Going off topic for a moment.... Montgomery.
To be fair to the individual, he was a product of his upbringing in that peculiar institution, the British Army.
I have read that the British army officer corps of the interwar years was an over-glorified fox hunting club, filled with the second boys of upper class families. Not good enough for business, politics or the RN, these fellows were good enough to hold commissions in that army.
The stereotype of being out of touch with the troops, with the developments within the land warfare profession and with reality in general; is a charge that the British officer corps of the 30s easily gins up, but one must remember that this was the WW I army and after that began in the 30's (Liddel Hart and J.F.C. Fuller and the experimental Motorized Regiment experiments of the late 20sand early 1930s.) to develop the concept of modern combined arms. Nevertheless, there is a germ of truth in the fuddery with which that officer corps is charged. Too many duds, too many dudes and not enough tacticians.
Montgomery was, supposedly, the commoner reaction and antidote to that effete elite problem in the 2nd World War. He was supposed to be the troops man, the trainer, the physical fitness fiend, the master planner, the detail man, the one who never went into battle unless he was certain to win. There was some stupid bet he made with Bedell Smith that involved an advance on Sfaz, Tunisia. He would take the place by a specific date and if he did, he would demand a B-17 as payment. The date was April 15, 1943. Montgomery's troops took it by April 10 after some brutal fighting, and he got his B-17. Now Bedell Smith was foolish for betting the B-17 for which Montgomery had no need nor use, but Alan Brooke, his superior, was furious at the idiotic bet and for the added friction it caused with the infuriated Americans.
That set the tone between Monty and
the people supplying him, beans, bullets and GAS.
It also revealed TO THEM the character flaws in his ability to conduct a war where his ability to deliver on promises made and not sustained would be bitterly remembered, where his incompetent preparations made would be likewise remembered, where every mistake, no matter how small and no matter how much he justified in hindsight analysis he made, would be remembered and dwelt upon.
The man cannot get a fair shake in history; it is claimed, because the British class structure and the Americans writing the history were/are against him.
They are. But upon close analysis, can it not be proved that the man brought it on himself?
Should one dwell on the planning errors that hung the British infantry up in the minefields during Lightfoot?
Should one remember that while the Americans were being mauled at Kasserine that 8th Army sat on its duff and did nothing to exploit the mistake the Germans made by weakening their southern flank?
Or how about the boundary dispute in Sicily where Montgomery took away a road from Patton on the (justifiable) excuse that he needed it for his own supply effort and to maneuver past Mount Aetna? And did he do that thing? Nope. More duffer; and now two corps were hung up instead of one.
And how about Salerno where every German in the vicinity; who could roll, walk, or crawl to the beachhead; swarmed in. What did Montgomery do when he had a golden opportunity to slam the door between them and Clark and do a Julius Caesar on them? He halted his own troops to organize, tidy up and "drink tea". He was quick to criticize Clark later for Anzio and the Alban Hills fiasco; but no-one was supposed to mention his pause during the American landings at Salerno?
One should accept at face value; Montgomery's claims that he intended the British to draw in all the German armor toward Caen during the Normandy landings; leaving the Americans free to break out and execute a right hook. Really?
What kind of a military genius looks at the French roadmap and comes up with a plan like that?
Maybe that would be a viable post facto Montgomery alibi, except for some things.
a. Nobody, German or Wallie, expected the Bocage fighting on the Allied right.
b. Goodwood. Was not even supposed to be necessary as the British/Canadians were supposed to be through Caen by D+2. And as planned, it was a banzai charge upslope into a camouflaged German artillery firesack by wall to wall British armor. Massacre reminiscent of North Africa.
c. Cobra was not even planned until well after Caen proved to be a stubborn bottleneck.
d. Cobra as executed should have bagged more Germans. There was a gap. The Americans asked for a boundary shift to stretch to reach the hard fighting Canadians who were doing their utmost; but could not quite close their half of the gap. Who nixed it? Montgomery.
Want to talk about Market Garden?
See that road?
That is a slice of the one road. Panzerfaust heaven. Ditches, marshes, embankments, and lots of close in tree cover. Might point out that meanwhile the Canadians desperately needed help to take Antwerp. They were trying. Nobody can fault THEM. Antwerp would cut 700 kilometers off the length of the Allied supply lines through France back to Normandy, because Montgomery had not reduced the channel ports as he marched up the coast. Immediate beneficiary of Antwerp's clearing would be the 21st Army Group. Try to explain that one to the military genius? The Americans tried. They even warned Montgomery that they did not have enough airlift to sustain this size assault in one go. The Dutch passed on to the British warnings about the Germans in the area. This was kicked up the line to Montgomery.
Now Montgomery is not the only one to blame. Browning, Dempsey, Horrocks, the American Brereton; plenty of fall guys; but THIS WAS MONTGOMERY'S BRAIN CHILD. It was his master "narrow thrust plan" to end the war. He had scoffed at Eisenhower's broad front operational plan as "uninmaginative warmaking". Montgomery never understood Eisenhower's rational of spreading the Germans out and not allowing them a breather or time to concentrate. Well, guess what Market Garden did, besides wrecking the British airborne? It gave the Germans the time and respite they needed to concentrate for a counterstroke.
And that brings us to The BULGE.
This was the last mistake. Not that the Americans did not walk into that one, eyes wide shut, themselves; but when Eisenhower adjusted the northern boundary and gave Montgomery authority over the northern shoulder, while Patton closed the gap from the south, Montgomery had the bad taste and the effrontery to claim that he had come in and sorted things out for them.
Considering that it was American corps and division commanders who did all the planning and execution, and except for some small late assist from British artillery and support troops at the extreme north edge of the bulge (under American command) the major fighting was done by Americans. It was somewhat sloppy and in many cases not as well executed as a Wehrmacht (or French) defense and counterattack might have been executed, but it was 100% American. It was Patton's triumph, not Montgomery's.
And yet Montgomery staged a press conference to claim it as his.
That man was despicable not only to his own army, but to his allies. If his generalship justified such a crassly politically insensitive attitude and such a monumental ego, then surely Eisenhower, Patton, Clark or even Alan Brooke have no case against him, and neither does GI Joe or Tommy.
But his generalship does not stand up. Not when objectively analyzed.
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But fair is fair... anyone want to take a crack at MacArthur?