointed a committee to give
their own version of the affair.2 Excitement was at white heat. Attention
was now turned upon the election of the six commissioners to Washington.
The majority succeeded on the first ballot in electing, as the two
delegates at large, E. J. Davis and J. W. Flanagan. On the second ballot
for the representative from north Texas, they also won, electing Whitmore.
The minority offered no further candidates and allowed Burnett and Morgan
Hamilton to be elected from east and central Texas; but by uniting upon
Varnell, a divisionist, they beat Newcomb for the western district. The
victory of the divisionists was not without qualifications. While they
were holding back every other important measure until division could be
accomplished, every newspaper in the state, except the San Antonio
Express, was either denouncing the measure or at least refusing its
support, and the citizens of San Antonio, the proposed capital for " West
Texas," and of New Braunfels, the second largest town in that district,
declared against it in mass-meeting.1 Although in entire control of the
commission, the divisionists were weakened somewhat by the fact that in no
form or manner had the wishes of the people been consulted on this
important subject, while the action of the convention in considering it
was wholly outside the duties contemplated by the Reconstruction Acts.
Moreover, a reaction was threatened against the high-handed methods by
which the victory was won. The Austin Republican announced the next day
after the commissioners were elected that the fight was not over and that
a delegation from the other side also would go to Washington.
"Now that the troublesome question of division was out of the way, the
delegates were free to turn their attention to other things..." One of
the most important was the suffrage provisions of the new Constitution.
On this matter, ex-Governor A. J. Hamilton, who in Ramsdell's words (p.
253) opposed "any and all attempts to disfranchise the late rebels further
than was already done by the Fourteenth Amendment" narrowly prevailed over
the Radicals (who had apparently won on the issue of division.)
This of course was not the end of the matter: "Though foiled in the
convention, the radicals,--a name now enjoyed exclusively by the Davis
party,--still hoped to defeat the constitution and divide the state
through their control over the commission elected to Washington. The
moderates, or conservatives, were determined to prevent this by sending a
delegation of their own. Within less than a week after the convention
adjourned, both were on their way, and political interest was anxiously
centered upon their work at the national capital."
http://books.google.com/books?id=cvRYAAAAMAAJ&pg=PA261
In Washington, the Texas Radical memorialists argued that the new
Constitution's liberal suffrage provisions were a menace to white and
black Unionists of Texas and would bring the Rebels back into control,
aligned with nominal Republicans. "The memorialists then went on to an
argument for the division of Texas into three states, as another part of
the remedy,--urging the diversity of interests and population of the
various sections, and the fact that a majority of the convention had
endorsed the plan. However, the chief reason urged in favor of division
was that it would offer the loyalists a better chance to get entire
control, since smaller administrative divisions would be more easily
reduced to order, and a full vote of the loyal blacks could be had,
sufficient, it was believed, with the loyal whites, to carry any election.
As an alternative to immediate organization of the three states, Congress
should create three territorial districts and hold them under military
control until civil governments could be safely established....
"It soon became evident that only a few of the most extreme of the
Republican leaders in Congress looked with any favor upon the designs of
the Davis committee, and none openly espoused their cause. General
Reynolds, who had influence with Grant, was credited with declaring
'division' a ridiculous proposition; at any rate, neither congressmen nor
the Northern press took up the idea readily. Nor did the ab initio
doctrine, soon to receive its deathblow at the hands of the Supreme Court
of the United States,1 gain many adherents. They were not more successful
in the matter of suffrage, for Northern politicians had grown weary of
carrying the burden of a disfranchised South so long after the war had
ended. The general disposition was to hurry up reconstruction and get it
over with. Finding there was small chance of getting Congress to interfere
in their behalf on these points, the radical leaders fell back to the
question of postponing the election until fall, which would give them more
time to determine upon their future policy...." (Ramsdell, pp. 263-5)
Anyway, although the Radicals did succeed in getting the election
postponed and indeed succeeded in getting Davis elected Governor in late
1869, they had lost on the division of Texas (as well as on their
opposition to the new Constitution's suffrage provisions), and the
opportunity had passed.
It seems to me that the best POD would be for Congress to have passed the
Beaman bill by mid-1868. Maybe if Johnson had been convicted by the
Senate, Acting President Wade would have taken action to encourage quick
passage. As it was, the failure of Congress to take action led lukewarm
divisionists in Texas to postpone the matter until the convention
reconvened in the winter of 1868-9. This delay was fatal because their
advocacy of division thereupon became associated in Washington with their
general Radicalism and opposition to the new Texas Constitution,
especially its suffrage provisions. Once Grant was elected, Radical
sentiment declined in Washington; the prevailing view came to be that once
the Fifteenth Amendment would be ratified, there would be no further need
to disfranchise ex-Rebels--or to take other radical steps like dividing
Texas.
So let's suppose that somehow the division into three states did go
through. Consequences? One of them would be that ultimately the division
would backfire on the Radicals because Texas would become *three*
Democratic states--indeed, wouldn't this be enough to elect Tilden in
1876? (South Texas might have more Republicans than the other two states
because of its large German community, but I still think it would become a
mostly Democratic state.) And of course the effect on careers of future
Texas politicians (even if they are not butterflied out of existence) is
incalculable.
Incidentally, as an alternative to full-scale division, Mills's proposal,
only narrowly defeated, to combine El Paso with Dona Ana County, New
Mexico (which was much larger then than it is today) to form a new federal
territory is interesting:
"Dona Ana was one of the original nine counties into which the [New
Mexico] Territory was divided by the legislative act of January 9, 1852,
and its boundaries were given therein as follows: The southern boundary,
on the left bank of the Rio del Norte, is the boundary of the state of
Texas, and on the right, the dividing line between the Republic of Mexico;
on the north, the boundary of the county of Socorro; and on the east and
west, the boundaries of the Territory. By an act of January 15, 1855, all
of the Gadsden Purchase was annexed to the county, but upon the
organization of Arizona Territory, in 1861-2, it retained only that
portion within the present limits of New Mexico.
"At one time Dona Ana was anxious for a union with El Paso county, Texas,
but finally settled down to single blessedness. In 1867 her citizens, with
those of the county across the line, petitioned congress to erect a new
Territory of the districts named and call it Montezuma. They claimed that
the area of the united counties would be sufficiently large, and the
population much greater than that of most territories upon their
organization." George B. Anderson, *History of New Mexico: Its Resources
and People* (1907).
http://books.google.com/books?id=C7Q1AAAAIAAJ&pg=PA561
An eventual State of Montezuma?...
https://groups.google.com/d/msg/soc.history.what-if/H8jePs_n6n4/dOA-HoX9WTMJ
